It is premature to bury traditional weapons in the SVO

92
It is premature to bury traditional weapons in the SVO


Tanks


First, let's get acquainted with a wonderful analysis of the application tanks in the Korean War:



"The argument that tanks are obsolete because new weapon made them more vulnerable, apparently makes little sense. Almost any weapon used against an infantryman to which he is desperately vulnerable. However, the infantryman is not obsolete. Tanks should be used as part of a team until a better weapon is found to perform the same task."

The analysis is American and quite ancient, but has not lost its relevance to this day. Experience and story suggest that tanks get it after every war. And not only domestic machines, as the most combative, but also imported brothers. Doubts about the advisability of continuing the tank theme, as we see, were after the war on the Korean Peninsula, after Vietnam (to a lesser extent) and "Desert Storm". With a small amendment regarding the NATO operation in the Middle East - then the whipping boys were Soviet-style tanks. When a high-tech NATO machine works against not the most modern armored vehicles, and even in an export version, a different outcome could not be expected. The notorious air supremacy was with the coalition, and it was decisive.

The experience of the Afghan war also showed the poor suitability of tanks for mountain warfare in the Central Asian republic. They were used, but on a limited scale. The specifics of military operations in Afghanistan even had time to affect the further evolution of Soviet tanks. For example, this is how the very same T-62M with the “Brezhnev eyebrows” of 1983 was born. The first and second Chechen campaigns almost brought all armored vehicles to the guillotine. The sad images of burnt tank columns became one of the symbols of those wars.


The result is not the most comforting. In none of the conflicts did the tanks show themselves in all their glory, there were always ill-wishers pointing to low protection against anti-tank weapons, or poor cross-country ability, or both. The conflict in Ukraine revealed another failure of the tank - this time vulnerability to FPV-drones and other flying brethren. In addition, weak protection against modern anti-tank weapons. Let's remember the Javelin and how they worshiped it in Ukraine. Banderites supported the myth of the high vulnerability of Russian armored vehicles in every possible way. However, they insistently demanded the same tanks from their masters in NATO.

The less than impressive effectiveness of armored units, especially in the early stages of the SVO, can be explained by several reasons at once. In no sector of the front were tanks able to achieve a decisive advantage either in numbers or in combat tactics. No one would be surprised if a platoon was sent against a company of fighters and all of them perished.

Since the time of Rotmistrov, tanks have not fundamentally changed their role on the battlefield. We open the immortal work of Kosyrev E. A., Orekhov E. M., Fomin N. N. "Tanks" of the 1972 model and read: "Tanks ensured the rapid advance of attacking rifle units. Having completed a breakthrough of the defense together with the infantry, tanks broke out into operational space, boldly bypassed the enemy's resistance nodes, destroyed its reserves, disrupted control, intercepted the escape routes of enemy troops, were the first, as a rule, to close the ring of encirclement of groups and took an active part in their final defeat."

In modern combat operations, air support is added to this, without which a tank attack would inevitably fizzle out. In the SVO, we see a very sedentary front, where tank attacks simply have no place - the enemy has time to pull up countermeasures and personnel to the breakthrough site. Especially when it is the enemy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, whose logistical reach is shorter than Russia's due to the special configuration of the front. In addition, direct air support is practically non-existent. Therefore, it is premature to write off tanks based only on the experience of the SVO.

The parties to the conflict managed to gather all available means to counteract tanks as the main players on the battlefield. As soon as the situation changes, armored vehicles again take the lead in the column. We are talking about the invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into the Kursk region. The enemy took advantage of a favorable set of circumstances and brought armored vehicle columns into Russia. Neither minefields nor FPV drones interfered. Over time, the Banderites will, of course, be driven out, but for now this example is a counterargument for opponents of tanks.

One cannot help but recall the experience of the Israeli army. It would seem that more than 1000 days have passed since the beginning of the NWO, but they are still fighting the IDF using the same old patterns. Israel is very lucky that neither Hamas nor Hezbollah have drones in sufficient numbers. For almost a year now, Israeli armored vehicles have been feeling very comfortable in the immediate vicinity of the front line. Russian drone operators would have burned down such gatherings of Merkava in a few minutes. This, by the way, is a big mystery of the war in the Middle East. Can't Lebanese Hezbollah create strike units with FPV drones? Enormous experience has been accumulated, and, for example, Iran is very closely monitoring the developments in the NWO fields. But FPV does not fly on the Merkava.

And others


Preliminary results of the SVO also leave little chance for attack helicopters. Largely due to the impossibility of providing direct support to attacking tanks. There are too many devices on the ground that are ready to bite a rotary-wing machine, the crew of which is invaluable. Drones, including home-made ones, have every chance of pushing helicopters into the background. But let's remember the famous counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine last summer. Helicopters noticeably influenced it in two cases. The first is by shooting at the armor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from long distances with guided rockets. Together with the "Surovikin line" this had a sobering effect on Bandera. The second factor is the lack of helicopters among the enemy. The Ukrainian Armed Forces hoped for an army of drones capable of exerting some influence on the situation, but they could not even replace rotary-wing aircraft.

At the same time, one cannot help but note the extremely difficult situation for Russian helicopter pilots. It has worsened with the Ukrainian Armed Forces' permission to strike deep into Russian territory. Aviation have long been removed from the strike at a sufficient distance, and this has not greatly affected combat effectiveness. With helicopters it is more difficult - the further they are from the front line, the less freedom of maneuver they have. After all, the specific fuel consumption of a rotary-wing aircraft will be higher than that of a classic turbojet aircraft.

It seems that the only path prepared for attack helicopters in the SVO is to stop enemy breakthroughs carried out without proper air defense cover. As it was in the summer and fall of 2023. Bombs from the UMPK have already partially taken over this function, which has further protected helicopters from deadly attacks. But it is too early to hand over the helicopters to a museum - they will definitely come in handy.

