On the Threshold of Afghanistan or Prelude to the Mission of Lieutenant General N.G. Stoletov
On the way to Central Asia or Farewell to the Balkans
In concluding the series of articles on the background of the Berlin Congress and dedicated to it itself, I mentioned the mission of Lieutenant General N. G. Stoletov to Afghanistan, which took place in 1878.
In part, Russia's advance in Central Asia was conditioned by the blocking of its interests in the Balkans, which was demonstrated by the congress that gathered in Berlin.
Let me emphasize: we are talking about the interests inherent since the second half of the 1905th century to the increasingly less far-sighted St. Petersburg elite, which did not measure its capabilities against its ambitions, which would lead to defeat in XNUMX and the breakdown of the First World War, although sober voices called for not getting involved in both conflicts.
Bala Hissar is an ancient fortress located in Kabul, built in the 5th century.
The Congress finally buried the idea of Russia's dominance in Europe, which had been born within the framework of the Holy Alliance - and, judging by the way Alexander II demanded that Bismarck and Wilhelm I follow the Russian interests, a similar complex, inherent in Nicholas I, was not completely overcome in the Winter Palace - just as it demonstrated the impossibility of occupying priority positions in the Balkans, which the naive Pan-Slavists dreamed of.
On the way to Asian maximum
Accordingly, the conquest of the Bukhara Emirate, the Kokand and Khiva Khanates became the only feasible strategy for St. Petersburg, which allowed it to expand its territory without significant opposition from the great powers.
But in 1873, Russia reached the borders of Afghanistan, stepping in the boots of a soldier from Central Asia onto the eastern threshold of the Middle East, where its ambitions intersected with those of Britain.
From the banks of the Thames, Afghanistan was seen as more than a sphere of geopolitical interests, but in psychological terms it became a pain and, if you like, a slap in the face, a phantom hanging over imperial pride, associated with the tragic death of the last fighters of Major General W. Elphinstone's army on a January morning in 1842 in the Gandamak region.
"The Last Survivors of Her Majesty's 44th Regiment of Foot at Gandamak, 1842" by W. Wallen
Yes, later the British – we are talking about their first war with Afghanistan in 1838-1842 – took revenge, but the aftertaste generated by the shock of London society remained: some “barbarians”, in the eyes of ladies and gentlemen who had a vague idea of the location of Afghanistan on the map, defeated an army armed with the latest technology.
And then the shadow of the Russian bear loomed over what, from the Foreign Office's point of view, rightfully belonged to Britain. Specifically to Britain, because the East India Company, which ruled the subcontinent, had accumulated a lot of questions by that time, and the Sepoy Rebellion was the final nail in the coffin of its existence.
The British were not pleased by the obvious truth: Iran retained a semblance of sovereignty in the second quarter of the 19th century only by the will of Nicholas I, who was satisfied with the Treaty of Turkmanchay and the apologies that followed the murder of A. I. Griboyedov.
View from the banks of the Indus
Let us assess the situation in the region from the British point of view from the banks of the Indus, placing our palm on the edge of our cork helmet and directing our gaze towards the snow-capped peaks of the Hindu Kush, anxiously moving it a little further north – in the direction of the lower reaches of the Amu Darya.
The picture was not encouraging: the consolidation of the Russians in Central Asia, their access to the northern borders of Afghanistan and the possibility of exerting pressure on it from the west – from Iran – hypothetically created several reasons for headaches for the United Kingdom, which there might not be enough medicine to relieve.
First: the prospect of the Tsar's troops reaching the Persian Gulf. It wasn't that obvious, but it shouldn't be ruled out. Second: the Russian advance to the Indus basin, where the Sikh state, which had caused the East India Company a lot of trouble until recently, had existed. Third: the strengthening of Russia's positions both in Afghanistan and Iran, with subsequent advancement in the direction of the Porte's possessions in Mesopotamia, beyond which lies Asia Minor, where, at any cost, the Russians cannot be allowed. Why? Because when we say Asia Minor, we mean the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Sudan.
The coat of arms of the East India Company, which ruled the subcontinent for about a century. Despite the fact that it began to develop it already at the beginning of the 17th century.
It was there that one of the valves of the British imperial heart was beating, and with increasing frequency. For in Sudan the British, having just wiped the sweat from their brows on the blood-stained streets of Delhi, having buried their compatriots who had fallen at the hands of the sepoys, and at the same time having executed prisoners with monstrous cruelty, were already standing on the threshold of the Mahdist uprising.
