February 26, under the leadership of the President of the Club of Military Commanders of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Anatoly Kulikov, held a "round table" where problems of developing and creating promising platforms for armored vehicles were touched. The discussion participants discussed the performance of new machines, the conditions of their production, a number of other topical issues that should have been put before the Ministry of Defense and the military-political leadership.
From “Almaty” to “Kurgants-25”
It is necessary to discuss the procedure for the formation of tactical and technical tasks (TTZ) for the creation of combat armored and other equipment for combined arms combat. This is due to the fact that in recent years in our country, unfortunately, this issue has not been given enough attention.
K promising BMP
The emergence of new means of warfare is a consequence of resolving the key contradiction: what is new in its tactical qualities is able to bring a model on the battlefield and technically ensure the implementation of the required capabilities.
This compromise is allowed in the formation of tactical and technical tasks for the development of warfare based on the priority tactical capabilities of units in order to achieve superiority over the enemy in fire and strike, and in security and maneuver, including by increasing command controllability.
Thus, when developing a TTZ for a model of armament, you first need to ask yourself: what is new in the nature of a clash does it give, how will the course of the battle change based on the tactical properties of this sample?
To answer this question, a detailed analysis of the development of an all-arms battle, including at the lowest tactical level (squad, platoon, company) is necessary.
Today, it is possible to predict and ensure the development of such features of an all-arms battle as the desire to maximize fire superiority without engaging in contact clashes, a significant increase in tactical autonomy of lower tactical units, and effectively implement the existing intelligence resource provided by the TU ES.
The solution of these issues is possible through the creation of an armament complex for a combat vehicle capable of solving the firing tasks of a general arms battle. Providing combat vehicles with such tactical capabilities makes it possible to give them the role of a system-forming fire weapon in the motorized rifle squad, platoon, company, creates the prerequisites for a significant increase in tactical autonomy of the lower echelon, which does not have any contactless means of destruction.
Another trend has also manifested itself: the increasing role of the tactical autonomy of lower-level units (platoon, company). But in our country they still implement intelligence information in part. Having left, say, a gap, a company, having a huge amount of information, cannot independently work on it. Why? Because the capabilities of an infantry fighting vehicle again remain the same. There is a contradiction. But the BMP must ensure maximum implementation of the intelligence information that it receives in the intelligence information network.
At present, contactless commanders are able to conduct a battle. aviation, full-time artillery and mortars - from the battalion and above.
A more detailed analysis of the structure of an all-arms battle conducted by a lower tactical unit (detachment, platoon, company) will make it possible to form other tactical qualities of promising combat vehicles of an all-arms battle.
How to provide it?
A serious analysis is required of the role of the military authorities in the development of projects for the performance of technical characteristics for the conduct of R & D to create promising equipment for combined arms combat. The TTZ for R & D should prioritize the emergence of combat vehicles capable of dominating the battlefield with their tactical capabilities.
We do not have the right to form a TTZ, relying only on old concepts. BMP badly needed new tactical properties. Then the tactic itself, based on weapon. A new battle pattern will appear.
Another negative tendency that hinders work is the problem of attracting private capital in solving R & D tasks. The President of Russia and the Chairman of the Government have set such a task. But how to do this? All R & D goes through tenders and tenders, where the head performer is selected, he is paid money, the work algorithm is determined. At the same time, players who are able to do alternative projects remain on the sidelines. Although many of them are ready to solve these things even proactively, at their own expense. The main enemy in this situation is the non-confidentiality of the process. One does one, the other - something parallel. And there is a body that begins to conduct a public comparison. In this case, there is no complete competition.
I believe that, along with the winners of R & D competitions, it is necessary to give the right to work to the so-called initiators. Give them the TTZ and, according to GOST, ask them. Then there will be a variety of solutions.
Weapons on new principles
Great work is underway today on the creation of weapons on new principles of defeat. A prerequisite for its placement on board the machine - the presence of the energy base and large sources of energy produced in a matter of seconds. Here you can go two ways. The first is to put an auxiliary power unit on board, pump energy and then throw it away (beam, electromagnetic, optoelectronic weapon). The second is to create cars with electric transmission and energy storage function.
The search for and resolution of the problem of energy storage is a rather complicated matter in terms of technology. The solution of this technical problem will allow you to create base machines, weapons systems which will make it possible to expand the aspect of impact on the enemy.
