Military Review

Operation Buffel. To the 70 anniversary of the end of the Battle of Rzhev

Operation Buffel. To the 70 anniversary of the end of the Battle of Rzhev

By the beginning of March 1943, in the situation on the Soviet-German front, significant changes occurred. The strategic initiative passed to the Soviet troops. After the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, our troops launched an offensive on many sectors of the front from Leningrad to the North Caucasus. The German command was forced to clear the Caucasus, part of their grouping retreated to the region of Rostov-on-Don, the other - to the Taman Peninsula. The Voronezh and Bryansk fronts conducted successful Ostrogozhsk-Rossoshansk and Voronezh-Kastornoye operations in the Upper Don. Soviet troops defeated the main forces of Army Group B, and liberated a large part of the Voronezh and Kursk regions. The troops of the South-Western and Southern fronts defeated the German troops in the Donbas and Rostov directions.

However, in the western sector of the front, the German command remained in the hands of the powerful Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead, which was still occupied in the 1941 year. The line of the Soviet-German front here was west of White, north-east of Rzhev, west of Yukhnov and east of Spas-Demensk. This ledge was still a potential springboard for a strike on Moscow. Therefore, in 1942, the Soviet troops repeatedly tried to eliminate it. "Rzhevskaya meat grinder" has become one of the bloodiest battles of World War II.

The Germans created the strongest defensive line on this bridgehead, which the Red Army unsuccessfully tried to break through several times. On the ledge, which had 160 km in depth and up to 200 km along the front, the German command concentrated about two-thirds of the German Army Group Center. This forced the Soviet command to keep on the Rzhev direction to 12 combined arms and 2 air armies of the Kalininsky and Western fronts, which hampered our significant forces, prevented to organize active offensive actions in other directions.

Operation Buffel (Buffalo)

In mid-January, 1943, the Soviet troops liberated the city of Velikie Luki, which increased the threat of the encirclement of the German group on the Rzhevsky ledge. The defeat of the German troops at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus also played a role. 6 February 1943 of the year, after repeated appeals from the leadership of Army Group Center and the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces General Kurt Zeitzler, Adolf Hitler gave permission to take the 9 and part of the 4 army to a previously prepared defense line, along the line Dukhovshchina - Dorogobuzh - Spas -Demensk.

This operation was called “Buffel” (it. B --ffel - buffalo), or “Buffelbevegung” - “Buffalo Movement” and “Buffelstellung” - “Buffalo Position”. Its main tasks were to level the front line in order to prevent the encirclement and defeat of the 4 and 9 armies, and the release of the divisions for reserve. The commander of the 9 Army, Colonel-General Walter Model, was appointed to be in charge of the operation "Buffalo".

The headquarters of the 9th Army prepared this operation a few months ago. The staff of the 9th Army were well aware of the danger of the stubborn defense of the Rzhevsky ledge. At any moment, enemy numerical superiority or tactical failure could lead to disaster. And the task was very large-scale, it was imperceptible for the enemy to withdraw 24 divisions, in total about 322 thousand soldiers and officers, plus a certain number of Russian collaborators, civilians. The 9th Army’s artillery and anti-tank fleet exceeded 400 guns, tank divisions had about 100 units of armored vehicles. In addition, it was necessary to ensure that the withdrawal did not turn into flight.

A special headquarters was established at 9 for the leadership of the operation. All army sappers, builders and teams of prisoners of war were subordinated to the head of the engineering service.

The plan of the operation included a large preparatory work:

- The Germans had to equip a new line of defense, prepare separate defensive positions for retreat. A new defensive line was built between Velizh and Kirov. In this area, the main infantry, artillery and anti-tank positions were urgently erected, the approaches and shelling zones were cleared. At the end of the preparatory period, each division sent a liaison team under the command of one of the senior liaison officers and sappers to check the area allocated to it. In each division, small working parties were created, mainly from the rear men and vacationers. These parties had to check everything and take responsibility for the new line of defense.

