Berlin Congress: Half Measures or Prologue to the First World War
None of the people depicted here could have imagined in their worst nightmares the geopolitical consequences of the decisions they made.
The Emperor's Bad Choice
In the series of conversations, the prehistory of the Berlin Congress and those dedicated to it itself, we finally reached June 13, 1878, having found out in the previous article: the formation of coalitions in the realities of the mentioned year did not seem possible, as did a repetition of the Crimean scenario.
Moreover, the parties tried to settle all the burning issues in advance: O. von Bismarck – through dialogue with the head of the Austrian Foreign Ministry D. Andrassy and the Russian ambassador in London P.A. Shuvalov. The latter was disappointed to learn of the appointment of A.M. Gorchakov as the head of the delegation, due to his strained relations with Bismarck and his Francophile views.
Russia and Britain? They also settled some of the issues before the congress, but more on that below, because at the end of the last conversation I mentioned the hypothetical possibility of a war between the two empires.
If you want peace, prepare for war or "The Cruising Case"
Count N.P. Ignatiev, who signed the Treaty of San Stefano, hinted at it to the English:
A war with Russia would be disastrous for England, since a united Russian-American fleet paralyze English trade and cut off the mother country from its colonies, thereby creating a socio-economic and political crisis in England itself, which would be left without raw materials.
Empty threats? Not exactly:
A special commission, formed by the Naval Ministry together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began its work in St. Petersburg. By order of the highest authority, the commission considered a number of important issues on the conditional "cruiser case", namely, on the conduct of a cruiser war against the English on sea and ocean communications in the event of a rupture in relations with England,
— writes historian G. A. Grebenshchikova (the quote below is also from her article).And Russia really decided to purchase cruisers.
The concept of cruiser warfare approved by Alexander II – if M.Kh. Reitern learned about this, I can just imagine him clutching his head – which his father had not dared to adopt at the time, but which seriously worried the English given the limitations of their forces in the Pacific Ocean, is so interesting that it is worth citing in full.
So, the tasks set before Captain-Lieutenant L. P. Semechkin, who was sent overseas to purchase steamships:
1. Buy in the United States several steamships well suited for ocean navigation, arm them and send them out to sea.
2. Officers and crews are to be transported from Russia on chartered ships as emigrants, and then hidden in the St. John's River in South Carolina and in coastal areas of Maine, where large logging operations are being carried out by the Americans.
3. Supplies for all units, as well as arming the ships with artillery, should be carried out in the United States.
4. Organize the delivery of fuel and provisions with the assistance of American ship owners.
5. Appoint agents at the main coastal points, some Russian, some American.
6. In the Atlantic Ocean, interfere with trade between Canada and Great Britain, destroy fisheries and create fear in all sea routes.
7. In the Pacific Ocean, stop trade between the South American states and England, as well as between California, China, Japan and the Sandwich Islands, which is carried out mainly on English ships.
8. In the Indian Ocean, influence colonial trade.
Having read this document, Alexander II wrote the resolution: “I agree.”
2. Officers and crews are to be transported from Russia on chartered ships as emigrants, and then hidden in the St. John's River in South Carolina and in coastal areas of Maine, where large logging operations are being carried out by the Americans.
3. Supplies for all units, as well as arming the ships with artillery, should be carried out in the United States.
4. Organize the delivery of fuel and provisions with the assistance of American ship owners.
5. Appoint agents at the main coastal points, some Russian, some American.
6. In the Atlantic Ocean, interfere with trade between Canada and Great Britain, destroy fisheries and create fear in all sea routes.
7. In the Pacific Ocean, stop trade between the South American states and England, as well as between California, China, Japan and the Sandwich Islands, which is carried out mainly on English ships.
8. In the Indian Ocean, influence colonial trade.
Having read this document, Alexander II wrote the resolution: “I agree.”
We acquired three cruisers, but, as we know, it never came to war.
The Russian cruiser Africa is one of three purchased from the US for the war with Great Britain
In general, the idea of crushing Britain's naval power through cruiser warfare is not new; Louis XV tried to implement it back in the 18th century after the naval appropriations were cut. It didn't work, just like the Nazi "wolf packs" did two hundred years later.
So I am sure that if it came to a conflict, the acquired cruisers would quickly rest on the ocean floor; however, I do not think that it would come to a hot phase of confrontation, which is why I began the conversation with statements about the impossibility of a full-scale war. The ships were rather needed for conducting a dialogue from a position of strength and demonstrating it.
Moreover, the sunken ships, both Russian and British, could not influence the configuration of borders, much less the balance of power in the ocean expanses or shake Great Britain’s dominance there: threats to disrupt its trade with the colonies by means of a cruiser war with extremely limited forces were empty.