In a word, you can go in different ways. But without solving this problem, we cannot yet talk about the transport base (unified platform). Therefore, it is advisable to start work on the creation of new platforms (different in mass) and potentially capable of using serious weapons without serious rework on new damaging principles requiring large energy flows.
Peek at 2020 year
No matter how today the implementation of the tasks of the three main R & D for the Ground Forces (Armata, Boomerang, Kurganets-25) goes, I think that all efforts of the MIC and the customer should be aimed at ensuring qualitatively completed. Because these are the first machines that are created, being inscribed in the ESU TK. These are the first cars that meet the new requirements for the level of security.
In addition, the achieved technical reserves on these R & D can be the basis for the creation of promising technology - the machines of the future. For this, it is also necessary to fully comply with the requirements of HPV-2011 – 2020 for the implementation and commissioning of this type of equipment, which will allow to gain experience in operating motorized rifle brigades with a single transport platform. Of great importance in the future will be experience in creating diverse (combat, supporting) equipment on a single platform.
The main advantage of these machines is that they are created within the framework of the ESU TK - the unified tactical command and control system. These brigades will, firstly, look different in matters of command controllability. Secondly, it will allow to gain experience, to teach the troops to work in the ESU TZ.
Key player - Glavcom
Improving the development methodology of TTZ for R & D should ensure that evolving “new” machines with the same tactical properties evolve, create conditions for equipping all-armed units with combat equipment capable of changing the pattern of general combat, primarily in the unit - platoon - company unit.
The required tactical properties of combined-arms combat vehicles are the result of an analysis of its development. Such an analysis is a matter of the main command of the Ground Forces of the RF Armed Forces, which means that the key player in this field is the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the RF Armed Forces.
ex-chief of staff of the Leningrad Military District, Colonel-General
New - well forgotten old?
The T-95 TTZ tank was approved by the Chief of the General Staff, and not by the Chief of the Central Board and signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. No sedition in this. The tactical appearance of the vehicle was always determined by the commanders, demands were made, the central board together with its institutions formed the TTZ, etc.
The problem is different. You just need to remember the well-forgotten old and restore the role of the cupola. I, for example, do not understand how now the current Glavs with the staff of 30 – 40 people (there were 300) and in the logistics system (where they entered together with the rear personnel) solve the problem of working out the TTZ. I think in any way. Currently, TTZ is working on the industry. And we know that very well. We see that today the military-technical policy is determined not by the Main Committee, not even by the General Staff, but by industry. That is the question.
And here much depends on the personality of the commander in chief, who must raise the flag and say: I am ready to deal with this issue. And the business of the industry is technical as a security body. Now command control in connection with the inclusion in the architecture of the ESU TK acquires the fourth property.
Today, as already noted, work is underway to create "Almaty", "Kurgants-25", "Boomeranga." All of them are associated with the creation of a new unified platform for weapons. “Armata” - heavy weapons, “Kurganets-25” - light, “Boomerang” - medium (wheelbase). But how much will the TTZ in them meet the requirements we are discussing? Therefore, it is necessary to talk about the compatibility of the new platform and the weapon system placed on it.
Advisor to the General Director of OJSC KamAZ, ex-head of GABTU, Colonel-General
We must seek a compromise
I am the former chairman of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Main Armored Directorate. In 1987, he was chairman of the commission for approving the drawing documentation of the BMP-3 and BMP-3F. From the report, I realized that the state, unfortunately, was removed from solving this problem. Weird competitions, outsourcing, etc. are taking place. We know all the players in this field: Tula (Shipunov), Kurgan (Salnikov), Rubtsovsk (Prokopovich) - everyone who could do something. We simply do not have other KBs that are able to create something. But many simply do not exist. KB and production in Rubtsovsk are in a depressed state. And they made good CMM and BRM.
In no case do not detract from the role of the General Staff and the Main Command of the Ground Forces in determining the appearance of a new combat vehicle. Nonetheless, I think it is necessary to return to the old IWT development system, in which everything was painted down to the details. The Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) worked in each type and type of troops, which determined the prospects for the development of this technology. Including in the Grau, GABTU. There were even four such NTK in the GRAU. And what can the GABTU do in its current form? Now there are fewer people in it than I had in NTK (56 officers in the department), plus the serial order department (40 people).
BMP-3 is a good car. And today we first need to decide how to use those 10 of thousands of machines that are in the army, including the BMP-2, BPM-1. What to do with them?
