Military Review

Commissar Popel and the feat of the Soviet soldiers under Dubno

57
Николай Кириллович Попель (1901—1980), генерал-лейтенант tank войск (с 1944 г.), был весьма незаурядной личностью. Участник Гражданской войны и Советско-финской войны, политработник. В начале Великой Отечественной войны бригадный комиссар, замполит 8-го механизированного корпуса под командованием Д. И. Рябышева. Войну Попель завершил членом военного совета 1-й танковой армии (переформированной в 1-й гвардейскую танковую армию).


During the war years, he became the inventor of the "operational" printing industry in the army. Popel formed his network of army correspondents and increased the staff of typesetters in the field printing house. As a result, the time from the appearance of the leaflet design to its delivery to a specific fighter at the front was three and a half hours. Huge speed for wartime and with those technologies. Popel became the author of a vivid memoir about the war, where journalism alternates with the artistic reality of wartime. Such works of the tanker as “In the grievous time”, “Tanks turned to the west”, “Ahead - Berlin!” Compare favorably with the memories of other military leaders by the artistic imagery of their heroes and the bright personal attitude of the author to the events. True, after the release of his memories, Popel was subjected to a wave of criticism from military historians, writers and ordinary readers. The tanker general was accused of “juggling with the facts,” his own exaltation, and a biased attitude towards events.

Apparently, this was largely due to the fact that Popel's memoirs became one of the first memoirs about the Great War. Passion has not yet subsided, the memories were "alive." The fundamental volumes of Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Baghramyan, Chuikov and other great commanders have not yet been published, have not been published historical studies and encyclopedias that would approve a unified view of the course of events of the Great Patriotic War. Pioneers are always difficult. Popel had to take emotional blows from readers who did not agree with his point of view.

Born Popele 19 December 1900, 2 January 1901 (new style) in the village of Epiphany, Nicholas district, Kherson province, was born. His parents were a blacksmith from the Magyars (Hungarians) Kirdat Popel and a peasant Svetlana. The boy graduated from a two-year parish school at a rural parish. He studied well, so he was enrolled in the veterinary class at the Kherson agricultural school. In the summer of 1917, he completed his studies, receiving a diploma of a veterinarian in category II.

I must say that Poppel’s biography is full of “white spots”. So, it is not known what the young vet did during the Revolution and most of the Civil War. According to Evgenia Yakovlevna’s testimony — the wives of the future tanker general — Nikolai Popel at the beginning of 1920, voluntarily came to the military commissioner of the city of Nikolaev and asked to be transferred to the Red Army. Veterinarians needed armies. He was credited with the "chief horseman" (veterinarian) of the 3 Equestrian Corps under the command of Nikolai Kashirin. Popel participated in the battles for Melitopol, Kerch, fought with the Wrangel and Makhnovists. His career as a military political worker begins at the same time. In April, 1921, Nikolai joined the RCP (b) and was immediately appointed Assistant Chairman of the Special Military Tribunal of the Alexander Group of Forces in southern Ukraine. A veterinarian by profession has to sign firing lists for “enemies of the people,” like anarchists, and personally participate in punitive expeditions against remnants of the Makhnovist gangs.

In 1923-1925 Popel is studying in the Odessa Infantry School. After that, he is transferred to the political department of the 4 Cavalry Division of the Ukrainian Military District. Two years later, Popel studies at the Advanced Training Courses for the Command Staff (KUKS) in the capital, then at the Military-Political Institute. Tolmachyova. The “Chief Officer” has been studying for almost eight years and in 1932 was appointed the head of the Disciplinary Crimes Department of the Military District of the Moscow District. For six years of work in this post, according to the calculations of researchers, Popel prepared about 120 compromising characteristics of the former commanders of the Red Army, who were under investigation.

In 1938, Popel was appointed military commissar of the 11 mechanized (tank) brigade. During the Soviet-Finnish War, Popelya was appointed head of the political department of the 106 Mountain Division (“Ingermanlandia”) of the Finnish People's Army. This "army" was created in the calculation of the establishment of Soviet power in Finland after winning the war, it was formed from ethnic Finns and Karelians. However, this plan was not implemented. The war turned out to be harder than expected, and Finland retained its government. Popel was transferred to the post of military commissar of the 1-th Leningrad Artillery School, and then deputy commander of the 8-th Mechanized Corps in the Kiev Special Military District.

Breakthrough to the rear of the enemy

The first month of the war became a political worker's high point. While some commanders succumbed to panic, gave up, Popel showed resilience, composure and was able to maintain a high moral spirit in the surrounding soldiers and commanders.

Popel became an active participant in the Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody (June 23 - June 30 of the year 1941). Approximately 3200 - 3300 tanks took part in this battle on both sides: 8, 9, 15, 19, 22, Soviet Mechanized Corps and 9, 11, 13, 14- I, 16-I German tank divisions. The command of the South-Western Front and the representative of the Headquarters of the Civil Code, G. K. Zhukov, decided to launch a counterstrike on the German group with the forces of all mechanized corps and three rifle corps of front-line submission (31, 36 and 37). The aim of the counter-offensive of the mechanized corps of the South-Western Front was the defeat of the Evald von Kleist's 1 tank group. As a result, a fierce oncoming tank battle took place. However, the lack of proper coordination of actions, the inability to immediately throw all the formations into battle (many units were in the process of being advanced to the front and entered the battle as they arrived), the lack of air support did not allow the Red Army to win the border battle. At the same time, this battle allowed to gain time, delayed the offensive of the 1 of the German tank group for a week, frustrated the enemy’s plans to break through to Kiev and the encirclement of a number of Soviet armies. It was precisely such fierce battles, unexpected for the enemy, that finally thwarted the idea of ​​a “blitzkrieg”, allowed the USSR to survive in the Great War.

One of the highlights of this battle was the strike of the 24 tank regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Volkov (from the 12 tank division), motorcycle regiment and Colonel Vasilyev's 34 tank division under the overall command of Brigadier Commissioner Nikolai Popel. From Dubno, the 8 and 15 mechanized corps with the 8 armored division of the 4 mechanized corps were to hit Dubno from the south. But in the 2 o'clock in the afternoon 27 June 1941, the Volkov-Popel group was able to go on the offensive only. The rest of the troops just threw in this direction.

According to Popel, the impact of our troops on a busy highway in the Verba area was unexpected. The first enemy barrier - a battalion of infantry and a company of tanks were shot down, the Germans were not ready for defense. Here, on the highway, the Popley shock group overtook the rear of the 11 of the German tank division. The Nazis quietly made a march, strictly observing the prescribed intervals. Everything was measured, thoroughly and decorously, before the advent of Soviet soldiers. Even when our motorcyclists overtook the enemy, the German soldiers did not think that they were Russians. When the machine guns sounded and the guns hit it was already too late. “So the enemy happened to find out what panic is,” the commissioner writes. Vasiliev, Volkov and Popel took a high rate of attack, trying not to linger at the nodes of resistance.