Where would the ships be based, repaired and, above all, refuelled with coal? Was the training of the crews and command staff adequate to the tasks assigned to them, given the lack of experience in cruising warfare?
But the English could not fight without a coalition either: E. Cardwell only reformed the army. The Royal Navy was capable of achieving local tactical successes in the Black Sea, but at the cost of international isolation of Foggy Albion – neither Wilhelm I nor Franz Joseph were going to bring grist to the mill of its interests. It is not worth mentioning France – it, like Italy, was not delighted with the transfer of Cyprus to Britain.
Accordingly, both from London and St. Petersburg, talk of war could have been part of rhetoric, a game of nerves and political speculation.
Another thing is that in the context of what was said, the common saying “the Englishwoman is shitting” sounds in a different connotation: they were shitting, forgive the terminology, all of them.
London Memorandum or By Compromise
We, in turn, will not simplify the relationship between the two empires. As just one stroke to their difficult relationship: the smell of gunpowder on the coats of Russian and English soldiers had not yet evaporated, as Britain built a steamship for yesterday's enemy.
No, in England and Russia there were those who saw their opponent as a geopolitical enemy and sought to undermine his power, sometimes in original ways. At that time, jingoism was gaining popularity in the United Kingdom, which I think only irritated the establishment responsible for making political decisions. And we had enough of our own passionaries.
Thus, V. L. Tsymbursky cites the words attributed to Adjutant General I. F. Paskevich:
The route to Constantinople goes through Vienna. Apparently, the route to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles goes through Delhi and Calcutta.
N. Ya. Danilevsky thought in the same vein, and during the work of the Berlin Congress, I admit, Pan-Slavic ideas faded into the background. Another example: I. S. Aksakov's emotional but politically illiterate speech about the congress, which pushed Russia into the abyss of a new war for the sake of implementing dead ideas.
But these are the emotions of journalists, publicists and salon regulars. British and Russian diplomats looked at the matter much more pragmatically, signing – Shuvalov and the head of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs R. Salisbury – on May 30, 1878 the compromise London Memorandum: Russia did not object to the transfer of Cyprus to England and received Batum, Ardahan, Kars. The latter, according to Shuvalov, greatly surprised Bismarck, who learned about this concession from the count.
Important: the interests of another player in the Balkans – the Habsburgs – were not infringed upon by the parties. Moreover, on the eve of the congress, London and Vienna also played a mutually beneficial game: the former promised to support the dual monarchy in its desire to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina – there was no talk of annexation yet – and, most importantly, the parties agreed not to allow Bulgaria to expand south of the Balkan ridge, which was already irritating the Serbs, Greeks and Romanians. The latter even put their army on combat alert.
Britain as referee
Note that in defending its own interests, London followed the path of reasonable compromises. Why? Because, as historian I.V. Litvinenko rightly notes, it set itself the goal of strengthening the prestige of Great Britain and, perhaps more importantly, achieving recognition of the leading role “in regulating the international order.”
That is, the British sought, in the context of new realities caused by the weakening of Austria and France and the emergence of Germany and Italy, to stake out for themselves a place as an arbitrator in the international arena, which, given the weakness of the land army and the global tasks that the navy had to solve, seemed to be the only path for English diplomacy, especially given the impossibility of forming coalitions.
We are, of course, talking about their formation here and now. I am sure that in London they were aware of the coalition nightmare that was haunting Bismarck – Shuvalov used this maxim in a dialogue with the chancellor, hearing in response: “Involuntarily” – and they took into account that the chancellor would use all his diplomatic skills in order to preserve Europe within the framework of a non-aligned status.
Yes, a side note: of course, I am far from the idea of seeing in the Union of Three Emperors even the semblance of a military-political bloc.
Honest broker
Above I noted the desire of the parties to settle all contentious issues either before the congress or behind the scenes and through personal negotiations at the congress itself. However, the businesslike atmosphere that reigned in Berlin was disrupted by English journalists who found out about the agreement reached in London regarding the transfer of Batumi and Kars to Russia.
There was a fuss in the British press about excessive concessions to St. Petersburg. There was a threat of denunciation of the document signed in London, with Russia being the loser, since the Sultan could have handed Cyprus over to the British by way of a bilateral agreement.
Count P.A. Shuvalov. I don’t know if there is a place for friendship in politics, but judging by the correspondence between Pyotr Andreyevich and Bismarck, the relations between them were at least comradely and trusting; by the way, both had a negative attitude towards Gorchakov
Shuvalov turned to Bismarck for help and received it: the chancellor, in a personal conversation, convinced B. Disraeli not to refuse to recognize the transfer of Kars and Batum to the Russians. In this case, Bismarck really turned out to be an honest broker.
