The F-35C That Drowned
Previous story about the F-35B, which turned into UAV, piqued my interest in these aircraft, or rather, in the incidents involving them. We present to your attention another investigation. The hero this time is the F-35C and, of course, its pilot.
F-35C (carrier variant) – modification designed for aircraft carriers, and it does not have vertical takeoff capabilities. According to Wikipedia, this F-35 has an increased wing and tail area, a landing hook and reinforced chassis.
So, on January 24, 2022, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) was in the South China Sea doing what aircraft carriers do: launching and receiving aircraft. At approximately 16:31 p.m. local time, another aircraft was coming in for a landing, but this time, things went wrong.
A few days later, two videos of this event appeared online (the links lead to a resource hostile to us). The first one, apparently, was composed of recordings from several surveillance cameras: the screen of a monitor installed in the aircraft carrier's air control room shows in black and white the plane hitting the deck, sliding along the ship and falling overboard. The second one, in color, shows a short flight of the same plane over the deck, but the moment of the crash is not shown, and it was apparently taken by one of the ship's crew on their smartphone. Another photo of the plane, still floating on the surface, has also become public knowledge.
This suggests that the deck crew keeps not only fire extinguishing equipment but also smartphones in combat readiness. Incidentally, those responsible for the leak were quickly identified and punished – how exactly, they do not say, but it is known that all five (!) remained on active duty.
The report not only describes the accident and its causes, but also allows us to look a little deeper into the procedures for landing modern fighters on the deck of an aircraft carrier. And how important meters and seconds are.
For example, based on the videos I watched while sitting on the couch about military operations in the Pacific Ocean, I assumed that an airplane would playfully approach an aircraft carrier from the stern, reduce speed, aim for the deck and, so to speak, plop down on it, trying to catch the landing hook on the cable. But these videos never showed what the pilot does if he misses the deck, or if the deck is occupied and he needs to circle around, waiting for the command. And in these days, when airplane speeds have increased significantly? Although it is clear that in any case, landing on a moving and swinging patch of land a hundred meters long is not an easy task.
The investigation report is not very detailed, but it does describe what a typical aircraft landing on an aircraft carrier looks like. According to the Naval Air Training and Operations Manual, it looks like this: the landing approach begins at a distance of 3 miles, an altitude of 800 feet, zero bank, and a course parallel to the carrier's course. It should be taken into account that the ship's course will not coincide with the actual landing course on the deck, since the deck is angled. The landing should occur with an optimal angle of attack of 12,3 degrees. (like this, with tenths!).
This angle allows the landing hook to securely hook onto the finisher cable. The APC mode, if selected, helps maintain the optimum angle of attack (more on that later).
Next comes the discussion of the relationship between the weight of the aircraft, its speed and the angle of attack. In general, the angle of 12,3 must always be maintained. We omit it.
But this is probably the simplest of several options. Maybe of many. It gives the pilot more time to make sure everything is going well and to make adjustments if needed. Later in the report, the expedited recovery mode, or “fast landing,” begins to be mentioned more and more often. The goal is to get the next aircraft in as quickly as possible. The report says that there are many variations of this fast approach, and that it is quite common for naval pilots. One such maneuver is called the Sierra Hotel Brake. In this maneuver, the aircraft first intentionally passes at high speed over or slightly to the side of the carrier. The pilot then makes a sharp turn in front of the ship’s bow, during which the speed is sharply reduced, and then continues the turn continuously, again approaching from the stern. There is even a drawing of how to do this.
The grey stripe is the trace of the aircraft carrier, which was probably shown to depict its turn into the wind. As for the plane, I will explain some of the designations (which I just found out myself, hehe).
LEVEL BREAK — a turn with zero roll.
SPEEDBRAKE - air brake if required.
KCAS — Knots Calibrated Airspeed, the indicated speed in knots, calibrated taking into account aerodynamic corrections. There is also KIAS — just the indicated speed without corrections, KTAS — the true speed relative to the undisturbed air flow... In general, it's a dark forest. Although in the trade navy there are also different speeds, and I somehow got used to them...
ATS - Air Traffic Control.
bank — roll.
ON SPEED — the set speed for this mode.
GLIDE SLOPE — glide path, glide slope.
WAVEOFF — landing cancellation, go-around.
However, as far as I understand, the pilots themselves call this maneuver Shit Hot Break. This is clearly a slang expression that cannot be translated, no matter how much one would like to. There are several options, and all are uncultured. But it clearly hints that this is something not very pleasant. At least, in the real video about such a maneuver, the word shit is used very often - and this is despite the fact that the maneuver was performed on a fairly slow Greyhound aircraft with turboprop engines. The veteran who described this maneuver says that this method adds significant stress to the pilot, since everything happens very quickly and it is almost impossible to correct anything.
On the other hand, there is a video of such a maneuver from the helmet display of an F-18A pilot, although the quality is very poor. There, the speed at the entrance to the turn was 600 knots, and the overload during the turn reached 7,4G. The pilot is silent and does not swear, you can only hear his snorting, and then he explains that there is nothing special about it, everything is perfectly visible, and you do everything as usual, but only at a higher speed. And the result is that with such a maneuver, the duration of the final phase was 11 seconds instead of 17-20 for a normal landing.
