A possible foothold in Libya. A valuable resource, but how much will the price tag say?
For several days, the Internet and the media have been actively discussing new satellite images of Libyan bases, where Russian transport activity is recorded. aviation and some loading and unloading work. Can we now say: "Well, here's Libya, hello again"?
Apparently, yes. But what comes next, here we can quote the words of one of the characters in the film "The Fountain" from the time of late perestroika: "Is it good? I don't know. Is it bad? I'm not sure."
In any case, it is impossible to quickly transport large military and household equipment from Syria to Russia under current conditions. The Libyan bases here are indeed a good option in terms of airlifting some of the equipment, although it cannot be said that this route is close. The distance from Khmeimim to the Libyan bases is 1800–2000 km.
The leader in the eastern part of Libya, H. Haftar, is not an ally for Russia, like the former President of Syria B. Assad (however, it now turns out that he was someone else), but a fellow traveler. From a certain point of view, one can even find a hypothetical plus in this, since relations between political fellow travelers are always more formalized (even if not publicly).
Current news from Libya in the mass media segment has not passed for a long time, so it is time to look at the state of affairs in this difficult part of world geography. Our fellow traveler in Libya will be (if everything finally goes that way) very peculiar, and it will be much more difficult for Russia to work there than in Syria.
West, East and Oil Infrastructure
Libya is de facto still divided into two parts - western (Tripolitania, capital Tripoli) and eastern (Cyrenaica, de facto capital Benghazi), or rather, the second part would be more correctly, although not very normal, called "eastern-southern Libya".
The Libyan government, formally recognized by the “world community,” sits in the capital, Tripoli, but in fact the country has a dual power structure that has already become traditional, which is only partially retouched through the functioning elected bodies of power, such as the House of Representatives, although it essentially represents Benghazi.
The political struggle for the prime minister's seat and finances is tough and constant, turning into armed clashes, but, strangely enough, neither ideologically nor even taking into account the positions of external sponsors and partners, the "West" and "East" are completely irreconcilable. This is now a kind of dynamic balance.
Somehow this structure holds together, and this bond, although completely soulless, is oil. Libya, unlike Iraq, did not seriously lose its infrastructure during the active phases of the war, but it was distributed in a rather specific way.
Since 2022, the average production of black gold in Libya has been characterized by indicators of 1,1-1,2 million barrels per day.
The "collective Tripoli" has the "El-Sharaa", "El-Fil" and offshore "Buri" fields, which gives about 400 thousand barrels per day or 35% of the total. The "collective Benghazi" with the leadership of H. Haftar has the "Sirte Crescent" fields, with the main ones being "Serir", "Waha" and "Selten". Only the last three give 590 thousand barrels per day or 51% of the total. Taking into account the entire cluster, Benghazi has almost 60% of Libyan production. Formally, the "Cyrenaica team" wins here.
It is not enough to extract oil, it also needs to be transported and shipped. As strange as it may seem, everything is more or less normal with the pipes in Libya, the issue is with the loading terminals. 70% of the current loading capacity of Libya as a whole (750 thousand barrels per day) falls on the ports of Ras Lanuf, Es Sidr, Marsa Brega, Hariga and Zuwetin, and they again end up in the zone of influence of Benghazi.
Tripoli, with its two ports (like Melita) in the west, has 2,5 times weaker storage and shipping capacity. It is unrealistic to build new terminals in such conditions.
The infrastructure is the same as that inherited from the "terrible dictator and tyrant" M. Gaddafi, and, naturally, was not designed for such a military scenario. It turns out that here too the "Cyrenaic team" is in the black.
It would seem that we have our own oil (and more of it than in the West), we have our own pipes and pumps, we have storage, we have ports, so what is missing for prosperity and a simple separation of the eastern part of Libya from the western?
To prosper, there is just one little thing missing: money, since oil can only be traded officially by the “NOC” – the national Libyan operator, which sends revenue to the central bank.
There were two central banks in Libya, as well as two authorities, and two NOCs, but the Benghazi NOC cannot officially sell oil - only through the NOC, joint with Tripoli, and only the official Central Bank can receive external money. As a result, the NOC and the Central Bank had to be merged.
Over the past few years, there have been attempts to ship independently and somehow receive money from Benghazi. The EU and the US threatened the UAE on this matter, which helped in this matter and even actively at one time.
This turned out to be very inconvenient technically, under the threat of sanctions, and neither Benghazi nor their sponsors decided to take the risk. But Tripoli no longer had any special methods of coercion.
Exploration, production and exploitation of infrastructure, as well as concessions for sale in Libya from the French Total with some participation from Conoco (USA) and the Italian ENI.
In fact, Tripoli offers participation to everyone: Russia, China, and India, but the main operators and investors are still France and Italy. It is clear that they do not cooperate directly with Benghazi, but work through official structures in Tripoli and the recognized "NOC" with subsidiaries.