Now about the expensive fighters. Of course, about the American F-35 products, which are sold to customers for 160-180 million dollars apiece. Not to mention the associated costs of maintaining combat readiness. Some analysts have already called these machines a purely business project of the American military. They say that the Yankees are making money on their partners as best they can. But it is not that simple. We still do not know for sure how the F-35 will behave in the conditions of the Central Military District. Simply because it was not there. But our Su-57 was and is. According to the head of Rostec, Sergei Chemezov:

“The Su-57 is the only fifth-generation fighter in the world that has proven its effectiveness in the face of counteraction from modern Western systems Defense, including Patriot, NASAMS and IRIS-T."

Now let's imagine a hypothetical scenario in which a fifth-generation aircraft must deliver a nuclear bomb to its destination. No one else can do it, and the valiant missile men and "strategists" are unable to help for some reason. Of course, the target is thoroughly covered by air defense and missile defense. Question: is $25-35 million for the Su-57 justified if only this aircraft is capable of overcoming the air defense zone and dropping the valuable cargo to the recipient?


A reassessment of the methods of armed struggle based on the results of the SVO will, of course, take place. The regulations will be adapted, the arsenals will be shaken up. But the formula about "generals preparing for the past war" will remain eternal. Simply because it is absolutely impossible to predict the nature of the war of the future. This is not even a science, it is an art.

By retiring certain models of military equipment early, we risk finding ourselves in a weak position in the future. Any forecasts in the field of technical progress inevitably crash against the future itself. I remember several fundamental failures that promised us happiness in a few years. This is total autopilot on the roads, these are breakthrough nanotechnologies, this is the "green agenda". Here are quantum computers and artificial intelligence, on which very high hopes are placed. Including in the military sphere. It is possible that this will also turn out to be a soap bubble, and in the future we will have to fight in the old way. With drones and tanks.
92 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +16
    1 December 2024 05: 15
    Without military commanders with the talent of Suvorov and Kutuzov, even with an armada of tanks, airplanes, and helicopters, it is impossible to achieve victory over the enemy.
    This was shown at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, when the Red Army had a quantitative advantage over the Wehrmacht in tanks and aircraft.
    This was also shown by the beginning of the SVO, when numerous columns of our armored vehicles were exposed to fire from the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
    Our country first of all needs competent commanders and fighters, who are now gaining combat experience in the Northern Military District, lying in hospitals with wounds... incompetents should not command troops... this is now evident in Syria.
    1. +10
      1 December 2024 06: 40
      Kutuzovs and Suvorovs are, of course, needed.
      But... In Syria it's a completely different matter.
      The main deficit is not Suvorovs, but miracle heroes Yes
      If there is no persistent, motivated, skilled soldier (Suvorov's efforts were aimed at educating the cortex), then no geniuses will help. This is more of a political reason, it cannot be solved by orders to the military unit, it is, you understand, the quality of the state at a certain historical stage.
      Let's hope for the IRGC and our pilots. The Arabs in Syria are apparently so divided that they cannot take control of their country themselves.
      As for traditional types of weapons.
      Anyone who is even slightly familiar with military history knows that tanks suffered even greater losses during the Second World War than during the Central Military District. And it was extremely difficult to use tank units without air superiority.
      It is also known that new types of weapons change tactics and require technical countermeasures.
      And so it is now. Until effective means of defeating drones are created, there will be no breakthrough of mechanized mobile groups. Including because such groups also need hundreds and thousands of tons of material resources per day, which can be delivered only if the enemy does not have the ability to strike supply columns.
      And besides drones, there are OTRK and other VTO, which makes it impossible to introduce TA into a breakthrough, for example, along one, two, three routes. Troops must move on a fairly wide front, which requires high training of commanders, starting with tank and squad commanders.
      I.e. everything remains as before, but military art is moving to a new qualitative level. As the mother of sciences, philosophy, teaches. wink
      1. +3
        1 December 2024 06: 44
        Eh... why am I not a general? smile,
        Military science is so interesting!!!
        Everything has to be learned from the couch and from books.
        1. +1
          1 December 2024 15: 46
          Since the time of Rotmistrov, tanks have not fundamentally changed their role on the battlefield.

          After this, you can not read the article. A set of smart words without understanding the essence of the issues under consideration. The author has no idea about modern war and modern combat. Personal wretchedness and backwardness form false associations at the level of perception. The person shares his emotions. There is no analysis here. The time it takes to prepare the article is equal to the time it takes to write it. Pathetic...
      2. +1
        1 December 2024 15: 56
        Suvorovs and Kutuzovs, analyzing the methods of waging war and the capabilities of the troops, chose tactics for a certain period. The ingenious Headquarters of the Russian Armed Forces is not able to do this now. Moreover, for 25 years they have not adopted a single concept of conducting modern combat. How can you fight in a Modern War without preparing for it, without knowing what it is? Answer: like in the SVO, stupidly and ineptly ... The main condition for conducting a SV is the presence of developed reconnaissance assets of various levels, from global to tactical, these are the means of transmitting and processing information in real time with its assessment and use for targeting precise strike systems in real time ... WE DO NOT HAVE ANY OF THIS YET ...
        1. 0
          10 December 2024 01: 12
          Russia has everything, everything it needs. How do you think Oreshnik gets there? And Iskander, Kinzhal? The day before yesterday they launched Condor, there is Peony, there is Lotus, Persona is still flying. And there are different "real times", with quantum hours, not seconds, as it seems to you.
    2. -4
      1 December 2024 10: 30
      Suvorov is clear, what does Kutuzov have to do with it? He screwed up the Battle of Borodino and surrendered Moscow, he preferred a cozy headquarters on the flank, and Napoleon himself ran and decided what and where to send. The result, almost 2 times greater losses.
      1. +10
        1 December 2024 13: 25
        The result is losses almost twice as large.
        As for "lost it". Buonaparti reported in Paris only the French losses, and he did not count all the others - Poles, pasta makers, lovers of beer with cabbage and sausages and other punks. It is not the Tsar's business. Almost all of it remained in Russia, fertilizing the fields. Kutuzov himself managed to defeat the Turks before the Patriotic War of 1812, make peace with them, and with enormous benefit for us, having received both the territories and the neutrality of Turkey.
        1. -3
          1 December 2024 16: 17
          We are talking only about Borodino, not about the entire campaign, besides, there were many other fearless competent commanders who, without permission from above, cleared the territories of the enemy. Here, even without Kutuzov, they would have managed.
      2. +3
        4 December 2024 16: 33
        And where did Napoleon end up? Here is the answer to all the questions about who is the winner and who is the loser.
      3. 0
        10 December 2024 12: 07
        What does Kutuzov have to do with this?