The fight turned on a wide field in 10 km southwest of Dubno. In the course of a fierce battle, the Popel group destroyed part of the 11 Panzer Division. In this battle, the commander of the 67 Tank Regiment (34 etc.) fell, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Dmitrievich Bolkhovitin. In Dubno, Soviet troops entered already in the dark. General Halder wrote in his diary: “On the right flank of the first tank group of the 8 Russian Tank Corps, it penetrated deeply into our position and went into the rear of the 11 tank division ...”. After the capture of Dubno, the Popelya group began to expect the arrival of the remaining parts of the 8 mechanized corps, which were to follow them.

Defense of Dubno

The situation for the Popil group in Dubno was very disturbing. There are no neighbors, there is no communication and information, there are no reinforcements. There is no contact with the enemy. The group began to prepare for defense. The principle of tough defense Popel explained very figuratively and succinctly: "stand to the death." “You are bombarded with bombs - high-explosive, fragmentation, incendiary. And you are standing. They are beating you with guns, machine guns, machine guns and rifles. And you are standing. You have come to the flank, they are already targeting you from the rear. And you are standing. Your comrades died, the commander is dead. You stand. Do not just stand. You beat the enemy. You shoot from a machine gun, rifle, pistol, throwing grenades, going into a bayonet attack. You can fight anything - butt, rock, boot, Finn. Only you have no right to withdraw. Step back at least a step! .. ”(Popel N. K. In a hard time). From 30 captured German tanks was formed a new battalion under the command of Captain Mikhalchuk. "Machineless" crews for these tanks lacked. In addition, the defense was reinforced by fifty guns abandoned by the Germans and a volunteer battalion was formed from local citizens, mostly from party and Soviet workers who did not have time to evacuate.

In Dubno, they expected the approach of two divisions of the 8th mechanized corps Dmitry Ryabyshev. But at night, the German command transferred parts of the 16th Panzer, 75th and 111th Infantry Divisions to the site of the breakthrough of Soviet troops and closed the gap. On June 28, only the battalion of the 300th motorized rifle regiment of the 7th motorized division with the artillery division managed to connect with Popel’s group. The 8th mechanized corps could not again break through the enemy’s defenses and under enemy attacks aviation, artillery and superior German forces went on the defensive. As a result, Popel's group was surrounded. Ryabyshev’s corps, under the threat of complete encirclement and destruction, was forced to retreat.

The Popiel group encountered connections from the 16 Tank Division. For the Germans, this meeting was also unexpected, they did not think in the area to meet with the Russians. In the two-hour battle, all German attacks were repelled, and 15 tanks, which broke through into the location of the Soviet troops, were captured (13 of them are in good condition).

The seizure of these tanks pushed Popel and Vasiliev to the idea of ​​organizing sabotage in the enemy rear. The operation was called a "miracle." She was headed by Senior Political Commissar Ivan Kirillovich Gurov (political deputy of the commander of the 67 Tank Regiment) and Senior Battalion Commissar Efim Ivanovich Novikov (Deputy Head of the Political Propaganda Department in 34-t etc.). Trophy T-3 and T-4 one at a time penetrated the enemy's location. They had to, one at a time, at intervals, enter the German column, which stretched along the road, and wait for the signal. At the signal of a red rocket, Gurov gave it to 24.00, the Soviet tank crews had to shoot at the front of the German cars and leave in the confusion. "Miracle" succeeded. At night, shots rumbled, the flame began to cloud. An hour and a half later, the first tank saboteur returned, by dawn, 11 tanks had arrived. Only one tank was lost, but his crew safely got out of the enemy rear and reached their own ones on foot. The result was quite expected - the 16-I German Tank Division did not launch an offensive in the morning.

For the defense of Dubno, the 3 sector was created: the northern one, at Mlynova, commanded by the commander of the 67 tank regiment, Major A. P. Sytnik and the commander IK Gurov; southwestern, in the Podluže region, headed by the division’s artillery chief, Colonel V. G. Semenov, and battalion commissar Zarubin; the eastern sector, in Dubno, under the command of the commander of the 68 tank regiment, M. I. Smirnov, and the senior battalion commissioner, E. I. Novikov. 24-th tank regiment of Colonel Volkov was a mobile reserve. Fights almost did not stop. Now in one sector, then in another. Some fights were fleeting, others - many hours, long.

Volkov recalled that from June 27 to July 2 1941, Brigadier Commissioner Popel practically did not sleep. He constantly rushed on a motorcycle between tank units, encouraged the fighters and showed an example of personal courage. During one of the trips, a stray German projectile projectile threw it over a ravine near Samokhovich. The sergeant died on the spot, and Popel was contused. But he managed to get out, dig a motorcycle out of the ground and get to his own.

29 June were fierce battles. The Germans, after a powerful artillery preparation and bombing, went on the attack. The group was defenseless against air raids; there was no anti-aircraft artillery. Soviet troops suffered significant losses from air strikes. The brutal battle boiled over Ptycha, she passed from hand to hand several times. Almost all the guns of the southwestern sector are disabled. As Popel recalled, tanks went against tanks. The enemy did not have heavy vehicles. But our heavy KV shells were running out. Soviet tankers, having spent ammunition, went to the ram. “The cars burned, sticking up the wreckage of guns in the ground, inverted transporters. And everywhere - in cars, batteries, transporters - the corpses of our and German soldiers. "

In a battle in the northern sector, Gurov knocked out two infantry battalions of the enemy from an ambush by ambush and destroyed the German regimental headquarters. In the course of repelling the German attack, the commander died a brave death. Vasiliev and Popel removed from command the commander of the 68-th tank regiment Smirnov, who showed cowardice. The regiment was received by captain V.F. Petrov.

On the same day, the Popiel group received an order to attack and destroy enemy tanks in the woods of Mala Milc and Belk Milch. It was found about 300 tanks, apparently without ammunition and fuel. The order was transferred with the help of a pilot who landed the plane in the Dubno area. And this order was received under conditions when the Popel group had nowhere to go for the wounded, it was running out of fuel, ammunition, medicines, parts lost most of the commanding staff. From the north against the Popel-Vasiliev group there were two infantry divisions — the 44 and the 225 — and the 14-I armored. From the southwest - 111-I infantry and 16-I tank. However, the order is an order.

At the military council, it was decided to divide the group into two parts: to make a dent, send the wounded and the rear units to their own, and attack the enemy with a strike fist. At night, they attacked Ptychu and punched a gap southward. The wounded were taken out into the corridor, the rear units were sent to Ternopil, where, according to the latest data, they had their own. At dawn, the main forces struck the 16 Panzer Division in the general direction of Kozin. It was assumed that Kozin, Sitno, Brod is 8 th mechanized corps. The Germans did not expect a night strike. After 40 minutes Ptycha battle was captured. The column with the wounded and the rears was led by Colonel Semenov, chief of artillery 34, etc. He was assigned 60 tanks, each had an 1-2 projectile for defense. However, at the beginning of the movement, Semenov was wounded and led by Colonel Pleshakov. I must say that he went to his.

