Turkey's gain, the costs of which Ankara will seek to shift onto Russia
The collapse of the Syrian state brought a lot of joy to the Turkish elites and personally to the President of Turkey R. Erdogan. After all, it is not every year that he gets a chance to so convincingly demonstrate the victory of the ideas of neo-Ottomanism. The past week essentially closed the question of R. Erdogan's promises to the electorate, and not only to the core of his permanent supporters, but even to skeptics and critics.
The second beneficiary is Israel. The bloody epic in the Gaza Strip has not yet ended, the hostages have not been returned, B. Netanyahu has not achieved a clear victory in Lebanon - it took a lot of effort to convince the Israeli Prime Minister of the opposite. But Syria has almost written off all the mistakes and problems.
Now everything can be presented as the result of "clever plans", and as a New Year's gift to society, B. Netanyahu has not just the Golan Heights, but the entire Syrian province of Quneitra. And there is no need to sort things out in the UN regarding this province - no one will really ask Israel to leave there.
A win that wasn't planned
The benefits and gains are obvious, but there are nuances everywhere. In this case, the nuance is that neither Israel nor Turkey were prepared for such direct proximity in Syria. Both players discussed their role in Lebanon for a long time, and for R. Erdogan, one of the main goals in Syria itself was the northern territories and specifically the city of Aleppo.
The gift of fate for each of these players may turn out to be a heavy burden, as well as a chance to redraw the map of the region.
It is interesting to read today that the Syrians are so tired of the extortions of the "tyrant Assad" that they looked at life in neighboring Idlib as an example of something good. In any case, the Syrians will now have something to compare.
If funding really did go to his territories, where R. Erdogan’s proxy forces lived “on payroll,” then in Idlib it was specifically the Turkmen settlements that laid claim to it (and even received it).
HTS (banned in Russia), which controlled Idlib and usually did not allow Erdogan's men on payroll there, was engaged in direct extortion, imposing a "tax" on all trade and even transit of goods.
In fact, this whole "hodgepodge", generously seasoned with people from Central Asia, North Africa, Sudan and Iraq, cooperated there with different goals, except one - to work. Their task was to fight and pray, the Syrians themselves were supposed to work.
So, everything will soon be very ambiguous with the "tyrant's extortions". How all these formations once plundered the city of Aleppo and its environs "to the last scrap of iron", how they also plundered the Afrin canton, is no longer remembered.
Ankara had no illusions about them; according to the original plan, they were supposed to be sponsored by the Arabs, who, however, got tired of this five years ago.
There was only one way to turn this burden, which was demanding more and more from the Turks, into a benefit: to utilize it in such a way that more territory could be taken on its shoulders. The city of Aleppo was an ideal target here, given previous experience.
This limited nature of Turkey's goals can be seen quite well through the force and resources that Ankara kept in the border area during the campaign on Aleppo, which turned into a campaign on Damascus. Israel also did not transfer serious resources to the Golan Heights, and this was logical - protests in Daraa were expected, occupying the entire Golan Heights was realistic, but Israel did not make plans for Quneitra and part of the Damascus province, otherwise they would have concentrated their forces fully. And stopping the finishing off of Hezbollah at such a moment would not have been the most far-sighted decision.
Israel's situation is much better than Turkey's. Sooner or later, Israel will stop and continue doing its favorite thing - watching Turkey get bogged down in economic problems and breaking away the Druze from Syria. At the same time, Israel will strengthen its traditional partner - Iraqi Kurdistan, which will become a refuge for the Kurdish population from some part of the northern territories, and will also find its own ways to support the anarchists from the Federation of Northern Syria. Here, Israel will work cooperatively with the United States.
Well, in the meantime, Israel is taking advantage of the opportunity to wipe out the main military infrastructure of Syria, and here the fate of the Bastion missile systems is interesting; they would be useful in Russia now.
Türkiye will move from the “Ottoman greatness” agenda to realism quite quickly
Iran has been investing in the Syrian economy for a long time. An objective assessment of its annual participation, converted into money for commodity deliveries, is around $5 billion. Moscow made targeted investments (although sometimes large ones, such as the restoration of Aleppo), but Russia had other tasks in that triumvirate.