        You, my dear fellow, really don't like Kutuzov. And in vain. It was Kutuzov who won the war, not Napoleon...
        A defeat or victory in one local battle is not yet a victory or defeat in the war. And we won the war...
    3. +2
      1 December 2024 12: 41
      Quote: Lech from Android.
      competent commanders and fighters

      Here they are sent into politics with the help of "hero time". They don't want to promote them to brigade commanders or army commanders, for this there are many old-school generals who are moved from place to place.
      1. +1
        2 December 2024 21: 45
        they are sent to cover up burnt asses
        1. +1
          2 December 2024 23: 50
          Rather, it is similar to writing off Poklonskaya, who was taken into politics and scandalized there. This, of course, is better than what happened to the militia commanders in 2015-17. And I think that heroes will be driven out of all sorts of gubernatorial reception rooms within a few years. Obviously, we do not need smart commanders, there is peace on the planet, all conflicts are resolved in rap battles or rock-paper-scissors
    4. 0
      1 December 2024 14: 12
      There was something like this before: "I don't have any Hindenburgs." Somehow, I remember, we managed without them.
    5. +2
      1 December 2024 14: 35
      Without military commanders with the talent of Suvorov and Kutuzov, even with an armada of tanks, airplanes, and helicopters, it is impossible to achieve victory over the enemy.


      But on the couches, all geniuses of Suvorov's level, what will a genius of Suvorov's level do now in the SVO, if there is no technological advantage over the enemy army, no numerical advantage, the enemy's air defense is not suppressed, aviation does not fly behind the front line, artillery is at best in equal positions, while the counter-battery fight is still with the enemy (if you believe the SVO participants), in drones, the advantage is also with the enemy.
      Maybe the complaints should not be made to the military, they are fighting with the forces they have, but to the commander-in-chief level, how did it happen that the country has neither AWACS nor air defense systems, etc., and also to intelligence, why did they not predict such a level of resistance in Ukraine, etc.
      1. -1
        2 December 2024 21: 50
        So whoever criticizes ordinary soldiers, any of us could end up in their place. You can't get through to the copperheads even if you're sitting on the couch or standing up. You can't see one brain cell from the cap behind their stupid mug.
        1. 0
          3 December 2024 00: 21
          How would you act in Ukraine if you were in command, taking into account the forces that exist and the tasks (at least those voiced by the president)?
          1. -1
            3 December 2024 08: 40
            Well, with such a president we didn’t get far.
            As for how to act, there are a lot of examples of how to act, modern Russia already has the experience of two Chechen wars, experience in Syria and the SVO has been going on for the third year. It was possible to learn something.
            1. +2
              3 December 2024 10: 43
              In the two Chechen wars and in Syria, Russia had a technological advantage and air superiority
              1. 0
                3 December 2024 11: 34
                And that at the beginning of the Second World War Russia did not have an advantage.
  2. +5
    1 December 2024 05: 22
    and in the future we will have to fight in the old way.
    The motorbike alone is worth something...
    1. +1
      1 December 2024 06: 54
      Quote from Uncle Lee
      The motorbike alone is worth something...

      Yeah...especially with the barn on top.
      1. -2
        2 December 2024 12: 39
        The wars of the future are a motor rig with a three-layer shed + a drone cassette (and the operator is not in the motor rig). Not tanks.
  3. +19
    1 December 2024 05: 52
    Judging by these almost three years of the SVO, the Russian leadership has no goal or task to defeat Ukraine - to defeat in the literal sense, with the signing of the capitulation in Kyiv. Moreover - for them it is like a bad dream - and what to do with it then? To flood them with money, like Chechnya - there are no such opportunities.
    Appoint new leaders - alas, for the last 20+ years in the upper circles there has been more and more negative selection - there are simply no people who know and are able to do something.
    That's why the fighting is like in the First World War.
    1. -1
      1 December 2024 12: 02
      There is recycling of old equipment and people - that's all. Well, who has better economics and patience in reality. The fulcrum for a global revolution in the consciousness of people all over the world.
      1. +1
        1 December 2024 17: 32
        Quote: Victor Alien
        There is recycling of old equipment and people - that's all.

        That is, Russians - into the ground, and migrants in their place?
    2. -4
      1 December 2024 14: 20
      Apparently, there is no goal to defeat NATO. Ukraine alone would have been dealt with long ago.
    3. +2
      2 December 2024 12: 47
      Well, of course, then it turns out that we need to open GULAG version 2.0... That comrade Stalin was right, that comrade Beria was too. And the elite of the White Guard creeps are not ready for this. Comrade Lenin's Mausoleum is bashfully covered up at the parade, but the hotbed of liberals, the E-center, stands like the Pyramid of Cheops. That's how we live... A swan, a crayfish and a pike. No ideology, no goal. What are we building? Capitalist socialism? Feudal capitalism? Capital authoritarianism? AutoroFeodosocioCapital? Frankenstein applauds standing.
  4. +7
    1 December 2024 05: 52
    Now let's imagine a hypothetical scenario in which a fifth-generation aircraft must deliver a nuclear bomb to its destination. No one else can do it, and for some reason the valiant missilemen and "strategists" are unable to help.


