Storming Budapest
Machine gunners of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in street battles for Budapest
General situation
During October 1944, the Red Army troops during the Debrecen operation occupied about a third of the territory of Hungary and created the prerequisites for an attack on Budapest (The brutal battle for Hungary).
The Headquarters decided to continue the offensive with the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts (UF) without a pause, although the front commander Malinovsky asked to wait, the army had to be restored after the fierce battles. At the same time, the special importance of the Hungarian capital was taken into account, in which more than half of Hungary's industry was concentrated.
The operational and strategic situation was favorable. The main forces of Army Group South (18 German and 20 Hungarian divisions) were operating north of Budapest, in the Nyíregyháza-Miskolc area. The German command believed that the northeastern approaches to Budapest needed to be covered first. The southeastern approaches were covered only by the 3rd Hungarian Army, weakened in battle, reinforced by one tank and one motorized German division. The operational density of the troops of the "South" group here was 2 times lower.
A Hungarian soldier smokes with a member of a machine gun crew from the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" near a Pz.Kpfw VI Ausf. B "Tiger II" tank from the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion. October 1944.
Therefore, the Soviet Headquarters ordered the 2nd UF headquarters to go on the offensive in the central, Budapest direction. There was no time left to regroup forces. The strike group of the 2nd UF under the command of Marshal Malinovsky (Shlemin's 46th Army, reinforced by the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps, Shumilov's 7th Guards Army, Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army) went on the offensive on October 29-30.
The main attack on Kecskemét-Budapest was carried out by the 46th Army, reinforced by the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps, which was transferred from the reserve (more than 300 tanks and self-propelled guns). The offensive was supported from the air by the 5th Air Army. The auxiliary attack was carried out by the 7th Guards Army from the Szolnok region with the aim of forcing the Tisza and capturing a bridgehead. The remaining troops advanced on Miskolc to tie down enemy troops and prevent them from being transferred to the Budapest region.
The troops of the 3rd UV continued to regroup and concentrate their main forces in the Yugoslav Banat, while the advanced forces seized bridgeheads on the right bank of the Danube in Hungary. At the same time, the troops of the 4th UV launched an offensive in Czechoslovakia, which contributed to the development of the Budapest operation.
The operation involved 39 rifle, 9 cavalry, 4 airborne divisions, 4 mechanized and 2 tank corps and other units. In total, more than 700 thousand people.
To Budapest
The enemy had a number of strongly fortified defensive lines and city outskirts on the approaches to Budapest, which rested their flanks on the Danube south and north of the city. The defensive line "Margarita" was prepared southwest of the capital - along the line of lakes Balaton and Velence, to the bend of the Danube near the city of Vac and further along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border.
But the enemy did not have large forces in the Budapest area at first. Thus, 46 Hungarian divisions defended themselves in the breakthrough zone of the Soviet 6th Army (3 divisions). The German 24th Panzer Division was in reserve.
The enemy did not expect a blow to Budapest. The offensive of the left wing of the 2nd UF began on October 29 and developed successfully. Divisions of Shlemin's army broke through the defense of the 3rd Hungarian Army. 400 tanks of the 2nd, and then the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps were thrown into the breach. By November 2, Soviet tanks were 15 km from the Hungarian capital.
However, the Russians were unable to break into Budapest immediately. The enemy managed to regroup its forces. The German command urgently transferred 3 tank and 1 motorized divisions from the Miskolc area. The Nazis occupied the first line of defense of the capital district and stopped the advance of Soviet tanks in a stubborn battle.
The Germans were able to stop the Russian breakthrough and transfer the battle to a positional fight. When the infantry arrived, it was too late to storm the city from the south. The Nazis managed to organize a defense. However, it was dangerous to attack in the narrow southern sector. The right flank of the strike group was under threat of an enemy counterattack from the northeast. The 7th Guards Army was unable to break through the enemy defenses on the move.
Indeed, on November 5, Kirchner's German tank group launched a flank attack on the right wing of Schloemin's army. The Nazis advanced 20 km and cut off the Kecskemet-Budapest road. It took the Soviet troops 2 days to restore the situation.
Meanwhile, on the right wing, the troops of the 40th and 27th armies, having destroyed the enemy bridgehead on the left bank, reached the Tisza along the entire strip. The 7th Guards Army advanced 45 km north with its right flank and was already behind the Tisza.