Now they are talking about "Kurgants". But many years ago we looked ahead when we developed the BMP-3. We used its platform and under the "Chrysanthemum", and under the machine fire control, and under the PDU - everything was provided. It’s just that a new problem came to the same problem, and not in the best way. Why? Because the organizational structure of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation (its technical services) does not now allow solving such voluminous tasks that we solved at one time.
The first and main task today is to upgrade the BMP-1, BMP-2, BMP-3. Although from the previous commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces I heard the opinion that we allegedly do not need the BMP-3 in any way. New commander in chief 13 January 2012, visited the plant in Kurgan and offered to decide on the modernization. But what was meant was not completely clarified.
What does it mean to develop a new car? Even in Soviet times, in the sweat of our brow, you had to work for this for five to seven years. Now, the task of allegedly armored infantry fighting vehicles against bullets of 12,7 caliber of a millimeter and from undermining a charge equivalent to six kilograms of explosives is allegedly set. You can, of course, write any requirements, but how to fulfill them?
Here, I think, it is necessary to look for a decent compromise and proceed from the tasks that the BMP performs on the battlefield. She, for example, does not need to set targets for firing from closed positions. It acts in line of sight of the enemy and on the identified targets.
If we talk about the tower, then I think we need the one that was developed by the CPB (Tula). But here it is necessary to develop a unified opinion, determine the methods of modernization and unify the BMP-3 and BMD-4 in terms of weapons. The main conclusion, I think, is that it is necessary to do one machine in the state system. We have already sucked in with tanks T-64, T-72. It's time to learn. But for now, apparently, we are not making any conclusions from our own mistakes.
And another very important issue - technical support. Now he was completely handed over to the organizations of Oboronservis. It is not right. I think the troops should provide both military and major repairs, as was done before. Plus carry out technical support in all types of combat.
ex-chairman of the Scientific and Technical Complex of GABTU, advisor to the president of RosAerosystem, Major General
What will the commanders say
The expenditure of ammunition in the Great Patriotic War was eight cars per day. In Afghan - 11 wagons. During the Chechen campaign - 16 cars. In the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, the 58 Army required up to three combat kits. Therefore, if we talk about the creation of a new BMP, then we must proceed from the fact that this will be a complex machine, which should first of all arrange a general commander not as an artillery weapon of destruction, but as a mobile fire complex.
Counselor of Turboholod JSC, ex-head of the Main State Institution of Ukraine, colonel general
Here a whole range of issues have been raised, which, however, are a bit unbalanced. The first is the construction of the Armed Forces and the concept of the use of fire weapons. The second is the role and place of specific weapons and military equipment in the battle formation. The third is the technical implementation of the idea of creating a new car.
We are talking about the system of protecting personnel and ensuring the seizure of a certain territory on the ground during an all-arms battle. Tanks provide seizure of territory, heights, a breakthrough of defense, protection of personnel. The backbone in this fist is always a tank. The BMP, like the armored personnel carrier, is the means of delivering personnel to a predetermined line. BMP is necessary for us in order to ensure the advancement of personnel.
Next is the issue of fire damage. Means of destruction on the BMP can, of course, hang a lot. But when we talk about mass armament, the cost-effectiveness criterion comes to the fore. It is also associated with the concept of maximum damage. If the BMP together with its unit causes damage of one million dollars, then building such a machine for 10 million dollars is pointless. I repeat: we are talking about mass production with unification in all positions, calibers, engines, energy supply.
In addition, we are talking about weapons of the fifth generation. And this is a single information space, an automated system for managing troops, armored objects, projectiles. But then, in an automated mode, we must also receive target designation. So, we need a single KP. And all this should be determined by the General Staff Public Educational Establishment together with the Main Command of the Ground Forces.
I agree with the speakers that we have always strived to reduce the type and unifications in order to ensure the survivability of the object on the battlefield, the shortest period of its restoration, the minimum variation in parts, etc. But let's see who will do all this: Kurgan plant, Arzamas? I'm not at all sure that they are ready for this. Welding of buildings, for example, can now be carried out only at factories in Volgograd and Kurgan. A body on the armored personnel carrier to cook only in Arzamas. Unfortunately, it is no longer possible to do this in Rubtsovsk, Podolsk, Vladimir.
We again return to the problems of our defense industry, which, it turns out, writes for itself the TTZ. I do not mind, but only for the creation of a new infantry fighting vehicle, if it fits into the overall system of armored weapons. And still will meet the concept of building the Armed Forces. No questions. But this should be coordinated between the General Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and the Military Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation. There is no need to reinvent the wheel. The question is specifically: will the machine meet the requirements of the fifth generation or not?
