Where did the electrification of railways of the second five-year plan go?
Many railways in the USSR before the war could have looked like this
Would you like some dark Soviet secrets in the new year? Of course, there are some. Not long ago I was looking through the first volume of the publication “The Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR (1933-1937)”, and the plan for the electrification of railways, envisaged for the second five-year plan, caught my eye.
The Great Plan
The second five-year plan envisaged a radical reconstruction of railway transport in order to create significant reserves of throughput and carrying capacity. Two methods of reconstruction were envisaged: the transfer of a number of lines from steam to electric or diesel traction, as well as the introduction of powerful steam locomotives and heavy-duty wagons.
The USSR NKPS has always been a recipient of significant capital investment, and for the second five-year plan the People's Commissariat was allocated 18,7 billion rubles, including 10,12 billion rubles for existing lines and 2,67 billion rubles for new construction. The concentration of work on existing lines included strengthening the track superstructure, in particular the re-laying of tracks with the laying of type 1A rails (R-38 according to the modern classification; 38,5 kg per linear meter or 482 kg in a 12,5-meter-long rail), as well as the laying of crushed stone ballast.
But the most important thing was the electrification of railways. The plan envisaged the commissioning of 4306 km of main and 579 km of suburban and resort electrified railways. The USSR was to overtake the USA, which had 1931 km of electrified railways in 3600.
The first to be electrified were the roads with a difficult profile, i.e. large slopes. The Transcaucasian Railway was in first place. Almost all the railways in Georgia (then — ZSFSR) were to be electrified. Then the roads with a mountain profile in the Urals were to be electrified.
An example of a highway with a difficult profile. Even in this photo you can see what a decent slope it is
Donbass, Kuzbass, and the line connecting Donbass with Stalingrad were also electrified. Preparations were to begin for the electrification of the Trans-Siberian Railway on the Omsk-Novosibirsk-Belovo section.
This plan was decent, although it fit into a relatively small table:
Azov-Black Sea line - 127 km
ZSFSR - 705 km
Ural - 1359 km
Kuzbass - 546 km
Siberian line - 627 km
Murmansk railway - 467 km
Total number of mainline railways: 6046 km
including in the second five-year period - 4306 km
Moscow junction - 330 km
Leningradsky junction - 172 km
Kharkiv junction - 66 km
Resort lines - 104 km
Total suburban and resort lines - 672 km
including in the second five-year period - 579 km
The total cost of the work was estimated at 751 million rubles, including 543 million rubles for lines introduced in the second five-year period.
By the standards of capital investments of the second five-year plan, even individual capital investments in railways are not much.
Scheme of electrification of lines as it should have been. The scheme does not claim to be absolutely accurate, it is more important to grasp the general picture
33% of the plan
Many historians constantly repeat that "you need to read documents." I, on the basis of my experience, believe that in order to read documents, you must first acquire solid experience in the knowledge and understanding of the period whose documents are being studied. In relation to stories Stalin's industrialization - extensive knowledge and deep understanding of the economy of that time. Otherwise, many things in the documents cannot be read or even discerned. Without knowledge, the numbers "don't stick" and remain meaningless.
Hundreds, if not thousands of researchers have read the second five-year plan and the tables attached to it. But how many have “hooked” on this table of electrified railway lines, how many have realized that something is wrong here?
There's not much here. Personally, I remembered that the electrification of the Trans-Siberian Railway began in the mid-1950s, and the plan to electrify a decent section of the Trans-Siberian Railway in the second five-year plan looks strange. What happened so that this plan, the benefits of which probably do not need to be proven, was not implemented?
But first, the scale of the problem. A search of the RSL catalogue showed that in the first half of the 1930s, a lot of specialized literature on railway electrification was published. Up until 1936. And from 1937 onwards, it was as if it was cut off. There was nothing at all. This is an interesting, suggestive observation.
Without the opportunity to conduct a deep study of the materials, I still found an interesting publication from 1939, which gave the state of railway electrification at the end of the second five-year plan: "Development of Railways". Not a report document, but still.
It states that in the first five-year plan there were 163 km of electrified railways, and in the second it became 1632 km. Or 33,4% of the original plan.
Of the "Dnieper ring" and the lines connecting Kharkov, Rostov and Stalingrad, only two lines remained to Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. The Ural line was cut in half. In Georgia, only the main line was electrified, but without approaches to the ports of Batumi and Poti. Lines in Siberia and on the Kola Peninsula were cut.
Scheme of electrified lines in 1939
In this configuration, the electrification plan lost much of its economic sense. For example, the road system connecting the Donbass with nearby industrial centers was clearly intended to save coal in the internal transportation of this economic region. Steam locomotives needed high-quality coal, while electric locomotives could be powered by state district power plants using low-value grades of coal or even waste, such as coal dust.
But the main thing, in my opinion, is that the electrified lines were initially planned so that in the third, maximum fourth five-year period, the backbone of rail transport would be created in the form of the main electrified highways. Kharkov - Moscow - Leningrad - Petrozavodsk - Murmansk; Stalingrad - Saratov - Kuibyshev - Ufa; Chelyabinsk - Omsk. There would be two main lines crossing the country from north to south and from west to east.
In addition, it was possible to electrify the road from Rostov to Samtredia, adding Georgia to the main line from north to south. It was also planned to build an electrified line across the Main Caucasus Range.
But then it didn't happen. And it's completely unclear why. I don't even know what to think. It was clearly someone's political decision, which effectively cancelled the implementation of the railway electrification plan, which had already been included in the second five-year plan and actually had the force of a state plan. Despite the obvious economic benefits of railway electrification, which was the "highlight of the program" in Lenin's GOELRO plan, and despite the broadest opening prospects.
The first Soviet electric locomotive
Who cancelled the plan?
In the same book, “Railway Development” of 1939, there was rather little talk about the fight against sabotage in the People’s Commissariat of Railways, in particular with the “limiters” (that was the name for the specialists who claimed that the railways had exhausted their technical and economic reserves and were working at the limit), the main hero of which was People’s Commissar L. M. Kaganovich. In particular, the fight was around fuel. In the autumn of 1936, measures were taken to regulate the fuel regime, since it turned out that a large amount of oil fuel and valuable coals were being burned. There was a discussion about the possibility of using fuel mixtures using lean and local coals.
L. M. Kaganovich talks with Stakhanovite railway workers
Kaganovich eventually defeated everyone, but, as we can see, one of the consequences was the virtual disappearance of railway electrification from the immediate plans.
And here many ambiguities arise. Firstly, did not Kaganovich understand the advantages of electric locomotives over steam locomotives, in particular in the fuel issue that worried him so much? Secondly, steam locomotive traction does not particularly contradict electric traction, and steam locomotives can run on electrified tracks. Moreover, it is possible to make a hybrid, as was done in Switzerland out of necessity, when a steam locomotive is equipped with electric heaters built into the boiler and a current collector. This could have been a completely reasonable measure to depreciate the existing fleet of steam locomotives. Thirdly, what is the point of leaving such a "tail" of the plans for the electrification of railways, and what is the point of cutting the state plan itself, even for the sake of saving about 300 million rubles?
No definite answers to these and other questions can be given yet. But a definite and specific answer is needed, preferably leading to the person who made the decision. Most likely, to Kaganovich, but this is far from proven.
Therefore, when, how and under what circumstances the plan for electrification of railways was abandoned during the years of the second five-year plan is still a big and interesting question, probably with a taste of a possible discovery.
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