Commissar Popel and the feat of the Soviet soldiers under Dubno


Breakthrough

Popel has 100 tanks left (80 tanks are the main forces, Petrov’s 20 tanks have distracted the enemy), each has 20-25 shells, and the tanks are only half full. Plus small landings. Tankers broke through the outer ring, destroyed two German batteries, began to expect Petrov tanks. Already at this stage, the group suffered heavy losses. Another German artillery division was hitting the flank of Popel’s tanks, which were awaiting Petrov’s squad. Popel led the troops to the rear of the German artillery. “We go through the swamp, fall through. In the outstretched hands over the heads of rifles, pistols and grenades. Some have daggers in their teeth ... Dreadful and dirty, like swamp devils, Popel writes, we rushed into the firing positions of the Nazis, adorned with birch trees and carefully covered from above with variegated camouflage nets. 150-mm howitzers can not be deployed in an instant. Grenades are torn, shots rumble. In some places it came to a melee. We emerge victorious: all three batteries with serviceable cannons, with stocks of oily glittering shells are ours. Fabulous wealth! ”The howitzer division, which was headed by Novikov, opened fire on German positions.

Tanks of Vasilyev and Volkov destroyed a significant number of German vehicles that did not expect the appearance of Russian tanks in this direction. Popel could try to escape from the ring. But waiting for the group of Petrov, but they could not abandon theirs, they lost time. The Germans threw aircraft into battle, pulled up the tanks. A new fight ensued. The ammunition ended, and the Soviet tankmen began to ram the German cars. Major Sytnik on KV rammed several German T-3. Volkov was wounded. German aircraft struck the artillery division. Several guns were mutilated, others continued to cover their own. Popel ordered Novikov to cover the waste, then blow up the remaining guns and leave. Novikov stood to the last and died the death of the brave. The divisional commander Vasilyev and the regimental commissar of the Germans were also killed.

The remnants of the group left for the forest: a handful of tanks, several vehicles (they had to be abandoned almost immediately), the remains of the landing party and machine-gun crews of tankers. For two days the rest of Popel’s group rested, gathered fought soldiers, scouted the area. Destroyed several enemy patrols. Then they put the remaining tanks out of action and set off. This movement in the rear is a whole story filled with fights with the Germans, overcoming natural obstacles, fighting fear, alarmism.

Having fought with the fighting in the enemy rear near 200 km, the Popel squad and the units of the 124 th rifle division that had joined it went into the 5 th army. Total from the environment Popiel brought 1778 fighters. The group has lost more than 6 thousand people killed and missing, since the beginning of its epic.

Sources:

Bad - good Commissioner Popel // http://novosti-n.org/analitic/read/1267.html.
Popel N.K. In a hard time. M.-SPb., 2001.
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  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 March 2013 09: 53 New
    26
    Generally speaking, “In a difficult time”, “Tanks turned west”, “Berlin is ahead!” I read and re-read it hard and I consider these books to be one of the best memoirs of WWII. And who wrote better? Is it Manstein, perhaps, whose valiant panzergirnidirs, starting from about the Kursk Bulge, destroyed on average FIVE Soviet tanks out of every TWO that could have happened at all in the war zone? wassat Which painted how the German troops under his brilliant leadership organizedly retreated to the Dnieper, exhausting the Soviet units attacking them - and twenty pages later bitterly weeps that in the three dozen divisions that he led beyond the Dnieper and which occupied the defense along the Dnieper there are no more 700-1000 people in each? With a staff of more than 16 thousand people?
    The tank general was accused of "juggling the facts," his own exaltation, and an impartial attitude to events.

    As for his own exaltation, it is strong. Popel in his memoirs usually stays in the background, talking about the exploits of those who fought next to him - the same Vasiliev, Ryabyshev, Babadzhanyan, Gorelov, Burda and many, many others. He does not particularly stick out his deeds.
    This is despite the fact that Popel is a hero. The same capture and retention of Dubno, the subsequent battles and the withdrawal of a large group of Red Army soldiers from the encirclement - under the command of the POLITICAL WORKER - are green trees, but did we have a lot of personnel commanders able to do at least half what Nikolai Kirillovich did? And how do you order to describe the fighting near Dubno? What, it was necessary to lower the intensity of the fighting, just for the sake of not looking like a hero?
    If I were in the place of our ministers, I would include Popel’s trilogy in the school curriculum. A blessed memory to Nikolai Kirillovich and ... probably you shouldn't say that, but thank God that he did not live to the disgrace of 1991
    1. Fox
      Fox 21 March 2013 10: 48 New
      0
      +++++++++++++++++ and more: where to get Rokossovsky’s memoirs, he didn’t write them. yes and Zhukov’s “fundamental” lies. But rather: “... and here, Ostap suffered ! ... "
    2. master_rem
      master_rem 21 March 2013 13: 53 New
      +3
      He read the trilogy for 17 years for the first time. The impression is that he does not finish talking to himself, but puts forward the unit commanders to the fore. Katukov respects, but apparently he was also afraid of Popel ...
    3. Odysseus
      Odysseus 21 March 2013 16: 09 New
      +3
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

      Generally speaking, “In a difficult time”, “Tanks turned west”, “Berlin is ahead!” I read and reread hard and I think these books are one of the best memoirs of WWII

      I absolutely agree. Very interesting from the military-historical and brilliant literary point of view. There are, of course, some shortcomings and overexposures, but without them the book would not have been released.
      In addition, the books are also reasonable, not cheers patriotic.
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      This is despite the fact that Popel is a hero. The same capture and retention of Dubno, the subsequent battles and the withdrawal of a large group of Red Army soldiers from the encirclement - under the command of the POLITICAL WORKER - are green trees, but did we have a lot of personnel commanders able to do at least half what Nikolai Kirillovich did? And how do you order to describe the fighting near Dubno? What, it was necessary to lower the intensity of the fighting, just for the sake of not looking like a hero?

      Stalin wrote about him in order 270
      1. maxvet
        maxvet 21 March 2013 16: 43 New
        +9
        But judging by the current "cinema" (QUOTES MANDATORY) ALL our political workers drank vodka in the rear, shot innocent people, drove into suicidal attacks by firing machine guns at their backs, etc. Maybe they were, but I think they were a minority.
        Eternal Glory to such people !!!!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 March 2013 17: 19 New
          11
          It happened in every way and, of course, everything depended on people. Drabkin’s “I fought with the Panzervaffe”, which is “double salary, triple death”, is such an interesting moment - one anti-tank warrior says that during the battle no one ever approached the PTA battery, because there’s a chance to part with your head - 50 50 and even higher. And they saw their commissioner only at the reformation. And another says that in the battle ALWAYS staff and political workers lay behind batteries and, when the soldiers died, they went to replace them.
          And the current "cinema" has long been put on truancy in the cemetery. Everything is ready - and the boiling tar, and the coals, and the service staff are diligent, though slightly horny ...
          The stamp "NKVD - bastards" (despite the fact that the NKVD division held the same Brest Fortress) "detachments are punitive" (despite the fact that the detachments were not uncommon, they did not shoot any of their own, but changed their composition repeatedly because they put them on threatening directions, and if the Germans broke through our defenses, then the German panzers thrown into the breakout went exactly to the detachment - and then the "punishers" fought to the last, didn’t run anywhere - not that education), etc. etc....
          1. maxvet
            maxvet 21 March 2013 18: 40 New
            +3
            By the way, the NKVD troops also included border troops, in which I had the honor to serve (though not in the NKVD, but in the FPS)
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 March 2013 18: 47 New
              +4
              Do you think the cinema knows about this? "The Great Film about the Great War" shot by the "great" Mikhalkov managed to show the penal battles in 1941. You think that they were introduced from the middle of 1942 ...
            2. Kubanets
              Kubanets 21 March 2013 21: 48 New
              0
              I support Although he served in the KGB forces .70 the army at the final stage of the war consisted of border guard personnel, which allowed some "joined" cabinet historians to call it (the army) the NKVDshna with a hint of a convoy
          2. mehanik27
            mehanik27 22 March 2013 00: 51 New
            +2
            Without detracting from the dignity of the NKVD troops that they fought during the war ... but what kind of NKVD division is this that held the Brest Fortress ????
            1. Kaa
              Kaa 22 March 2013 01: 40 New
              +2
              Quote: mehanik27
              .but what is this NKVD division such that it held the Brest Fortress ????