The general rule when landing is as soon as you touch the deck, put the throttle to max because nothing is over yet. You could miss and not catch the cable, the cable could break, and you will have to fly the entire runway and take off again.
Now about the APC mode mentioned above, and about landing assistance systems in general. To begin with: at a speed of less than 300 knots and with the landing gear extended, the aircraft – or rather its control system – automatically switches to PA CLAW mode. PA means powered approach, i.e. approach to landing with increased engine thrust, and CLAW stands for control laws. In total, we get something like “rules (laws) for controlling (an aircraft) during approach to landing with increased power.” This mode, according to the document, provides precise control of the glide path, bank, speed and angle of attack. How this is achieved is not explained. It is only clear that the aircraft begins to behave differently.
So, the PA CLAW mode, in turn, has three options: manual, APC and DFP. If no mode is selected by the pilot, then the PA CLAW will remain in manual mode. In this mode, the pilot must independently operate both the control handle and the throttle handle.
In the APC (Approach Power Compensation) mode, the pilot only needs to operate the pitch stick, setting the desired angle of attack and focusing on the vertical speed indicator. The aircraft will automatically adjust the engine thrust and controls (apparently, rudders-ailerons-flaps-slats and so on). The required angles and speeds are somehow calculated and transmitted to the HUD. The mode is turned on with a special switch, and turned off in several ways: with the same switch, by retracting the chassis, or by changing the thrust assignment by more than 10 pounds in any direction.
DFP (Delta Flight Path) is more precise and delicate, and it is this mode that is recommended for use. The pilot controls the trajectory with a pitch stick, focusing on the readings of the IFLOLS Optical Landing Assistance System, known in the US Navy as meatball, or simply ball.
The CLAW computer somehow calculates the desired trajectory using the ship's speed, the aircraft's parameters, and the angle of the lens (Apparently, this refers to the Fresnel lens, the main part of the landing assistance system?), with the aim of landing the aircraft at the landing reference point LRP. The LRP can be entered manually or automatically, since the aircraft receives information from the ship in real time. The mode is selected by pressing the little finger on the switch on the control stick (the picture is filled in) and should be selected when the "ball" of the landing assistance system is in the center of the cross and stabilized. After that, you only need to add/reduce engine thrust, the aircraft does the rest itself. The system even makes the necessary adjustments to neutralize the air turbulence that occurs behind the superstructure.
APC is basically the same as DFP, but requires more attention and more frequent traction control. DFP will automatically switch to AFP mode if it "feels" one of the sensors failing.
Well, we seem to have figured out the planting systems and now we’re moving on to the main course.
Nothing is known about the pilot - neither his full name nor his rank, but it is clear that he was a young pilot. His total flight time was 650 hours, of which 370 were on the F-35C, he passed all the tests and exams, received the necessary qualifications and was allowed to fly as a wingman. His rank was Junior Officer, and this was his first assignment to an aircraft carrier. However, among young pilots, he was one of the best. It is noted that he had a Top-5 Nugget and a Top-10 ball-flyer (This is some professional slang again, probably something cool. You should ask Tom Cruise). Let's call him Pilot.
Taking off as part of a flight, the Pilot spent almost 4 hours in the air, completing everything required by the mission, and returned to the carrier. And then he decided to perform an expedited recovery, or SHB, which he had never performed before. He had discussed the maneuver with other young pilots who had done it before, and did not want to end his first tour without trying it.
He did not want to gain too much speed and conducted the SHB at 370-390 knots. The aircraft's systems recorded a speed of 400 knots and an overload of 7G. He maintained this overload for 5 seconds, then dropped it to 2G for another 5 seconds, increased it again to 7G for 4 seconds and then held it within 2-3G for another 10 seconds. The aircraft's sensors showed that the throttle was set to IDLE after the first turn and remained there for the next 48 seconds, and then, 2 seconds before impact, the afterburner was turned on. The pilot explained that he tried to avoid missing the ship by maintaining the bank and overload and trying to reduce the speed below 300 knots. (this is the speed at which the landing gear can be released). After releasing the landing gear, he also released the landing hook, but he does not remember whether he selected the APC mode (as we remember, after the chassis is released, the ARS is turned on, but remains in manual mode).
The plane's sensors recorded that it activated its air brakes 4 seconds before impact. (the instructions prohibit their use in the last 10 seconds of landing). He later explained that at that moment he was "4 balls" higher than he needed to be. (referring to the Landing Aid system symbols), and wanted to quickly reduce speed and lower the nose of the plane.
Analysis of the aircraft's flight data shows that when the air brake switch is released, the trailing edges of the flaps retract to the normal symmetrical position for the PA mode, and this leads to a decrease in lift.
