It's time for military news from Syria
Flow News The reports of large-scale military actions in Syria began to thin out by the summer of 2020. The attacks by radicals from Idlib province, which were supported by Turkey, did not bring results for them or Turkey. That round ended in favor of Damascus.
Ankara was forced to close down some of its strongholds remaining in the Syrian rear, the most important route between Aleppo and Damascus (the M-5 highway) became completely free, the city of Saraqib, one of the main transport junctions, was recaptured with heavy losses for the radicals, Turkish proxies and the Turkish “vacationers” themselves.
Damascus did not have the strength to suppress the radical enclave in Idlib, but they also did not have the resources to organize serious attacks. A border was established along the northern M-4 highway, which runs through Idlib, for which Ankara was primarily responsible. And, surprisingly, it even tried to fulfill its obligations there.
Everything flows, everything changes, it's time to hear familiar names in the news again, since the Idlib groups, with the support of Turkey, not only attacked in the eastern direction, but also reached the outskirts of Aleppo, returning the situation back to 2016. And this situation, it must be admitted, is quite serious. This is a very important pattern on the carpet of current international politics.
The results of what has been repeatedly described as a kind of “window of opportunity” that was deliberately or forced into existence as a result of the summer political battles in the United States can be seen in a variety of places.
Israel was the first to use it and the first to complete the work, moving on to the revision of acquired and disposed assets. Ukraine will climb into this window with animal persistence until the very last moment. There are many other points in the world where different players are trying to take something, albeit not in such a terminal version.
It would be strange if Turkey did not try to take advantage of this situation. We are seeing this attempt right now in Syria - Ankara is trying to come out by January with new assets, with new positions for a big bargain. It is even doing this late, apparently having focused too much on Israel and Lebanon.
The offensive is now taking place on a very broad front, and it appears that Ankara has deployed all the active forces of its proxies there, and is also pushing and even driving forward the entire armed cesspool that has accumulated over the years in Idlib.
Regretting how once again neither the Syrians, nor ours, nor the Iranians saw such a concentration of forces is, in general, an unproductive matter. For Damascus and its supporters, it is now important not to repeat history with Palmyra in 2016 and not fall into the trap set in the south of the country.
The battles are not only in the Anadan Valley (the very suburb of Aleppo), but also practically within the boundaries of western Aleppo. In fact, the jihadists and their Turkish counterparts are trying to repeat the "mother of all battles" (attempts to unblock Aleppo) only with the hope of a better outcome.
They actually have enough forces, since the Idlib radicals alone can field up to 12-15 thousand fighters, and from the north, pro-Turkish proxies are already moving towards the city of Tel Rifaat. In total, this is up to 40 thousand fighters, not counting the Turkish army already participating.
The city of Tel Rifat is occupied by Kurds and anarchists from the PYD, but there were Russian military police forces in the area. They are, naturally, being withdrawn from it.
In fact, the Turkish army will now, together with the forces of the controlled movements, put pressure on the PYD, but put pressure in such a way as to push the Syrians specifically into the city of Aleppo, giving the forces from Idlib the opportunity to take as much as possible.
The relationship between Idlib radicals and Turkey is actually quite strained. Simply put, these forces are alien to Ankara, they do not work for Turkish interests. The radical stench that has now gathered in Idlib and is storming the province of Aleppo is a collection of movements close to Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), previously financed in Syria by the CIA (see the so-called "Podesta letters" of WikiLeaks), the most hardened radicals from Syria itself (the environs of Damascus, Daraa), jihadists from Central Asia and Africa, as well as the remnants of ISIS (banned in Russia), who turned out to be in demand in Idlib as "valuable specialists".
Among the attackers, everyone is visible: Turkish special forces, Central Asian militants, and straight-up ISIS members, who are dressed in a specific military uniform in the pseudo-Afghan style (a one-piece shirt without a collar to the middle of the thigh), only now it is not black or gray, but in camouflage colors. Distinguishing marks are blue and yellow electrical tape, which is also a kind of message to B. Assad, Moscow and Iran.
They move exactly in the ISIS tactics - at high speed and in many columns, flowing around strong points. There has never been a continuous line of defense in Syria, but why there was no monitoring from the air after so many years is, of course, a question.
The scale of the offensive is truly significant, something that has not happened for a long time. This offensive cannot be stopped quickly, and it will not end quickly. Firstly, because by cutting off the M-5 highway, the delivery of forces and resources to the city of Aleppo itself will be very complicated, and secondly, because of the relations between Ankara and the Idlib cesspool.
R. Erdogan has been in a specific position with regard to them for a long time, when their previous Arabian patrons and the USA do not give money for Idlib, and Turkey cannot carry foreign forces on its own for long.
Ankara is also incapable of abandoning them and boycotting them, since they are already part of domestic Turkish politics, where Bashar al-Assad is a priori the enemy of all good people, and all who fight him are fighters, including for the greatness of Turkey the liberator. It is not for nothing that so many Turkish observers with cameras are now running after the militants, savoring what is happening - they have a decent audience in Turkey.
