Shells and Armor of the Russo-Japanese War. Lessons and Conclusions
Well, the year 2024 is coming to an end. And with it, the cycle dedicated to the projectile and armor of the Russo-Japanese War era is coming to an end. All the calculations, tables of armor penetration and range of Japanese ships have already been presented by me in previous materials. In this article, I will share with the esteemed readers the conclusions that I personally made. Everything that I will say below is not the ultimate truth. It was not in vain that I scrupulously wrote out all the assumptions that I made in certain calculations, so that everyone can decide for themselves where I was right and where I was wrong, and draw conclusions different from mine.
But let's get down to business!
On the evolution of projectiles and armor in the Russian Empire
Russian Imperial fleet made significant efforts to ensure that his warships of the late 19th and early 20th centuries received the most advanced armor and means of destroying it – high-quality armor-piercing shells.
The Russian Empire, not being a leader in technical progress, acquired (and sometimes obtained by other means, indicated by the combination of the words "industrial" and "espionage", but mostly acquired) the latest and most advanced developments, mastered their production at domestic factories and, having gained the necessary experience, developed the obtained technologies independently. The Naval Ministry responded promptly to the appearance of Harvey's armor and reproduced its production in Russia. Later, "Harveyization" technologies were improved abroad, which is why this armor became much more durable (the so-called "double forging"). In Russia, it was apparently not made. However, this shortcoming was compensated by the rapid development of the production of even higher quality protection: we are talking, of course, about Krupp armor.
As a result, despite the fact that the Japanese fleet used the services of recognized leaders in naval affairs, of the six 1st class battleships with which they entered the war, only one, the Mikasa, was protected by Krupp armor (although it cannot be ruled out that the Asahi was at least partially protected by it). At the same time, of the seven Russian squadron battleships of the Port Arthur squadron, four ships were protected by Krupp armor: the Retvizan, Tsesarevich, Pobeda, and Poltava.
This result was achieved thanks to the energy of our naval leadership: it not only demanded that foreign suppliers use the best armor, which was Krupp's at that time, but also achieved, regardless of costs, the development of the production of this armor under license at domestic industrial facilities. It should be noted that the qualitative improvement of Russian armor occurred against the background of a sharp increase in its production volumes.
In Russia, they also approached the creation of high-quality shells capable of penetrating the thickest armor with all possible responsibility. They did not skimp on armor-piercing shells, making them from high-quality steel, and the testing methods for accepting shells into the treasury were constantly being improved. They tried to improve the armor-piercing properties of shells by using "Makarov caps", with which they conducted many tests.
In addition to the armor-piercing qualities of the shells, the Russian Imperial Navy made considerable efforts to equip them with a suitable explosive. Pyroxylin cannot be called an ideal "filler" for an armor-piercing shell, it had its drawbacks, but, without a doubt, among the explosives known at that time, it was a good, and perhaps even the best choice. A fuse (Brink's tube) suitable for this type of ammunition was also created, ensuring the detonation of the shell behind the penetrated armor and fully meeting the purpose of the armor-piercing shell.
It is impossible to deny the great progress of the Russian Empire in improving armor and projectiles in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. But it is also impossible not to note the most serious mistakes made by our naval ministry.
Penetration tests were conducted regularly, but there was no money to test the destructive power of the new steel shells. But it is not enough to penetrate the armor; you also need to damage the enemy ship behind it. And the decision to equip 12-inch armor-piercing shells with smokeless powder and tubes of the 1894 model seems completely inexplicable, as a result of which they completely lost their armor-piercing status, turning into very weak semi-armor-piercing ammunition.
Conditions for the success of armor-piercing shells of the Russian Imperial Navy
Theoretically, Russian large-caliber armor-piercing shells (10-12 inch) could well have become weapons victories in the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War. They were capable of inflicting decisive damage on the Japanese armored ships of the 1st and 2nd combat detachments. But only if two conditions were met:
1. Equipping not only 10-inch, but also 12-inch armor-piercing shells with pyroxylin and Brink tubes;
2. Formation of Russian squadrons of battleships, at a minimum not inferior, but preferably superior in speed to the ships of the main forces of the United Fleet.