The pilot does not remember whether he activated the APC mode. As for the DFP mode, he explained that he did not have time to select it, because he was working hard to reduce speed, maintain the desired angle of attack, maintain the glide path and center the landing deck (that is, everything that the automation should theoretically do). The pilot explained that when the aircraft was at an angle of 45 degrees to the aircraft carrier (that is, the final turn for the stern approach began), he felt insecure because the aircraft was slowly reducing speed, could not maintain an angle of attack of 12 degrees, and the aircraft carrier was getting closer and closer.
The pilot believed that when he entered final descent, his speed was about 180 knots, and he was "one ball too high." The optimum speed to maintain a 12-degree angle of attack, based on the weight of the remaining fuel, should have been 140 knots. He suspected that because of his high speed, the air traffic controller was about to send him on a go-around.
As the aircraft approached the optimum angle of attack and 140 knots, the pilot realized that the aircraft was continuing to lose speed and sink, and tried to add power. He pushed the throttle to the "combat power" position and then engaged the afterburners. The aircraft's data recorder showed that the speed increased by 3-4 knots from that point until impact.
During the final landing, the speed dropped to 120 knots and the angle of attack increased to 16 degrees. Impact with the ramp occurred at 123 knots and an angle of attack of 23 degrees.
The pilot explained that he had performed all actions according to the instructions: released the landing gear and landing hook, turned on the landing lights, but was unable to confirm that he had selected the APC/DFP mode, as he was "overloaded with many tasks". He performed all actions to control the aircraft in the confidence that the APC or DFP mode was engaged. However, his manipulations with the control stick were not transmitted to the power control system, as a result of which the aircraft lost speed during the final landing phase and "failed". The Pilot's attempt to correct the situation was too late and led to nothing.
From the start of the SHB maneuver until impact, 53 seconds passed. After that, everything happened very quickly.
1631:31:31.4 — The aircraft strikes the carrier's ramp, the point of contact being just forward of the main landing gear. The impact shears off the main landing gear, throwing the tail of the aircraft up and the nose down, while simultaneously dropping the left wing sharply toward the deck.
Here I have difficulties with the translation of the word "ramp". In relation to aircraft carriers, ramp means "ski-jump", which the Nimitz-class carriers do not have at all, the planes there take off from a catapult. Most likely, in this case and in the context, it means a short section of the aft deck, slightly bent downwards. Allegedly, this was done so that ammunition that broke off from the planes during an unsuccessful landing could be thrown overboard without interference. However, in this case, the ramp really played the role of a ski-jump.
1631:32.3 – the furthest guide for missiles On the left wing, the aircraft catches on the first arresting cable. This causes it to rotate uncontrollably around the vertical axis counterclockwise.
But here I had an unexpected question. There are four cables, the distance between them is 15 meters. If the landing is normal and the hook caught, for example, the second cable (aerobatics are cable number 3, but the second one is also normal), the plane slows down sharply... But it will still roll these 15 meters? And what happens to cables 3 and 4? They are stretched above the deck at some height, and you can't run over them with a wheel, it will break? It is unlikely that the cables are hidden somewhere, which means they are immediately loosened and they lie on the deck? Then the plane folds its wings and rolls to the parking lot, and the cables can now be driven over? All the videos somehow do not show this moment.
1631:32.5 - the remains of the nose wheel catch the second cable and it begins to pull out (apparently, it starts working as it should, that is, slowing down what is caught on it).
1631:32.65 - after extending 20 feet, the cable is released from the nose wheel.
1631:32.85 - The rocket guide on the left wing engages the second cable.
1631:32.95 - the guide breaks away from the wing and both cables are released from the aircraft, causing its rotational speed to increase.
The investigation goes on to say that these accidental cable snags likely prevented the F-35 from colliding with other aircraft on the deck..
1631:33.3 – The pilot ejects. At this point the aircraft is already past the 4th cable, its left wing is almost on the deck, the nose of the aircraft is pointing perpendicular to the side of the carrier, the rotation continues.
1631:35.8 - the aircraft makes another one and a half turns and falls into the water from the left side.
1631:39 - The pilot also lands on the left side of the ship.
1631:44 – The mobile fire-fighting unit begins to douse the burning debris with foam.
The rescue helicopter was 7,5 miles from the carrier at the time, which is normal. The regulations require that it be no more than 10 miles from the carrier at night and 20 miles from the carrier during the day, remaining within a range that allows for VHF communications to be monitored. The helicopter immediately realized that something was happening on the carrier and headed toward it. As it approached, the helicopter crew saw smoke on the deck and immediately received a call from the carrier: “We have an incident, the pilot is in the water.” Six seconds had passed since the impact with the deck.
Twelve seconds after the impact, the driver of the MFVV P-12 mobile fire-fighting unit, seeing the burning and smoking wreckage of the plane, begins to cover it with fire-fighting foam.
This is the cart called MFVV. During flight operations, two such installations must be on deck, and their crew must have already put on protective suits.
Within 25 seconds of the impact, the burning debris was extinguished and medics arrived to help the victims.