              “On the day of the German attack on the USSR, 7 rifle battalions and 1 reconnaissance, 2 artillery divisions, some special units of rifle regiments and units of corps units, enlisted personnel of the 6th Oryol Red Banner and 42nd rifle divisions of the 28th rifle corps were stationed in the fortress Army units of the 17th Red Banner Brest border detachment, 33rd Separate Engineering Regiment, part of the 132nd battalion of the NKVD troops, the headquarters of the units (the headquarters of the divisions and the 28th Rifle Corps were located in Brest). Units were not deployed in combat and did not occupy positions at the border lines. Http: //www.brest.by/ct/page3.html
              All the more significant - the incomplete battalion + border guards in the first days of the war appeared in the Wehrmacht in the form of the NKVD DIVISION.
              1. mehanik27
                mehanik27 22 March 2013 07: 17 New
                +1
                We learned how to quote Pedivics ... now we begin to learn to think and conceptualize what we read ....units of the 17th Red Banner Brest border detachment and part of the 132nd battalion of the NKVD troops. The question is again what kind of division of the NKVD? What was there among the Germans, let them remain on their conscience
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 22 March 2013 09: 34 New
              +1
              This is my mistake, alas, confused reality with the reports of the Wehrmacht. Not a division. Parts of the NKVD. The 17th Red Banner Border Detachment under the command of Major A.P. Kuznetsov was 2165 people, and in the Brest Fortress itself the 3th commandant’s office, the 9th detachment’s frontier post, a reserve outpost, and the district school of border guards drivers were stationed. At the same time, when on the morning of June 22 a part of the personnel left the fortress (about 4 thousand people remained on its territory), it seems that the border guards and escort companies remained almost in full force.
              1. mehanik27
                mehanik27 22 March 2013 23: 37 New
                +1
                Something I see you are confusing a lot here. Without detracting from the feat of the soldiers who defended the Brest Fortress and the soldiers of the NKVD in particular, I would like to clarify. You famously brought in the number of 2165 people. Moreover, this figure was taken from the official staffing of the border detachment ( RGVA, f. 38652 “Documents from the secretariat of the deputy people's commissar”, d.12 l. D.237-241). Obviously the actual was less. And if you take purely border guards, there were not so many of them. state 3 people, 54th PZ statewide 9 people, reserve outpost 62 people state. sports company 42 people in the state, sapper platoon of the detachment 44 people in the state.
                132 June NKVD battalion had 21 people on the boiler allowance according to eyewitnesses. And those who returned from the guards. The rest were either on guard of the prisons or outside the RPM, like the 93rd company on business trips. Moreover, the commander of the battalion, captain Alexander Stepanovich Kostitsyn was in Moscow at the training camp. On Saturday, June 3, 21, the battalion commissar Grigory Petrovich Sorokin moved to the city of Kobrin, where one willow platoon of the 1941st company stood. Other middle commanders were on business trips, and those who remained in Brest lived two or three kilometers from the fortress. Therefore, when the Nazis attacked, the resistance of the battalion was headed by senior sergeant master chemical department K.A. Novikov and deputy political instructor platoon communications Sh.M. Schneiderman. Moreover, the majority of the personnel were fighters from service units - drivers, tailors, shoemakers, cooks, horse breeders.
                And here you are telling about the mythical division of the NKVD when about 5 hundred KGB fighters fought in such a way that the Germans practically didn’t take prisoners (fighters of the convoy battalion even took many of our wars as border guards), when German intelligence even knew which cables with which veins were laid in trenches on the bank of the Bug. And I would very much like to hear what part of the personnel stationed in the fortress and most importantly where it left.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 March 2013 20: 52 New
                  +1
                  Quote: mehanik27
                  Something I look you are confusing a lot here.

                  let's get a look
                  Quote: mehanik27
                  Here you famously brought the number of 2165 people. Moreover, this figure is taken from the official staffing of the border detachment. RGVA, f. 38652 "Documents from the Secretariat of the Deputy People's Commissar", d.12 l. d.237-241) Apparently the actual was less.

                  Maybe. For example, in February 1941 the payroll was as much as full-time 24 staff. The headcount according to Order No. 07 of 10.02.1941. amounted to 2141 people (Central Committee of the FSB of the Russian Federation, f.14, op.2, d.206, l.68.) Well, maybe they urgently demobilized for war something :)
                  In general, it’s rather strange to read about “obviously less” actual numbers. Our rifle divisions were brought to a number close to the full-time, but the border guards, obviously, God himself ordered.
                  Quote: mehanik27
                  3-I commandant staff 54 person, 9-I PZ staff 62 person

                  You take into account only the number of parts that were assigned to the Brest Fortress. And not those who were on the territory of the fortress with the start of battles. Unfortunately, I don’t have exact numbers, but there were mentions that border guards who were nearby had retreated to the fortress.
                  Quote: mehanik27
                  And here you are talking about the mythical division of the NKVD

                  In my opinion, I have already admitted my mistake. I see no reason to do this twice.
                  Quote: mehanik27
                  And I would very much like to hear what part of the personnel stationed in the fortress and most importantly where it left.

                  Does it matter to you? Okay, look.
          3. vyatom
            vyatom 29 March 2013 12: 19 New
            -1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Stamp "NKVD - bastards" (despite the fact that the NKVD division held the same Brest Fortress)

            Directly the same NKVD division. Think before you write such nonsense.
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 March 2013 17: 08 New
        +2
        Quote: Odyssey
        In addition, the books are also reasonable, not cheers patriotic.

        Absolutely agree with you.
        Quote: Odyssey
        Stalin wrote about him in order 270

        Yehh, I can't resist quoting
        Not only friends recognize, but our enemies are forced to admit that in our liberation war with the Nazi invaders of the Red Army, their vast majority, their commanders and commissars behave impeccably, courageously, and sometimes just heroically. Even those parts of our army that accidentally broke away from the army and were surrounded, retain the spirit of steadfastness and courage, do not surrender, try to inflict more harm on the enemy and get out of the environment ...
        ... The commissar of the 8 mechanized corps brigade commissar Popel and the commander of the 406 joint venture Colonel Novikov withdrew from the encirclement of the armed 1778 people. In stubborn battles with the Germans, the Novikov-Popel group traveled 650 kilometers, inflicting huge losses on the rear of the enemy.
    4. aleshka
      aleshka 21 March 2013 17: 54 New
      0
      With Katukov, they did not like each other very much, now you just won’t know why !!!
      1. maxvet
        maxvet 21 March 2013 18: 33 New
        +1
        I wanted to add a picture of how the younger political instructor Alexei Eremenko raises the attack, but damn it does not work, as far as I know, he was killed during this attack. Who can put this photo.
        1. super-vitek
          super-vitek 21 March 2013 21: 13 New
          +6
          Here he is. As requested. Goosebumps are running, ha photo is a rush of a real man, a hero of his country! Glory to the Heroes !!!
      2. Odysseus
        Odysseus 22 March 2013 00: 01 New
        +1
        Quote: Alesha
        With Katukov, they did not like each other very much, now you just won’t know why !!!