However, for official Ankara these are alien elements, since R. Erdogan has long had his own forces on his payroll, which he places as a future political opposition to B. Assad and considers as part of the future political field of Syria under his influence and control.
The Idlib cesspool is not included in this policy, but it demands money, weapons, medical care, attention, shares in trade, etc.
R. Erdogan has two options: send this conglomerate to Africa for disposal or send it to B. Assad for disposal. The second option is the best for him, but very problematic for Syria, Russia and Iran.
In this version, he utilizes the cesspool, which captures as much as it can, and on its shoulders introduces his forces, up to and including official troops, “for the sake of stability and peace” (as usual).
The most unpleasant thing here is that the Syrian field had been warming up since the beginning of summer. Such a development of events was quite probable, although not 100% predetermined. It was simply necessary to prepare response scenarios for them.
Each variant of events in such a general window of opportunity had its own chances for development: both pressure on Iraq and the Kurds, and pressure on Lebanon. But the window of opportunity works for everyone, not just for Turkey - Damascus, Iran and Moscow could have taken advantage of the instability in the Euphrates region, as well as the new relations between the Arabs and Iran (these are related elements). But, as they say, we have what we have.
Unsightly pictures from Syria will be coming out frequently now, there will be a lot of them, and there will also be a lot of alarmism in the style of “Aleppo will fall soon.”
The Syrian campaign in the past has regularly provided situations triggered by some unique "jambs", to put it simply. There were also some very dramatic moments, like the storming of Deir ez-Zor, in which ISIS was assisted by the American aviation, and the city itself, which had been under complete siege for several years and was supplied by air, was hanging by a thread. The defense of Aleppo had been extremely dramatic even earlier.
For Syria, Iran and Russia (and now we have to remember again that we are going in tandem here) the best option (office) would be to grind up the Idlib cesspool and, based on the results of its disposal, as in 2020, enter further into Idlib on its shoulders, occupying territories.
Moreover, if events develop in a frankly negative way for the cesspool and the Syrians have a significant advantage, even R. Erdogan will later say that, well, that was the plan. However, this is precisely the cabinet option. And the realistic option will most likely turn out much more difficult.
The fact is that in the past, three military forces operated on the side of Damascus in Syria, which were at the forefront of the offensive or were on the defensive in the most difficult areas: the world-famous “W” group, the 5th assault brigade “Tiger” of H. Suheil, assembled from the best elements, and the military wing of the Hezbollah movement.
Hezbollah forces have not been active in recent years, but they have always been a factor in the presence and reserve. There were also mechanized experimental units that were under the command of M. Assad.
It will not be possible to call Group "W" for defense today for obvious reasons; it will be difficult, if not impossible, to gather the same number from Hezbollah after the Lebanon campaign. And the problem with the transfer of other Syrian units will not be technical, but strategic.
It is not for nothing that Israel, having violated all the rules, has secured its position behind the demarcation line on the Golan Heights. As soon as Damascus begins a mass transfer of its best units to the north, Assad is guaranteed to be hit by the activation of the opposition in the south - in the same Daraa region.
It is not for nothing that this area has been actively “warmed up” by protests since the beginning of the year. To get something similar to the situation of 2012-2013 in the suburbs, which are often a solid urban agglomeration, is a very unpleasant option for official Damascus, which can only be stopped by a full-fledged military presence and preferably strong units.
In theory, the Iranians could land in Syria, but then Israel would enter the game with traditional sabotage under the banner of “defending itself from Hezbollah.”
Now many war correspondents who previously wrote about the Syrian campaign are asking questions about where the forces of the same H. Suheil are. The question is logical, but B. Assad is also in a difficult position here, a very difficult one, he must be vigilant about a blow to the underbelly from the south. At the moment, a general mobilization has been declared in Syria, which shows an understanding of the depth and scale of the threat.
In fact, as has been written many times before, Russia will have to leave its inactive position on Syria, and one of the important tasks will be to stop Damascus's possible problems from the south. This is a question of multilateral diplomacy.
We'll have to send additional aircraft there again, as cover. Defense, and given that the Idlib cesspool will now definitely have “its own” MANPADS, it is possible that Ukrainian operators will also dronesThe Ukrainian GUR will also be there, if only because it cannot help but leave its signature there, and it will clearly not be limited to blue and yellow tape for Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia) and ISIS (banned in Russia) militants.
Iran will have to start transferring its proxies from Iraq - expensive, complicated, but there are practically no options here. It is only strange that this has not been done before, but nowadays there are many strange things in general.
For Russia, this is, of course, a serious diversion of forces to a direction that was supposedly considered potentially calm, but at least Lebanon should have already made it clear that this is exactly the direction things are heading. The loss (even if temporary) of positions in Syria will have a rather sensitive effect on the value of Russia's negotiating assets as a whole. And after January there will be a very large negotiating round, and such a situation cannot be allowed.
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