    The argument is brilliant))). Let's remove the other methods and applaud the only one remaining. And why the hell can't the missile men do it? The locations of the self-propelled launcher are much easier to change, the machine itself is easier to camouflage, the autonomy is higher, it is easier to service. A huge runway is not required.
    Couldn't you find another argument?
  5. +5
    1 December 2024 06: 03
    In addition to the hardware, we need tactics for its use, commanders who know how to use this tactic correctly, and soldiers and sergeants who know and can use the equipment and clearly follow the orders of their commanders. The absence of any component of this triad leads to the rapid destruction of expensive but useless hardware, no matter how "cool" and protected it is.
  6. +4
    1 December 2024 06: 03
    The author has noted everything correctly. Tanks should be used in large numbers to complete a breakthrough and to act in the depth of the defense. To break through the enemy's tactical defense, it is necessary to mass artillery at the breakthrough site. If we turn to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, then the Red Army's strikes were successful only if at least 100 artillery units were concentrated at the breakthrough sites, which allowed the destruction of almost all enemy fire weapons. In modern conditions, a minimum of 3 divisions per 1 kilometer of the breakthrough site.
    1. -1
      1 December 2024 06: 17
      Near Dubno, in a week of fighting, the Red Army lost 2500 tanks against Kleist’s 700 tanks...how can this be explained?
      1. +5
        1 December 2024 06: 20
        Aviation and artillery closely cooperated with the Wehrmacht tank and infantry units. The Red Army tank corps were introduced into battle in units without infantry and artillery support. A significant portion of the Red Army tanks were lost on the march.
      2. +11
        1 December 2024 07: 05
        Near Dubno, in a week of fighting, the Red Army lost 2500 tanks against Kleist's 700 tanks...how can this be explained?

        Mainly non-combat losses, lack of fuel due to senseless marches and the impact of aviation on the escort columns. There was no anti-aircraft or air cover. Read the unloved Zhukov N.K. Popel, a commissar who turned out to be a better commander than the generals promoted by Zhukov
        1. -7
          1 December 2024 11: 00
          The impact of aviation is combat losses. And the lack of fuel is solved by air delivery.
          1. +3
            1 December 2024 11: 05
            The impact of aviation is combat losses. And the lack of fuel is solved by air delivery.

            Blitzkrieg tactics are not only tank groups, but also aviation, which destroyed anti-tank defenses and even supplied tank columns in isolation from the main troops. And until we created parity, and then superiority in the air, we could not defeat the Germans.
            And while our aviation is practically grounded, we will not see any victories. The meager number of combat sorties does not make a difference in the SVO. What has come to this, every KAB strike is almost number 1 news. How does our aviation fight if it has no losses?
            1. -4
              1 December 2024 11: 20
              The counteroffensive near Moscow in 41, and Stalingrad in 42, was without an advantage in the air. In the Ardennes, the Germans also gave no advantage in the air.
              Aviation has many of its own limitations, even now the Su-25 has a primitive bombing system and no radar. And each sortie costs a considerable amount. We need to count the money and fight as effectively as possible.
              1. +3
                1 December 2024 11: 26
                The counteroffensive near Moscow in 41, and Stalingrad in 42, was without an advantage in the air. In the Ardennes, the Germans also gave no advantage in the air.

                In 41, more than half of our fighter aviation was concentrated in Moscow, while there was a lack of it on other fronts, and the weather did not allow the Germans to use their aviation to its full potential.
                In Stalingrad, Stalin did not allow a counteroffensive to be launched without creating air superiority.
                In the Ardennes, on the contrary, the Germans were able to do little, since the weather did not allow the Allies to use their air superiority.
                1. -2
                  1 December 2024 16: 06
                  The main thing is that they were able to do it without air superiority. Air superiority is a pfft if there is competent combined arms air defense. There was no air superiority in Stalingrad, and even at the Kursk Bulge they barely managed to ensure it.
              2. -1
                1 December 2024 11: 38
                In the Ardennes the Germans also had no advantage in the air.

                Do you think Kolobanov and his company of Colonel Pogodin's 1st Tank Division managed to destroy so many tanks?
                Yes, because almost all German aviation from the Leningrad direction was transferred to help Guderian, who was supposed to encircle Kyiv.
                1. -2
                  1 December 2024 16: 08
                  In any case, the USSR Air Force had no superiority.
                  1. 0
                    1 December 2024 16: 19
                    In any case, the USSR Air Force had no superiority.

                    You should at least study this issue a little before making such statements.
                    1. -3
                      2 December 2024 01: 03
                      Listen, stop hanging around here, you were immediately told about the periods of 41-42. What was there to study? Where were the superiorities of our air force? Only in your dreams. Strategist, damn it.
                      1. 0
                        2 December 2024 07: 37
                        Listen, stop hanging around here.

                        Ham, read
                        Stalin's telegram to Zhukov before the start of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad
                        “To Comrade Konstantinov
                        If the air preparation of the operation is unsatisfactory for Eremenko and Vatutin, then the operation will end in failure. The experience of the war with the Germans shows that an operation against the Germans can only be won if we have air superiority. In this case, our aviation must perform three tasks:

                        The first is to concentrate our aviation operations in the area of ​​offensive of our shock units, suppress German aviation and firmly cover our troops.

                        The second is to pave the way for our advancing units by systematically bombing the German troops facing them.

                        Third, to pursue the retreating enemy forces by systematic bombing and assault actions in order to completely upset them and prevent them from gaining a foothold on the nearest lines of defense.

                        If Novikov thinks that our aviation is now unable to fulfill these tasks, then it is better to postpone the operation for a while and accumulate more aviation.

                        Talk to Novikov and Vorozheikin, explain the matter to them and tell me your general opinion.

                        Vasiliev


                        12.11.42/4/170686. XNUMX hours. No. XNUMX.”
                      2. -3
                        2 December 2024 17: 34
                        So? There is a telegram, but is there any implementation? I can throw around documents, but what is there in fact? In fact, it got to the point that Zhukov started shooting pilots for cowardice.
              3. 0
                4 December 2024 17: 25
                In the Ardennes the Germans also had no advantage in the air.

                near Moscow 41 years

                Both were accompanied by bad weather. The Germans were counting on this, and when the weather allowed it, for some reason the Fritzes' counteroffensive began to falter, and Bastogne survived thanks to air supplies...
                At least read a little about the operations you mention.
                Stalingrad is a complete fantasy.
                1. -1
                  4 December 2024 22: 38
                  They simply didn't have enough fuel. And you need to draw the right conclusions, otherwise you look at the book and see a fig. What's so fantastic about Stalingrad? That our historians believe that we locally gained air superiority? Believing and having superiority are two different things. I strongly recommend that you don't get involved in adult conversations.
                  1. -1
                    5 December 2024 14: 29
                    They simply didn't have enough fuel.