The helicopter sees two yellow smoke signals, hovers over them and observes the Pilot in an inflatable raft, a water-filled parachute, fuel stains, floating debris and the aircraft still floating. A rescue swimmer jumps into the water. The Pilot reports back and neck pain, the swimmer requests a rescue basket. While it is being prepared and lowered, the helicopter tows the Pilot away from the parachute.
1656 – the pilot was raised from the water, and in 1705 he was taken to an aircraft carrier and placed in the ship’s hospital.
Since the Pilot was the first of his flight to land, it was natural that after his "landing" the carrier stopped accepting aircraft. The three remaining in the air were redirected to the aircraft carrier CVN-72 Abraham Lincoln, which was located nearby. CVN-72 raised an air tanker especially for them. After refueling, the three returned to their ship and three hours after the incident were able to land successfully.
Six people were injured to varying degrees, three of whom had to be evacuated to a hospital in Manila. All of them returned to duty fairly quickly.
An F-35C aircraft, which the Navy had purchased for $115 million, was completely destroyed. An F-400G electronic warfare aircraft was parked near lift #000 and was damaged by flying debris. Replacing the components will cost about $3 million, and the damage to the hull and skin was impossible to calculate at the time the document was written.
One of the two R-25 mobile fire-fighting units was also damaged; the cost of replacing the damaged components is 850 thousand; damage to the hull is being calculated.
The carrier's deck was left with several deep gouges in the metal and part of the "lead trough" was blown away. (I don't know what it is. Perhaps a chute along which the catapult cart rolls?) The approximate cost of repairs is $120.
The pilot was sufficiently qualified and met all possible requirements for naval pilots. aviation, was well rested and had no medical contraindications. The flight and the Pilot's interactions within the flight, although tense at times, were not the cause of the incident.
The pilot initiated the SHB maneuver at 400 knots and 7 Gs, momentarily engaging afterburner. Based on the pilot's previous flights, the normal speed at which he initiated the turn was 350 knots, but in this attempt the turn speed was higher than normal. To compensate for the high speed, 3 seconds into the turn the pilot set the control stick to IDLE and applied 7 Gs to reduce the speed. This resulted in the approach path changing and the distance required to slow to landing gear extension speed increasing.
During several stages of his maneuver, the Pilot maintained a higher G-force than required. The approach route was therefore denser and the time it took the Pilot to control the aircraft was more saturated with the various actions he had to perform. The Commission believes that the initial 7G-force was excessive. Ultimately, this resulted in the final approach lasting 12 seconds instead of the usual 15-18.
The lack of time did not allow the Pilot to comply with all the requirements of the instruction. In particular, he did not select the APC or DPF mode, and the aircraft remained in the PA CLAWS manual mode.
The pilot was unaware that the aircraft was operating in manual mode and the throttle was still in the IDLE position. During the final phase, the pilot continued to operate the control stick in the same way as he had operated it in previous landings and in DFP mode. As a result, the aircraft slowed down and sank during the final phase, and the angle of attack continued to increase. Engaging the afterburners 2,6 seconds before impact did not help.
After the turn, the pilot set the throttle to the IDLE position and did not touch it for 48 seconds. In an attempt to reduce speed, the pilot released the air brakes while at a 90-degree angle relative to the aircraft carrier. The brakes remained released until "4 seconds before impact", which is a violation of the instructions regarding the use of air brakes. Their use led to the aircraft's speed sharply decreasing at the critical moment of landing, and this became an additional factor leading to the accident.
The pilot's ejection was justified and timely.
Since the accident occurred in the East, but still China Sea, the command had a reasonable fear that the sunken plane with all its secrets could end up in either China or Russia – and it is not yet known which is worse. The US even issued a Warning to Mariners, the so-called NAVAREA, where they announced that rescue operations were being conducted in the area.
The depth at the crash site was slightly more than 4 km. The search was carried out by specialists from Task Force 75, part of the 7th Fleet. They did not say which vessel or apparatus were used for the search. But the "commercial" vessel "Picasso", belonging to the class of Diving Support and Construction Vessel, and the underwater remotely controlled vehicle CURV-21, belonging to the American military, were used to lift the plane.
There are two versions of the lifting process. The first is shown in the picture, where floats are attached to the plane, and everything floats up.
The second version looks simpler in some ways: the underwater vehicle somehow attached the plane, and then it was lifted by a crane. Personally, I have doubts about this version: lower the crane hook to a depth of 4 km? But in general, the details are not particularly important - the plane was lifted.
This is where the story ends, nothing more interesting happened. The accident was the Pilot's fault - actually, we already understood that. The Pilot's personal data was never published, but it is known that he was kept on duty, but suspended from flight work.
At first, this incident was hotly discussed on their aviation and marine forums. While nothing was really known, people exchanged opinions and their own impressions. Everything there is sprinkled with abbreviations and slang, but in general, the pilot is cautiously criticized. After the investigation materials were made available, interest in the incident faded. Only one publication was memorable - a person there talks at length about the terrible harm caused by all sorts of automatic systems that wean people off thinking, making decisions quickly and implementing them just as quickly. And then there's AI on the way...