- Clear the army more than 100 km in depth;

- To facilitate the evacuation of troops and weapons, build a new 200 km highway and 600 km road for sledges and horse-drawn vehicles.

- Evacuate military equipment, economic good (machines, tools, grain, livestock, etc.). In particular, artillery guns, which could not be removed using horse-drawn and motorized vehicles, were delivered to a new line of defense by rail. The guns were partially dismantled. At the forefront, they tried to leave only captured guns that were not a pity to throw and destroy during the retreat. In addition, all food supplies were removed from the population. Many settlements were destroyed, wells were poisoned. The model used the scorched earth tactics. Therefore, the USSR declared the general a war criminal.

- Take out for the new defensive line more than 60 thousand civilians. Soviet citizens were sent to forced labor to build defensive lines. In addition, they wanted to avoid sabotage and sabotage during the preparatory period of the operation and the operation itself. The model ordered the evacuation of the entire male population of military age from the Rzhevsky bulge.

- It was ordered to collapse, so as not to get the enemy, 1000 km of railway track and 1300 km of wires, and also to lay 450 km of cable lines. In addition, military and civilian objects were subject to mining and liquidation.

- 9-I army before the withdrawal of troops conducted a large-scale anti-partisan operation. Although the Rzhevsky salient was saturated with German troops, a significant number of Red Army soldiers were still hiding in wooded and swampy areas, who were cut off and lost during various offensives of the Soviet army. So, in February 1943, the 9 Army Intelligence reported that, up to 12, thousands of Soviet soldiers could strike at the retreating German columns. Therefore, parts of the 39 tank corps conducted a 2 weekly sweep of suspicious areas. Combinations of the SS cavalry division, four army divisions, small SS units, police and collaborators were also attracted to the operation. According to the reports, 3 of thousands of “partisans” were destroyed (many were unarmed, therefore their belonging to organized resistance is doubtful). 16 small-caliber guns, 17 mortars, 9 anti-tank guns, 61 machine guns and other weapons were found.

A typical case of fighting “partisans” is told by the corporal of the 4 Panzer Division: “... our patrol detained the old man and the 6-year-old boy with a supply of salt and potatoes. They said that they were going to fish ... We did not hold them for long and almost immediately released them. To heaven. Personally, I was not lucky enough to shoot someone, but I will do it with a smile ”(Newton S. Hitler’s Fireman - Field Marshal Model. M., 2007).

The preparatory activities tried to be carried out in secret. So, loading of railway echelons and evacuation of the population and weapons, tried to carry out at night. By order of the Model, it was forbidden to use the name of the operation in telephone conversations. 28 February 1943, the commander of the 9 Army, designated the start of Operation Buffalo on the 19 of the March 1 watch. The rearguard had to leave the leading positions and Rzhev in the 18 of the 2 hours of March.

When the start date for the withdrawal of troops approached, the special headquarters divided the rear of the 9 Army into three large sectors. The headquarters was also divided into three divisions. Each unit had to control all movements of transport and foot columns. The headquarters of each sector was headed by the commander of an infantry regiment, and engineers, artillery officers, and communications operators were subordinate to him. Everyone had their own job site. Corps and divisional commanders received tough orders to submit to the sector headquarters.

Course of operation

In 19 hours 1 March 1943, the German troops began to retreat to the previously prepared positions. At the front line, only the rear guard troops remained. In the evening of March 2 the Germans left Rzhev. Before the sapper left, they destroyed the bridge across the Volga.

5 - 7 March The Germans held a defensive line along the Sychevka - Bely line. In the forests of Sychevka, despite the anti-partisan operation, the Wehrmacht encountered active resistance from the partisans who attacked the retreating enemy columns, and also destroyed the telephone lines. March 8 Wehrmacht left Sychevka, March 10 - White, and March 12 - Vyazma. By March 14, the main forces of the German army were withdrawn to the Buffel position. 9-I army retreated without serious losses and retained almost all the equipment. In combat contact with the Soviet advanced units entered only cover units.