It should be taken into account that Iran did not have control over Idlib, the entire north of Syria, which was controlled by Ankara itself, as well as the northeast and the Euphrates region - this region supported itself.
These 5 billion dollars were absolutely insufficient. Now the thesis that B. Assad took all the money from the people is still popular. But by and large there was nothing to take, and it was still unrealistic to ensure the restoration of the country with these 5 billion dollars a year.
Turkey is now sending more than 3,5 million people to Syria (there is a direct advertisement about returning to their native shores). And the advertisement is clear - Turkey was forced to carry them on its own. Only this "carrying", as everywhere, had its own nuance - EU sponsorship funds, in fact, ransom payments.
The EU itself is preparing to send home most of the Syrians, hoping to reduce expenses. This is another 1,5-1,8 million people. Jordan (+-600 thousand), Lebanon (almost 1 million) will send people home. In a "head-on" calculation, without frills, 5 billion dollars will have to be added to the 3,3 billion Iranian. At the same time, Iran, naturally, will not contribute the previous 5 more to the economy. In reality, this is far from 3,3 billion.
Will the EU now pay "ransoms" (about $1,2 billion per year) to Turkey? In the old version, no, and new versions will have to be negotiated. There will also be no humanitarian supplies, including Iranian oil and oil products to Syria.
Syria formally has its own oil, there are even rumors that it is potentially "a lot." But for this, the new Syrian government needs to take this oil not even from the Kurdish-Arab SDF of Zaefratiya, but from the United States.
If we remove from the analysis various mythical figures on Syrian oil, the reality is quite modest. Even those 2,2-2,6 million tons, which are still being extracted in Zaefratiya and in the north-east of Syria, were partly sold to Damascus (with Iranian money), and partly went to Iraq for Turkey.
But they just provided for the Federation of Northern Syria (autonomy). And this is taking into account that the Kurdish cantons are in the agricultural zone and can provide additional goods for sale, and they also have access to generation on the Euphrates River, which provided a good saving. If there is no "humanitarian oil", then what will even 2,6 million tons give on a scale that will go strictly for domestic needs?
Of course, you can feed the people. stories about the arrival of investors and future oil prosperity without the "corrupt Assad", but even in the pre-war years, the maximum that Syria could send for export was almost the same 3 million tons of oil, and the remaining 12-15 million tons went to domestic consumption for the entire country. Now it is hardly possible to even restore these volumes, let alone increase them.
There have been breakthroughs in production volumes in the past, but investors have not sought to consolidate them. The complexity of production on a scale suitable for international trade was summed up in calculations with recoverable reserves - 220-225 million tons, with a maximum of up to 360 million tons with the hypothetical introduction of technologies.
Investors were therefore not particularly eager to come to Syria. There was a fight for Syrian oil, but it was never fundamental. There was simply not enough raw material for long-term investment, the concession was unprofitable, since everything would go to the domestic market, and there was nothing for an external investor to take away.
In fact, Syria was being bailed out by foreign money not by exported oil, but by the phosphate trade, where it occupied a 7% share of the overall market with an income of $3,7 billion per year. After the end of the hot phase of the war, this share fell to 1,1%, and the income to $0,6 billion, which is very meager given the problems in the country.
B. Assad fled and freedom triumphed, but have the initial figures on oil reserves changed? Not at all. But now who and how will provide guarantees to investors in the oil sector, the "valuable specialists" from Idlib and Julani himself? And the phosphates still need to be mined and sold.
The irony of fate is that Julani and Co. should now actually think about how to persuade Qatar to lay the famous "gas pipeline to the EU". At least this is some money for transit.
Black Hole and Turkey's Ball Flip
If in 2025 the Ukrainian knot is somehow actually untied or (more realistically) weakened, then the EU and the US can find the funds to support Syria for 2-3 years.
Up to $20 billion a year is not an expense that would break the West if direct spending on Ukraine were to be cut. However, what would be Turkey's share here?