The first condition was not met, Russian 12-inch shells received gunpowder filling and tubes of the 1894 model. That is, fuses suitable for high-explosive, or at best, semi-armor-piercing shells. At the same time, it can be safely stated that there were no insurmountable obstacles to equipping 12-inch shells with pyroxylin and Brink tubes - single ammunition of this caliber was equipped with pyroxylin and used in tests at least since 1904, and most likely - much earlier. It can be assumed that the rejection of pyroxylin equipping of the main weapons of the fleet was caused either by saving on the cost of shells, or by saving on technological equipment that allows for the production of pyroxylin equipment for them on an industrial scale.
It can be argued that the Russian Imperial Navy could have received 12-inch shells with a Brink tube before the Russo-Japanese War in sufficient quantities - this was entirely within the capabilities of our Naval Ministry. But the second condition could not have been fulfilled by the efforts of the Naval Ministry in any way and completely.
Both the 1st and 2nd Pacific Squadrons were a "hodgepodge" of modern battleships designed for a speed of 17,8-18,6 knots, and relatively old ships whose maximum speed during acceptance trials was 16-17 knots. No amount of trickery or shuffling of the budgets allocated to the Naval Ministry could have assembled an "18-knot" squadron in the Far East by the start of the Russo-Japanese War that would have been able to give a general battle to 6 first-class battleships and 6 armored cruisers of the Combined Fleet with a chance of success. And it was just as impossible to provide the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which was going to the rescue of Port Arthur, with such ships.
But even if we assume that the Russian Empire managed to achieve some alternative-historical miracle, so that by the beginning of the war in Port Arthur there would have been Peresvet, Oslyabya, Pobeda, Retvizan, Tsarevich and an additional three or even four ships of the Borodino type, this still would not have given us a squadron equal in speed to the Japanese. The latter, planning the war, carried out the necessary repairs on the battleships and armored cruisers of the main forces in order to fight "at the peak of their form." Our ships, having just completed the passage across half the world, and based in Port Arthur and Vladivostok, which were frankly weak in terms of ship repair capacity, would hardly have been in a technical condition that would have allowed them to equal the Combined Fleet in squadron speed.
In other words, in order to achieve not even superiority, but at least approximate equality in squadron speed with the Japanese squadron, the Russian Imperial Navy had to receive completely different and much greater funding than it actually had. It was necessary not only to ensure the presence of a powerful squadron of high-speed battleships in the Far East, but also to bring the ship repair capacities of Port Arthur and Vladivostok to a qualitatively different level in comparison with what Russia had in 1904-1905.
I can only state that in the realities of the Russian Empire of the late 15th – early XNUMXth century, such a thing was absolutely impossible. Accordingly, our lag in speed was predetermined. Only the Japanese could compensate for it, if they themselves were striving to conduct a decisive battle at a distance of XNUMX cables or less. But they were not striving for this at all.
This means that our armor-piercing shells, regardless of whether they were filled with pyroxylin or not, could not decide the outcome of the Russo-Japanese confrontation at sea.
Of course, there were cases when Russian and Japanese ships converged or could have converged at a distance of 20 cables or less. But such approaches were short-lived. As has been said many times before, in order to use armor-piercing shells, it was necessary not only to approach the Japanese ships, but to hold them in the desired position for a long time, measured in tens of minutes. This is due to the fact that even at 15 cables it was practically impossible to accurately inflict decisive damage on the enemy. To do this, it was necessary to point the guns at the citadel, barbette or turret and fire until the theory of probability gave the "go-ahead" to hit the desired part of the enemy ship.
If not armor-piercing, then what?
Could the Russian Imperial Navy have achieved victory without having an advantage in squadron speed over the Japanese? The answer is yes, it could have. But this required not high-quality armor-piercing shells, but:
1. No savings on high-explosive shells. If the Russian Empire had found the funds for high-quality steel for them, the fleet could have received very powerful high-explosive shells of all calibers, generally similar to the shells of the 1907 model. For example, the creation of a 12-inch shell containing 20-22 kg of wet pyroxylin and equipped with a sensitive fuse was quite within the capabilities of the Russian industry. But its price would have been close to that of an armor-piercing shell.