As a result, some have the ability to ensure market settlements and status in order to avoid sanctions, the ability to attract mining companies to concessions, while others have volumes and terminals.
This is, in fact, the “bond” that holds the Libyan west and east in a common space. In financial terms, the bond is not so lightweight – Libya receives $13,3–13,5 billion a year from concessions (this is 2022–2024), or 33–34% of oil revenues.
After deducting operating costs and necessary depreciation, this is just a fair half of the market price of Libyan oil, which has high quality characteristics. It cannot be said that the greedy European capitalist does not share with Libya.
It is divided, but it is not enough to “fairly” divide $13 billion between the West and the East; it is also necessary to establish and agree on the shares of authoritative and irreplaceable players within the West and the East. And each wing has its own, and the interests there are not only Libyan, but also third-party.
Military-political division and forces
The personalities who represented (represent) the Libyan West and East are generally well known in Russia through the press: in the first case, it is the former Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli Fayez al-Sarraj, in the second case, it is the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Marshal Khalifa Haftar. F. al-Sarraj has already been replaced, while H. Haftar continues to work as the patriarch of the Libyan East.
The forces subordinated to Tripoli and Benghazi are not something united and united by tribal or any other principle. In each case, it is a collection of different military brigades. Nevertheless, there is a connection to the locality, and religious and ideological differences are also present.
The division of forces took place in four stages, two of which were the struggle for the central coast - the city of Sirte and the city of Misurata. The first was the stage after the overthrow of M. Gaddafi. The second was the struggle for the city of Sirte with ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation), then the city and its surroundings remained with the GNA.
The third stage is K. Haftar's fight for Tripoli. The city of Misurata opened the way to Tripoli, the city of Sirte was the key to oil reserves and shipping ports. K. Haftar's forces managed to take Sirte, and clear out the surrounding areas and another oil transit center (Ajdabiya). There, on the side of K. Haftar, the forces of the Russian "W" group took part and played one of the main roles.
Misurata and Tripoli did not yield to the marshal due to the direct intervention of Turkey, which sided with the GNA. Units disloyal to Haftar moved to the western half, ISIS (banned in Russia), which had settled there using its characteristic tactics of taking trade hubs, was pushed out into the desert and dissolved for the time being. The fourth stage is the current one and is more political.
As a result, in addition to the Tobruk and Benghazi units, H. Haftar has a "combat guard" left, which consists of the remnants of the special forces recruited under Gaddafi, units from Sirte itself that are quite loyal to him, "combat Salafis" from the forces of the supporters of the preacher R. al-Madkhali ("Madkhalites"). By and large, the Sirte forces and the "Madkhalites" are one and the same in terms of brigades. The backbone of this army is 9 thousand "bayonets", with the possibility of recruiting 8-9 thousand "units" from the militias of the controlled territories.
An important companion on his difficult military-political path for K. Haftar are the tribal and territorial militias that control the El Kufr oases and the borders with Chad, southern Egypt and northwestern Sudan.
These are also radical Salafists, oriented, like the Madkhalis, towards Saudi Arabia, which is located in a very profitable place in terms of caravan trade, while at the same time they have nipped in the bud the local version of Islam (also, by today's standards, of the Salafist persuasion) - the Senussi.
The descendant of the founder of this religious order was the first and only king of Libya (Idris I), who was overthrown by the Jamahiriya. The Senussi are active, there are many of them in the western part of Libya, the al-Senussi family is formally rehabilitated and is related to Libyan politics.
On the western side, we can see the same conglomerate of Tripoli and Misurata units, where the brigades associated with such territories as Zintan (Zintan Brigades), Ghadames, Zawiya, and the huge southwestern region of Fizzan with the cities of Sabha and Mazruk have influence. The GNA and Tripoli as a whole are supported by forces associated with the Muslim Brotherhood movement (banned in Russia).
If in Turkey there is R. Erdogan's party "Justice and Development Party", then in Libya there is "Justice and Construction Party". The GNA (collective Tripoli) several times entered into confrontation with the Zintan brigades, which sometimes leaned towards H. Haftar, but then turned back. Similarly, the tribal brigades of Fezzan (a conglomerate of "Tubu" tribes) sometimes supported Tripoli, sometimes Benghazi, and eventually, against the backdrop of the purges against heretics in El Kufra, they stood for Tripoli. The forces of the parties are approximately equal in numbers, but the forces of H. Haftar are somewhat more resistant to problems.
Kaleidoscope for 2024
F. Saraj ultimately failed to cope with the hardships and deprivations of politics, handing over the post to the openly pro-Turkish politician A. Dbeibeh. But H. Haftar's protégé, F. Bashagha, did not last long in the seat of the general prime minister. The post of prime minister was contested twice in three years and as a result of the struggle, it was quite logical, as was everything else, to be divided between H. Haftar in the person of the former finance minister Osama Hammad and A. Dbeibeh.
