Storming of the residence of the head of Afghanistan Amin – the Taj Bek Palace
So, cuckoo, wait a minute,
I'm giving away someone else's share.
A soldier has eternity ahead of him,
Don't confuse it with old age....
Lyrics from the song "Cuckoo"
“The very first minutes of the assault ruined our entire carefully prepared plan.”
Commander of the assault group "Zenit" Ya.F. Semenov
Operation Storm 333
Dozens of articles and essays, as well as separate chapters in thick books, have been devoted to the description of this special operation, carried out on December 27, 1979. But, unfortunately, none of the sources can boast of sufficient clarity in the presentation of the events that took place. Moreover, if you carefully analyze the information published over the years, you will notice a lot of inconsistencies and contradictions. As they say in such cases: there are as many versions as there are storytellers.
The scope of this article does not allow me to outline the details of the entire operation “Storm 333”, which is one of the components of the “Baikal 79” SVO (this should be written about separately), but I consider it necessary to try to reconstruct at least in general terms historical the course of the main event - the actions of the assault groups solving the problem of capturing the residence.
According to one of the widespread versions (belonging to V.V. Kolesnik and repeated in his books by A.A. Lyakhovsky [5], [8]), in the first phase of the battle for the capture of the Taj-Bek residence, the Grom and Zenit groups were delivered to the palace walls along an asphalt serpentine road in ten infantry fighting vehicles of the first company of the 154th separate special forces regiment (under the command of V.S. Sharipov). During the breakthrough, the lead vehicle was hit, caught fire, the landing party abandoned it and began to climb the hill using assault ladders. The vehicle behind pushed the hit vehicle aside, and the remaining 9 infantry fighting vehicles moving behind it found themselves on the platform in front of the palace 20 minutes after the start of the assault [5].
The same version about the movement of ten infantry fighting vehicles (one of which was destroyed) is also given in the book by Yu. I. Drozdov [3].
It should be noted that these two legendary officers did not directly participate in the storming of the palace (they were at the command post), and they wrote their memoirs many years after the events described, so they could have gotten it wrong due to the time it took.
If we carefully read the memoirs recorded from the words of direct participants in the events, officers of the 154th detachment Vladimir Salimovich Sharipov and Rustamkhodzha Turdikhudzhaevich Tursunkulov [2], [6], as well as the memoirs of the commander of the Zenit group Yakov Fedorovich Semenov [9], then we can form the following version of the development of events.
(I do not set the task of describing in detail the course of the entire operation, and even more so to assess the reliability of the information presented in the sources, separating truth from fiction, therefore I will describe the events briefly and fragmentarily.).
Approximate diagram of the location and actions of the opposing sides (based on the diagram from the source [5], which was subsequently revised by the author).
The beginning of the special operation
The capture group was the first to act. tanks under the leadership of the deputy commander of the detachment, Captain Murad Taimasovich Sakhatov - 14 people from the 154th detachment (2 officers and 12 soldiers), 2 snipers from the Grom group and 2 from the Zenit group. It was tasked with capturing three tanks dug in near the palace and then blocking the tank battalion of the Afghan army.
At 19:15, Sakhatov's group (according to the plan) moved out to their objective in a GAZ-66 fifteen minutes before the assault began. When the car passed through the location of the third infantry battalion, Sakhatov discovered that an alarm had been declared there. The battalion commander and his deputies stood in the center of the parade ground. The personnel received weapon and ammunition. Having immediately assessed the situation, Sakhatov decided to capture the battalion command. The car with our scouts suddenly drove onto the parade ground, stopped abruptly near the Afghan officers, and in a matter of seconds they were already lying in the back of the GAZ-66, which immediately rushed forward, leaving a trail of dust behind it. In the first minutes, the battalion soldiers did not even understand what had happened, but then they opened fire after the retreating car. However, it was too late. Due to the dust that had risen, hiding the car, it was ineffective. Two hundred meters later, Sakhatov stopped the car and the personnel hurried, who immediately lay down and opened fire on the security soldiers who had jumped out of the barracks [5].
A battle ensued, and immediately the first irreparable loss occurred: a sniper, KGB captain Dmitry Vasilyevich Volkov, was killed.
V. V. Kolesnik, having heard the shooting, without delay gave the signal to all other groups involved to begin the operation (the signal was given by radio with three green lights rockets) [2][5]. The operation began in complete darkness, which was generally an additional positive factor for the attackers.