2. Conducting tests of high-explosive shells of the “correct type” on ship structures, which would demonstrate the high destructive properties of such ammunition.
3. Understanding the importance of being able to hit an enemy at a distance of 30 kbt or more, and taking measures that follow from this understanding:
- Providing the fleet with foreign optical sights (until they learn to produce their own) and rangefinders;
- Transition to systematic training of artillerymen in shooting at a distance of 30 cables and beyond no later than 1902.
And it would also be absolutely wonderful to equip our high-explosive shells with armor-piercing tips, which would bring them even closer to the shells of the 1907 model.
In such a development, the Russian Imperial Navy would have received the materiel and certain skills in long-range shooting, as well as high-explosive shells, which would have definitely surpassed the Japanese in terms of their comprehensive effect on the enemy. With the possible exception of observability - the explosion of pyroxylin is barely noticeable, but such shells would have retained the ability to penetrate armor half their caliber thick. And even if our gunners could not demonstrate the same accuracy as their Japanese "colleagues", the power of large-caliber high-explosive shells could well tip the scales in our favor.
Could the Naval Ministry of the Russian Empire have followed this path? Alas, no. It simply did not have the funds for this. In conditions when 22,6 million rubles were required to equip the fleet ships with a second set of shells (letter signed by Vice-Admiral Avelan dated July 19, 1900, addressed to the Minister of Finance S. Yu. Witte), and only 1,3 million rubles were allocated in 1900 and 1,8 million rubles in 1903, there was not the slightest possibility of achieving mass equipping of the fleet with high-quality high-explosive shells, optical sights, intensifying the training of gunners, etc., etc.
Conclusions
Without in any way claiming to have the ultimate truth, I will risk putting forward the following theses:
1. Inflicting decisive damage on the enemy with armor-piercing shells during the Russo-Japanese War was only possible during a long fire battle at a distance of about 15 cables or less.
2. The Russian Imperial Navy had no reason to believe that the battles of the Russo-Japanese War would take place at a distance of more than 20 cables and relied on armor-piercing shells, financing the supply of high-explosive shells on a residual basis due to forced savings.
3. The Japanese reliance on combat at distances of 30 cables and more was not predictable, as it was made on the basis of completely erroneous premises. In the end, the Japanese were successful, but it was not achieved in the way they expected.
4. During the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Imperial Navy did not have the opportunity to use armor-piercing shells, since it could not form a squadron that would simultaneously have sufficient strength to defeat the main forces of the Japanese fleet and a speed not inferior to the 1st combat detachment of H. Togo.
5. The superiority of the Japanese in squadron speed along with the increase in distance artillery The battle put the Russian Imperial Fleet in a clearly losing position, since under these conditions its main weapon could not be used.
6. Before the Russo-Japanese War, the lower squadron speed of our units could not be perceived as a decisive disadvantage that would devalue armor-piercing shells. It was logical to assume that, despite their superior speed, the Japanese would seek to get closer to our battleships to use their armor-piercing shells, and therefore would fall within the range of our ammunition of the same purpose.
7. Equipping 12-inch armor-piercing shells with smokeless powder and tubes of the 1894 model instead of Brink tubes and pyroxylin did not play a significant role. Russian ships could not effectively use armor-piercing shells, regardless of the type of explosive and fuses used.
8. The main weapon of our fleet in the Russo-Japanese War was high-explosive shells, which before the war were considered auxiliary and which turned out to be of significantly worse quality than they could have been. The reason for this was economy.
9. Despite its lower squadron speed, the Russian Imperial Navy could still have achieved victory, but this required equipment (optical sights, high-quality high-explosive shells, etc.), which it did not have – again, as a result of savings.
As we know, victory has many fathers, but defeat is always an orphan. Of course, the loss of the war at sea in 1904-1905 occurred for many reasons, and not all of them were limited to the material part.
