"Farming" on the Ka-52: operational laying of minefields from combat helicopters to isolate the combat zone
Image TG-channel Fighterbomber
One of the most tragic events in the framework of the Russian special military operation (SMO) in 2024 was the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) into the Kursk region. Unfortunately, at the moment, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AF RF) have not managed to finally drive the enemy out of the captured territories - heavy fighting is ongoing.
At the same time, one cannot underestimate the enemy’s ability to conduct a similar operation in another direction – information periodically appears in various open sources about the movement of large enemy ground forces with new tactical identification marks.
New tactical signs on Ukrainian armored vehicles
It is still unclear what of this is a “game” – disinformation carried out by the enemy, and what is real preparation for an invasion. Perhaps some information is available at the headquarters of the Russian Armed Forces, but, remembering recent experience, the threat should clearly not be underestimated.
Let us assume that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will once again attempt an offensive, and the Russian Armed Forces, for some reason, will not determine the direction of the enemy’s main attack, as a result of which the defensive line will be broken through by superior enemy forces, who will then try with all their might to reach operational space.
What actions can we take to neutralize the breakthrough?
NWO experience
According to open data, during the invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into the Kursk region, combat helicopters played an important role in stopping the enemy, which is not surprising - we previously talked about this in June 2023 in the article "Combat helicopters - the basis for countering the breakthroughs of enemy armored units in the NVO zone".
In general, recently there have been increasingly frequent opinions that the time of combat helicopters has passed, and two main factors are usually mentioned:
- the first factor is that the functions of combat helicopters are increasingly being taken over by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of various purposes, including the ubiquitous FPV-drones;
- the second factor is the ever-increasing number of threats to helicopters on the battlefield. They are also hunted by "large" anti-aircraft missile complexes (SAM), and portable SAM (MANPADS), there have been cases of helicopters being hit by anti-tank missile systems (ATGM), and recently the enemy has begun to hunt our helicopters using FPV drones.
Modern IRIS-T type air defense systems pose a significant threat to helicopters; fortunately, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lack these air defense systems, so they are mainly deployed deep inside Ukrainian territory to “hunt” for our cruise missiles.
However, the above factors are not a death sentence for combat helicopters, but only a reason for their development and improvement, in particular, in July 2023 in the material "Evolution of combat helicopters and their weapons: before and after the SVO" We talked about measures designed to increase the survivability of combat helicopters on the battlefield.
In short, this can be done by abandoning frontal attacks on the enemy using unguided weapons, increasing the effectiveness and expanding the range of guided weapons, ensuring the joint operation of UAVs and combat helicopters (slave UAVs), and equipping combat helicopters with active defense systems. aviation equipment (KAZ-AT).
If these measures are implemented, combat helicopters will be able to counteract rapid enemy breakthroughs in the future.
However, combat helicopters are not the only way to counter the enemy’s advance deep into our territory.
In the September 2023 material – Invisible Death Maneuver: Rapidly Deployable Minefields We talked about various systems and methods of remote mining of the area, including the prospects for using the latest Russian engineering systems of remote mining (ISRM) “Agriculture” in the SVO zone.
Mine-explosive weapons are one of the most demoralizing for the enemy. If in the event of the beginning artillery or missile attack, the enemy maneuvers, evades, hides, trying to make maximum use of available shelters, after which he continues combat operations, then in the case of the installation of minefields (MVZ), the danger remains until the sappers clear the area or the mine self-destructors are activated.
ISDM "Agriculture". Image by the Russian Ministry of Defense
The question arises: can the ISDM “Zemledeliye” and combat helicopters effectively interact?
Strengths and Weaknesses
On the one hand, the ISDM "Zemledeliye" and combat helicopters can interact very effectively in the context of solving the task of disrupting the enemy's offensive.
The ISDM "Zemledeliye" will limit the maneuver of enemy ground units by laying mine-explosive barriers, after which combat helicopters can complete the rout of the enemy's main forces with the help of high-precision weapons, knocking down his offensive potential.
