Reassessing the Arsenals: Whose Side Has the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Advantage?
Four to one
It is worth starting with a paradoxical thought. Despite the fact that the danger of nuclear war is about to be literally touched by hands, there is a special meaning in using weapon mass destruction is absent. With reservations, as always. We are talking about tactical nuclear weapons and so far only about the theater of military operations in Ukraine. It's all about the dispersal of combat formations on both sides of the front.
Tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) were initially developed as a tool to compensate for the shortage of personnel and combat equipment. At one time, NATO was very afraid of the well-equipped and numerous Soviet Army, which is why it was forced to maintain a solid arsenal of TNW. The Soviet Union, among other things, counted on similar weapons in a possible conflict with China. Tactical nuclear strikes on the enemy were supposed to knock out a good share of personnel, which the Chinese had in excess. For all the designated scenarios, classical methods of waging war were assumed with the concentration of a huge amount of equipment and military personnel in the direction of the main attack. These were the targets for which tactical nuclear weapons were practiced.
The events of the special operation forced us to abandon any concentration of personnel. This is true both for the front line and for the deep rear. Therefore, if we are talking about the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Ukrainian army, then we will have to carry out a whole series of strikes. Otherwise, there is no point in talking about military expediency - a single strike would be another political statement. A series of successive strikes along the front line can really thin out the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but many civilians will die with it. Let us recall that now most of the events of the special operation are unfolding in new territories of Russia, that is, civilians on the other side of the front are potential Russian citizens.
Another matter is tactical nuclear weapons for European military purposes. If NATO openly talks about the inevitability of war with Russia almost in the current decade, then maybe it is not worth waiting and striking first? For the Americans, for example, one of the options for using tactical nuclear weapons is "de-escalation of a hypothetical conflict." However, we will leave all discussions about the advisability of strikes on Europe or the United States to the highest military-political leadership of Russia. The main thing in this situation is to understand how our Armed Forces can unpleasantly surprise the enemy.
Little more than nothing is known about the TNW stockpiles of Russia and the United States. Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, no one has counted tactical ammunition. The last attempt to limit TNW took place in 1991 on the initiative of Mikhail Gorbachev. Already in the status of President of the USSR, he proposed to the Americans to mirror the reduction of tactical special ammunition on warships, submarines, aircraft and systems Defense. The last position requires clarification. Special combat units of anti-aircraft missiles could be used to repel a massive enemy attack, and also allowed reaching the enemy's satellite group. Most likely, a considerable part of the TNW from the air defense is still stored in warehouses.
After years 1991 story with mutual limitations of tactical nuclear weapons of Russia and the USA is shrouded in darkness. It seems that the Americans have reduced their ammunition from 11,5 thousand to 500. About two hundred B-61 type aerial bombs (modifications -3; -4; -10) are now in Europe - in Germany (Büchel, more than 20 units), Italy (Aviano and Ghedi, 70-110 units), Belgium (Klein-Brogel, 10-20 units), the Netherlands (Volkel, 10-20 units) and Turkey (Incirlik, 50-90 units). The Pentagon keeps a hundred bombs in reserve. Another hundred "Tomahawks" with a special warhead are at the disposal of the Navy fleet USA. But no one can verify the veracity of these figures. The Russian leadership declares an eleven-fold reduction in arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons. From 1991 to 2011, stockpiles decreased from a gigantic 22 thousand charges to two thousand.
At present, according to the publication “Moscow University Bulletin. Series 25. International Relations and Politics”, the Russian arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons presumably includes:
– about 500 warheads for Tu-22M3 medium-range bombers and Su-24 and Su-27IB/Su-34 frontline bombers;
- about 300 aviation missiles and bombs of naval aviation;
– about 500 anti-ship, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft missiles (including up to 250 long-range sea-based nuclear cruise missiles);
– about 630 warheads on S-300, S-400 anti-aircraft missiles and other air defense systems.
Data is given for 2011.
Escalation
As mentioned above, there is currently no urgent need to use TNW in Ukraine. The same cannot be said about military facilities on the territory of NATO countries. The principle here is quite simple - the more enemy units are deployed near the Russian border, the more nuclear bombs and Iskanders will appear nearby. Russia is a priori incapable of fighting the entire NATO bloc on equal terms - there are not enough human or material resources. That is why the stake is placed on TNW. That is why Russian special munitions are deployed in Belarus.
Potential targets for the Russian Oreshnik
The enemy is not standing still. Firstly, the production of B61-12 nuclear bombs is actively increasing and American bases in Europe are being re-equipped with them. This high-precision guided bomb is currently considered the most dangerous non-strategic munition of the US Army. The next modification, the B61-13, with an enlarged warhead from the 7th version and a correction system from the 12th, is on the way. The capacity of the promising product will exceed 340 kilotons, which allows the bomb to be considered a strategic weapon.
Secondly, nuclear weapons are gradually approaching the borders of Russia, which cannot be considered anything other than a stage of escalation. Forward airfields in Poland (Malbork, Lask, Minsk-Mazowiecki air bases, etc.) and the Baltic states (Zokniai, Lielvarde, Emari air bases) have been prepared for the relocation of carrier aircraft and special munitions. Speaking of aircraft, there are about four hundred potential carriers of the B61 family of aerial bombs in Europe. Some commentators say that nuclear missiles for the S-300 and S-400 systems have been removed from combat duty in Russia. It seems that it is high time to return the special products to our anti-aircraft gunners.
Another sign of the coming escalation is the unrest in the West regarding the imbalance in the number of TNWs between the US and Russia. Abroad, they claim that America has 250 nuclear weapons. This is two times less than previously mentioned. Where the Pentagon hid another 250 items is not mentioned. The story being promoted about Russia's almost tenfold advantage in TNWs is nothing more than a call to launch the Western military-industrial complex machine. To rearm as quickly as possible with the latest B61-12 and bring the 13th version to combat readiness. The media is working in unison with the provisions of the "Nuclear Posture Review" dated 2022. In this document, the Americans state that "US competitors continue to expand, diversify, and modernize their nuclear forces, while increasing dependence on nuclear weapons."
The tactical nuclear arms race has officially started. It is most dangerous because of the almost complete lack of control on both sides. Russia currently has a serious advantage, but it could melt away in a matter of years. And then it will be very difficult for NATO to resist the temptation to launch a disarming first strike. Especially since preparations for it have already begun.
Information