End of story.
F-35C (carrier variant) – modification designed for aircraft carriers, and it does not have vertical takeoff capabilities. According to Wikipedia, this F-35 has an increased wing and tail area, a landing hook and reinforced chassis.
So, on January 24, 2022, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) was in the South China Sea doing what aircraft carriers do: launching and receiving aircraft. At approximately 16:31 p.m. local time, another aircraft was coming in for a landing, but this time, things went wrong.
A few days later, two videos of this event appeared online (the links lead to a resource hostile to us). The first one, apparently, was composed of recordings from several surveillance cameras: the screen of a monitor installed in the aircraft carrier's air control room shows in black and white the plane hitting the deck, sliding along the ship and falling overboard. The second one, in color, shows a short flight of the same plane over the deck, but the moment of the crash is not shown, and it was apparently taken by one of the ship's crew on their smartphone. Another photo of the plane, still floating on the surface, has also become public knowledge.
This suggests that the deck crew keeps not only fire extinguishing equipment but also smartphones in combat readiness. Incidentally, those responsible for the leak were quickly identified and punished – how exactly, they do not say, but it is known that all five (!) remained on active duty.
The report not only describes the accident and its causes, but also allows us to look a little deeper into the procedures for landing modern fighters on the deck of an aircraft carrier. And how important meters and seconds are.
For example, based on the videos I watched while sitting on the couch about military operations in the Pacific Ocean, I assumed that an airplane would playfully approach an aircraft carrier from the stern, reduce speed, aim for the deck and, so to speak, plop down on it, trying to catch the landing hook on the cable. But these videos never showed what the pilot does if he misses the deck, or if the deck is occupied and he needs to circle around, waiting for the command. And in these days, when airplane speeds have increased significantly? Although it is clear that in any case, landing on a moving and swinging patch of land a hundred meters long is not an easy task.
The investigation report is not very detailed, but it does describe what a typical aircraft landing on an aircraft carrier looks like. According to the Naval Air Training and Operations Manual, it looks like this: the landing approach begins at a distance of 3 miles, an altitude of 800 feet, zero bank, and a course parallel to the carrier's course. It should be taken into account that the ship's course will not coincide with the actual landing course on the deck, since the deck is angled. The landing should occur with an optimal angle of attack of 12,3 degrees. (like this, with tenths!).
This angle allows the landing hook to securely hook onto the finisher cable. The APC mode, if selected, helps maintain the optimum angle of attack (more on that later).
Next comes the discussion of the relationship between the weight of the aircraft, its speed and the angle of attack. In general, the angle of 12,3 must always be maintained. We omit it.
But this is probably the simplest of several options. Maybe of many. It gives the pilot more time to make sure everything is going well and to make adjustments if needed. Later in the report, the expedited recovery mode, or “fast landing,” begins to be mentioned more and more often. The goal is to get the next aircraft in as quickly as possible. The report says that there are many variations of this fast approach, and that it is quite common for naval pilots. One such maneuver is called the Sierra Hotel Brake. In this maneuver, the aircraft first intentionally passes at high speed over or slightly to the side of the carrier. The pilot then makes a sharp turn in front of the ship’s bow, during which the speed is sharply reduced, and then continues the turn continuously, again approaching from the stern. There is even a drawing of how to do this.
The grey stripe is the trace of the aircraft carrier, which was probably shown to depict its turn into the wind. As for the plane, I will explain some of the designations (which I just found out myself, hehe).
LEVEL BREAK — a turn with zero roll.
SPEEDBRAKE - air brake if required.
KCAS — Knots Calibrated Airspeed, the indicated speed in knots, calibrated taking into account aerodynamic corrections. There is also KIAS — just the indicated speed without corrections, KTAS — the true speed relative to the undisturbed air flow... In general, it's a dark forest. Although in the trade navy there are also different speeds, and I somehow got used to them...
ATS - Air Traffic Control.
bank — roll.
ON SPEED — the set speed for this mode.
GLIDE SLOPE — glide path, glide slope.
WAVEOFF — landing cancellation, go-around.
However, as far as I understand, the pilots themselves call this maneuver Shit Hot Break. This is clearly a slang expression that cannot be translated, no matter how much one would like to. There are several options, and all are uncultured. But it clearly hints that this is something not very pleasant. At least, in the real video about such a maneuver, the word shit is used very often - and this is despite the fact that the maneuver was performed on a fairly slow Greyhound aircraft with turboprop engines. The veteran who described this maneuver says that this method adds significant stress to the pilot, since everything happens very quickly and it is almost impossible to correct anything.
On the other hand, there is a video of such a maneuver from the helmet display of an F-18A pilot, although the quality is very poor. There, the speed at the entrance to the turn was 600 knots, and the overload during the turn reached 7,4G. The pilot is silent and does not swear, you can only hear his snorting, and then he explains that there is nothing special about it, everything is perfectly visible, and you do everything as usual, but only at a higher speed. And the result is that with such a maneuver, the duration of the final phase was 11 seconds instead of 17-20 for a normal landing.