In the middle of March a thaw began, which slowed down the movement of German troops. The final evacuation of the German forces was completed on March 30 of 1943. In addition, in the second half of March, the Wehrmacht successfully repelled the attacks of the 1 and 5 of the Soviet tank corps, which attempted to surround the enemy in the area of ​​Spas-Demensk and Yelnya.

Actions of the Red Army

The Soviet command was also not asleep and was developing plans to eliminate the enemy grouping. 6 February 1943 of the Year The Supreme Command issued directive No. 30043, where it was intended to “cut off” the Rzhevsky bulge, with the release of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy. The main forces of Army Group "Center" wanted to surround and destroy. The headquarters decided to conduct an Rzhev-Vyazma offensive operation in March 1943. The forces of two fronts were supposed to take part in the operation: Kalininsky (commander Maxim Purkaev) - 22, 39, 41 and 43, 3 and Western Army (Commander Vasily Sokolovsky) - 5 , 10-I, 20-I, 30-I, 31-I, 33-I, 49-I and 50-I armies, 1-I air army. The total number of troops - about 870 thousand people.

February 18 and February 23 intelligence of the Western and Kalinin fronts reported on the preparatory work in the German rear. Soviet intelligence officers found that the German troops began to retreat to the west, heavy artillery pulling closer to the roads, and fortifications are preparing to undermine. Despite intelligence reports, the Soviet command was unable to respond promptly to the retreat of the German forces. Only in 14: 30 2 of March, the commander of the 30 army Vladimir Kolpakchi, having received data from the army intelligence on the withdrawal of German troops, ordered the army to go on the offensive. A little later, on the same day, the directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 30062 appeared, where the formations of the Kalinin and Western fronts were ordered to immediately begin the pursuit of the Nazi troops.

In the morning of March 3, without a fight, the Soviet troops occupied Rzhev. March 4, Soviet soldiers liberated Olenino, March 5 - Gzhatsk, March 8 - Sychevka, March 10 - White, and March 12 - Vyazma. The offensive of the Soviet troops was complicated by minefields, destroyed communications, well-prepared defensive positions of the enemy, which kept the rearguard troops. As a result, the rate of movement of the Red Army was low - 6-7 km per day.

In the second half of March, 1943 and 1 tank corps tried to surround the German forces in the area of ​​Spas-Demensk and Yelnya. The command of the Western Front accepted the withdrawal of the troops of the “Center” group to a new frontier for the weakness of the enemy, and tried to build on the success without thinking through all the details of the operation and without making appropriate preparations. Attacks of the 5 Army, reinforced by the 49 and 1 tank corps and the 5 artillery division, were thrown on the offensive. However, the tank corps and artillery division were not fully staffed, the command could not establish their combat interaction between themselves and parts of the 14 army.

In addition, the enemy has already organized a powerful defense. So, before the front of the 1 tank corps defended 4 infantry divisions (in two echelons). German positions were saturated with firing means, including mobile firing points - tanks. The Soviet troops met a developed system of engineering and defense facilities, which included trenches, pillboxes, dugouts, escarpments and rubble. The offensive made it difficult to start the thaw.

Therefore, the offensive developed under the unfavorable scenario for the Soviet troops. Soviet tank brigades with submachine-gunners from motorized rifle battalions mounted on tanks went into the attack. But tank units, deprived of artillery support, suffered heavy losses. They made their way into the depths of the German positions, capturing the planned positions, but German artillery cut off the Soviet infantry that followed the tanks. Then the German artillery brought down a blow on the tanks that had come out ahead, and by the end of the day they were forced to retreat to their former positions. The 14 Artillery Division did not have projectiles to fight the counter-battery with the German artillery. Thus, the determination and dedication of tankers, their offensive outburst and initial successes were negated by the lack of adequate support from rifle and artillery formations.