                    The Germans at Stalingrad? And who is to blame?
                    Without fuel, an airplane cannot fly, so what kind of dominance in the sky can we talk about? Maybe dominance of a meter over the parking lot.
                    And you need to draw the right conclusions, otherwise you look at the book and see a fig.

                    The conclusions have long been made and can be found in professional literature on the topic. Look in books about aviation in the Great Patriotic War or about the Battle of Stalingrad by authoritative and popular writers on the topic, you can search by reviews or look at the book ratings. I don’t know in which book and what kind of fig you saw, but the statement about the lack of air superiority is really fantastic. The German aviation lost the Battle of the Caucasus, depleted the fuel reserves prepared for Operation Blau, critically stretched communications and, starting in June 41, steadily suffered losses in materiel and pilots, while in the USSR the aviation industry accelerated colossally, the lack of fuel was compensated by Lend-Lease and the proximity of large oil fields to the southern fronts, and the USSR increased the quality and quantity of the Air Force, as the German units were exhausted, it was the USSR that concentrated aviation forces for the offensive and did not experience a shortage of new-generation aircraft equal to the German ones.
                    If you are not aware, the isolation of the German group in Stalingrad was mainly carried out by the forces of attack and bomber aviation, it could not be otherwise when it was necessary to lock the Germans located on the other bank of the river, from behind the Volga, it was problematic to carry out regular, accurate and massive artillery attacks at such large distances, often the river interfered with the transfer of artillery to the necessary distances and prevented ground artillery reconnaissance, only air reconnaissance remained, and it must be regular and massive in such operations, so as not to miss the retreating forces and promptly transmit current data to the artillery.
                    How you can even imagine the isolation of troops in the conditions of Stalingrad without aviation, I have no idea. As well as conducting such a large-scale crossing of the Volga "under the hood" of German aviation. But, apparently, you know some miracles that are incomprehensible to me.
                    I strongly recommend that you stay out of adult conversations.

                    I will take into account and consider the "adulthood" and "maturity" of your level of polemics:
                    I can throw around documents, but what is there in fact?

                    Listen, stop hanging around here, you were immediately told about the periods of 41-42. What was there to study? Where were the superiorities of our air force? Only in your dreams. Strategist, damn it.

                    Air superiority is a piece of cake if you have a competent combined arms air defense

                    (it's even interesting how you split air superiority and air defense)
                    even now it is on the Su-25 primitive bombing system и no radar

                    (there is only one like it - the Su-25 - unreasonably expensive and primitive)
                    The impact of aviation is combat losses. And the lack of fuel is solved by air delivery.

                    But what if the impact of aviation consists of the destruction of airfield and road infrastructure, the destruction of fuel delivery vehicles, both air and ground, and the exclusion of the possibility of transport flights precisely because of complete dominance in the sky?
                    I understand if you just don't know something or don't understand. But in your arguments and reasons you throw out stubbornness and rudeness. As a mature and formed individual)
                    1. 0
                      8 December 2024 16: 08
                      And how long have you had this? People and horses are all mixed up... Su-25 is cheap? Yes or no?
                      Modern Su-25? Yes or no?
                      Are troop losses from aviation combat losses? Yes or no?
                      The Germans ran out of fuel in the Ardennes.
                      It feels like a person woke up with a hangover and wrote something, but didn't figure it out himself and just threw it out, like figure it out yourself. I figured it out, I beg you not to comment on my posts, you are an amateur and don't go where they write seriously about serious things.
                      1. 0
                        9 December 2024 01: 41
                        How long have you had this? People and horses have become mixed up...

                        Don't project the chaos from your head onto mine, I answered you precisely according to the theses you voiced, I didn't raise any new topics. If there is a mess, it wasn't made up by me.
                        I kindly ask you not to comment on my posts

                        Then why are you asking me questions?)
                        is su-25 cheap?

                        Dear. Not a biplane of course. But compared to other aircraft and similar planes, it is quite economical, its performance characteristics pay for themselves.
                        Modern Su-25?

                        In the basic version, it is not modern, but relevant. It copes with the tasks of applying the BShU, and copes with it no worse than its competitors. Cheaper than the same Su-34, more effective than the same A-10. And in the modern upgraded version - SM3 - it will shut up the same A-10 "in both cheeks".
                        Are troop losses from aviation combat losses?

                        Of course. But what is the question?
                        It feels like a person woke up with a hangover and wrote something, but didn’t figure it out himself and just threw it away, like figure it out yourself.

                        You are an amateur and don't go where they write seriously about serious things.

                        I wash my hands of it, I won’t be able to give a more accurate and eloquent description than you gave yourself)
        2. +1
          4 December 2024 16: 41
          lack of fuel due to senseless marches

          Rather, it was due to the emergency retreat and the poor operational security of the tank corps.
          It was originally a fool, unable to perform maneuvers quickly. Too little support.
          You can endlessly look for the guilty and point to numbers. In retrospect, everyone is a genius.
    2. +7
      1 December 2024 06: 23
      Tanks should be used in a massive manner

      And not only tanks, aviation must also be used on a massive scale.
      And now a single aircraft makes a combat sortie, targeting itself with everything it can. The modern experience of the Israeli Air Force is not applied in our country. I do not understand why, when massive launches of Kalibrs and Geraniums were carried out, there were no parallel sorties of aircraft with anti-radar missiles to destroy the radars that began to work actively. Maybe it is not the technology that is to blame, but the tactics...
      1. +1
        1 December 2024 06: 29
        The question is where the interception is carried out, if deep in the territory, then the question is whether the aircraft's weapons will reach. If the aircraft enters enemy territory, then it is possible to get into an ambush. Most likely, the tactics you proposed are not used due to uncertainty about the suppression of air defense systems.
        1. -1
          1 December 2024 06: 42
          you can get ambushed

          That's the point, you can organize an ambush for one... two, but not for hundreds of planes, which are supposed to suppress the air defense
          uncertainty about the suppression of air defense systems.
      2. -1
        1 December 2024 06: 45
        Quote: Konnick
        aviation should also be used on a massive scale
        Massive use of aviation will cause the same massive use of air defense forces. The consequences of such use are easily predictable
        1. +3
          1 December 2024 06: 50
          Massive use of aviation will cause the same massive use of air defense forces. The consequences of such use are easily predictable

          There is no need to think in a straightforward manner, I wrote in parallel with the massive raid of Kalibrs and Geraniums and possibly based on the experience of Azerbaijan with false targets in the form of An-2 drones, no one has cancelled the overload of air defense, our S300s did not help Iran resist Israeli raids in any way even without these tricks
        2. 0
          1 December 2024 06: 57
          The massive use of aviation will cause the same massive use of air defense forces.