On November 11, 1944, the 2nd Ukrainian Front troops again went on the offensive, which lasted 16 days. Pressing the enemy between the Tisza and Danube rivers, the Soviet armies advanced up to 65 km, reaching the outer fortifications of Budapest. However, they failed to cut through and defeat the enemy group east of the Hungarian capital.
The Germans fought stubbornly. The fatigue of the troops, who had been fighting for more than three months, was a hindrance. Communications were stretched, which worsened the supply of supplies and fuel. Plus the autumn thaw. Command errors, when mobile units were thrown into positional battles, tanks were used to support the infantry, dispersed, in small groups, etc.
Meanwhile, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, having defeated the opposing enemy forces, captured a large bridgehead on the western bank of the Danube.
German tank Pz.Kpfw. VI Ausf. B "Tiger II" of the 503rd tank battalion in Budapest. Autumn 1944
December offensive
At the end of November, Malinovsky asked Headquarters for a pause for the left flank of the front to prepare it for a new offensive from December 4–5. Budapest was planned to be taken by envelopment from the north by the forces of the 7th Guards, 6th Guards Tank Armies and Pliev’s group, and from the southwest by the forces of the 46th Army and the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps. The strike group was supported on the right by the offensive of Tarasov’s 53rd Army to the north. The 53rd Army was reinforced with 160 tanks and self-propelled guns.
In total, the 2nd Ukrainian Front numbered more than 520 thousand people, over 9 thousand guns and mortars, over 550 tanks and self-propelled guns, 950 aircraft. The Germans had in this area more than 120 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 1800 guns and mortars, over 400 tanks and self-propelled guns, 450 aircraft.
The German command, taking into account the threat that hung over the front due to the capture of a large bridgehead on the Danube by the 3rd Ukrainian Front, transferred the 2nd Panzer Army from Army Group F to Army Group South. The Budapest group was also reinforced. Three more tank divisions, one brigade of assault guns and the 3rd heavy tank battalion were transferred to the sector of the 3rd Hungarian Army.
During the fierce battles from December 5 to 9, the 7th Guards, 6th Guards Tank Armies and Lieutenant General Pliev's cavalry-mechanized group broke through the defenses with a tank strike and intercepted the northern communications of the Budapest group. The Russians were able to break through to the large bend of the Danube north of Budapest, pushing back the main forces of the German 6th Army to the area north of the Ipel River.
However, it was not possible to immediately bypass the city from the southwest. When units of the 46th Army began to force the Danube on the night of December 5, they were unable to achieve surprise. Shlemin's divisions suffered serious losses. The enemy troops with strong machine gunsartillery The fire destroyed most of the floating craft.
As a result, the crossing of the water obstacle dragged on until December 7. The army captured a small bridgehead, but due to a lack of forces, it was unable to reach the city from the southwest. The slowness of the 46th Army allowed the enemy to create a strong defense on the Erd, Lake Velence line. To the southwest, on the Lake Velence, Lake Balaton line, the Germans were able to stop Zakharov's 4th Guards Army from the 3rd UF.
Thus, the third attempt to take Budapest by forces of one front did not lead to success. However, the Soviet troops intercepted the northern communications of the Budapest group.
Tanks crossing the Danube River near Budapest on ferries from the heavy bridge park. 1944. — original caption under the photograph in the Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Signal Corps of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg. Soviet troops crossed the Danube in early December 1944 during the Budapest Operation.
The Budapest "cauldron"
On December 12, 1944, the Soviet Headquarters specified the tasks of the two fronts. The Soviet armies were to complete the encirclement and defeat of the Budapest group with joint attacks from the northeast, east and southwest, and take the Hungarian capital, which had been transformed into a real fortified area with three defensive lines.
By the beginning of the December offensive, the 2nd Ukrainian Front had 39 rifle divisions, 2 tank, 2 mechanized and 2 cavalry corps, 2 fortified areas, 14 Romanian divisions. Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front: 31 rifle divisions, 1 tank, 2 mechanized and 1 cavalry corps, 1 marine brigade, 1 fortified area. Plus the Bulgarian army, aviation 5th and 17th Air Armies, Danube Military Flotilla.
The Soviet forces were opposed by the troops of the German Army Group South and part of Army Group F – 51 German and Hungarian divisions, 2 brigades (including 9 tank and 4 motorized divisions, 1 motorized brigade, 1 cavalry brigade), a significant part of the forces of the 4th Air Force. fleet.