This whole kaleidoscope still depends on who and how will distribute oil money. Since 2022, the struggle has been more in the political field and precisely because the oil "pumps" are working. It is the fact that they are working and not standing still that makes the situation, although dynamic, balanced. Moreover, now Libya is part of the oil market with its volumes, Libyan exports are taken into account in price calculations and OPEC+ plans.
The bottom line is that there is the PNA with Prime Minister A. Dbeibah, the House of Representatives in Tobruk with a separate Prime Minister U. Hammad. The former has Turkey and Qatar in the military and ideological-religious sphere, Italy and France as conductors of oil deals and borders with Algeria and Niger with very relative control.
Tripoli's forces are very heterogeneous and sensitive to monetary fluctuations. The second player has oil, pipes and ports with the eastern border, more homogeneous forces, slightly less (but only) sensitive to monetary fluctuations, as well as the support of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and partly Egypt.
This entire deserted military-political vaudeville is much more complicated than what happened in Syria. On the one hand, in Libya there are almost irreconcilable supporters of the Qatari-Turkish Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi "Salafis". However, in general, we see that local Salafis are on both sides, brigades go back and forth, the militias of the south, the southeast, the southwest can also take the side of both the west and the east.
Both the West of Libya and the East of Libya are forced to somehow negotiate about oil money, and if until 2020-2021 they could still play the game of "who-whom", then after, when the oil industry started working, it became dangerous for each of the parties. The valve can be shut off everywhere, in one case in money, in another case in physical raw materials. Moreover, in Tripoli this can be done by dissatisfied tribes - Tubu and Tuaregs. That is, this is a kind of dynamic balance, which neither party will want to seriously violate.
It is quite logical that Turkey took over the port of Homs, turning it into a military base. In this way, it covers both Misurata and Tripoli at the same time. It is also already clear that Turkey needs not only Libyan resources, but also the establishment of control over the border with Niger, Chad and Sudan - this is how the noose is stretched around Egypt for the future, and for this purpose, Ankara is building a military base in Sudan, and is conducting military-technical cooperation with Niger and Chad, which is growing.
Of course, everything that is happening is just a pale shadow of the "mighty French plan" to defeat M. Gaddafi, where France and Qatar in theory emerged as full beneficiaries in North Africa (after all, the "Arab Spring" began in Tunisia, and M. Morsi's government came to power in Egypt). Now Turkey and France are in conflict, the EU in general and Italy in particular do not welcome Turkey's strengthening in Libya. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which support H. Haftar, are also against it. This is the balance that has been established over several years.
For Russia
Now let's look at the situation of Russia, which could really use jump-off bases in Libya like the Al-Jufra airbase (this is a district of the city of Hun) and one of the ports. When the "W" group fought in Libya, it represented a large commercial project, which in general, although not in everything, was synergistic with state policy.
The logic of the work of the state and the military corporation are different. For example, in Sudan the corporation supported M. Daglo's forces (SBR) more, and Moscow as a foreign policy player of a different plan is limited in such steps. Also, the corporation could "work" with H. Haftar in a variety of ways, and Moscow as an official player is limited in methods.
In Libya, Russia as a state is coming into the existing balance of power, and it will be necessary to integrate into it precisely as part of the official balance of power. This means working with both Tripoli and Benghazi. But who sits on the financial valve in Libya? France and Italy.
H. Haftar really needs good weapons against the threat from Turkey, Defense and specialists, and Moscow can sell them directly or indirectly, but if Russia is there as part of official policy (military bases), then this plus in weapons is already a violation of the balance.
France and Italy, through the US, can cause a financial crisis in Libya for six months, and how can Moscow stop it? Somehow in conjunction with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but they have not sought to create a parallel market before. And what player is still standing aside? The US. And they have not even begun to make policy in Libya yet. They have been looking around for several years, giving it to France and the Arabs, this year they have no time for this, but would they in principle miss the opportunity to influence such an important area, especially knowing that they can raise the price for Russia?
Actually, that is why the preamble to this long material included a phrase from the film: “Is it good? I don’t know. Is it bad? I’m not sure.” The fact that we have the opportunity to withdraw some of our resources and forces from Syria is definitely good, but there is also a price to pay, which cannot be resolved using a method accessible to a military corporation.
Tripoli Prime Minister A. Dbeibah has already made statements that Russia's increased presence is an infringement on Libya's sovereignty and is generally a grim matter. This is understandable, and no one expected anything else.
But there is another player - Turkey, which can ask for something important and useful for itself in politics. Turkey can "render a favor", as it has done more than once, because Ankara is our partner and neighbor. It seems kind. Here in Syria it nobly renders a favor. But if you look into it, there is a bill somewhere for all the services.
There was a big war in Syria, but the situation was simpler for the state - our bases were part of the official policy and part of the balance of power, which also had official boundaries. In Libya, to create such conditions, it would be necessary to pay both Tripoli and Turkey, and not far away are the USA and "friendly" France.
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