After the signal, two Shilka ZSUs of Senior Lieutenant Vasily Maksimovich Prauta’s platoon opened fire on the palace (two other ZSUs were operating at the location of the tank battalion) [5].
Participants in the assault on the ZSU 23-4 "Shilka" (V.M. Prauta, 5th from the left, sits on the turret)
Their tasks were to prepare fire and support attacks by assault groups. But the firing positions of the ZSU were poorly chosen, the installations were located slightly below the palace and too close to it. In addition, the installation crews worked without aiming and adjusting fire, so, according to some estimates [2], in the first phase of the battle, some of their shells fell on the path of the detachment's APC and BMP columns.
At the same time, the AGS-17 "Flame" began to operate - two grenade launchers fired at the positions of the 1st security battalion and the tank battalion, the other two - at the positions of the anti-aircraft regiment (see diagram).
The armored personnel carriers are on their way
The first to move to Taj-Bek (in violation of the plan, as ordered by Drozdov) was the assault group under the command of Lieutenant of the 154th detachment R.Kh. Tursunkulov [5][9]. The GRU special forces were given the following tasks: to deliver 28 people from the group “Zenit» to the pedestrian staircase located at the foot of the slope on the western side of the hill and leading to the main entrance to the building; take control of the exit and windows of the building, preventing attempts by the Afghans to get out of it, and protect the perimeter from enemy attacks from the outside [2] [6]. The only means of communication for the Zenit was a compact shortwave walkie-talkie radio belonging to Ya. F. Semenov. But it could only be used to contact the main leader of the entire operation, B. S. Ivanov; there was no direct connection with the immediate leader of the KGB groups, Drozdov (although it would have been more logical to give the radio to him).
The group moved on BTR-60PB - four vehicles raced straight to the palace across the off-road, which is why one of them (number 013) accidentally fell into a ditch and was immobilized. No one was hurt in the car, the driver-mechanic remained in the armored personnel carrier, the rest quickly dismounted and began to move towards the palace in rapid dashes [2][3].
The three remaining armored vehicles, in the open, continued moving toward the designated landing site under a barrage of fire. The second (along the way) armored personnel carrier was hit and caught fire. Senior Lieutenant of the KGB Boris Aleksandrovich Suvorov was killed, the others were wounded to varying degrees of severity [9]. The survivors (who could walk) made a rapid dash toward the stairs.
The lead APC with punctured wheels (where Ya. Semenov was located) managed to slip through to the lower tier of the palace, almost to the beginning of the stairs, and enter the dead zone.
The approach to the palace where Semenov's group broke through, a staircase is visible on the right side of the photo
The officers and soldiers got out of the vehicle and lay down near a stone wall, taking cover from the fire of Afghan machine guns [9]. The troops from the APC that followed also dismounted and lay down - the high density of fire did not allow them to take any other action (presumably, they were mistakenly fired at by their own "Shilkas" and the palace security units, and already on the close approaches to the building they were additionally covered by "friendly" fire from the detachment's AGS-17, which was firing at areas without correction [2]).
To reach the building, the group had to overcome three steep staircases, each at least five meters high, and two flat platforms of two meters each, under enemy fire [9].
When the intensity of the fire abated a little, the GRU and KGB special forces rose from the ground and, firing back, began to make their way toward the building, moving up the stairs. Then the officers of the Zenit group burst into the palace and joined the officers of the Grom group who were already fighting there [2].
According to Tursunkulov's recollections, he and his fighters initially guarded the approaches to the building, but then, in violation of the original plan, they were all drawn into a firefight by the "committee members" that was taking place inside the palace. And after the assault, they remained inside to guard it from possible enemy attacks [2][6].
BMPs are on their way
V.S. Sharipov's group (25 a man from the 154th Special Forces Regiment and 22 from the Grom group) moved out on an infantry fighting vehicle a little later than Tursunkulov's group. But not on 10 (as Kolesnik recalled), but on 5 cars. Sharipov was given the immediate task of delivering officers of the group to the entrance to the building.Thunder", which included E. Kozlov (in BMP #30, led personally by Sharipov) and G.I. Boyarinov (in BMP #37). After the landing of the KGB special forces, the soldiers and officers of the detachment were to take control of the exit and windows of the building, preventing the Afghans from trying to get out (so as not to give Amin the opportunity to escape), and also to protect the perimeter from enemy attacks from the outside. It was planned that both KGB groups would be delivered by the detachment's vehicles to the assembly point at the same time and would enter the building together[2].