It seems to me that it will not. And that's why. In World War I, 25 – 27 percent of the data was explored, of which 50 percent is reliable. In World War II, 50 – 55 percent of intelligence data 50 percent reliable. Now air, space, electronic intelligence work on it, which allows us to completely reveal information about the enemy. Contactless war allows you to detect and destroy all objects not only on the battlefield, but also deep in the rear. Therefore, we must do BMP with high survivability, good protection. A fire, figuratively speaking, the BMP will never be beyond the horizon. Its task is to follow tank orders and solve specific tactical tasks.
As for the new propellers (electromechanical, electromagnetic), then this is only a version. It would be good to make an air cushion BMP and thereby achieve the highest maneuverability, even in the swamps. But what will it cost?
Many are talking about new armor, which we supposedly will buy abroad if necessary. But understand, nobody will sell our armor. We have a new aluminum armor with a specific gravity 2,3, but it does not take. There is another brand, but there is no one to roll it. You can, of course, attract "Zaporizhstal", but this is another state.
Professor Alexander Yelkin, who created the first dynamic defense for tanks, addressed me. Now he and his colleagues have developed a new one, having received the Zhukov Prize for it. There are other organizations like Zenith that create a system of active protection of objects. Due to this, armor penetration decreases several times. But are these inventions always in demand?
We can not make a BMP mobile home. Studies have shown that reducing the height of the BMP on the 0,5 meter increases the survivability of the crew immediately by 25 percent. That is, only a change in silhouette immediately by a quarter improves the survivability of the machine. For comparison: the height of our tank is 2,107 meters, and the “Leopard” or “Abrams” - 3,3 meters. And today the question is not how to pierce armor (in combat with a projectile, armor loses), but how to get.
To summarize, we, of course, support the creation of a new machine as a new model of weapons. But when shaping its appearance, it would be necessary for the veterans of the GABTU, specialists of other departments to participate in writing the TK, and then lobbying it. To do this, it is necessary to prepare a good engineering note with a reasoned justification of all the technical characteristics and proposals for their implementation.
We are now preparing a new concept of the system of provision and technical readiness. After all, the functions of repairing equipment were transferred to Oboronservis and now nothing works, no one is responsible for anything. Complex repair is not, as there is no and its elements. It is interesting that in the internal troops the old system of maintenance and repair of weapons and military equipment was preserved and works perfectly.
President, Chairman of the Board of Directors of CJSC VKMS, Member of the Public Council under the MIC, Colonel-General
BMP-3 - a good car
I will express the opinion of a man who in Afghanistan exploited the BMP as a battalion commander, chief of staff and regiment commander, division commander, which had four motorized rifle regiments and everything on the BMP.
What are the strengths and weaknesses of this car? I had to fight on it, sleep in it, repair it with the help of Rembat and even install additional equipment. For example, special mounts for DShK, KPV, NSV "Cliff", AGS-17, "Cornflower", "Tray", on which the life of the crew and landing forces sometimes depended on board. But where and how was it all located? We were engaged in amateur activities, and we would like the designers to take into account our wishes in further development of the machine. After all, the BMP is not a two-man crew, but a motorized rifle squad, which is further enhanced in combat operations by flamethrowers and mortar-gunners.
Special fastenings for boxes with ammunition, PG-7 grenades, fumes and explosives, which are also necessary for combat, turned out to be extremely necessary in battle. But for some reason designers never paid attention to this. Not to mention the equipment of the armored back for the commander of the BMP or the fastening of sandbags, on which the infantry and machine gunner of the PKK and the PC could be placed, located in front on the armored car of the BMP.
Finally, it is a device for storing knapsacks, which, when conducting combat operations in the mountains, can have weight under 52 kilograms, for OZK, dry rations, and water tanks. In none of our cars, no one invented a simple water tank; one could boil water for tea and feed the soldier with hot food in the field. No rear of the soldier in battle will feed.
And how to relax in the BMP at night and at the same time constantly keep in touch with the commander? To do this, you must always be in the headset to be able to listen to all company and regimental networks. But the speakerphone inside the BMP is not provided, although it is easy and simple for the industry to make it. A voice and flags in battle not noupravlaesh. It would seem a trifle, but you can not do without them.
Of course, the machines must be of several types for combat in different conditions: mountains, desert, in the marshland, in the northern regions. But in general, BMP-3, I repeat, the car is good. I started with the BMP-1 and even the battalion commander became a master of driving. Then there were the BMP-2, the BMP-3 and the impression of their operation in combat conditions was excellent.