The general rule when landing is as soon as you touch the deck, put the throttle to max because nothing is over yet. You could miss and not catch the cable, the cable could break, and you will have to fly the entire runway and take off again.
Now about the APC mode mentioned above, and about landing assistance systems in general. To begin with: at a speed of less than 300 knots and with the landing gear extended, the aircraft – or rather its control system – automatically switches to PA CLAW mode. PA means powered approach, i.e. approach to landing with increased engine thrust, and CLAW stands for control laws. In total, we get something like “rules (laws) for controlling (an aircraft) during approach to landing with increased power.” This mode, according to the document, provides precise control of the glide path, bank, speed and angle of attack. How this is achieved is not explained. It is only clear that the aircraft begins to behave differently.
So, the PA CLAW mode, in turn, has three options: manual, APC and DFP. If no mode is selected by the pilot, then the PA CLAW will remain in manual mode. In this mode, the pilot must independently operate both the control handle and the throttle handle.
In the APC (Approach Power Compensation) mode, the pilot only needs to operate the pitch stick, setting the desired angle of attack and focusing on the vertical speed indicator. The aircraft will automatically adjust the engine thrust and controls (apparently, rudders-ailerons-flaps-slats and so on). The required angles and speeds are somehow calculated and transmitted to the HUD. The mode is turned on with a special switch, and turned off in several ways: with the same switch, by retracting the chassis, or by changing the thrust assignment by more than 10 pounds in any direction.
DFP (Delta Flight Path) is more precise and delicate, and it is this mode that is recommended for use. The pilot controls the trajectory with a pitch stick, focusing on the readings of the IFLOLS Optical Landing Assistance System, known in the US Navy as meatball, or simply ball.
The CLAW computer somehow calculates the desired trajectory using the ship's speed, the aircraft's parameters, and the angle of the lens (Apparently, this refers to the Fresnel lens, the main part of the landing assistance system?), with the aim of landing the aircraft at the landing reference point LRP. The LRP can be entered manually or automatically, since the aircraft receives information from the ship in real time. The mode is selected by pressing the little finger on the switch on the control stick (the picture is filled in) and should be selected when the "ball" of the landing assistance system is in the center of the cross and stabilized. After that, you only need to add/reduce engine thrust, the aircraft does the rest itself. The system even makes the necessary adjustments to neutralize the air turbulence that occurs behind the superstructure.
APC is basically the same as DFP, but requires more attention and more frequent traction control. DFP will automatically switch to AFP mode if it "feels" one of the sensors failing.
Well, we seem to have figured out the planting systems and now we’re moving on to the main course.
Nothing is known about the pilot - neither his full name nor his rank, but it is clear that he was a young pilot. His total flight time was 650 hours, of which 370 were on the F-35C, he passed all the tests and exams, received the necessary qualifications and was allowed to fly as a wingman. His rank was Junior Officer, and this was his first assignment to an aircraft carrier. However, among young pilots, he was one of the best. It is noted that he had a Top-5 Nugget and a Top-10 ball-flyer (This is some professional slang again, probably something cool. You should ask Tom Cruise). Let's call him Pilot.
Taking off as part of a flight, the Pilot spent almost 4 hours in the air, completing everything required by the mission, and returned to the carrier. And then he decided to perform an expedited recovery, or SHB, which he had never performed before. He had discussed the maneuver with other young pilots who had done it before, and did not want to end his first tour without trying it.
He did not want to gain too much speed and conducted the SHB at 370-390 knots. The aircraft's systems recorded a speed of 400 knots and an overload of 7G. He maintained this overload for 5 seconds, then dropped it to 2G for another 5 seconds, increased it again to 7G for 4 seconds and then held it within 2-3G for another 10 seconds. The aircraft's sensors showed that the throttle was set to IDLE after the first turn and remained there for the next 48 seconds, and then, 2 seconds before impact, the afterburner was turned on. The pilot explained that he tried to avoid missing the ship by maintaining the bank and overload and trying to reduce the speed below 300 knots. (this is the speed at which the landing gear can be released). After releasing the landing gear, he also released the landing hook, but he does not remember whether he selected the APC mode (as we remember, after the chassis is released, the ARS is turned on, but remains in manual mode).
The plane's sensors recorded that it activated its air brakes 4 seconds before impact. (the instructions prohibit their use in the last 10 seconds of landing). He later explained that at that moment he was "4 balls" higher than he needed to be. (referring to the Landing Aid system symbols), and wanted to quickly reduce speed and lower the nose of the plane.
Analysis of the aircraft's flight data shows that when the air brake switch is released, the trailing edges of the flaps retract to the normal symmetrical position for the PA mode, and this leads to a decrease in lift.
The pilot does not remember whether he activated the APC mode. As for the DFP mode, he explained that he did not have time to select it, because he was working hard to reduce speed, maintain the desired angle of attack, maintain the glide path and center the landing deck (that is, everything that the automation should theoretically do). The pilot explained that when the aircraft was at an angle of 45 degrees to the aircraft carrier (that is, the final turn for the stern approach began), he felt insecure because the aircraft was slowly reducing speed, could not maintain an angle of attack of 12 degrees, and the aircraft carrier was getting closer and closer.