The vehicles moved up the serpentine road at high speed, but 200 m before the landing site, the lead BMP #035 was hit (presumably by a "friendly" Shilka shell [2]), stopped, but did not catch fire. Everyone inside was wounded (the senior vehicle officer, Lieutenant Abdullaev, had his heel broken), but they managed to get out, lay down, and opened fire on the windows of the palace [2].
The remaining vehicles, without stopping, drove around the disabled BMP and rushed towards the palace building. But on the last turn of the serpentine road just before the exit to the palace site, the driver of the lead armored vehicle lost control - the BMP ran into the edge of the wall and stalled, apparently completely blocking the road. Because of this, the other vehicles stopped, and the KGB officers in them quickly dismounted, dispersed and lay down, covering themselves from the shelling with armor.
The situation became alarming: the stationary BMPs turned into tempting targets for enemy grenade launchers. Meanwhile, the intensity of small arms fire from the palace began to increase. But the riflemen of the 154th detachment in the vehicles quickly destroyed the searchlights shining from the building, and the armored vehicles were enveloped in saving darkness.
But now another danger arose: the BMPs, which had become "invisible", could accidentally cover their "Shilkas" operating just below the palace with fire. Sharipov immediately realized this and gave the drivers the order to turn on the headlights and all the side lights so that the fire support platoon could see the BMPs standing motionless. And, apparently, the platoon commander, Senior Lieutenant Prauta, noticed them and realized that the detachment's armored vehicles were stuck on the serpentine, so he transferred the fire of the "Shilkas" to the upper floors of the building [2].
The danger of being caught in "friendly fire" had passed, and in the meantime the mechanic had managed to start the engine, reverse and put the car into motion. The soldiers and officers of the two special forces instantly jumped into the cars, the column again rushed forward, quickly approached the central entrance, the officers of the "Thunder" group dismounted, lay down, then, under cover of fire from the dispersed BMPs, began to break through into the palace, where they entered into battle with Amin's guards [2][6].
By that time, the Grom group had already suffered its first irreparable losses: Captain Gennady Yegorovich Zudin and Senior Lieutenant Andrei Aleksandrovich Yakushev were killed. Apparently, by that time, the squad commander of the 3rd company of the 154th detachment, Junior Sergeant Mirkasym Shcherbekov, had also been killed.
Many machine gunners of the 154th detachment (about 10 people), having forgotten the order, rushed inside in the heat of battle together with the KGB officers and took direct part in clearing the palace [2]. And the BMPs dispersed along the wall of the building opened return fire on the soldiers of the outer ring guard located just below.
Sharipov, as the person responsible for communications with headquarters (by that time he had already received a through-and-through wound to his thigh), remained outside, repeatedly tried to contact headquarters, but never heard an answer - the radio station was silent. Soon, the detachment's radio operator, Private Shokirzhon Sulaimanov, who was next to him, was killed [6].
When the battle inside the palace had already moved to the second floor, reinforcements arrived on the platform of the building - consisting of personnel from the 154th detachment, the 3rd group in two infantry fighting vehicles (No. 041 and No. 042), senior vehicle commanders: Senior Lieutenant Egamberdiev Bakhadyr Abdumanapovich (Sharipov's deputy for technical matters) and Senior Lieutenant Abdullaev Rashid Igamberdievich (company political officer), whose driver-mechanic was Sergeant Shavkat Azamatov.
Sharipov sent them inside the building to provide assistance to the attackers, while he himself remained outside, trying to establish radio contact with the command post, which stubbornly refused to be established [2][6].
The connection suddenly appeared at the moment when Amin was no longer alive, and the last flashes of the battle were gradually dying out in certain places on the third floor [6].
What is most surprising is that no one from the 154th Special Forces or KGB special groups died in the battle inside the residence; all the irreparable losses occurred on the march and on the platform near the entrance to the building (according to some sources, G.I. Boyarinov died outside, according to others, inside).
Summing-up
Thus, two KGB assault groups took part in the direct capture of the premises of the facility: Grom (members of Group A of the 7th Directorate) and Zenit (officers of the KUOS), and GRU special forces. The KGB groups were delivered to the landing site by armored vehicles of the 154th Special Forces Regiment (on armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles), which followed in two separate columns and broke through to the palace along different routes. Each column lost one vehicle along the way: the armored personnel carrier burned down, and the infantry fighting vehicle was badly damaged. There were also casualties.