But, due to the above-mentioned reasons, in my opinion, the Russian Imperial Fleet was indeed significantly inferior to the Japanese Combined Fleet in its material part, and the “shell” issue became one of the key reasons for our defeat at sea in 1904-1905. Moreover, I estimate the influence of the “shell issue” coupled with the insufficient speed of our squadrons so highly that, again, in my opinion, it was impossible to compensate for it no matter how good the command of the 1st or 2nd Pacific Squadrons.
Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War
The defeat in the naval war of 1904-1905 taught the leadership of the Russian Empire many lessons. But I will risk highlighting two of them, which I consider the most important.
Lesson 1: It is unacceptable to economize on the main weapons of the fleet. The rejection of expensive high-explosive shells, the delay in equipping warships with optical sights, and the savings on exercises might have seemed acceptable for a fleet preparing to fight at distances of 15 cables or less. But the armed forces in general and the fleet in particular must be prepared for any scenario, including one in which the pre-war stratagems turn out to be false. They turned out to be false, but the fleet was completely unprepared for such a development.
Even leaving aside questions of strategy, one cannot skimp on the chances of inflicting damage on the enemy. If there is a possibility of inflicting losses on the enemy at a long distance, one had to learn to shoot at long distances, even if this did not give a chance to inflict decisive damage. Of course, one had to have the appropriate equipment to be able to hit the enemy at long distances as effectively as possible.
Lesson 2: When preparing armed forces for war, achievable goals should be set. After the unsuccessful Russo-Japanese War, a lot of criticism was directed at the Naval Ministry. This is, of course, correct, since the General-Admiral and the department he headed really did make many mistakes in the process of preparing for the war.
But the whole point is that it was impossible to expect a fundamentally different result with the funds allocated for the construction and maintenance of the Russian Imperial Fleet. While our fleet was relatively small, the budget of the Naval Ministry could still ensure its functioning according to the Makarov principle "at sea - means at home!" However, the tasks assigned to the fleet put the leadership of the Naval Ministry before dilemmas that it could not resolve in principle within the budgets allocated to it.
Politics required a fleet equal to the Japanese in the Far East, but such a requirement could only be met with a sharp, explosive increase in the number of squadron battleships, armored cruisers, and all other classes of warships. Even for this, the Russian Empire did not have enough money: despite the absolutely sensible and prophetic demand of the admirals to assemble a fleet of the required size, in 1903, at the insistence of the Minister of Finance, shipbuilding programs were extended until 1905.
The lack of budgets meant that shipbuilding programs were not up to the challenge of the threat that needed to be countered. But even so, there were still not enough funds to prepare the fleets that were being created. What kind of intensification of combat training could we talk about if we had to resort to such a blatant measure as putting warships into reserve? When ships of the active fleet were laid up for several months to save money?
How can one demand that the Naval Ministry be concerned with high-quality and expensive high-explosive shells when it could not beg for money for a second set of ammunition?
In my opinion, the fundamental problem of the Russian Imperial Navy was that the budget of the Navy Ministry, no matter how you look at it, remained "Trishka's coat". As of 1895, to prepare for war, it was necessary to:
1. To sharply increase the size of the fleet.
2. Create and obtain the highest quality equipment – shells, sights, etc.
3. Intensify crew training.
But the money allocated for this was obviously too little! They tried to build more ships, putting up with savings on shells and exercises, but still got insufficient. Considering that Peresvet and Pobeda should have been considered more as armored cruisers than squadron battleships, the Pacific Ocean Squadron at the beginning of the war was inferior to the Japanese fleet in all classes of warships. Well, if they had concentrated on shells and exercises, they would have had to reduce the already insufficient number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers concentrated in Vladivostok and Port Arthur...
In view of the above, it may seem that the root cause of the loss of the Russo-Japanese War at sea should be sought not in the Navy Ministry, but in the Finance Ministry. But even such a judgment, in my opinion, would be only partially fair. Whatever one may say, S. Yu. Witte did not seek to cut the demands of the fleet because life was good: the budget of the Russian Empire, in essence, was the same "Trishka's coat" as the budget of the Navy Ministry, and it was simply not enough for all the needs of the Empire... We are talking about the shortages of the fleet, but the ground forces did not receive the required funding either.