The pilot believed that when he entered final descent, his speed was about 180 knots, and he was "one ball too high." The optimum speed to maintain a 12-degree angle of attack, based on the weight of the remaining fuel, should have been 140 knots. He suspected that because of his high speed, the air traffic controller was about to send him on a go-around.
As the aircraft approached the optimum angle of attack and 140 knots, the pilot realized that the aircraft was continuing to lose speed and sink, and tried to add power. He pushed the throttle to the "combat power" position and then engaged the afterburners. The aircraft's data recorder showed that the speed increased by 3-4 knots from that point until impact.
During the final landing, the speed dropped to 120 knots and the angle of attack increased to 16 degrees. Impact with the ramp occurred at 123 knots and an angle of attack of 23 degrees.
The pilot explained that he had performed all actions according to the instructions: released the landing gear and landing hook, turned on the landing lights, but was unable to confirm that he had selected the APC/DFP mode, as he was "overloaded with many tasks". He performed all actions to control the aircraft in the confidence that the APC or DFP mode was engaged. However, his manipulations with the control stick were not transmitted to the power control system, as a result of which the aircraft lost speed during the final landing phase and "failed". The Pilot's attempt to correct the situation was too late and led to nothing.
From the start of the SHB maneuver until impact, 53 seconds passed. After that, everything happened very quickly.
1631:31:31.4 — The aircraft strikes the carrier's ramp, the point of contact being just forward of the main landing gear. The impact shears off the main landing gear, throwing the tail of the aircraft up and the nose down, while simultaneously dropping the left wing sharply toward the deck.
Here I have difficulties with the translation of the word "ramp". In relation to aircraft carriers, ramp means "ski-jump", which the Nimitz-class carriers do not have at all, the planes there take off from a catapult. Most likely, in this case and in the context, it means a short section of the aft deck, slightly bent downwards. Allegedly, this was done so that ammunition that broke off from the planes during an unsuccessful landing could be thrown overboard without interference. However, in this case, the ramp really played the role of a ski-jump.
1631:32.3 – the furthest guide for missiles On the left wing, the aircraft catches on the first arresting cable. This causes it to rotate uncontrollably around the vertical axis counterclockwise.
But here I had an unexpected question. There are four cables, the distance between them is 15 meters. If the landing is normal and the hook caught, for example, the second cable (aerobatics are cable number 3, but the second one is also normal), the plane slows down sharply... But it will still roll these 15 meters? And what happens to cables 3 and 4? They are stretched above the deck at some height, and you can't run over them with a wheel, it will break? It is unlikely that the cables are hidden somewhere, which means they are immediately loosened and they lie on the deck? Then the plane folds its wings and rolls to the parking lot, and the cables can now be driven over? All the videos somehow do not show this moment.
1631:32.5 - the remains of the nose wheel catch the second cable and it begins to pull out (apparently, it starts working as it should, that is, slowing down what is caught on it).
1631:32.65 - after extending 20 feet, the cable is released from the nose wheel.
1631:32.85 - The rocket guide on the left wing engages the second cable.
1631:32.95 - the guide breaks away from the wing and both cables are released from the aircraft, causing its rotational speed to increase.
The investigation goes on to say that these accidental cable snags likely prevented the F-35 from colliding with other aircraft on the deck..
1631:33.3 – The pilot ejects. At this point the aircraft is already past the 4th cable, its left wing is almost on the deck, the nose of the aircraft is pointing perpendicular to the side of the carrier, the rotation continues.
1631:35.8 - the aircraft makes another one and a half turns and falls into the water from the left side.
1631:39 - The pilot also lands on the left side of the ship.
1631:44 – The mobile fire-fighting unit begins to douse the burning debris with foam.
The rescue helicopter was 7,5 miles from the carrier at the time, which is normal. The regulations require that it be no more than 10 miles from the carrier at night and 20 miles from the carrier during the day, remaining within a range that allows for VHF communications to be monitored. The helicopter immediately realized that something was happening on the carrier and headed toward it. As it approached, the helicopter crew saw smoke on the deck and immediately received a call from the carrier: “We have an incident, the pilot is in the water.” Six seconds had passed since the impact with the deck.
Twelve seconds after the impact, the driver of the MFVV P-12 mobile fire-fighting unit, seeing the burning and smoking wreckage of the plane, begins to cover it with fire-fighting foam.
This is the cart called MFVV. During flight operations, two such installations must be on deck, and their crew must have already put on protective suits.
Within 25 seconds of the impact, the burning debris was extinguished and medics arrived to help the victims.
The helicopter sees two yellow smoke signals, hovers over them and observes the Pilot in an inflatable raft, a water-filled parachute, fuel stains, floating debris and the aircraft still floating. A rescue swimmer jumps into the water. The Pilot reports back and neck pain, the swimmer requests a rescue basket. While it is being prepared and lowered, the helicopter tows the Pilot away from the parachute.