Malinovsky launched an offensive in the direction of the main attack with the 6th Guards Tank and 7th Guards Armies. The tankers advanced in the first echelon, having a separate offensive zone.
Tank units (in the center - T-34-85, on the left - T-34-76) and a crew of a 7,62-mm heavy machine gun "Maxim" of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on the approaches to Budapest
On December 20, Soviet tankers broke through the enemy defenses, and by the end of the day the 5th Guards Tank Corps captured the crossings on the Gron River in the Kalnitsa area. After that, two tank and two mechanized brigades rushed south to support the offensive of the 7th Guards Army.
On the night of December 22, the German command, having concentrated units of the 6th, 8th and 3rd tank divisions (up to 150 tanks), launched a strong counterattack from the south and north on Shagi, on the flank of the Soviet tank army. German troops were able to break through to the rear of the 6th Guards Tank Army. However, the Soviet strike wedge, with active air support, continued its offensive and itself reached the flank and rear of the southern German tank group.
By the end of December 27, as a result of the joint efforts of Soviet tank crews, infantry and aviation, the German troops suffered a defeat. Meanwhile, the troops of the 7th Guards and 6th Guards Tank Armies, developing an offensive in the western and southern directions, reached the northern bank of the Danube in the Esztergom region and began fighting on the outskirts of Pest.
Il-2 17 Air Force ground attack aircraft in flight in the area of Budapest
The 3rd Ukrainian Front also resumed its offensive on December 20, 1944. However, the units of the 46th and 4th Guards Armies were unable to break through the enemy defenses. The Germans counterattacked fiercely. The fighting was especially fierce in the Székesfehérvár area.
Front commander Tolbukhin brought the second echelons of rifle corps into battle, and then the mobile units - the 2nd Guards and 7th Mechanized Corps of Major Generals Sviridov and Katkov. The introduction of these units into battle also did not lead to a decisive result. It was necessary to throw another mobile unit into the battle - the 18th Tank Corps of Major General Govorunenko. Only after this was it possible to break through the German defense of three defensive lines.
The front's troops overcame the enemy's army line of defense, took Székesfehérvár and, developing the offensive in the northern direction, took Bicske on December 24, and Esztergom on the 26th. Here, the tankers of the 3rd Ukrainian Front established contact with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.
Meanwhile, units of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps reached the western outskirts of Buda. Thus, the encirclement of the Budapest group was completed. An enemy group of almost 190, consisting of various German and Hungarian formations, units and subdivisions, fell into the "cauldron".
At first, both sides overestimated each other's strength, so the Soviet side did not attack, and the German-Hungarian side did not counterattack. There were gaps in the encirclement ring, through which some German-Hungarian units were able to break out.
On the evening of December 25, the last suburban train left the Hungarian capital, packed to capacity with various Szálasi functionaries who feared just punishment. The local Hungarian population, tired of the war and mostly hating the Szálasi regime, almost universally welcomed the Red Army.
Crew of a Soviet 122mm M-30 howitzer during the battle for Budapest.
"Fortress" Budapest
Most of the German and Hungarian generals believed that Budapest was not worth defending in conditions of complete encirclement. Thus, the commander of Army Group South, Johannes Friessner, asked the high command to withdraw German troops to the western bank of the Danube in the event of a breakthrough of the Red Army's defense line. He wanted to avoid protracted and bloody street battles at any cost.
In this case, Friessner did not focus on military factors, but on the anti-German sentiments that reigned among the residents of Budapest and the possibility of a revolt by the townspeople. As a result, German troops would have to fight on two fronts - against the Soviet troops and the rebellious townspeople.
The Hungarian military command also considered it possible to defend the capital only in the defensive zone of the Attila Line. They did not plan to defend the city after the breakthrough of the defensive line and the threat of encirclement.
The "national leader" of the Hungarian state, Ferenc Szalasi, who seized power after the overthrow of Admiral Horthy, who had planned to conclude a separate truce with the USSR, immediately after coming to power declared that from a military point of view it was more advantageous to evacuate the population of the capital and withdraw troops to the mountainous regions.
