The fate of towed artillery in the North-Eastern Military District
Woven from contradictions
One of the main discoveries of the special operation was the rebirth of an outdated, seemingly towed artillery. This surprise, it should be noted, was unpleasant for the Russian Army and was present during the first period of military operations. Later, the emphasis of combat work was shifted slightly to other areas of confrontation. All the attention of experts and military personnel was occupied by combat drones, primarily FPV. By the way, it is reconnaissance Drones allowed old guns, such as the 122mm howitzer D-30, 105mm Howitzer M101, 105mm M119, 105mm L118 and others, to become quite highly accurate weapons. A triune structure has been formed, headed by a gun, a quadcopter and the Starlink satellite communications system. It is worth adding only the Krapiva artillery fire control system, which can be used on any Android device. Without exaggerating its importance, we note the high efficiency of Krapiva in the realities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Unfortunately, we have to wait for a Russian analogue.
As the special operation unfolded, experts increasingly began to give preference to self-propelled artillery. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the armor protects the crew and equipment from counter-battery fire. The Ukrainians were very good at this in the first months of the conflict. Secondly, the automated loading system of individual self-propelled howitzers allows for high-density fire, unattainable for the vast majority of towed guns. The third advantage of the self-propelled howitzer is its high mobility, which is of decisive importance in the event that the gun is detected by enemy counter-battery systems. When armies rush into an attack, it is highly desirable for the gun barrels to be self-propelled, rather than attached to artillery tractors. These advantages play a very important role in choosing the self-propelled howitzer as a means of combat operations, but there are also some drawbacks.
The obvious disadvantages of self-propelled artillery include high visibility. On both sides of the front, reconnaissance capabilities are constantly being increased, which cannot but affect the tactics of using artillery. For example, the long-range of individual self-propelled guns is used not to reach an enemy entrenched in the rear, but so that the installation can be rolled back further to the rear. Modern reconnaissance systems "Msta-S" or Panzerhaubitze 2000 are quite easy to detect and destroy. In the absence of appropriate caution, of course. And it is very difficult to hide even the lowest-profile vehicle from enemy eyes. A serious giveaway sign of a self-propelled gun is its thermal signature. The power plant, exhaust gases, track and barrel glow on the thermal imager during intensive shooting.
Self-propelled artillery is also a very expensive toy. It is no coincidence that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are experiencing a chronic shortage of modern artillery. NATO countries, even if they pool their money, are not able to provide Ukraine with highly mobile artillery in the required quantities. NATO self-propelled guns are very fat targets for the Russian Army, which has been repeatedly demonstrated by objective control data. The hunt for Panzerhaubitze 2000 and Caesar has become one of the priority tasks of Russian drone operators.
Opinion of the howitzer battery commander
Modern combat operations in the North-Eastern Military District have been static for two years now. The times of rapid breakthroughs are a thing of the past, and the Russian Army's offensive consists of a series of tactical crises of the enemy. The enemy is forced to retreat, but there is no talk of a breakthrough of the fronts yet. In this regard, low-mobility towed artillery occupies a special niche. A howitzer crew can remain at its location for months, only occasionally moving the guns to mislead the enemy.
There is much to theorize about the fate of artillery in the SVO, but there is probably nothing better than the opinion of a combat officer. The Internet has published analytical reasoning by the commander of a howitzer artillery battery, I. V. Pinchuk, who fought in 2023 on the northern flank of the Bakhmut agglomeration. This is a very difficult section of the front, where the officer worked with D-30 howitzers. All his reasoning boils down to the place of a light 122-mm towed gun in modern combat. The main thing that can be taken from the veteran's analysis is that the end of barrel artillery is not coming soon. Especially in light of the advertised FPV drones, which, according to some, have made a real revolution.