But after several days of stubborn fighting, the Soviet troops suffered significant losses. The offensive was stopped. March 22 The Red Army reached the line Dukhovshchina-Dorogobuzh-Spas-Demensk, where the main forces of Army Group Center were entrenched. Having met the powerful defenses of the enemy, as well as the withdrawal of troops from the supply bases, which reduced the supply of ammunition and food, the Red Army completed the offensive by March 31.


- The German command has solved the tasks. The troops were successfully redeployed to pre-prepared positions. The Wehrmacht lost more than 15 thousand people killed, wounded and missing. For use in other areas were released: 1 army headquarters, 4 corps headquarters, 15 infantry, 2 motorized, 3 tank and 1 cavalry divisions. Hitler and OKH had the opportunity to use these forces to conduct a major offensive operation in order to intercept a strategic initiative.

- The Rzhevsky bulge was liquidated, which was a danger to Moscow. The front line was reduced from 530 to 200 km. Soviet troops liberated Rzhev, Sychevka, Gzhatsk, Bely, Vyazma. The Wehrmacht was moved away from the Soviet capital on 100 — 120 km. At the same time, the Red Army suffered heavy losses in attempts to disrupt the systematic withdrawal of German troops and in battles with German cover units: more than 138 thousand people (of which about 39 thousand dead). However, the Soviet command, like the German, was able to withdraw some of its forces to the reserve.

Thus ended one of the bloodiest and fierce battles of the Great Patriotic War - the Battle of Rzhev.
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  1. pinecone
    pinecone 21 March 2013 08: 59 New
    Interesting details of the planning and implementation of the operation to withdraw troops. .
    I did not like the inserts from translated texts, such as "economic goods" and "workers' parties". ...
    1. hommer
      hommer 21 March 2013 10: 50 New
      Quote: pinecone
      Interesting details of the planning and implementation of the operation to withdraw troops.

      We fought with professionals of the highest level. The headquarters culture of the Germans has always been almost a reference.
      The more magnificent is the feat of our grandfathers who managed to win!
      A deep bow to them from us all!
  2. Prometey
    Prometey 21 March 2013 09: 13 New
    One of the main meanings of the Battle of Rzhev (by the way, in Soviet times, they stubbornly refused to recognize it as a battle) was the completion of the defeat of Paulus's army at Stalingrad. The Rzhev operation did not allow the Wehrmacht to transfer reinforcements from the Center grouping to Stalingrad.
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 21 March 2013 11: 53 New
      It is poorly understood when the "diversion forces" in the "auxiliary direction" exceed the main forces in the direction of impact of the main operation. The "Marshal of Victory" should have secretly deployed troops arriving in the Rzhev direction, at least partially, towards Stalingrad. There would have been a chance to "lock up" the Germans in the North Caucasus.
      As a result, the Germans simply squeezed out of the Rzhev ledge.
      The same thing happened in the North Caucasus.
      1. Kubanets
        Kubanets 21 March 2013 19: 54 New
        At the time, squeezing was efficient and less costly. The encirclement at Stalingrad showed that it is possible to encircle but also to destroy. Can you imagine the consequences of the "locking" of 1 Kleist's tank army in the North Caucasus with its steady supply from the Crimea? Hence the "incomprehensible" trampling of the 2nd Guards Army of Malinovsky's army in front of Bataysky neck. Let us get out. And do not forget the economic factor: the sowing was suitable and the North Caucasian steppes were necessary for further feeding the army
      2. maxvet
        maxvet 21 March 2013 19: 56 New
        you read about the secrecy of the preparation of Operation Mars, you will be greatly surprised
        1. Kubanets
          Kubanets 21 March 2013 21: 16 New
          Read . Normal demonstration in order to distract attention from the direction of the main blow
          1. vitya29111973
            vitya29111973 24 March 2013 03: 48 New
            As for the demonstration, the troops more than doubled, the tanks more than tripled - the offensive was scheduled on November 25.11. and operation "uranium" on 19.11. Or the diversion started later than the main laughing the first time in the history of wars. It’s just that Comrade Zhukov has prosralized the offensive under Mozka, and everything immediately falls into place.
  3. maxvet
    maxvet 21 March 2013 10: 51 New
    This meaning can be said as a side-goal of "Mars" was the same as that of "Uranus" to crush the ledge, only Romanians broke through at Stalingrad, and the Germans had to be near Rzhev, and you are right.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 21 March 2013 13: 56 New
      Quote: maxvet
      This meaning can be said to be a collateral - the goal of "Mars" was the same as that of "Uranus" to destroy the ledge ...