However, there is a problem: for such interaction to become a reality, both combat helicopters and the ISDM “Zemledeliye” must be simultaneously in the breakthrough zone.
Combat helicopters can arrive at the breakthrough area fairly quickly due to their high cruising speed of around 200-250 kilometers per hour and combat radius of action of several hundred kilometers, moving in a straight line from the base point to the breakthrough area.
But the ISDM "Zemledeliye" will have to move along public roads at an average speed of about 50-60 kilometers per hour along the route. Of course, one can assume that the ISDM "Zemledeliye" will be in the breakthrough area initially, but in reality such "miracles" rarely happen.
As a result, there will be no synchronicity between the installation of minefields and the use of high-precision weapons from combat helicopters; targets will actively maneuver, disperse, and “snap back” with fire.
Accordingly, it is necessary to ensure the synchronicity of the MHP deployment and the operation of combat helicopters with high-precision weapons. This can be done by introducing MHP deployment packages, developed on the basis of the ISDM "Zemledeliye" guide packages, into the composition of combat helicopter armament.
Presumably, the optimal choice for this is the Ka-52/Ka-52M family of combat helicopters.
"Agriculture" on the Ka-52
It can be assumed that the task of integrating the MHP installation packages into the armament of Ka-52 combat helicopters can be completed in a relatively short time frame.
Ka-52 combat helicopter. Image by TG-channel Fighterbomber
The ISDM "Zemledeliye" was developed and is manufactured by the Tula JSC "NPO "Splav" named after A. N. Ganichev", where unguided aircraft missiles (NAR) S-8OFP "Broneboyschik" for combat helicopters and aircraft are also developed. Accordingly, the developers of NPO "Splav" have experience working with aircraft weapons and knowledge of their features.
It is possible that the airborne version of the mine-laying packages developed on the basis of the ISDM "Zemledeliye" will have a slightly smaller range and number of simultaneously thrown mines than the ground version, but this is fully compensated by the speed of their delivery to the combat zone.
Why Ka-52/Ka-52M and not, for example, Mi-28N/Mi-28NM?
Based on open information, combat helicopters operate NAR from a hovering or pitching mode. In the first case, the accuracy of the hit is higher, in the second, the firing range, with regard to the placement of the MHP, accuracy should be of greater importance.
Coaxial helicopters are better suited for operation in hover mode; moreover, based on open data, Mi-28 helicopters previously experienced engine surge when operating in hover mode, which led to emergency situations.
Mi-28NM combat helicopter. Image airwar.ru
The author does not know whether this problem has been fixed on the Mi-28 family helicopters at the present time. It is characteristic that the Ka-52 family helicopters are equipped with the same engines as the Mi-28 family helicopters, but there were no similar problems with them.
On the other hand, if the problem of engine surge is solved, then it is possible to do “farming” from Mi-28N/Mi-28NM helicopters.
Conclusions
The installation of minefields from both aircraft and helicopters is nothing new, but the use of the most modern solutions implemented within the framework of the creation of the ISDM "Agriculture" will allow the installation of minefields from combat helicopters to be brought to a new level.
To use the VSM-1 mining system, helicopters must be directly above the mine-laying zone. Image: war-russia.info.
The introduction of mine-explosive barrier laying packages into the armament of combat helicopters is advisable and can potentially be implemented in a relatively short time.
The optimal carrier for mine-explosive barrier laying packages is presumably the Ka-52 family of combat helicopters.
The joint use of Ka-52/Ka-52M combat helicopters to isolate the combat zone in the event of an enemy breakthrough will allow for the rapid limitation of the maneuver of invading ground units with their subsequent defeat using high-precision weapons, also used from combat helicopters.
The relatively high cruising speed and sufficiently large range of combat helicopters will allow them to quickly advance to the site of a breakthrough by enemy ground units, ensuring the disruption of the enemy's offensive at the initial stage, until the moment when it can enter operational space and/or consolidate its position in the captured territory.
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