        Well, one can definitely say only that his wife Katukova did not like, but even if this is so, it does not matter much. The main thing is to fight well!
    5. ikrut
      ikrut 22 March 2013 02: 38 New
      +5
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      If I were in the place of our ministers, I would include Popel’s trilogy in the school curriculum.

      And not only in textbooks. You need to make films on these events. Even the series. And not that "soap." what show today.
      It is bitter and insulting that the children and grandchildren of these heroes were “bred” by different Korotichs and Evtushenki as youngsters.
      And today's liberal consumers dare to say something else about how our fighters and commanders "draped and surrendered by the thousands".
      These events are not only our great history, but also our pride. And how much more we do not know and will not know already. unfortunately never ...
    6. Strategy
      Strategy 15 September 2017 20: 36 New
      0
      And what about the book of our illustrious fellow countryman - twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General of Tank Troops Arkhipov Vasily Sergeyevich - "Time of Tank Attacks"?
  2. zao74
    zao74 21 March 2013 10: 25 New
    +5
    Eternal Glory to the Heroes!
    1. neodymium
      neodymium 21 March 2013 13: 32 New
      15
      From the "Note of the Soviet officer" author Penezhko,
      description of the time of the death of KV Vasiliev in the battle of Dubno
      (34 etc. of the 8th mechanized corps)
      “Now all KB are clinging to Vasiliev. The hatch cover is lifted, his head is shown, waved flags - the signal“ Forward! ” At the same moment, a bunch of blinding sparks bounces off its tower, followed by a second from the port side. The tank shudders and freezes. A flame explodes from a half-open hatch with a candle. Not believing in the periscope, I look out of the tower and do not want to believe myself: KB full of fire. Nobody shows up from the hatches. I wait With a frozen heart: Vasilyev’s head is about to appear now. No, he doesn’t show up. It’s clear that it's over, and yet I don’t believe it. Another KV flashes. But what is it is it? Why do they suddenly burn? I turn the periscope away from the tank Vasiliev A. Long-barreled cannons are visible on the high-rise near the village. “Anti-aircraft guns!” a hint flickers. “That's who could break KB!”
      My grandfather died in that tank.
      Everlasting memory.
      1. Roman L.
        Roman L. 15 January 2014 15: 48 New
        0
        Good afternoon.
        I was interested in the phrase: "My grandfather died in that tank."
        My grandfather is a political officer of a tank company as part of 34 td. I went out with Popel.
        Interested in any information about the events of those days.
  3. Enjoy
    Enjoy 21 March 2013 10: 30 New
    +8
    A man with a capital letter .. Just imagine - capture almost a hundred tanks of the enemy, being surrounded to enter his location and arrange a sabotage. Then capture the howitzer division .. Let all those who claimed that the commissar are always a synonym for incompetence or even worse wipe away liquid.

    This is not for you cp..ye Pearl Harbor or Iwo Jima.
    1. vyatom
      vyatom 29 March 2013 12: 22 New
      0
      Quote: Enjoy
      A man with a capital letter .. Just imagine - capture almost a hundred tanks of the enemy, being surrounded to enter his location and arrange a sabotage. Then capture the howitzer division .. Let all those who claimed that the commissar are always synonymous with incompetence or even worse wipe away liquid. This is not for you cp..we Pearl Harbor or Iwo Jima

      Comparison out of place. Do not write nonsense. And read more so as not to show your grayness.
  4. stalkerwalker
    stalkerwalker 21 March 2013 11: 12 New
    +6
    1. The article did not put a minus or a plus.
    2. I read memoirs of Popel and Dragoon.
    3. I read detailed studies about the tank battle in the area of ​​Dubno-Lutsk-Brody on 23 June - 30 June 1941.
    And now, what is strange: in the memoirs of the Red Army alone won almost a victory. We read further - a member of the Military Council, Vashugin, shot himself dead from the shame of losing almost 800 tanks at the end of the fighting.
    I am not going to belittle the magnitude of the feat of our soldiers and officers who have laid down their heads on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War. Honor to them and Glory.
    But maybe you need to find specifics in those events?
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 21 March 2013 12: 14 New
      +3
      Quote: stalkerwalker

      And now, what is strange: in the memoirs of the Red Army alone won almost a victory. We read further - a member of the Military Council, Vashugin, shot himself dead from the shame of losing almost 800 tanks at the end of the fighting.

      Try joking with Google on Isaev-Popel-Dubno.
      Somewhere I met, and not so long ago, that Isaev more carefully went through the archival materials of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody.
      And the actual material is very at variance with that set forth in Popel's memoirs.
      In particular, the circumstances of receiving an offensive order, preparation time, etc.
      Although, of course, Nikolai Kirillovich must be read.
      1. vladim.gorbunow
        vladim.gorbunow 21 March 2013 13: 21 New
        +3
        The circumstances of the formation of the advance detachment are confirmed primarily by Ryabyshev. Their criminal component - Popel’s statement about the need to check the combat orders of the front headquarters, the inexplicable death of Vashugin’s PMF obviously suggest the possibility of adjusting the documents. What can be learned from Isaev? The fact that the headquarters of the SWF preferred not to notice the success of the Popel detachment, moreover, a version of the German strike in the south (instead of the real east) arose. To parry which began the withdrawal to the rear of the remnants of 8 and 15 MK. “But, occupied with its thoughts about a terrible blow to the flank and rear, the leadership of the Southwestern Front did not try to use the unexpected chance to change the situation in their favor. The divisions of the 36th Rifle Corps, located southeast and south of Dubno, did not were thrown to assist the group of N.K. Popel.The 140th and 146th rifle divisions were located only ten kilometers south of the tankers of the 34th and 12th tank divisions, on the eastern bank of the Ikva River. Dubno and the release of the surrounded parts of the 8th a hanized corps. However, this was not done. "A. Isaev" From Dubno to Rostov ".
        1. stalkerwalker
          stalkerwalker 21 March 2013 17: 53 New
          +4
          And here is the setback!
        2. Bigriver
          Bigriver 22 March 2013 03: 16 New
          0
          Quote: vladim.gorbunow
          The circumstances of the formation of the advance detachment are confirmed primarily by Ryabyshev .. "A. Isaev" From Dubno to Rostov ".

          I'm a little about something else. On the quality and reliability of Popel’s memoirs :)
          There was no detachment in Dubno. Although, the panzerstrasse cut.
          There were no defeated rear of the 11 TD.
          A melodrama with Vashugin was completely invented and an offensive order was received a day before Vashugin appeared. Etc.
          Babajanyan, who commanded the corps at 1TA and served with Popel, called him a treacher and Khrushchev's litter.
          And still, you need to read :)
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 22 March 2013 10: 43 New
            +1
            Quote: BigRiver
            There was no detachment in Dubno. Although, the panzerstrasse cut.