1656 – the pilot was raised from the water, and in 1705 he was taken to an aircraft carrier and placed in the ship’s hospital.
Since the Pilot was the first of his flight to land, it was natural that after his "landing" the carrier stopped accepting aircraft. The three remaining in the air were redirected to the aircraft carrier CVN-72 Abraham Lincoln, which was located nearby. CVN-72 raised an air tanker especially for them. After refueling, the three returned to their ship and three hours after the incident were able to land successfully.
Injuries, damages and losses
Six people were injured to varying degrees, three of whom had to be evacuated to a hospital in Manila. All of them returned to duty fairly quickly.
An F-35C aircraft, which the Navy had purchased for $115 million, was completely destroyed. An F-400G electronic warfare aircraft was parked near lift #000 and was damaged by flying debris. Replacing the components will cost about $3 million, and the damage to the hull and skin was impossible to calculate at the time the document was written.
One of the two R-25 mobile fire-fighting units was also damaged; the cost of replacing the damaged components is 850 thousand; damage to the hull is being calculated.
The carrier's deck was left with several deep gouges in the metal and part of the "lead trough" was blown away. (I don't know what it is. Perhaps a chute along which the catapult cart rolls?) The approximate cost of repairs is $120.
Conclusion of the Investigation Commission
The pilot was sufficiently qualified and met all possible requirements for naval pilots. aviation, was well rested and had no medical contraindications. The flight and the Pilot's interactions within the flight, although tense at times, were not the cause of the incident.
The pilot initiated the SHB maneuver at 400 knots and 7 Gs, momentarily engaging afterburner. Based on the pilot's previous flights, the normal speed at which he initiated the turn was 350 knots, but in this attempt the turn speed was higher than normal. To compensate for the high speed, 3 seconds into the turn the pilot set the control stick to IDLE and applied 7 Gs to reduce the speed. This resulted in the approach path changing and the distance required to slow to landing gear extension speed increasing.
During several stages of his maneuver, the Pilot maintained a higher G-force than required. The approach route was therefore denser and the time it took the Pilot to control the aircraft was more saturated with the various actions he had to perform. The Commission believes that the initial 7G-force was excessive. Ultimately, this resulted in the final approach lasting 12 seconds instead of the usual 15-18.
The lack of time did not allow the Pilot to comply with all the requirements of the instruction. In particular, he did not select the APC or DPF mode, and the aircraft remained in the PA CLAWS manual mode.
The pilot was unaware that the aircraft was operating in manual mode and the throttle was still in the IDLE position. During the final phase, the pilot continued to operate the control stick in the same way as he had operated it in previous landings and in DFP mode. As a result, the aircraft slowed down and sank during the final phase, and the angle of attack continued to increase. Engaging the afterburners 2,6 seconds before impact did not help.
After the turn, the pilot set the throttle to the IDLE position and did not touch it for 48 seconds. In an attempt to reduce speed, the pilot released the air brakes while at a 90-degree angle relative to the aircraft carrier. The brakes remained released until "4 seconds before impact", which is a violation of the instructions regarding the use of air brakes. Their use led to the aircraft's speed sharply decreasing at the critical moment of landing, and this became an additional factor leading to the accident.
The pilot's ejection was justified and timely.
Airplane lift-off
Since the accident occurred in the East, but still China Sea, the command had a reasonable fear that the sunken plane with all its secrets could end up in either China or Russia – and it is not yet known which is worse. The US even issued a Warning to Mariners, the so-called NAVAREA, where they announced that rescue operations were being conducted in the area.
The depth at the crash site was slightly more than 4 km. The search was carried out by specialists from Task Force 75, part of the 7th Fleet. They did not say which vessel or apparatus were used for the search. But the "commercial" vessel "Picasso", belonging to the class of Diving Support and Construction Vessel, and the underwater remotely controlled vehicle CURV-21, belonging to the American military, were used to lift the plane.
There are two versions of the lifting process. The first is shown in the picture, where floats are attached to the plane, and everything floats up.
The second version looks simpler in some ways: the underwater vehicle somehow attached the plane, and then it was lifted by a crane. Personally, I have doubts about this version: lower the crane hook to a depth of 4 km? But in general, the details are not particularly important - the plane was lifted.
This is where the story ends, nothing more interesting happened. The accident was the Pilot's fault - actually, we already understood that. The Pilot's personal data was never published, but it is known that he was kept on duty, but suspended from flight work.
At first, this incident was hotly discussed on their aviation and marine forums. While nothing was really known, people exchanged opinions and their own impressions. Everything there is sprinkled with abbreviations and slang, but in general, the pilot is cautiously criticized. After the investigation materials were made available, interest in the incident faded. Only one publication was memorable - a person there talks at length about the terrible harm caused by all sorts of automatic systems that wean people off thinking, making decisions quickly and implementing them just as quickly. And then there's AI on the way...
End of story.
Information