When the Soviet troops were breaking through to Budapest, Szalasi took virtually no measures to strengthen the city's defense. Szalasi was not focused on the defense of the Hungarian capital. This was due not only to the possible destruction of the old city, but also to the danger of a population uprising (the Hungarian Fuhrer called it "the rabble of the big city"). Neither the Germans nor the Hungarians had the available forces to suppress the population of the capital; all combat-ready units were fighting on the front lines. In December, Szalasi once again raised the issue of the defense of Budapest. However, his question remained unanswered.
Calculation of the Soviet 122-mm howitzer M-30 in the battle for Budapest. On the right, the Erzhebet bridge blown up by German troops can be seen, connecting Buda and Pest.
The only figure who insisted on defending Budapest was Adolf Hitler. However, his voice was the most powerful. On November 23, 1944, the Fuhrer issued an order (and a whole series of similar instructions followed) on the need to fight for every house and not to take into account losses, including civilians.
On December 1, Hitler declared Budapest a "fortress". The supreme leader of the SS and police in Hungary, General of the SS, Obergruppenführer Otto Winkelmann was appointed commandant of the city. The 9th SS Mountain Corps, commanded by SS Obergruppenführer Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, was transferred to his command. He essentially became responsible for the defense of the capital of Hungary. His main task was to prepare the capital for the upcoming assault. Every stone house was to become a small fortress, and streets and neighborhoods were turned into bastions.
To prevent possible civil unrest, units of the German and Hungarian gendarmerie were subordinated to the SS corps command. The military police were mobilized. Special units began to be formed in the city commandant's office. Composite companies began to be created from rear-echelon personnel (drivers, cooks, secretaries, etc.). Thus, 7 composite companies were formed in the Feldherrnhalle division, and 13 companies in the 4th tank division.
Thus, the Führer condemned the Hungarian capital to terrible battles and destruction. The wishes of the Hungarian leadership to make Budapest an "open" city and save it from destruction were rejected. The German ambassador Edmond Fesenmayer, who acted as the Führer's special representative, expressed himself very clearly: "If this sacrifice allows Vienna to be held, then Budapest could be destroyed more than a dozen times over."
The opinion of the German command on the issue of the defense of Budapest was also not taken into account. Although Friessner repeatedly tried to obtain permission from the German headquarters to change the front line in the interests of the army group. All his proposals were decisively rejected. The command of Army Group South had no doubts about the possibility of holding the capital of Hungary. On December 1, Friessner ordered the evacuation of all military institutions and civil services under his command from the city. The remaining services were to be in full readiness for evacuation.
The commander of the German 6th Army, General Maximilian Fretter-Pico, proposed to retreat behind the Attila Line to avoid the threat of encirclement. Hitler forbade the retreat. Soon Friessner and Fretter-Pico were removed from their positions.
Portrait of General of the Infantry Johannes Friessner (1892-1971) - German military leader, participant in the First and Second World Wars. During the Second World War, he commanded the 102nd Infantry Division, the 23rd Army Corps, Army Group North, Army Group South. Hitler sharply criticized Friessner's failures in commanding the army group. In December 1944, Friessner was removed from his post as commander and sent to the reserves. He was not appointed to command positions until the end of the war.
Budapest garrison
The encircled Budapest group included: the German 13th Panzer Division, the Feldherrnhalle Panzer Division, the 8th and 22nd SS Cavalry Divisions, part of the 271st People's Grenadier Division, parts of the 9th SS Mountain Corps and its subordinate detachments, the 1st SS Police Regiment, the Europa Battalion, a heavy anti-aircraft artillery division (12 guns), and the 12th Assault Artillery Regiment. Defense (48 guns) and other parts.
Hungarian troops: 10th Infantry Division, 12th Reserve Division, 1st Tank Division, part of the 1st Hungarian Hussar Division, parts of the 6th Self-Propelled Gun Division (30–32 SPGs), six anti-aircraft artillery battalions (168 guns), army artillerymen (20–30 guns), five gendarmerie battalions and a number of separate units and formations, including Hungarian militias.
According to the Soviet command, about 190 thousand people were surrounded in the Budapest region (of which 133 thousand were eventually taken prisoner).
The reports of the command of Army Group South state that at the end of 1944, about 45 thousand German soldiers and officers and 50 thousand Hungarians were caught in a “cauldron” in the Hungarian capital.
The command of the Budapest group did not have precise data on its forces. As the chief of staff of the 1st Army Corps, Sandor Horvath, noted, for seven weeks he “did not come across reliable data on the number of combat units, the number of troops at their disposal, the number of weapons and ammunition. There was not even a diagram for identifying accounted and unaccounted parts."