          I usually give an example from the past
          There is a military facility, it is guarded by 10 anti-aircraft guns, how can this facility be destroyed by 10 bombers? Send them one by one or simultaneously?
          1. 0
            1 December 2024 07: 05
            Quote: Konnick
            I usually give an example from the past
            If we look back to the past, the best conditions for bombing an object are night time or low clouds. And even now, massive raids on enemy territory, as the Americans and the British did in WWII, are no longer possible in modern conditions. We need to develop some other tactics for using aviation. I hope that this is what our General Staff is doing. And probably not ours either.
            1. +4
              1 December 2024 07: 12
              I hope that this is what they do in our General Staff. And probably not in ours either.


              vague doubts torment me
              and aren't the parquet generals in the General Staff stretching out the "pleasure", since their salaries are now too good
              1. +5
                1 December 2024 07: 15
                Quote: Konnick
                their salaries are too good now
                When you have a good salary, you start thinking about yourself, for example, how to build a summer house or buy an apartment in the center of Moscow, and not about some questions of strategy and tactics wink
                1. +3
                  1 December 2024 07: 18
                  When you have a good salary,

                  Yes, yes...yes, even in a warm office.
        3. +4
          1 December 2024 09: 44
          Quote: Dutchman Michel
          Massive use of aviation will cause the same massive use of air defense forces. The consequences of such use are easily predictable

          this is if everything happens on a 100 km section every day or the enemy has a million air defense systems for the entire LBS... otherwise, if the air defense is concentrated, we just go the other way, especially since it was removed from somewhere in order to concentrate...
        4. 0
          1 December 2024 13: 44
          The air defense is standing still. A raid by one plane will happen to the same massive air defense as a raid by a hundred planes.
      3. +2
        1 December 2024 08: 20
        Nobody understands this. Such a brilliant idea is beyond the reach of simple minds.
        1. 0
          1 December 2024 08: 22
          Nobody understands this. Such a brilliant idea is beyond the reach of simple minds.

          Not available...please comment your comment.
          1. +1
            1 December 2024 08: 35
            I don’t understand why, when the massive launches of Kalibrs and Geraniums were carried out, there were no parallel sorties of aircraft with anti-radar missiles to destroy the radars that were beginning to work actively.


            This is sarcasm in support of your thesis.
      4. +1
        2 December 2024 01: 41
        Quote: Konnick
        Maybe it's not the technology that's to blame, but the tactics...

        Do we even have this tactic? I'm not even asking about strategy.
  7. 0
    1 December 2024 06: 24
    Quote: Mitrich73
    The Red Army tank corps were introduced into battle in units without infantry or artillery support.

    Is this what they taught at the Frunze Military Academy?
    The enemy took full advantage of this. request
    The Red Army found itself without tanks at the decisive moment... although Kleist's assault group was delayed for two weeks... which also played a role in the battle of Moscow.
  8. +4
    1 December 2024 06: 34
    The problem is that there is no concept of the use of tanks, their place in modern warfare.

    The tanks that are currently in use were created to meet the requirements of the Cold War (main tank, main battle tank).
    A high-speed armored vehicle, with a cannon to destroy armored vehicles, and with powerful protection of the front of the hull and turret.

    That is, in essence, a development of a cavalry/cruiser tank, but with powerful armor, not thin, like pre-war tanks.

    It turned out that modern GUIDED weapons (ATGMs, and even ersatz ATGM drones) hit a tank in its most vulnerable spot - the roof of the turret, in addition, the operator can aim them at the turret/hull joint, hatches.
    That is, the armor of modern tanks is no longer adequate to the conditions (and will not be, since there are still modern self-propelled guns that fire 152/155 mm guided projectiles, from which no armor can protect).

    High speed and essentially an anti-tank gun are also not adequate to the conditions, since tanks are used to support infantry, and not for high-speed breakthroughs/bypasses and fighting tanks.