When the battle inside the building was in full swing, reinforcements from the 154th detachment were brought in, arriving in two infantry fighting vehicles.
An analysis of the sources allows us to conclude that the battle inside the building was fought by 47 people from the KGB special forces and about 40 people from the 154th Special Forces.
If we take as a basis the data on the number of defenders of the palace 200 people [9], then in the battle inside the building the numerical ratio between the attackers and defenders was 1:2,3. The overall ratio of forces during the operation was 1:6 [9].
The attackers had better protection (the KGB officers wore heavy bulletproof vests), while the defenders had a thorough knowledge of the palace’s layout and a tactical advantage in defending the second floor and attic spaces (the attackers had to move up the stairs).
The presence of the ZSU should probably be taken into account as a factor that both helps and hinders both (the "Shilkas" several times transferred fire to the area in front of the palace, therefore, they could hit their own [3]). But, of course, to a greater extent, the fire from the installations hindered the defenders.
The fighting inside the residence did not develop exactly as the capture plan had determined. As Ya. Semenov aptly put it: “The very first minutes of the assault ruined our entire carefully prepared plan.».
They had to act according to the situation, and one of the results of such a development of events was the involvement of servicemen of the 154th detachment in the inner-palace battle, who had neither bulletproof vests, nor helmets, nor predetermined places and tasks in the battle. And they did not even have any clearly distinguishable signs that distinguished them from the defending Afghans (at least their Slavic appearance). To the credit of the GRU special forces, it is worth noting that not one of them left the battle, even after being wounded, all fought courageously and to the very end.
This version does not claim to be the ultimate truth, but at least it reconciles almost all the contradictions and fills in the omissions found in the memoirs of the leaders and direct participants of Operation Storm 333.
Assessing the above events, one can only be surprised once again that in this very difficult battle, where everything went wrong from the very beginning, the assault groups suffered such small losses. Apparently, the highest combat and moral training of the assault participants played a role here - the USSR knew how to prepare special units. Well, and not without a certain influence of luck.
Despite the fact that for many of the participants in the assault this was their first firefight in their lives, no one was afraid or faint-hearted, everyone acted in a coordinated, skillful, selfless manner, so the assigned combat mission was accomplished more than successfully. The soldiers, sergeants and officers proved themselves to be worthy successors of the military glory won by their grandfathers and fathers, who had defeated the most powerful army in the world in a difficult war. And once again they clearly demonstrated that there were no army units in the world that, even with multiple superiority in forces, means and tactical position, could withstand the friendly onslaught of Soviet special forces.
This battle subsequently entered many special forces textbooks as an example of one of the most successful and effectively conducted special operations.
About how heroes did not become Heroes
The topic of rewarding the participants of this assault is usually presented extremely sparingly.
Four people received the title Hero of the Soviet Union: three from the KGB - G. I. Boyarinov (posthumously), E. G. Kozlov and V. F. Karpushin, and one from the GRU - V. V. Kolesnik.
But no one from the 154th Special Forces Brigade became a Hero of the USSR. Not R.Kh. Tursunkulov, who delivered the officers of the Zenit group to the landing site under a barrage of fire and then personally took part in clearing the palace premises. Not V.S. Sharipov, who led a column of infantry fighting vehicles and, in the most difficult conditions, having lost one vehicle along the way, nevertheless delivered the personnel of the Grom group to the entrance to the palace.
And Sakhatov and his fighters, although they did not directly participate in the storming of the palace itself, also solved a very important task - they captured tanks located near the residence. It is not difficult to imagine what would have happened to the BMP of Sharipov's group if these tanks had opened fire on them.
Well, and many of the detachment’s fighters, during the operation, more than once, risking their lives (and being wounded), performed brave and, most importantly, very necessary actions for the success of the common cause, which in books about the war are called by the loud word “feat”.
Why didn't any of them receive an award?
According to the recollections of some participants in the events, after the battle, in accordance with an old military tradition, the KGB officers, as winners, took some objects from the palace rooms as commemorative trophies. After all, the interior of the residence was actually a battlefield for them.
Some of the Musbatovites did not remain on the sidelines either - many filled their pockets with local money, "Afghanis", lying around everywhere [2][6], hoping to buy something for themselves in the "dukhans" later. But nothing came of this venture.
The secretary of the party organization of the detachment, Senior Lieutenant A. G. Rashidov, did not participate directly in the combat operations on 27.12, but was counting on receiving an order. But he was only nominated for a medal, so he took offense at everyone and wrote a report to his superiors outlining the facts of the alleged looting that was unworthy of a valiant Soviet soldier [2], [6].