It is also difficult to take into account the number of volunteers. Thus, in January 1945, many Hungarian students, cadets, high school students and teenagers, who were most easily susceptible to propaganda, volunteered.
A Panther tank from the Feldherrnhelle tank division, abandoned during the Germans' unsuccessful breakthrough from blockaded Budapest.
A significant part of the Hungarian troops that found themselves surrounded tried to avoid fighting and waited for capitulation. Some units capitulated at the very beginning of the battle. The Hungarians were demoralized by the loss of the war, many hated the Germans. Therefore, the Hungarian commanders tried to understate the number of soldiers and weapons at their disposal so that the German command would not assign them dangerous tasks. The Hungarians preferred that the German troops fight in dangerous directions.
For example, the Hungarians claimed that by January 14, 1945, the strength of the 10th Infantry and 12th Reserve Divisions had been reduced to 300 men, although supply documents showed that the 10th Division alone was consuming provisions for 3,5 men. That is, for just one division, the figures were understated by more than 10 times! The Hungarian commanders considered the battle for Budapest lost and did not want to shed blood in vain. As a result, no more than a third of Hungarian soldiers participated in the battles.
Many Hungarian units had weak combat capability, were poorly trained and armed. So, just before the siege, special police combat units began to form. Many of the police themselves expressed a desire to defend the city. As a result, about 7 thousand people signed up for these units. However, the police had no combat skills and, when confronted with army units, lost up to half of their number killed and wounded in the first battles.
A Hungarian artilleryman at the sight of a captured 7,62/8,8 cm Flak M31 (r) anti-aircraft gun (Soviet 76 mm anti-aircraft gun 3-K model 1931, converted to German 88 mm caliber) on Adam Clark Square in Budapest. The Széchenyi Bridge (Chain Bridge) is visible in front. December 1944
Many Hungarian soldiers were not ideological fascists, so they surrendered at the first opportunity. The Germans were afraid to send such units into battle, so as not to worsen the situation. An example of such a unit was the 1st Hungarian Tank Division. In just two weeks in December, 80 people deserted from the division. Moreover, the division command did not intend to conduct even a formal investigation, and no criminal cases were brought against the deserters. And the division command itself, during the siege of the capital, sat down with the 6th Reserve Regiment in warehouses and sat there until the end of the fighting.
A similar position was taken by other Hungarian commanders, who imitated the fight. In fact, the Hungarian officers no longer wanted to fight and only wanted to survive this battle. At the same time, the Hungarian troops suffered greater "losses" than the actively fighting German troops, they simply gradually dispersed to their homes and basements. The German and Hungarian command, apparently, knew about this, but reconciled in order to avoid a mutiny in the rear. Also, the German commanders were able to shift the blame for the defeat onto the Hungarians.
The most combat-ready part of the Hungarian part of the Budapest grouping was the divisions of self-propelled artillery installations (about 2 thousand people and 30 machines). These soldiers had combat experience and fought well.
Therefore, the entire burden of the siege of Budapest had to be borne by the German troops. In their fighting spirit, skill and weapons, they were far superior to the Hungarians. But this did not mean that all German soldiers demonstrated high combat effectiveness. Thus, the German SS units, recruited from the Hungarian Volksdeutsche, often not only did not speak German, but also did not want to die for Greater Germany. They most often deserted.
Therefore, it was necessary to create blocking detachments. Machine gun crews shot without any warning those who tried to hide from the battlefield.
The combat core of the German group was the 13th Panzer Division, the Feldherrnhalle Division and the 8th SS Cavalry Division. These units had extensive combat experience and included many volunteers and members of the Nazi Party. Therefore, units of these divisions fought to the death.
A destroyed Hungarian light tank 38M "Toldi I" from the 2nd Hungarian tank division, which was routed in Budapest.
Soviet-Romanian group
The battles for Budapest were led by a specially created Budapest Group of Forces from the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The siege of the Hungarian capital was led by the commander of the 18th Guards Rifle Corps, Lieutenant General Ivan Afonin (later, due to Afonin's injury, Lieutenant General Ivan Managarov). The group was created on January 11, 1945, when the lack of coordination in the actions of the troops storming Budapest became obvious.