    Thus, it is necessary to rework a modern tank, and create a new vehicle on its chassis, which will be integrated into the combat formation (the destruction of SINGLE vehicles with ATGMs and drones is not a basis for conclusions, for example, whether it will be possible to destroy a vehicle with APS, modern dynamic protection, covered by SAM and anti-aircraft missiles (both its own and the vehicles accompanying the tank).
    1. +2
      1 December 2024 06: 50
      Quote: Maxim G
      The problem is that there is no concept of the use of tanks, its place in modern warfare
      This is all because modern warfare is completely different and not at all like what all the General Staffs were preparing for. The same can be said about aviation, navy and towed artillery.
    2. +1
      1 December 2024 13: 49
      Tanks were made for their massive use in a full-fledged army, and not to drive three tanks past the enemy without any cover. Nobody openly discusses the tactics of our generals, since this would be 100% discrediting. Even in 1946, they use equipment inadequately. And not only equipment
      1. -1
        1 December 2024 14: 00
        Nowadays tanks are expensive and take a long time to build.
        1. +2
          1 December 2024 14: 09
          Yes, everything is expensive now, even Chinese drones with a re-glued nameplate are very expensive. But our field marshals are the most expensive. With the stolen money, we could have built twenty thousand Armatas and still have enough left over for a thousand Su-57s.
    3. 0
      1 December 2024 22: 29
      in my opinion, there is a repeat of the situation at sea, when dreadnoughts were poorly equipped with air defense due to underestimation of the threat from the sky.. and before the SVO, it was considered sufficient to cover tank columns with Shilkas and Tunguskas.. but against FPV, it's all the same as from a cannon and at mosquitoes.. mini-gatlings are needed (not even 7.62 but 5.45 and less (the strength of drones is not the armor of the Su-25 or A-10) .. also (again in my opinion) it is possible to use lasers capable of burning out optics on the seeker of drones, well, and everything rests on guidance.. it is possible to use existing drives, but then the question of guidance arises.. even millimeter radars for the fact that they will take a drone, and optics require an operator.. i.e. artificial intelligence is needed.. all this already exists, it remains to connect and.. then the percentage of FPV defeats will fall to acceptable values, and This means that OBT will be back in the game..
  9. 0
    1 December 2024 06: 39
    Quote: Yevgeny Fedorov
    T-62M with "Brezhnev's eyebrows"
    I'm not an expert in tank science, but what are "Brezhnev's eyebrows"? wink
    1. +4
      1 December 2024 09: 20
      In the second photo of the T-62, "Ilyich's Eyebrows" are the add-on modules of combined armor on the front cheekbones of the turret (where the white inscription "leopard" is)
      1. -1
        1 December 2024 10: 55
        Brezhnepard should have been called
  10. +2
    1 December 2024 10: 50
    Why is Israel not being terrorized by drones? It's very simple, they are equipped with electronic warfare systems, and the Palestinians do not have NATO's military-industrial complex behind them. All suppliers of UAV control systems in the West are controlled, and it is very easy to get counteraction systems with the necessary algorithms for jamming and interception of control from them. This is one of the reasons for the transition to an optical control channel via fiber optics for the Russian Armed Forces.
    Although it is possible to control the same UAVs using laser systems via a UAV repeater via IR channels.
    Combating UAVs in the Kursk region also does not present any difficulties, it is enough to identify the coordinates of control points and, using additional reconnaissance systems on UAVs, specify the coordinates and destroy them. I do not think that the frequency hopping mode somehow masks the control point from direction finding systems. If an aircraft repeater is used, then destroying such a thing should not cause any problems.
  11. -1
    1 December 2024 10: 55
    The recent use of Atakams on the S400, essentially destroying the complex. Now the hysteria over these systems is understandable, apparently a very difficult target. And the battery commander neglected to change position.
  12. +4
    1 December 2024 11: 03
    Sending a Su-57 to carry out an atomic bombing, alone, are you serious? What is the "dagger" with a range of 2000 km for, medium-range missiles in the end?
  13. +2
    1 December 2024 12: 17
    Well, breakthrough nanotechnologies are already taking place, it's just that it's perhaps not so noticeable. This situation reminds me of the first years of LCD monitors. There was a general dominance of various tube monitors, they were already tested and beaten off in the launch of production, developers made equipment for them, their repair was established, and so on. Despite the fact that there was already a more than worthy alternative option, beating them "dry". Off the top of my head, this "struggle" between the old and the advanced stretched out for a decade for purely economic and production-cooperative reasons.
    Our society is not always ready to implement innovations promptly, even if their extreme benefits are evident.

    Regarding military equipment - when was the last time a tank could be called conditionally "indestructible"? Off the top of my head, during the early-middle period of WWII in the case of the KV and Tiger tanks. And even then - with a number of amendments and very. relatively in places. Since then, ... 80 years have passed, hmm. And the same tank is no longer capable of even approaching the survival parameters that were mentioned above. Given that they were not exactly ideal back then. Just like the survival of the T-34 at the time of its appearance, although that would also be a good example.

    The question is, is it possible now to design a machine that approaches the mentioned survival parameters by analogy with modern means? Probably, it is possible. But is it possible to do this while preserving the TRADITIONAL appearance of the tank and its traditional concept? Here the answer is rather negative - either the price and maintainability of such a product will grow by leaps and bounds.
    I think that the tank's appearance in the future will inevitably change dramatically - because its current configuration is conceptually very old. But the tank itself will probably remain - although it may have to be divided into types again, instead of an abstract MBT.
    1. +2
      1 December 2024 18: 12
      more than a worthy alternative option for them, beating them "dry"

      Bad example, not dry because of the size but they beat CRT and for dynamic scenes/games they still beat

      First of all, the response
      LCDs that were from the early nineties to the end of the noughties had a response of more than 10 ms, and the difference in characteristics with reality can differ several times, and sometimes tens of times. The use of different measurement methods creates real chaos, if you quickly move the mouse on the LCD, there will be many cursors - this is a trail from the mouse. On a CRT with a frequency of more than 85 Hz, on the contrary, no matter how quickly the cursor moves, it will always be the only one and without a trail
      The reason for the problem is a long response time. This indicator is responsible for the smoothness of image reproduction in dynamic scenes. The lower the response time, the less fast-moving objects leave artifacts on the screen in the form of trails and the image does not seem blurry. I have not yet touched LCD screens with a response of 0.01 ms due to the high cost, but I think they will be equal in comfort of smoothness with CRT, I myself switched from a 17 "100 Hz CRT to a 24" 60 Hz 4 ms in 2010 to watch movies and work on a big screen, but in Counter Strike Source on a local server it could no longer show the same results as on the CRT and the purchase in 2012 of a 27 "1920x1080 144 Hz 2 ms somehow did not change the situation much, I guessed from the trail from the mouse that 2 ms is a lot