Chief Military Inspector of the Western Military District, Chairman of the VAGSh doctoral dissertation council, former deputy chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General
Restore the deputies for armament
Speaking from the position of the internal troops about the TTZ, when the need arose to create special police equipment, the General Staff of the VV took part in its development. And we first talked about the tactical characteristics, and then about the technical. At the same time, we closely cooperated with the Ministry of Defense. Only then did they make tactical and technical tasks. So the application was made for 5-th class of protection. Therefore, the communication of staff commanders and techies should be the most durable.
And today, on whom to rely the same, say, Commander of the Ground Forces, if he does not even have a deputy for armaments? All the same, by Grau, GABTU not pass. Is that why sometimes we see such a difference of opinion on this issue of the various commanders who replace each other at the posts? The commander-in-chief himself should not and cannot write TTZ to this or that machine. But then who?
I do not know how much we can recommend, but we have the right to express our point of view on this issue. I think that in the Ministry of Defense it is necessary to revise the organizational structure of the high command authorities. In particular, to restore the post of deputy for armaments in the types of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Strengthen the role of headquarters.
In this connection, we must initiate a scientific-practical conference, and not only within the framework of the Club of military leaders, but on the scale of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense. And the deputy minister of defense for armaments must necessarily take part in it, and the recommendations and conclusions of the conference are reported to the minister of defense.
As for the BMP, even after the first Chechen campaign, we concluded: it showed itself very well. And not only BMP, but also BMD, MTLB, BTR, other combat vehicles. Now in the internal troops there are about 300 BMP, which are in reserve. But I stress, it is too early to write them off, they are needed.
New BMP will appear only after some time. Therefore, the immediate task is to subject the machines in the formation (especially the BMP-3, BMP-2) to a deep modernization. To do this, our defense industry, the deputy minister of defense with the appropriate structures should be connected.
Regarding the creation of a promising infantry fighting vehicle, here I agree with those colleagues who believe that it should not break through the defenses of the enemy. This became clear even during the implementation of special operations by internal troops to combat gangs. First, a mortar and artillery strike, an air strike, and only then special forces from the BMP.
Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, Ex-Deputy Commander of the Army for Armaments, Lieutenant-General
Early written off BMP-3F
BMP-3F - very good car. She provided everything: movement afloat, and the landing of troops, and firing on the move. I wrote right through to the commander-in-chief: let's restore its production. Even today, it meets the necessary requirements, and given the possible modernization - even more so. Let's say it loads onto a BMN 15 BMP. But sometimes they can not go ashore, as shown by the events in Yemen in 1989. The ship then could not approach the shore. It was possible to do this only with the help of TCP. And the BMP-3F could. So her potential has not been exhausted today.
ex-chief of coastal troops of the Navy, lieutenant general
Need BBM XXI century
Summing up, I would like to thank everyone for the substantive conversation. Of course, for each direction and type of hostilities, different weapons and military equipment are needed. I remember that in the Chechen campaign after the very first explosions on anti-tank mines, all the commanders asked for the “Urals” in which the engine was brought forward and it was the force of the explosion that occurred (unlike the KamAZ vehicles), and the crew remained alive. And when even in the body began to put an armor sheet, sew on the side, close the cockpit, then the best shelter did not come up.
In Chechnya, our BTR-80, in which there were several other generals, followed the BMP. It so happened that the BMP exploded a mine. Unfortunately, not everyone survived in her, but she thereby saved our BTR from death. Therefore, it was absolutely correct here that the BMP should ensure not only transportation, but also protection of personnel. Otherwise, why is it needed.
Today we need, apparently, a different infantry fighting vehicle. With an effective power plant, high fire capabilities and maintainability, more spacious troop compartment, where there is everything necessary for combat and recreation of personnel. That is, you need a car of the XXI century.
But from whom should TTZ come to her? Apparently, from the one who formulates the plan of the battle. And this, apparently, the commander in chief of the Ground Forces. These problems, which are well identified practices of the troops and industry representatives, it seems, very relevant and timely. Therefore, I propose to prepare to the address of the Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation Dmitry Rogozin and the Minister of Defense General of the Army Sergei Shoigu a note outlining our proposals on the results of the discussion of the problems of organizing work on the development of military equipment for general arms combat, taking into account the prospects for improving the forms and methods of its conduct .
President of the Club of Military Commanders of the Russian Federation, Army General