The number of the Soviet-Romanian group that stormed Budapest was not constant, it was constantly changing: in December 1944, according to various sources, it numbered about 150–170 thousand people (together with auxiliary, rear units), in February – about 80 thousand people.
Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the battle for Budapest. The soldier on the left holds a DP-27 machine gun, the soldier on the right is armed with a PPSh submachine gun, and an RPG-41 anti-tank grenade is attached to his belt
During the storming of the capital of Hungary, there was a constant regrouping of troops, fresh units were sent into battle, others were withdrawn. The eastern part of the city, Pest, was stormed by units of the 10 Guards Rifle Corps, 23 Rifle Corps (from early November to early December 1944); 37 Rifle Corps (mid-November 1944 g. - 16 January 1945 g.); 7 Romanian Army Corps (November 15 1944 - January 18 1945); 30 Rifle Corps (from mid-December 1944 g.); 18 Guards Rifle Corps (3-18 January 1945).
The following were involved in the storming of Buda: the 75th Rifle Corps, the 83rd Marine Brigade (from December 24, 1944); the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps, the 10th Guards Rifle Corps, the 23rd Rifle Corps, the 49th Guards Rifle Division (from December 24, 1944 to January 3, 1945); the 37th Rifle Corps (January 3–21, 1945); the 18th Guards Rifle Corps (from January 21, 1945).
In general, Pest (Pest bridgehead) was constantly stormed by forces of about three corps. Three corps (two army and one mechanized) stormed Budu. Plus reinforcements - two tank brigades, a marine brigade, artillery (70 light and 32 heavy artillery batteries, 10 self-propelled gun batteries) and aviation.
Troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the battle for Budapest
The reasons for the duration of the assault
The duration of the assault on Budapest was due to several factors. Firstly, the main and most powerful forces of the two UFs were engaged in heavy fighting, repelling strong attacks from the Third Reich's elite armored units. Fierce fighting raged west of Budapest and in the area of Lake Balaton. The Nazis threw large armored units into the attack, trying to liberate Budapest and prevent the loss of their last ally, Hungary.
Secondly, the Soviet troops did not have a serious numerical superiority. In most cases, there was not even the classic three-fold superiority, which is prescribed when organizing the assault on fortresses. And the defending side in the conditions of urban battles was in a more advantageous position.
Thirdly, it is the quality of the Soviet and Romanian units that stormed the city. The Soviet divisions were exhausted, bled dry by previous battles. The corps that were sent to besiege and storm Budapest cannot generally be called "first-rate"; most of the "elite" guards, tank, cavalry and rifle units fought in more dangerous directions.
In particular, strong tank corps did not take part in the assault on Budapest. Although during the future assault on Berlin, tanks and self-propelled guns would become almost the main striking force of the advancing Soviet troops (three tank armies plus armored units of combined arms armies).
Only a small number of tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the assault on the Hungarian capital. This was due to the fact that the UF had to fight heavy tank battles on the outer ring of encirclement. Soviet tanks in Budapest acted singly or in pairs, supporting the assault groups. As a result, the remnants of the German-Hungarian armored forces in Budapest were quite comparable with the small tank forces of the advancing Soviet troops.
Older men, soldiers called up from the recently liberated regions, who did not always have a high fighting spirit, were sent to replenish the Budapest Group of Forces. They were ironically called "Westerners", "Banderites" and "Moldavians".
Also, former prisoners of war were sent to the units, who, contrary to the widespread liberal myth, did not go to the GULAG, but to the active army.
The combat readiness of the Romanian troops, who until recently had been the enemy of the Red Army and traditionally were not distinguished by high fighting spirit, was also not high.
A heavy tank Pz.Kpfw VI Ausf. B "King Tiger" from the 509th Heavy Tank Battalion, blown up by a mine and abandoned by its crew. Despite the 82 mm of side armor on the turret, the tank crew was clearly wary of Soviet anti-tank artillery and additionally reinforced the sides of the turret with a garland of spare tracks. Budapest area. January 1945.
Heavy tank Pz.Kpfw VI Ausf. B "King Tiger" from the 1st company of the 509th heavy tank battalion, subordinated to the 4th SS Panzer Corps, knocked out in the January battles near Budapest. The tank was knocked out by 57-mm anti-tank guns from a distance of 350-400 meters. Two holes are visible on the side of the vehicle, outlined in white.
To be continued ...
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