            Because Isaev wrote this? But Goncharov, for example, writes
            Obviously, Soviet tankers managed to break into Dubno - however, neither this, nor the next night, the complete seizure of the city (as described in Popel's memoirs) was out of the question. At least de Lannoy, who used German memoirs (also distinguished by a fair amount of fantasticness), described these battles as follows:
            “On the evening of [28 June] the situation in Dubno became critical. The Soviet command used against the city all the means at its disposal, including chauffeurs and clerks! The attackers were knocked out on the outskirts of the city. On June 29, the battles around Dubno were ongoing. However, by the 17 clock [Berlin time], all attacks were repulsed and many tanks destroyed (including the KV-2 heavy tanks). ”

            And where is the truth?
            Quote: BigRiver
            There were no defeated rear of the 11 TD.

            Maybe. Does this mean that the rear of no other division was defeated?
            take the same Goncharov
            In general, the Germans recognize the fact of panic and confusion caused by the breakthrough of the Popel group. Here is what is written in the combat history of the 16th Panzer Division: “It seemed that no one seemed to have heard the orders, and indiscriminate firing started around. The retreat partially panicked. Only for a short time once again managed to stop the pressure of tanks and infantry. Verb had to leave "
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 22 March 2013 10: 43 New
              +1
              Quote: BigRiver
              A melodrama with Vashugin was completely invented and an offensive order was received a day before Vashugin appeared.

              Isaev didn’t even think of such a thing - he just alluded to Ryabyshev’s report. And in the report we read
              In 6.00 27.6.41, in the area 2, km south of Brody, through the brigade commissar Mikhailov, the second order was received by the commander of the Southwestern Front No. 21215 from 27.6.41 g. On the advance of the 8 mechanized corps with 9.00 27.6.41 g. In the direction of Brody, metro Verba, Dubno and the concentration of the corps towards the end of the day in the area of ​​Dubno, Volkovye, metro Verba.
              By this time, parts of the corps with their combat materiel were: the 12-I Panzer Division on the move to Podkamen, the 7-I Motorized Rifle and 34-I Panzer Divisions remained in the occupied areas and fought with the enemy.
              In accordance with Order No. 2121 of the Southwestern Front, the following combat order was issued by the corps commander in 7.00 27.6.41:

              But you think, confuse the day with the hour - a trifle, right?
              In general, Isaev is simply unique
              However, melodramatic scenes with the participation of embodied evil in the person of HH Vashugin do not find their confirmation in the documents.

              I wonder in what form Isaev intended to see this confirmation?
              The fact is that before the appearance of Vashugin, the corps did not go on the offensive - except for sending the 25 tanks as an advance detachment to the 10.00 for such - and this DOESN'T LOOK for the offensive.
              Quote: BigRiver
              Babajanyan, who commanded the corps at 1TA and served with Popel, called him a treacher and Khrushchev's litter.

              Probably for how beautifully painted Popel Khrushchev. But what without it ... But what does this have to do with Dubno?
              1. Bigriver
                Bigriver 23 March 2013 05: 14 New
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

                Probably for how beautifully painted Popel Khrushchev. But what without it ... But what does this have to do with Dubno?

                You are probably right here and above.
                I am very superficially familiar with the actions in the "triangle".
              2. Bigriver
                Bigriver 23 March 2013 06: 29 New
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

                Isaev didn’t even think of such a thing - he just referred to Ryabyshev’s report.
                But you think, confuse the day with the hour - a trifle, right?
                In general, Isaev is simply unique
                However, melodramatic scenes with the participation of embodied evil in the person of HH Vashugin do not find their confirmation in the documents.

                It is interesting in what form Isaev intended to see this confirmation?

                Rummaged :))
                No, not so.
                Here is what Alexei Isaev writes in his Ph.D. dissertation "THE BATTLE ACTIONS OF THE SOUTH-WEST AND SOUTH FRONTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR (June 22 - July 9, 1941)
                Disser was defended a little less than a year ago.

                .... in the literature quite often accusations are made against a member of the Armed Forces of the South Front of the Corps Commissioner N. Vashugin, according to the memoir version of events by direct threats, forced to enter the corps into battle in parts. In fact, this episode becomes the basis for accusations of a political nature, a vivid example of party intervention in command and control. However numerous documents not confirm this version. The order of the Armed Forces of the South-West Fleet for withdrawal actually secured the already begun withdrawal of parts disorganized by air strikes, orders for an offensive in a new direction were given by the command of the 8th MK even before the arrival of N. N. Vashugin at the command post.
                That is, he speaks of documents refuting.
      2. stalkerwalker
        stalkerwalker 21 March 2013 17: 35 New
        +4
        Thanks for the tip. I’m joking.
        Although in general I know the situation more or less: there was an attempt to “catch the tail” of the 1 tank group of Germans with flank counterattacks, etc.
        Thanks again.
      3. mehanik27
        mehanik27 22 March 2013 00: 54 New
        -3
        On this site, the hamster is selective ... it’s either pushing Isaev’s works into shit, then you are offering hamsters to read it ... don’t tear them the patterns.
    2. Dmitry_2013
      Dmitry_2013 21 March 2013 12: 53 New
      -1
      I agree completely, according to some, in these battles the main mechanized corps of the Red Army in the European part were destroyed, which could significantly help in the further defense of the country.
      Zhukov threw them without preliminary preparation and intelligence, hoping to crush them with a number.
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 March 2013 13: 18 New
      10
      Quote: stalkerwalker
      And now, what is strange: in the memoirs of the Red Army alone won almost a victory. We read further - a member of the Military Council, Vashugin, shot himself dead from the shame of losing almost 800 tanks at the end of the fighting.

      You know, if you
      Quote: stalkerwalker
      2. I read memoirs of Popel and Dragoon.
      3. I read detailed studies about the tank battle in the area of ​​Dubno-Lutsk-Brody on 23 June - 30 June 1941.