The question of whether a soldier who, following orders from his command, risked his life to carry out a coup d'etat in a foreign country, and after the battle put a pack of "unattended" Afghans or foreign watches lying on the floor of the residence in his pocket, can be called a looter remains debatable. However, the "dirty wave" raised by the party organizer reached the high generals of the Ministry of Defense and even (according to rumors) the Central Committee. As a result, all nominations for the title of Hero of the USSR were rejected, and the candidates for Hero received awards of a lower rank - the Order of Lenin.
They didn’t bother to sort out the personalities; the performance was even turned down for Sharipov, who didn’t take part in the “trophy collection” and who didn’t make it into the palace after the battle – he was immediately taken to the hospital.
As a result, for the heroism displayed in Operation Storm 333 during the storming of Amin's Taj Bek palace, the title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to three KGB officers and only one serviceman from the GRU General Staff.
Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Ulyanovich Shvets was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
It can be assumed that the scandal with the trophies also ricocheted on the KGB officers: for unknown reasons, the title of Hero was not received by the commanders of the Grom and Zenit groups, and the head of the operation along the KGB line, Yu. I. Drozdov, was also “bypassed”.
There is information that as a result of Operation Storm 333, 400 state security officers were awarded[3], although only about 50 participated directly in the storming of the palace.
They also rewarded the chief military adviser Magometov, who did not sign the operation plan, and presented him with the highest award of the Motherland - the Order of Lenin.
Awards of the 154th separate special forces unit: 283 people received the medals “For Military Merit” and “For Courage”, 7 received the Order of Lenin, 30 received the Order of the Red Banner, 43 received the Order of the Red Star (a total of 363 people).
The Order of Lenin was awarded to: Major Kholbaev Khabibjan Tadjibaevich, Captain Sakhatov Murad Taimasovich, Captain Djamolov Ashur, Senior Lieutenant Baikhambaev Makhamodzhon Karimovich, Senior Lieutenant Prauta Vasily Maksimovich, Senior Lieutenant Sharipov Vladimir Salimovich, Lieutenant Tursunkulov Rustamkhodzha Turdikhudzhaevich.
And not a single Gold Star [2].
There are also other reports. For example, V.V. Kolesnik later recalled:
"...Seven people were awarded the Order of Lenin, including Khalbaev and Sakhatov, although I nominated him for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Twenty people were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, among them was O. U. Shvets. About sixty people were awarded the Order of the Red Star and almost three hundred people were awarded the medals For Courage and For Military Merit. In total, three hundred and seventy people were awarded"[5].
However, none of the participants in this legendary battle from the 154th Special Forces even thought about awards. The country called people into the army, the country highly appreciated them and showed trust by sending them to serve in the special forces, the country sent them to Afghanistan and set a difficult combat mission. And once the mission is set, it must be solved, and if necessary - not sparing their blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over the enemies.
It may seem strange now, but at that time many young men and women serving in the army thought exactly like that. People were not like they are now, and for many servicemen the phrase "to fulfill one's military duty with honor" did not seem false or pompous at all. And the soldiers and commanders of the unit fulfilled this duty with honor and to the end. Therefore, the best reward for them was that in the most difficult battle they won, remained alive and covered themselves with military glory...
And this battle laid the foundation for an extensive, but never fully completed chronicle, telling of the heroic actions of the GRU special forces units in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan...
Bibliography
[1] Andogsky A.I., Drozdov Yu.I., Kurilov V.N., Bakhturin S.G. Afghan, Afghan again...
[2] Belyaev E.V. Muslim Battalion. Eksmo Publishing House, 2012.
[3] Drozdov Yu.I. Fiction excluded.
[4] Kikeshev N.I. Get up and go. Moscow: Onyx Publishing House, 2010.
[5] Kozlov S. Spetsnaz GRU. Fifty years of history, twenty years of war. 3rd ed. - "Russian panorama" 2002, pp. 100-115.
[6] Kozlov S. Spetsnaz GRU-2. The war is not over, history continues. "Russian Panorama" 2002, pp. 107-131.
[7] Lyakhovsky A.A. Secrets of the Afghan War.
[8] Lyakhovsky A.A. Tragedy and valor of Afghanistan.
[9] Semenov Ya.F. Life without a draft. Memories of a KGB colonel of the USSR. Moscow, 1995.
Information