And if the Royal Navy served as a factor in containing Russia in relation to the Straits, then in regard to Afghanistan, London relied on diplomacy, since it clearly lacked military resources as a reliable barrier to the advance of Russian troops - the Indus basin was not calm anyway: for some reason, the Afghan tribes living there were not happy with the presence of the English colonial administration and paid little attention to borders.
A Word on Geopolitics and Mountains or A Necessary Digression
There was another restraining aspect, not only the geopolitical interests of London and St. Petersburg, but also Kabul, which sought to unite Afghanistan.
We are talking about the Hindu Kush ranges and the geographic factor as a whole, which determines politics, hence the now fashionable term. As for geopolitics, digressing from the topic, I will allow myself to say a few words.
Hindu Kush – Afghanistan's Natural Fortress
In my opinion, it is a completely scientific discipline, despite the fact that the term itself has been discredited by its use by just anyone, including yesterday’s “prominent immunologists” and “specialists” in vaccination, who in 2022 quickly retrained as “major” military experts.
Given that the realities of geography often weigh on the will of both individual rulers and ethnic groups as a whole. Just one example. Venice at the turn of the 15th–16th centuries had advanced economic and intellectual potential to become a leading European country. It is no wonder that it became the birthplace of the European banking system.
However, it was not even the Ottoman factor, but the remoteness due to the Great Geographical Discoveries from the pulse of world economic life that led to the decline of the Republic of St. Mark. Its place was taken first by the Netherlands, and then by England.
The same applies to countries located among mountain ranges, which to a significant extent determine or at least influence the nature of the economy, military affairs, the social structure of society, determining the fate of both the elite and the population as a whole.
The formation of centralized states there is always complicated by the isolation of individual regions, which causes the desire of local clans for isolation, forming a narrow horizon of their political interests, a khatoskrin psychology, which serves as a barrier to the maturation of the imperial idea and its implementation in practice.
A striking example here is Ancient Greece, whose city-states had difficulty finding – and sometimes did not find – a common language even in the face of an external threat. Philip of Macedon was a kind of flashpoint, but neither his expansion nor Alexander’s campaigns led to a significant transformation of the region’s political realities in the long term: with the collapse of the empire, squabbling resumed.
And the uprising that arose in Hellas in 1821 against Ottoman rule was accompanied by almost internecine warfare among the rebel leaders.
Or let us remember Shamil, who fought simultaneously with Russian troops and internal enemies.
I will also note that comparatively developed countries, such as Turkey and Iran, are faced with Kurdish and Baloch separatism, which is largely caused by geography and the unwillingness of regional elites to tolerate central authority. And this is despite the fact that, if the Kurds and Baloch gain independence, their standard of living is unlikely to be higher than in the progressively developing metropolises.
In this case, I will allow myself a controversial thought: the confrontation between the mountainous regions and the center is associated with a conflict between the city and the village – in this case, the highland one.
For example, the Montenegrins had blood feuds at the time we are considering, and the Albanians have not eradicated them to this day. The Pashtuns also had them.
That is, we are talking about the conservation of socio-economic, religious relations and traditions in mountainous regions. Sometimes it seems as if the tread of Chronos has stopped there.
And often the westernized center is seen by the outskirts not just as a political enemy, but as something existentially hostile, designed to destroy the way of life that has been sanctified for centuries, as is most clearly demonstrated by the recent social conflict between the Taliban – still banned in the Russian Federation – and Kabul.
Of course, I am not saying that mountains are often the only obstacle to the unification of a country, but they are still a significant factor in this regard, given their specificity as a theater of military operations: counter-elites resisting the central government are easier to pacify on the plain than among the green-covered peaks or passes convenient for ambushes and guerrilla warfare.
One cannot discount the inefficient nature of agriculture in mountainous regions, which led either to an outflow of population – the famous Greek colonization of the Black Sea region and the southern Apennines – or, far from the coast, to the formation of a raiding economy – the Caucasus of the 19th century.
In fact, the geography of Afghanistan, the multi-tribal nature of its population – which is also very warlike, especially the aforementioned Pashtuns – has hindered and continues to hinder the centralization of the country.
Strength and weakness of Afghanistan
Although Afghanistan was lucky to have strong rulers, from Ahmad Shah Durrani, who created a semblance of an empire, to Mohammed Daoud, who almost became a Pashtun Ataturk. They, who possessed imperial – not in the formal legal, but in the existential sense of the word – thinking, always tried to pull Afghanistan out of the quagmire of poverty, interethnic quarrels, often fueled by external forces, turning it into an object of geopolitical interests of its neighbors.