Therefore, the true and key reason for the loss of the Russo-Japanese War at sea, in my humble opinion, should be considered the discrepancy between the economy of the Russian Empire and the political tasks that it set for itself.
End.
PS
In view of the above, Dmitry Peskov’s statement that the current leadership of the Russian Federation is striving to ensure that “the country was more reminiscent, I would say, from the point of view of historical analogies, of Russia at the end of the 19th century" seems, to my unenlightened opinion, a little ambiguous.
"This is one of the most wonderful times, with all sorts of big social cataclysms, difficulties and everything else, but this is a time when, as they say, serfdom has already been abolished, when we have a golden age of literature, when the economy is growing rapidly, when the ruble is strong, when we are competitive in the world, when we have strong science, when there is something to be proud of. This is a truly good image" (D. Peskov).
I can only assume that the continuity of views of those in power has already been observed: it is quite possible that the autocrat of all Rus', Nicholas II, when getting involved in a “small and victorious” war in the Far East, was thinking something like this about the Russian Empire…
P.P.S
In conclusion of my series, I would like to present to the esteemed reader a brief summary of the previous materials in terms of the strength of different types of armor, the capabilities of armor-piercing tips of those years, and the ranges of destruction of Japanese ships by domestic armor-piercing shells. I have recalculated the latter a little again, and here is the point.
Professor L. G. Goncharov in his work “Course of Naval Tactics. Artillery and Armor” recommends using the classic de Marr formula for calculating the resistance of cemented armor with a thickness of over 75 mm:
And for non-cemented armor less than 75 mm thick, he proposes a different formula:
At the same time, the durability of non-cemented armor less than 75 mm is assessed by him as extremely low, its “K” is only 1100. It was according to this formula that I calculated the durability of the slopes and ends of Japanese ships, including when their thickness exceeded 75 mm.
But, after thinking about it, I came to the conclusion that if in the case of the bevels (and they, although they had a thickness of 50,8-114 mm, were made of several sheets of steel with the addition of a maximum of one sheet of armor) the use of this formula is justified, then I “humiliated” the ends completely in vain - after all, the steel-nickel armor of those years could have “K” = 1500. Therefore, I recalculated the resistance of the ends according to the classic de Marr formula with “K” = 1500. Of course, for shells with a caliber of 10-12 dm nothing has changed, they penetrated such armor at any distance, but smaller calibers - no longer.
Vulnerability Ranges of Japanese Armored Ship Defenses
"Mikasa" (Krupp armor, "K" = 2275):
"Asahi", "Shikishima", "Hatsuse" (armor "improved Harvey", "K" = 2100):
"Fuji", "Yashima" (presumably "improved Harvey" armor, "K" = 2100):
"Yakumo" (presumably Krupp "K" armor = 2275):
"Izumo", "Azuma", "Asama", "Tokiwa" (armor "improved Harvey", "K" = 2100):
"Nissin", "Kasuga" (Terni armor, presumably - corresponded to "improved Harvey", "K" = 2100):
Strength of armor of various types according to domestic data
The strength of Harvey and Krupp armor
Reduction in the armor penetration rate provided by the Makarov caps
For 120 mm shells and 127 mm armor - up to 27% for Krupp armor produced by the Izhora plant;
For 120 mm shells and 171,45 mm armor - up to 12,7% for Krupp armor produced by the Izhora plant;
For high-quality 152-mm shells and 171,45-254-mm armor - approximately 17% for Krupp armor produced by the Obukhov plant;
For 254 mm shells and 171,45-254 mm armor - approximately 17% for Krupp armor produced by the Obukhov plant;
For 203 mm shells and 305 mm armor – not less than 7,3% for Krupp armor produced by the Obukhov plant;
For 254 mm shells and 305 mm armor - about 9% for Krupp armor produced by the Obukhov plant;
For 305 mm shells and 305 mm armor – 9-12% for Krupp armor produced by the Obukhov plant.
Calculation tables of armor penetration for guns of Russian ships that participated in the Russo-Japanese War:
Thank you for attention!
Information