      That you would not ask this question.
      Vashugin did not give Ryabyshev time to pull up the whole 8 MK. He almost at gunpoint forced to attack with small forces, on the move - one division and two regiments went into battle. It was assumed that later Ryabyshev, pulling up his forces, would follow Popel and support him.
      But the Germans quickly reacted to Popel’s strike, having transferred additional forces to the Dubno region and Ryabyshev could not come to the rescue of Popel. When Vashugin realized that he had in vain driven into the environment one and a half divisions - he committed suicide.
      Little remark. Vashugin is described by many sources as a person who is not too smart, unkind, but very "vigilant" (in the worst sense of the word).
      But to what extent even not the best people of those times turned out to be higher than our current "elite"! Vashugin was unable to understand what he was doing, sending Popel to battle, but he seemed to act with good intentions (to fulfill the order at all costs). And when it finally dawned on him that he was wasting the deaths of thousands of soldiers and commanders in vain - he didn’t hide behind the usual wisdom, saying that there is no war without losses, etc. He found the strength to face the truth. He HONESTLY assessed his own actions, HONESTLY judged himself and pronounced his sentence. And he carried out this sentence - the hand did not flinch.
      Compare this action with our red roofing material. “Well, thirty million will die out. They didn’t fit into the market. ”And - run RAO UES. The hand did not flinch ...
      So here. The hostilities of Popel’s group were just one episode of the battle in the area of ​​Dubno-Lutsk-Brody on 23 June - 30 June 1941. And - the most worthy, perhaps. It was Popel’s actions that made the Germans lose their pace, namely (and probably only) Popel’s troops were able to do much more harm to the Nazis than they themselves did. A small group surrounded by many forces achieves, in fact, STRATEGIC success - it detains the Germans, thereby saving the 6, 12 and 26 armies located on the Lviv ledge (they manage to get out of the planned encirclement) About such "trifles" like dozens (!!!) of captured German tanks, I generally keep quiet. So Popel’s squad is 300 Spartans, if you will. And Popel certainly won this fight.
      But overall, the Southwestern Front, alas, lost the battle.
      1. Odysseus
        Odysseus 21 March 2013 16: 21 New
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But the Germans quickly reacted to Popel’s strike, having transferred additional forces to the Dubno region and Ryabyshev could not come to the rescue of Popel. When Vashugin realized that he had in vain driven into the environment one and a half divisions - he committed suicide.

        This story has a flip side. Considering how chaotically and unsystematically our other mech corps attacked and how many conflicting orders were given to them, it can be assumed that if there hadn’t been this order of Vashugin there would have been no blow to Dubno. Accordingly, the 8th corps would have stagnated, like the 15th, trying to coordinate and at the same time fulfill the infinitely retarded orders of the front.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 21 March 2013 17: 30 New
          +2
          Dear Odysseus!
          I thought about it a lot at one time. I came to such conclusions
          Quote: Odyssey
          it can be fully assumed that if there had not been this order of Vashugin there would have been no blow to Dubno.

          Sorry, but IMHO - completely excluded. Ryabyshev received a clear order - to attack. This order was given by none other than Zhukov, who was then on the front of the South-Western Front.
          Unfortunately, the disgusting connection led to the fact that the headquarters of the South-West Fleet very poorly imagined where the 8MK is located, and therefore everyone believed that he would be able to concentrate for the EMNIP counterattack a day ahead of schedule. Zhukov, of course, was not going to throw the corps into battle in parts, he gave the order, being sure that the 8MK would manage to concentrate on the attack. But he did not have time. Therefore, Ryabyshev arbitrarily postponed the attack until the concentration of the body - but as soon as the body was pulled, a blow would be dealt.
          Unfortunately, Zhukov left the headquarters of the SWF before the start of the counterattack. If he had been at headquarters then he would have certainly forced Kirponos and Purkayev to send rifle divisions to support the counterattack. They took the divisions contrary to Zhukov’s instructions)
          At the same time, the Germans did not know what was happening on their flanks, so they would not begin to concentrate their forces to parry the 8MK strike.
          1. Odysseus
            Odysseus 21 March 2013 22: 32 New
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Unfortunately, the disgusting connection led to the fact that the headquarters of the South-West Fleet very poorly imagined where the 8MK is located, and therefore everyone believed that he would be able to concentrate for the EMNIP counterattack a day ahead of schedule. Zhukov, of course, was not going to throw the corps into battle in parts, he gave the order, being sure that the 8MK would manage to concentrate on the attack. But he did not have time. Therefore, Ryabyshev arbitrarily postponed the attack until the concentration of the body - but as soon as the body was pulled, a blow would be dealt.

            Well, I don’t know ... On the 26th, the 8th mechanized corps attacked Berestechko against the prepared German defense, on the 27th early in the morning an order was given to leave the infantry line of the 37th infantry, and two hours later a counter-order to advance on Dubno. Ryabyshev believed that on the 27th he could not advance because all his divisions were dispersed. But in the afternoon Vashugin arrives and gives his famous TsU.
            I don’t want to defend him, but, IMHO, if this order weren’t there, then from the 8th it would be the same as with his neighbor the 15th mechanized corps (who had the same task) .27th 15th was concentrated under German bombing, and on the 28th sluggishly attacked the German defense, moreover, 212 motorized, in general, disappeared somewhere.
            The Germans had a huge advantage in air reconnaissance, and pulled forces through Dubno, so that the whole effect of the advance of the Popel group arose due to its unexpectedness.
            However, this is exclusively my IMHO, if you specifically engaged in the battle of Dubno, then you know better.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            If he had been at headquarters then he would have certainly forced Kirponos and Purkayev to send rifle divisions to support the counterattack.

            So all the rifle divisions at hand were sent. And there was only the 36th Rifle Corps. But by June 28 it had already lost control and was not combat-ready. One division was in Ostroh. The other two were hanging chaotically south-east of Dubno. They did not take part in the attack, moreover, they retreated contrary to the order.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Unfortunately disgusting connection

            I believe that poor communication, along with poor motorization and poor interaction between the military branches, was the largest shortcoming of the Red Army in the initial period of World War II.
            But regarding the border battle on the South-Western Front, there are huge questions for aviation as well. I don’t understand at all where she was and what she was doing. But the support of strikes mech.korpusov was her most important thing!
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 22 March 2013 11: 29 New
              +1
              Quote: Odyssey
              However, this is exclusively my IMHO, if you specifically engaged in the battle of Dubno, then you know better.

              I do not pretend to the ultimate truth at all. There are many questions, but I consider the fact that Ryabyshev received order No.2121 on the morning of 27 to be true. Accordingly, he had to fulfill this order.
              Quote: Odyssey
              27-th 15-th concentrated under the German bombing, and 28-th languidly attacked the German defense, moreover, 212 motorized, in general, disappeared somewhere.