      There is an opinion (Sudoplatov, Gareev) that information about Mars was leaked to the enemy as a result of a radio game.
      In general, a picture with many attacks on a wide front demonstrates a desire to tie the maximum amount of enemy forces.
      The Germans definitely did not expect "Uranus". And there the picture is different - classic Cannes, with a concentration on the flanks.
      1. maxvet
        maxvet 21 March 2013 16: 12 New
        I heard such that Zhukov tried to repeat Brusilov's offensive, accordingly reworking it, the same strikes on diverging ones, it did not work out very well and Zhukov did not repeat this anymore, and Uranus seemed to be expected, but not of such strength and scale, the Germans did not believe that ours were on such capable, and even with a breakthrough, they believed from the experience of Demyansk that they could provide for their encircled, but our intelligence also incorrectly estimated the number of Germans at Stalingrad - they thought they would encircle about 80 thousand Germans, but it turned out to be about 300, I wonder if the German forces would be appreciated would you have decided on such a daring operation?
      2. stalkerwalker
        stalkerwalker 21 March 2013 18: 11 New
        Damn yourself, leaked ....! The people were laid unnecessarily ... Add the loss of winter 1941-1942 gg
      3. Kaa
        Kaa 22 March 2013 05: 03 New
        Quote: BigRiver
        There is an opinion (Sudoplatov, Gareev) that information about Mars was leaked to the enemy as a result of a radio game

        Quote: Prometey
        The Rzhev operation did not allow the Wehrmacht to transfer reinforcements from the Center grouping to Stalingrad.