Ankara's partners won't allocate funds to a personal Turkish fund for the restoration of Syria. The Arabs won't work in tandem with Ankara, with the exception of Qatar, but Turkey already pours money into its economy every year at Doha's expense, and now, together with Great Britain, has also persuaded Qatar to invest in Central Asia.
What is now in place of Syria, the players will throw to each other like a ping-pong ball and finish the serve in Ankara.
Turkey will simply be given the main burden of expenses and will watch with interest the Turkish attempts to govern the new "Syrian vilayet" of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey will ultimately try to concentrate its efforts on the original plan - control of northern Syria and further attempts to capture the Kurdish cantons, i.e. to lighten the burden.
Formally, there are funds for a Syrian “Marshall Plan”, but in reality, the entire history of recent years shows that Syria is becoming a giant black hole, before which even problematic Afghanistan will pale.
The Taliban (banned in Russia) are locals, albeit with regional and ethnic specifics, while HTS are outsiders who will demand money, places, a share in the "feeding" system. And now Ankara has nowhere to dispose of them, essentially, only to throw them at Israel or pro-American Kurds - both options are fraught for Turkey.
Most likely, as historical experience shows again, those who will not have enough to feed (and there are many of them) will be engaged in the production and transit of drugs, especially since it is now completely unclear how the Syrian ports will be managed and by whom. Such depths of "grace" are opening up there that it is difficult to imagine.
B. Assad and Hezbollah were loved by European and American media to be labeled as "production of Captagon", which was produced right under the roof of the Americans in their zone of control. Now this sphere will expand to the size of central Syria and with uncontrolled ports.
It is clear that Turkey was counting on growing its territories, “pumping up its ideology” at the expense of these territories, disposing of foreign radicals, and leaving the economy to Iran and B. Assad as before. The latter was forced to negotiate on new terms.
A good plan, but it dissolved in a week, and a pulsating black hole formed that would suck all the notorious regional stability into it. Everything would boil and splash there, like in a mud volcano.
The current Syrian “black hole” problem now has no solution in principle.
The revolutionary leadership will hold back the intensity of radical madness for now (for political purposes for the US and the EU), although it will still break through, and footage of soldiers hanged, shot even in hospitals, officers “committing suicide”, murdered scientists, ideologists, and politicians will appear online regularly.
And the more of them there are, the more actively the population will wave new flags, trample the statues of “tyrants” in front of cameras, and also accuse them of all conceivable sins, even original sin.
Western media will (naturally) try not to notice this, but investors do not watch these media. Although they will demonstrate various investment memoranda "for the sake of politics", they will not invest real money there.
The situation in Syria is much worse than that of the Taliban (banned in Russia), which has a base investor (China) and into which external players are extremely selective. Here, everything is the other way around - there are no base investors, but all external players work as internal players.
As a result, we will very quickly see a metamorphosis in which Turkey will try to push off the Syrian legacy, while at the same time presenting it as if it alone is responsible for it before the world.
And everyone else will try to prevent this from happening to Turkey. and pull it deeper and deeper into the Syrian swamp.
Israel will watch with interest, simultaneously giving a hand to the Kurds and separating the Druze from Syria, while the United States will gain the most in terms of political potential, as they can stoke this human “furnace” practically at their own discretion – the United States now has many options.
What does this mean for Russia?
The reason for our, specifically Russian, failure in the Syrian mission lies in the gaps in methodology and weak skills of work, which in the old-fashioned way can be called the search for ways to fuse “pragmatic colonialism” and “pragmatic union.” The issue here is not the negative connotation of the term, but the essence.
It is precisely the analysis of methods that allows us to say that in the described situation, regional and larger players will try not to push Russia out of the negotiation process in Syria, but, on the contrary, to lure us into it.
Türkiye will play the first fiddle here, and the bait will be made in an oriental attractive way. They will try to literally hook Russia on the status of a "global player".
Playing negotiator in this black hole will mean one thing - a part (and not a small part) of the problems will be pinned on us, and there will be no result. The lack of result will again be pinned on a third-party negotiator. And this will mean that we will be asked for specific compensation in another place, which was not even discussed initially.