There is no way to stop or knock a projectile flying at supersonic speed. They have learned to cope with mines flying along a trajectory, but not with projectiles. In a short essay, Pinchuk points out the high speed of fire impact on the enemy. If units ahead request artillery support, then an experienced crew will hit the target in a matter of minutes, if not seconds. Quote:
"The second important factor is the time between the shot and hitting the target - the projectile flight time. Here, too, light guns are superior to MLRS, heavy howitzers and drones. When firing at a range of 6 to 12 km, the flight time is from 35 sec. to 1 minute 30 sec., respectively. What does this mean in practice? This means that, standing 6 km behind the infantry (practice has shown that being closer greatly complicates the work due to the easier counter-battery fight for the enemy by all means), we can provide support to it in 1:20 (1 minute - projectile flight, 20 sec. - aiming) - 2.00 (1 minute - projectile flight, 1 minute - bringing the gun to combat with aiming). In this case, the work can be carried out both aimed and suppressive. When working on suppression, the gun is capable of firing once every 8-10 seconds, with the restoration of aiming, of course."
As a result, we get an ideal means for fighting advancing infantry. A pair of D-30s can paralyze an attack by enemy units up to a company inclusive. Of course, if we are not talking about warfare in urban areas. A natural question arises: what is the advantage of a towed howitzer in this case, if the Gvozdika on tracks can handle it just as well? And here officer Pinchuk I.V. gives examples of the low visibility of his D-30s.
The low profile and relatively small dimensions of the 122 mm howitzer allow the weapon to be camouflaged as a pile of debris measuring 1,5 x 1,5 x 1,5 meters. The veteran recommends that after camouflage, it is imperative to raise a drone and fly around the battery location to ensure the success of the work. Of course, this will not protect against counter-battery work, but it will not be able to conduct aimed fire at the battery, but will only methodically work out a square. When the battery crew is in shelters, it is almost impossible to detect the howitzer through a thermal imager. Only by indirect signs - for example, by fresh traces of human activity. In the infrared spectrum, the weapon glows only after a shot.
Pinchuk briefly explained the means of defeating the enemy. The most "harmless" turned out to be the MLRS "Grad". The shells are audible, which allows you to take cover in time, and the power of the ammunition is enough to destroy the gun only with a direct hit. Next in terms of effectiveness is the high-precision GMLRS from Himars or M270 MLRS. The means are destructive to the crew due to the supersonic speed and the inability to hear the sound of the "exit". The officer claims that even under ideal conditions for the enemy, the high-precision Rocket deviates from the target by 6-10 meters. And if it works EW, and even more. Only a direct hit can cause fatal consequences for the steel frame of the GMLRS gun.
The most terrible weapon, according to the howitzer battery commander, was the 155-mm M795 fragmentation high explosive. This case is dangerous for both manpower and the gun due to the formation of large and fast fragments.
It is interesting how Pinchuk describes the methodology for combating enemy UAVs:
"As for the enemy drones' work on our guns, I don't have any comprehensive information. But remember, drones only work on what they see. Camouflage helps. In fact, if drones are hanging over positions, you can't work until they are destroyed. If a drone detects a gun, and even if it attacks that gun, you shouldn't touch the gun for a couple of days - they'll pound that spot. However, after a while, there's a high probability that the gun will be repairable after the shelling."
As a result, it can be stated that towed guns, especially light class, are very durable. Due to the comparative simplicity of howitzers and guns, repairs can be carried out quickly and in field conditions.
Among the obvious disadvantages of towed artillery, low mobility and dependence on the tractor come to the fore. As Pinchuk wrote, "the formula: quick change of position = success, this may be about self-propelled guns, but not about towed howitzers." The combat work of such equipment requires careful selection of the position and tactics of use. Here is the vulnerability of the crew, as well as the impossibility of firing under fire. In the end, we will give the author's answer to the question about the feasibility of a light towed howitzer in modern battles:
“As long as there is a place for infantry and unarmored vehicles on the battlefield, as long as minefields work, and as long as there is a front line in war, light guns will be in demand.”
Based on the essay "Guns in Modern Realities. Junk or a Bending?" Author - howitzer artillery battery commander I. V. Pinchuk
Information