        "" As for the brechology that the operation "Mars" (Rzhevsko-Sychevskaya, November 25 - December 20, 1942) was the largest defeat of Zhukov, it was divorced by the modern American researcher D. Glantz. Which, however, is not surprising - for that he is a Yankee, so as not to understand the essence of what he writes. ... As S. Gerasimova, one of the leading specialists in the history of these operations, notes in her book "Rzhev 42. Positional massacre" (M., 2007), "in the domestic historical literature, in the mass consciousness of the battle in the region of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge in summer, in the fall and in the winter of 1942 they helped the actions of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad. It is interesting that the Germans also said that they were defending Rzhev in order to achieve victory in the south. The task of both sides at Rzhev was to pin down the enemy forces and not allow them to be transferred to the south, near Stalingrad, to the Caucasus direction. ... For the entire time of the battle, German formations and units transferred to the center of the Eastern Front were withdrawn not only from the south, but also from other directions, which for some reason is forgotten ”[1]. But the most magnificent summary of the military essence of these operations, especially in 1942, was summed up by the famous historian D.M. The projector, who emphasized that during these operations, the troops of Army Group Center were for a long time excluded from the general balance of the fascist strategy! [2]
        So that was the whole essence of Stalin’s strategy for 1942. The Rzhev operations were one of the largest contributions of Soviet soldiers and officers who fought on this front, the military command and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief personally to the Great Victory, the victorious march for which not only truly began from the banks of the Volga and the foothills of the Caucasus, but also under our own artillery cannonade on the Rzhevsky direction. . .. And for this, he needed to forge the troops of the GA Center in the Rzhev direction. . At the direction of Stalin, intelligence (NKVD) "helped" the Germans two weeks before Zhukov arrived in this direction. “Helped” in the sense that it brought to their attention information that, starting from November 15, 1942, the Soviet command would launch an offensive in this direction. This part of the operational game “Monastery” (described in Sudoplatov’s memoirs) was carried out back in 1941 by our Heine agent, who was introduced into the Abwehr agent network — he was Alexander Demyanov (in the abwehr he was listed under the pseudonym “Max”).
        Stalin so stubbornly played the card of the imaginary significance of the operation “Mars”, that for decades ahead he was mislead by all. Including the following. Despite the fact that the “Mars operation” just like an offensive crashed, but succeeded as a restraining 1/6 part of the Wehrmacht forces on the Eastern Front and therefore played one of the decisive roles in our Victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin made Zhukov to Marshals Soviet Union. The first of the commanders of that time. It is possible that Zhukov himself was perplexed - for what ?! It can hardly be explained by anything other than these perplexities that he was not inclined to spread about Operation Mars, and official Soviet history followed the same “tactics”.
        1. stalkerwalker
          stalkerwalker 22 March 2013 10: 47 New
          I repeat ...
          The losses are incomparable with the "success" in Operation Mars ...
          I am more than sure that the "marshal of victory" was "pulling the blanket over himself" in the process of preparing and carrying out offensive actions in the Rzhev-Sychev area (Stalin believed in his promises - a fairly successful counteroffensive near Moscow had just ended).
          But since the "bogey" of the Red Army victories was required, G. Zhukov always found a place "in the orchestra"
          But the guy was so skidded that already in 1946 he fell into disgrace, and then downward.
        2. maxvet
          maxvet 22 March 2013 14: 14 New
          I heard that the tag "Max" in the Abwehr was put on messages received from the Sofia radio station of the Abwehr
        3. vitya29111973
          vitya29111973 April 3 2013 21: 15 New
          dear comrade, if that is so, why does the Russian leadership keep the plan of operation Mars and even the won Uranus under seven locks. Yes, because they went as a tandem and the main one was Mars and distracting Uranus !!! Just Uranus was carried out by military generals Rokosovsky and Vatutin, and Mars was a marshal from the victory of Zhukov. And since when, twice as many troops were thrown at a distraction operation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  4. Goldmitro
    Goldmitro 21 March 2013 11: 16 New
    <<< This is how one of the bloodiest and fierce battles of the Great Patriotic War ended - the Battle of Rzhev. >>>
    Less and less white spots remain in the Second World War. The article objectively describes the final stage of the Rzhev battle, which they do not like to remember once again, because as one of the participants of the Rzhev battle wrote, the whole truth about this longest and bloody battle of the Second World War will be written when there are no those who commanded in those tragic events. The reason is quite understandable - our army, all its structures from ordinary to commanders of all levels at that moment were just learning the science of VICTORY, studying on the battlefield in battles with the world’s strongest army at that time, which didn’t forgive any mistakes to either soldiers or commanders, actions which, of course, were not always successful. So a huge price had to be paid for this science (as a result, our losses in this battle amounted to about 2 million people.). These events make it possible to more clearly imagine what our soldier and commanders had to go through, make their crushing VICTORY over this gigantic military machine of Western civilization more significant and majestic as a result of which the POWER OF Nazism was broken! ETERNAL MEMORY to our fallen heroes!

