It is premature to bury traditional weapons in the SVO

Tanks
First, let's get acquainted with a wonderful analysis of the application tanks in the Korean War:
The analysis is American and quite ancient, but has not lost its relevance to this day. Experience and story suggest that tanks get it after every war. And not only domestic machines, as the most combative, but also imported brothers. Doubts about the advisability of continuing the tank theme, as we see, were after the war on the Korean Peninsula, after Vietnam (to a lesser extent) and "Desert Storm". With a small amendment regarding the NATO operation in the Middle East - then the whipping boys were Soviet-style tanks. When a high-tech NATO machine works against not the most modern armored vehicles, and even in an export version, a different outcome could not be expected. The notorious air supremacy was with the coalition, and it was decisive.
The experience of the Afghan war also showed the poor suitability of tanks for mountain warfare in the Central Asian republic. They were used, but on a limited scale. The specifics of military operations in Afghanistan even had time to affect the further evolution of Soviet tanks. For example, this is how the very same T-62M with the “Brezhnev eyebrows” of 1983 was born. The first and second Chechen campaigns almost brought all armored vehicles to the guillotine. The sad images of burnt tank columns became one of the symbols of those wars.

The result is not the most comforting. In none of the conflicts did the tanks show themselves in all their glory, there were always ill-wishers pointing to low protection against anti-tank weapons, or poor cross-country ability, or both. The conflict in Ukraine revealed another failure of the tank - this time vulnerability to FPV-drones and other flying brethren. In addition, weak protection against modern anti-tank weapons. Let's remember the Javelin and how they worshiped it in Ukraine. Banderites supported the myth of the high vulnerability of Russian armored vehicles in every possible way. However, they insistently demanded the same tanks from their masters in NATO.
The less than impressive effectiveness of armored units, especially in the early stages of the SVO, can be explained by several reasons at once. In no sector of the front were tanks able to achieve a decisive advantage either in numbers or in combat tactics. No one would be surprised if a platoon was sent against a company of fighters and all of them perished.
Since the time of Rotmistrov, tanks have not fundamentally changed their role on the battlefield. We open the immortal work of Kosyrev E. A., Orekhov E. M., Fomin N. N. "Tanks" of the 1972 model and read: "Tanks ensured the rapid advance of attacking rifle units. Having completed a breakthrough of the defense together with the infantry, tanks broke out into operational space, boldly bypassed the enemy's resistance nodes, destroyed its reserves, disrupted control, intercepted the escape routes of enemy troops, were the first, as a rule, to close the ring of encirclement of groups and took an active part in their final defeat."
In modern combat operations, air support is added to this, without which a tank attack would inevitably fizzle out. In the SVO, we see a very sedentary front, where tank attacks simply have no place - the enemy has time to pull up countermeasures and personnel to the breakthrough site. Especially when it is the enemy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, whose logistical reach is shorter than Russia's due to the special configuration of the front. In addition, direct air support is practically non-existent. Therefore, it is premature to write off tanks based only on the experience of the SVO.
The parties to the conflict managed to gather all available means to counteract tanks as the main players on the battlefield. As soon as the situation changes, armored vehicles again take the lead in the column. We are talking about the invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into the Kursk region. The enemy took advantage of a favorable set of circumstances and brought armored vehicle columns into Russia. Neither minefields nor FPV drones interfered. Over time, the Banderites will, of course, be driven out, but for now this example is a counterargument for opponents of tanks.
One cannot help but recall the experience of the Israeli army. It would seem that more than 1000 days have passed since the beginning of the NWO, but they are still fighting the IDF using the same old patterns. Israel is very lucky that neither Hamas nor Hezbollah have drones in sufficient numbers. For almost a year now, Israeli armored vehicles have been feeling very comfortable in the immediate vicinity of the front line. Russian drone operators would have burned down such gatherings of Merkava in a few minutes. This, by the way, is a big mystery of the war in the Middle East. Can't Lebanese Hezbollah create strike units with FPV drones? Enormous experience has been accumulated, and, for example, Iran is very closely monitoring the developments in the NWO fields. But FPV does not fly on the Merkava.
And others
Preliminary results of the SVO also leave little chance for attack helicopters. Largely due to the impossibility of providing direct support to attacking tanks. There are too many devices on the ground that are ready to bite a rotary-wing machine, the crew of which is invaluable. Drones, including home-made ones, have every chance of pushing helicopters into the background. But let's remember the famous counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine last summer. Helicopters noticeably influenced it in two cases. The first is by shooting at the armor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from long distances with guided rockets. Together with the "Surovikin line" this had a sobering effect on Bandera. The second factor is the lack of helicopters among the enemy. The Ukrainian Armed Forces hoped for an army of drones capable of exerting some influence on the situation, but they could not even replace rotary-wing aircraft.
At the same time, one cannot help but note the extremely difficult situation for Russian helicopter pilots. It has worsened with the Ukrainian Armed Forces' permission to strike deep into Russian territory. Aviation have long been removed from the strike at a sufficient distance, and this has not greatly affected combat effectiveness. With helicopters it is more difficult - the further they are from the front line, the less freedom of maneuver they have. After all, the specific fuel consumption of a rotary-wing aircraft will be higher than that of a classic turbojet aircraft.
It seems that the only path prepared for attack helicopters in the SVO is to stop enemy breakthroughs carried out without proper air defense cover. As it was in the summer and fall of 2023. Bombs from the UMPK have already partially taken over this function, which has further protected helicopters from deadly attacks. But it is too early to hand over the helicopters to a museum - they will definitely come in handy.
Now about the expensive fighters. Of course, about the American F-35 products, which are sold to customers for 160-180 million dollars apiece. Not to mention the associated costs of maintaining combat readiness. Some analysts have already called these machines a purely business project of the American military. They say that the Yankees are making money on their partners as best they can. But it is not that simple. We still do not know for sure how the F-35 will behave in the conditions of the Central Military District. Simply because it was not there. But our Su-57 was and is. According to the head of Rostec, Sergei Chemezov:
Now let's imagine a hypothetical scenario in which a fifth-generation aircraft must deliver a nuclear bomb to its destination. No one else can do it, and the valiant missile men and "strategists" are unable to help for some reason. Of course, the target is thoroughly covered by air defense and missile defense. Question: is $25-35 million for the Su-57 justified if only this aircraft is capable of overcoming the air defense zone and dropping the valuable cargo to the recipient?

A reassessment of the methods of armed struggle based on the results of the SVO will, of course, take place. The regulations will be adapted, the arsenals will be shaken up. But the formula about "generals preparing for the past war" will remain eternal. Simply because it is absolutely impossible to predict the nature of the war of the future. This is not even a science, it is an art.
By retiring certain models of military equipment early, we risk finding ourselves in a weak position in the future. Any forecasts in the field of technical progress inevitably crash against the future itself. I remember several fundamental failures that promised us happiness in a few years. This is total autopilot on the roads, these are breakthrough nanotechnologies, this is the "green agenda". Here are quantum computers and artificial intelligence, on which very high hopes are placed. Including in the military sphere. It is possible that this will also turn out to be a soap bubble, and in the future we will have to fight in the old way. With drones and tanks.
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