Therefore, Russia should under no circumstances enter into negotiations on a “new Syria” and similar “formats”.
Unfortunately, there are some clues for us here, since we can be promised the lease of military bases (for money, of course). The new government will not refuse money, and we seem to need these bases to supply Africa. And it seems we can close our eyes to the fact that these bases do not provide any control, but there is a transit and supply point.
"Transit to Africa" and "the status of a geopolitical arbiter" are a strong bait for us and, on the surface, a very juicy fruit against the backdrop of the current failure. Our media will also take it, since it outweighs the failure and provides news. What can we say if headlines like "Syrian opposition executes Bashar al-Assad's brother in the square" are already in circulation. Allegedly, for "blood ties" and crimes against "those who disagree with the regime." And they also executed a professor of organic chemistry, Assad's nephew, a theologian, and soldiers in hospital beds. The opposition has only just begun its "revolutionary purges" there. Have they taken the right path? However, even Iran is providing information support here in a very entertaining way.
The fruit looks good, but it is not advisable to take it in your hands. Simply because Turkey will invite us to this game, and since the real referee will be the USA, then in the end we will involuntarily have to play on Turkey's side, and then accept part of all the problems from Turkey's work in Syria.
Unfortunately, in Ankara they have studied us well and know many design hooks that can be used to catch such a big fish as us.
Realistic assessments suggest that without political and military control over the provinces of Latakia and Tartus, maintaining military bases and participating in a political settlement will only bring problems, not solutions. No matter how difficult it is to supply Africa through Libya and Algeria, this is the path that will have to be taken.
The heaviest stone that the Syrian hole will throw in our direction will be those very radicals who sooner or later will cross the path of all players.
They will be against even Turkey, not to mention the new government of "Syrian democrats". They will not be able to liquidate them, sending them against American interests and Israel is fraught with danger? What remains is to send them towards Russia.
If the CSTO is needed for anything, it is for a situation like this. We need to squeeze everything out of military cooperation and control the flow of people from the south so as to nip any attempts at lobbying in the bud in the bud in the migration sphere. A regime of enhanced verification, similar to the visa one, albeit temporary, is a minimal solution. There is no worse contingent in the world than the one raging in the radical groups in Syria. Just as there is no human description of who they are.
If it is impossible for us to resolve the migration issue even with such a threat, then perhaps it would be easier to pay these “creatures” money so that they go to Europe.
The next issue, about which there is no visible discussion yet, is Russia's relations with the political part of what is now called Syria.
The bulk of Syrian politicians have pledged allegiance to the "revolution" and are now pouring water on the former leader like from a sewer bucket. They are not saving their lives, but their careers, which will now be linked to anyone but Russia or even Iran. And these people will do absolutely everything for the West.
The flag over the Syrian embassy in Russia has been replaced. It seems to be a sovereign matter, but what does Ambassador Bashar Jafari say about it?
"The collapse of a corrupt system in a matter of days demonstrates its unpopularity and lack of support both in society and in the ranks of the army and the armed forces, and the escape of the head of this system in a shameful and humiliating manner under the cover of night without any sense of national responsibility confirms the need for change and awakens hope for a better future."
And who was part (and a significant one) of this system for so many years and to whom does Mr. Jafari owe his long career and his seat in the UN? Not the worst seat, to put it mildly. He served under B. Assad's father and, like an eagle, spoke from high tribunes against those to whom he so obsequiously swore allegiance today. But is he the only such "hidden fighter for the people" under a terrible tyrant? There will be many, many such changes of shoes, since even M. Assad's wife (B. Assad's younger brother) has updated her wardrobe.
It would be a good idea to think about what political contingent Russia will now have to work with in terms of Syria. Traditionally, this will be interpreted differently here - as a valuable, proven supplier of information in a valuable area. But in essence, this is a direct Western agent, dangerous also because previously, as an ally, it was allowed in where others do not go, and information will be supplied there in both directions. And this would only be an ethical side of the issue, if not for the threats described above. We no longer need this valuable geopolitical area, and our participation must now be excluded from the Syrian formula. The time for other decisions will come later.
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