    1. vladimirZ
      vladimirZ 21 March 2013 18: 06 New
      Who is interested in the Battle of Rzhev read "Vanka company commander" Alexander Shumilin, comfrey from the front line, company commander, officer, passed this bloody battle since September 1941 directly in the advanced trenches of the fighting forces.
      In an unpublished autobiographical book by Alysander Ilyich Shumilin, You will learn the terrible truth of war on the front line, which is not found in any of the books about the war. The truth that we all need to know and always remember, so that God forbid it does not happen again. But we, unfortunately, do not remember kinship, again and again we are stepping on the same rake.
      The book is published on the website
      Eternal Glory to those who died for our Motherland, who did not return from that brutal Great Patriotic War!
      1. Kubanets
        Kubanets 21 March 2013 22: 18 New
        Read. The double impression of the read. I do not want to encroach on Shumilin’s bright memory, but there are, to put it mildly, inaccuracies. vladimir I invite to discussion
        1. vladimirZ
          vladimirZ 22 March 2013 11: 08 New
          "Kubanets", said A, then keep talking to B.
          Only what contradictions can there be in the memoirs of a War veteran who described what happened to him and his soldiers after more than 30 years. The most emotional events remained in the memory of "Vanka of the company": death, injuries, hunger, the severity of trench life, but if there were so many of them, they constantly remind him of certain events that the author wanted to convey to his descendants.
          Captain Shumilin A.I. he didn’t fight at headquarters, he didn’t keep headquarters documentation, he tried to reflect everything that remained in his memory on the pages of his book.
          And the fact that the text is repeated or, rather, the selection of words that would most clearly express the picture of what is happening, the book is unfinished by the author. The author simply did not have time to literally process the material presented - he died, excuse him, the veteran’s heart could not stand it.
          The harsh Truth of the current events did not need the authorities adjacent, it ran counter to the "stories of the Great Patriotic War", which were written by such historians as the above-mentioned "political instructor", "staff worker", general from history Zhilin.
          The book was put on the Internet by the son of a veteran, thank him very much for that. He exhibited and asked: who can, help literary modify the book for publication in print.
          The value of the book by A.I. Shumilin in the piousness of the described events of the life of a simple soldier in the trench, the stupidity of individual higher commanders, the great feat of a simple soldier who was starving, freezing on the bare cold ground in the trench, "on the front end", but continued to fight for his homeland, for you and me, and did not return from that fiery "front end", remained there until now unburied, in many cases "lost without knowing."
          You will forgive Alexander Ilyich Shumilin's "company commander" for this.
  5. Vladimirets
    Vladimirets 21 March 2013 11: 40 New
    "I am killed under Rzhev,
    In an unchanged swamp,
    In the fifth company, on the left,
    With a cruel raid.
    Bequeathed to that life
    You are happy to be
    And my homeland homeland
    With honor to continue to serve.
    To grieve proudly
    Do not bend your head,
    Rejoicing - Not Boasting
    In the hour of victory itself.
    And take care of her holy
    Brothers, your happiness -
    In memory of a warrior-brother,
    That he died for her. "
    A.T. Tvardovsky "I was killed near Rzhev"

    Eternal memory to our soldiers.
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 21 March 2013 11: 55 New
      Thank you.
      I remember these lines from childhood ...
    2. ikrut
      ikrut 22 March 2013 03: 10 New
      THANKS for the poetry. These verses need to be learned by heart at school. As we once learned excerpts from "Vasily Terkin"
  6. xan
    xan 21 March 2013 18: 22 New
    It’s not yet time to win with skill
    Lacked operational skill.
  7. Avenger711
    Avenger711 21 March 2013 22: 24 New
    About 15 thousand German total losses thanks neighing. It remains only to find out what the hell they are at a loss ratio of 1:14 completely spent 45 million by the 20th year of the recruiting resource and as a result lost the war completely.
    1. ikrut
      ikrut 22 March 2013 03: 11 New
      Quote: Avenger711
      About 15 thousand German total losses thanks neighing.

      This, apparently, it was only about losses during the withdrawal of troops in this operation.
  8. Valter
    Valter 23 March 2013 16: 20 New
  9. Valter
    Valter 23 March 2013 16: 21 New
    [media = http: // v = Ft6CL60jrSA]
  10. Valter
    Valter 23 March 2013 16: 22 New
  11. Valter
    Valter 23 March 2013 16: 25 New
    Rzhev: the unknown battle of George Zhukov
  12. gora1960
    gora1960 April 12 2013 11: 48 New
    When I was teaching history, even at the institute about Rzhev through gritted teeth, fights of local importance. You learn half the truth - the hair on your head is moving. And all under the guidance of the unforgettable and ingenious Zhukov.