              I believe that Ryabyshev’s offensive would have been better than 15’s.
      2. stalkerwalker
        stalkerwalker 21 March 2013 17: 46 New
        +5
        Thanks for the answer...
        You know, there were no written orders (naturally), and they could not reach our days. In memoirs and memoirs, everyone writes about what he remembers (or thinks that he remembers).
        Yes. Vashugin found the strength to shoot himself. Mehlis in Crimea did not.
        I emphasized the difference in the assessment of personal memories (memoirs) and how it looked "looking from above."
        I was not going to suspect anyone of anything ...
        This is a forum. For this we communicate.
  5. Terrible ensign
    Terrible ensign 21 March 2013 12: 03 New
    0
    Honestly: all political workers would have been 50% of the effectiveness of Nikolai Kirillovich, had a completely different history of the initial period of the Second World War ...
  6. vladim.gorbunow
    vladim.gorbunow 21 March 2013 12: 04 New
    +6
    Unfortunately, the episode of 27 06 41 was bypassed. "Comrade member of the Military Council of the front ... The doors of automobiles slammed. New and new faces appeared before us - colonels, lieutenant colonels. I recognized some of them - the prosecutor, the chairman of the Military Tribunal ... Fighters jumped out of the back of a lorry blocking the convoy ... "- How much did you sell, Judah? ... I could not stand it and stepped forward: ... - It remains to be seen what considerations are guided by those who order to give the territory taken to the enemy with battle." It was said to the Member of the Military Council of the SWF the corps commissioner N.N. Vashugin. Legally - the gravest war crime, military orders were called into question and not privately, but in the presence of the military prosecutor and the tribunal. And then Popel successfully carries out an improvised decision, beats the Germans, but the corps does not come to him. And FVM Vashugin returns to the headquarters of the SWF, the political report does not write to the Red Army GPUR, he does not start the check. That is, commits an official crime. But he shoots himself with impressionability (Baghramyan I.Kh. So the war began). 8 MK acts successfully until it is led by the headquarters of the Southwest Front. This is the only headquarters of the front, destroyed by the Germans in the largest boiler of the Second World War.
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 21 March 2013 17: 49 New
      +4
      Very valuable! For good reason !!!
  7. Aleksys2
    Aleksys2 21 March 2013 12: 16 New
    +4
    I remembered:
    Yes, there were people in our time,
    A powerful, dashing tribe:
    Bogatyri - not you.
    They got a bad share:
    Few came back from the field.
  8. Raphael_83
    Raphael_83 21 March 2013 19: 45 New
    0
    I got acquainted with the trilogy of Nikolai Kirillich’s memoirs in the 9th grade: our head of the National Political Party cited him as an example of what a political worker should be, so I caught fire. Since then re-read more than once. I liked the very figurative, lively language of books. It is especially valuable that the commissar did not "stick out" his own achievements, but rather pressed on the description of the exploits of his comrades. The images of Babadzhanyan, Gorelov, Burda appeared before the eyes as alive.
    PS
    By the way, in the "Battle for Moscow" Ozerov also has this episode with the "cavalry"
    attack and its consequences - very figuratively and efficiently.
    1. Kubanets
      Kubanets 21 March 2013 22: 06 New
      +1
      I read carefully all the posts. Everything is true everything is right But I want to note the 8th fur corps of Ryabyshev was one of the most fully equipped in the Red Army. And the failure near Dubno, in my opinion, was that he was pulled out either in providing the 6th army of Muzychenko, then 26 Kostenko in a counterattack on Dubno. The corps operated in the triangle Lviv - Przemysl - Dubno losing motor resources and combat effectiveness. And with all this, he was able to inflict a painful blow to Kleist. Glory to the heroes !!!
  9. AlexMH
    AlexMH 21 March 2013 22: 08 New
    +2
    Usually, memoirs of Soviet military leaders are boring to read - they were edited, military leaders themselves thought how not to drop the prestige of the winners ... Actually, in Soviet times it was difficult to imagine a public showdown between the retired commanders, which are full of memoirs of German generals. Unless Chuikov and Zhukov had an argument in absentia .. And against the background of politically verified memories, which by no means aim to attract readers - a bright, lively, tragic narrative of Popel. I read and read with pleasure, and I think that it is living memories written shortly after the war (such as Simonov’s diaries) that give us the opportunity to appreciate the feat of our ancestors.
  10. krpmlws
    krpmlws 22 March 2013 07: 01 New
    -1
    In my opinion, the reasons for the defeats at Dubno should first of all be sought in the inability to control tank units, in a misunderstanding of tank tactics. Reading the memoirs, Ryabyshev wondered why the corps was fighting on a wide front like a rifle corps. Poppel’s group goes to Dubno and takes up defense ??? !!! What kind of defense can be in that situation, especially for a tank group, in a situation of maneuverable, oncoming battle? And this decision to attack him. etc. received from a certain pilot who did not even have a package with an order. So the group and thousands of people were stupidly ruined. And in the end, appeal to heroism and dedication, if there is no elementary professionalism. We need to learn from the mistakes of our grandfathers, to draw conclusions, so that such a rout near Dubno does not happen again (but unfortunately this is difficult for us). V. Arkhipov writes well as near Dubno in the absence of air cover, but thanks to the competent organization of intelligence, it was possible to inflict significant damage to the enemy.
  11. Udom84
    Udom84 30 March 2013 13: 02 New
    0
    Glory to the heroes!
  12. Ferdinand
    Ferdinand 19 December 2014 17: 59 New
    0
    Absolutely all the memoirs of Soviet generals are continuous Soviet propaganda, designed to hide the true criminal goals of the top leadership, as well as his mediocrity, negligence and general mess. Although the chronology is respected and the general course of hostilities is described, these memoirs abound with so many lies - this applies primarily to motives, causes and effects - that there is no point in studying history from them. This creation, with its colorful performance, is no exception.
    In today's information age, you can get almost any information. I am sincerely surprised by readers who admire such scribble - you would still remember about Zhukov!
    The heroic defense of the poor and weak Red Army ... Whoever explains intelligibly - how, having only 3817 tanks in Western Ukraine (not counting the BA armed with 45 that pierced the armor of all German ones of that time), absolutely everything could be done in a week about .... what? Given that the total number of German tanks on the entire eastern front, which, moreover, are, by the way, much inferior to the Soviet in all respects, is it already 3582? And so for all military branches ... And now they write to us "memoirs", trying to justify their pro..y? Rave...
    By the way, not a single German anti-tank gun could penetrate the tank depicted in the photo, and even more so, not a single German tank was 41 years old. How could you ditch so much valuable, and besides, for the most part - invulnerable equipment? And you say ...
    P.S. Want to read interesting and true memories of the war? Read better the memoirs of German officers - this is much more informative. And I highly recommend to all lovers of the military theme - "Rolye company" Shumilina, which, incidentally, has never been printed on paper. Standard Soviet "memoirs" do not go to any comparison. Believe me, you will get a lot of pleasure and emotions.
    Good luck.
    1. Parahutist
      Parahutist 8 August 2017 19: 12 New
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      Since June 22, 1941, the Red Army was losing its tanks - in the tens and hundreds, from the powerful, strong and massive raids of German aircraft. From the air, the tank is an excellent target. Falling - a vertical projectile dropped from an airplane, mines are capable of hitting a tank engine located behind, and tearing down a tank’s head - a tower. This became possible due to the fact that German aviation disabled our aircraft both on the Western Front and on the South-Western Front. German aircraft bombing our airfields with airplanes, as a result, began to dominate the sky.
      1. balian
        balian 18 December 2017 07: 05 New
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        Where have you read these fantasies? :))) Do you have any idea how close the bomb should get in order to seriously damage the tank? For example, according to the documents of the Soviet 10th tank division that was fighting there from German aviation, she lost 5 light tanks there - against the background of losses for other reasons, nothing at all. Secondly, the Air Force of the South-Western Front in a border battle until July 10, 1941 - during the first 18 days of the war, it made more than 10 thousand sorties (official Soviet data), stories that Soviet aircraft were "withdrawn" no more than a Soviet myth. According to Soviet documents On June 22-30, at the airdromes, 331 aircraft were lost destroyed and damaged (to be repaired) —for the number of front-line Soviet aviation — 1600 aircraft — these are insignificant losses. For example, according to the report of the South-Western Front Air Force headquarters, only on June 28 to the battlefield under Dubno to German positions, Soviet aviation made more than 400 sorties, losing only 5 planes shot down, the report noted that German aviation was not active .. German divisions documents also testified to massive air raids near Dubno, they complained that German aviation was not visible.
  13. zimzinov
    zimzinov 2 October 2019 00: 17 New
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    Certainly Popel is a hero. Yes, and smart. It was not enough at that time when we had such commanders. In 1941.