      And the second for games is the cinematic aspect ratio of 16:9
      In games, usually at the bottom in the middle there is either a weapon or a steering wheel or a car or an avatar, and with a 16:9 ratio it is either small or takes up half the screen in height, with a 4:3 ratio it was kind of normal, at the top and bottom there was information for which peripheral vision was enough, so if you sit close to the left and right it was normal
  14. bar
    0
    2 December 2024 08: 59
    The article gives the impression of some kind of chaotic, hackneyed text with examples pulled from somewhere, in and out of place. No.
  15. 0
    2 December 2024 09: 41
    Conclusions should not be made about modern war in such an epic sense - based on the analysis of the SVO. This is a specific local conflict with its own individual characteristics. This is a special case.
    It is unlikely that they would have fought like this seriously if there had been a strong wartime state with a decisive command.
    I will not dwell on the details and features of what is, but will suggest how it should be.
    Advancing from Belarus and Crimea, towards each other, two armies (with a thousand tanks in each) united somewhere in the area of ​​Zhitomir and Vinnitsa. There they deployed with the front to the west, and built a deeply echeloned defense from Moldova to Belarus, 50-100 km deep, with the second echelon behind them.
    This is all done with the massive use of tanks, aircraft, missiles and bombs, strikes by armies numbering a million or more. The losses are such as would be necessary to accomplish the task.
    And this must be done suddenly, uncompromisingly and without any breaks for negotiations.
    The army has completed the task, taken up defensive positions on the future demarcation line - then please, negotiations, as much as you like. And before that - missile and bomb strikes, carpet strikes if necessary, and an offensive of thousands of tanks without interruption and without stopping day and night.
    For everything - two weeks. And in no case longer. If strong resistance arose somewhere that could not be bypassed - use TNW.
  16. 0
    2 December 2024 10: 05
    What we are witnessing now is not a modern war in miniature, so as to draw conclusions "from the particular to the general". A modern war is approximately the strength and power of the Second World War, multiplied by modern technologies. And the first sign of such a war is the absence of a rear, that is, "war everywhere and at once", especially for such a separate not very large country as Ukraine. All the destructive power of modern weapons, multiplied by quantity and accuracy, would be applied to it. If a serious enemy took it seriously, then first of all, it would be heavily bombed, and then occupied everywhere and by very large forces, and no rear and no front line, no one would simply allow it to organize. In two weeks, with Ukraine as a state, once a former state, everything would be decided, there would be focal resistance, and then a guerrilla war.
    The front line and the rear are a rudiment of past wars, in modern wars these concepts will not exist, we must start with this. And what follows from this, and how it will look, a war without a front and rear, it is difficult to imagine.
  17. exo
    0
    3 December 2024 13: 43
    SVO is rather a vivid example of how weapons that have already been “buried” can be in demand
  18. 0
    4 December 2024 16: 31
    The experience of the Afghan war also showed the poor suitability of tanks for mountain warfare in the Central Asian republic. They were used, but on a limited scale. The specifics of military operations in Afghanistan even had time to affect the further evolution of Soviet tanks. For example, this is how the very same T-62M with the "Brezhnev eyebrows" of 1983 was born. The first and second Chechen campaigns almost brought all armored vehicles to the guillotine.

    I had already decided from this paragraph that the author was different, better known for his competence, but no.
    And can you tell me how Afghanistan got to the T-62M?
    The modernization of the T-62 and 54/55 in the 80s was carried out with the aim of bringing their performance characteristics up to the realities of the 80s. They were given additional armor taking into account NATO weapons, with the expectation of holding 105 mm guns and I-TOW ATGMs, they were equipped with a fire control system corresponding to the time, solutions from the then-current vehicles, combined armor, and a control system were used. The chassis was modernized for unification, so that the old vehicles would not lag behind current tanks on marches and in cross-country ability. Radio stations, some spare parts and weapons were unified, NSV and PKT were installed. The T-62 was brought up to the level of Soviet tanks of the late 70s and early 80s, where it was possible and appropriate.
    Why the hell armor thousands of T-62s to send a few to Afghanistan, where even ATGMs are a terrible rarity? And RPGs are severely limited in their accuracy and combat range due to the mountainous terrain.
    The same applies to the experience of use in Afghanistan and Chechnya and even Vietnam.
    An encounter with a tank at a checkpoint or on a hill was always a very unpleasant surprise for poorly armed irregular formations. And it was the use of tanks in open areas in Chechnya that brought enormous results. Fortified settlements were taken out and the militants fled. The encirclement of populated areas was carried out successfully, and checkpoints with the use of heavy equipment allowed for an ironclad hold on the territory.
    And until drones carry some kind of super-effective warheads, they won't send tanks anywhere, rather the opposite. And the fact that tanks don't have armor from RPGs all around is a question of setting the task and man-hours.
  19. 0
    8 December 2024 13: 23
    Tanks, as a reconnaissance and fire complex, with a drone as a standard tank armament. This was argued about 20 years ago at the BTV Academy. Now in the SVO, this is the main way to use tanks in positional warfare. At the last exhibition, China has already shown a tank with a standard drone ready for series production. And it all started, as always, in Russia. There are articles and patents, the last article was written in 2021 by an employee of the General Staff Academy, just before the SVO. The SVO will give and has already given the development of new means of active protection of camouflage of group and individual armored vehicles. This is the improvement of the weapons and military equipment of the engineering troops and the NBC protection troops. Helicopters can be used as carriers of drones for their rapid movement to the launch point, etc. And only those who have no idea about military affairs can predict the "demise" of this or that type of weapon.
  20. +1
    10 December 2024 10: 38
    The author is right, if you attack a battalion with a platoon, and a brigade with a battalion, the outcome will be obvious. The imposed stubborn conviction that a "compact, contract army" will disperse a conscript army with dirty towels, and forced such idiocy to act. The result was that they began to cough up blood.
    Tanks are good for breakthroughs in combined arms combat, when they operate as part of formations, supported by artillery, aviation (army and air force), then yes, they break through, isolate enemy groups, cut off supply routes.
    But tanks are powerless when a tank platoon and a motorized infantry platoon send a blunt frontal attack on an enemy stronghold, while helicopters and attack aircraft "fart" from afar with unguided rockets over large areas, and artillery - three barrels per kilometer. Naturally, in such conditions, tanks will burn.
  21. 0
    26 December 2024 09: 32
    This is a whole ideology, and the fact that "the generals are preparing for the wrong war" is how politicians absolve themselves of responsibility for failures. In the past decades, mantras about the "impossibility of a big war" and about a "small compact army for local wars" were very fashionable - politicians gave such a task, and the generals were forced to carry out this nonsense. Let us recall that by the beginning of the Central Military District, the Russian Federation had only 2300 tanks and 160 thousand ground troops - slightly more than tiny Israel at the same time!
    In addition, there was an attempt to replace the Talent of the Commander with some kind of AI (ESUTZ) or a gathering of people at computers (NCUO), and this was done by the same people who shuffled personnel (Serdyukov and Chubais), justifying it with some unique experience-knowledge-skills)))
  22. Eug
    0
    9 February 2025 17: 01
    There is an interesting article on the "brotherly" resource about the Ukrainian Armed Forces' entry into the Kursk region - reconnaissance drones, kamikaze drones, electronic warfare and then - columns of armored vehicles. That is, it worked with the appropriate organization and adequate management...