Ahmad Shah achieved the greatest success in this field; perhaps due to his command of the Afghan contingent in the army of the outstanding Iranian commander and statesman Nadir Shah.
Ahmad Shah Durrani
I will assume that communication with the Shah and service to him made Ahmad a champion of the imperial idea and aroused the desire to implement it in Afghanistan, uniting tribes and clans mired in local squabbles; in other words: Iranian existence determined his Afghan consciousness.
The latter was determined not only by the ambitions of Ahmad Shah, but also, not least of all, by the nature of the economy and the scarcity of food resources in Afghanistan, which, for example, predetermined expansion in the direction of the left bank of the Amu Darya and South Turkestan. “The territories they occupied here,” wrote historian N.A. Khalfin, “later became the granaries of mountainous Afghanistan.”
However, the geography that had formed the mentality of the counter-elites, as if supported by the silent mountain peaks, stood in the way of Ahmad Shah’s actions, and after his death in 1772 the country fell apart again.
Something like an imperial renaissance came in 1826 and is associated with the name of Dost Mohammed Khan – also a non-trivial personality, but not as outstanding as those mentioned above. He returned the Amu Darya basin, lost after the death of Ahmad Shah, to the orbit of Afghan influence, conquered Badakhshan, Kandahar and Herat, but suffered defeat in the war with the Sikhs for the strategically important Peshawar.
It is noteworthy that, with the exception of the advance in the direction of the Indus, that is, directly into the British sphere of influence, the emir’s expansion to the west, north and northeast was supported by the British, because “it was advantageous for them,” notes historian T.V. Rabush, “to divert the Afghan emir’s passionate aspirations for conquest to the territories lying north of Afghanistan, in order to have freedom of action for themselves in the Prigindukushye and in the ‘stripe of independent tribes’, and for this purpose the emir was provided with English financial and military support.”
It was also advantageous because, according to the agreement concluded in 1855 between Kabul and the East India Company, the former renounced its claims to the Afghan-populated Punjab, which had previously been part of its sphere of interest and whose resistance to the colonizers was left without the support of Dost Mohammed and was suppressed.
The strategically important Peshawar, where the agreement was signed, also remained in the hands of the British, who had destroyed the Sikh state six years earlier.
Ancient Fort Bala Hissar in Peshawar
By controlling this city and Punjab as a whole, the British had its northern border resting on the spurs of the impregnable Pamirs, which naturally ensured the security of India’s northwestern borders.
In addition, Punjab became a springboard, if necessary, both for an invasion of Afghanistan and as a base for working with the emirate's elites.
But most importantly, the treaty secured the rear of the British army, which was forced to suppress the sepoy rebellion two years later, although some Afghan elites made proposals to the emir to return Peshawar. However, Dost Mohammed preferred a policy of non-intervention. In general, it was reasonable: it seems that the emir had information about the disunity of the sepoys' actions and did not believe in the success of the rebellion.
And the military efforts of the emir at that time were concentrated in the opposite direction from the city and were connected with the capture of Herat, and Dost Mohammed could not fight on two fronts.
Dost Mohammed in the family circle
It is also necessary to take into account the centrifugal tendencies within Afghanistan itself that have not been eradicated, which made themselves known immediately after the death of the emir in 1863 – the country again plunged into the chaos of internecine wars, from the quagmire of which it would be pulled out by the son of Dost Mohammed, Sher Ali Khan, who would receive Stoletov’s mission in his capital.
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Использованная литература:
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Vasiliev D.V. Afghanistan in the Center of the Great Game. 1878 – 1879. Act Two: Embassy of N. G. Stoletov [Electronic resource] // Bulletin of the Orenburg State Pedagogical University. Electronic scientific journal. 2022. No. 3 (43). P. 69 – 85.
Grankovsky Yu.V. Polischuk A.I. History Armed Forces of Afghanistan. 1747 – 1977. M., 1985.
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Steinberg E. L. History of British Aggression in the Middle East. – M., Voenizdat, 1951.
Rabush T.V. On the role of Afghanistan as a factor in the regional system of international relations in the 19th century.
Omarov A.I. "Raid system" as a factor in mountain socio-economic life
Saifullah Garhwal, Asmatullah Ziar. Political, Social and Cultural Reforms during the Reign of Amir Sher Ali Khan
Khalfin N. A. The failure of British aggression in Afghanistan (1959th century – early XNUMXth century). – M.: Publishing house of social and economic literature, XNUMX.
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