In addition, Russian interests in Transcaucasia were on the periphery of the congressional agenda. The British themselves were more concerned about the Russian penetration into Afghanistan, which I plan to discuss in the context of the story about N.N. Stoletov's mission to Kabul in 1878.
Chancellor and coalitions
In his dialogue with Bismarck, Pyotr Andreevich also raised the topic of a Russian-German defensive-offensive alliance. A tempting idea. But Bismarck was satisfied with it in the context of Austria joining the alliance, which seemed unlikely due to the strained relations between Vienna and St. Petersburg due to the difficult-to-resolve Balkan problem. In addition, the alliance could cause concern in London, and Berlin was not going to aggravate relations with it.
And logic itself would have pushed, in the event of a positive response to Shuvalov's initiative, the British to rapprochement with France and, perhaps, with Italy, which did not suit and even, probably, frightened Bismarck, who directly told Shuvalov about the openness of German borders, about dependence on Russia in the event of manifestation of revanchist sentiments in France and Austria. In fact, they manifested themselves in the first. One coalition pulls another along with it: the chancellor saw right through it.
Bismarck was more concerned with the task of preventing a Russian-Anglo-Austrian quarrel over the Balkans, which were of no interest to him personally.
In Berlin, the nerve of the discussion was the Bulgarian border. Above, we noted the negative reaction of neighbors to its length.
London was displeased with Bulgaria's access to the Aegean Sea, which the British saw as a threat to their interests from Russia in the Mediterranean, since the newly-created country was viewed by the United Kingdom as a projection of St. Petersburg's influence in the Balkans, from whose mountains it is easy to cast a glance at the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
London's concerns are understandable. But why did St. Petersburg need to extend the border of the new state to territories that had never belonged to it before, taking an obvious step toward destabilizing the situation as a whole not only in the Balkans, but also in the Eastern Mediterranean?
For clarity: the borders of states according to the Peace of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin
In the end, a compromise was found. Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Bulgaria gained independence, albeit with reduced borders. And most importantly, the latter found itself far from the Aegean Sea. Austria-Hungary, as already noted, retained de facto power over Bosnia, Herzegovina and also Dalmatia.
Epilogue, or prologue to the First World War
It was almost a reasonable maximum in the conditions that had to be met back in San Stefano. Why almost?
Let me give you an example: a certain person is deprived of the opportunity to eat normally for a year or two. He is starving. And then he returns to normal conditions. It is obvious that if the unfortunate man eats his fill right away, he will die from intestinal obstruction.
I understand that the example is not very successful, but still: the transfer of power from the Porte to the local newly-minted elites under the control of the great powers should have occurred more gradually, as it seems to me, than was envisaged by the treaty, and, most importantly, accompanied by the deployment of troops of the great powers along the perimeter of the Serbian-Bulgarian, Turkish-Bulgarian and Serbian-Turkish borders. The "brothers" had to be separated.
This did not happen. Unfortunately. Because, as they would say now, peacekeeping contingents could have become an obstacle to the blazing wars, or perhaps prevented the monstrous in its cruelty massacre of the Obrenovic dynasty in 1903, moreover with significant political consequences, which in many ways predetermined the shot at Sarajevo, since the Karadjordjevics changed the Austrian vector to the Russian one, which only exacerbated the situation in the region.
In general, I think the great powers did not fully take into account the specifics of the Balkans. That is why, instead of long-term occupation, at least of the border regions, freedom of conscience was proclaimed in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Eastern Rumelia, and religion did not become an obstacle to obtaining civil and political rights.
And this is in Montenegro, where blood feuds have not been eradicated, and in Serbia and Bulgaria – in the latter, the medieval murder of S. Stambolov in its execution – political opponents were dealt with with infernal cruelty.
Thus, half measures were adopted in Berlin: the border of Bulgaria was reduced by half, while the Porte’s semi-power was retained in Eastern Rumelia, a half-solution to the Bosnian question, and power in Bulgaria was at first semi-dependent on St. Petersburg.
Unfortunately, the Balkan countries, which had gained independence and were economically weak and in need of an influx of foreign capital – and with it, external political influence – were unable to use it for state building, plunging first the region and then the continent into the abyss of a bloody war.
Использованная литература:
Treaty of Berlin
Grebenshchikova G.A. Secret expedition to America of Captain-Lieutenant L.P. Semechkin and the crew of the steamship "Cimbria" in 1878
Iskenderov P.A. The Berlin Congress of 1878 and its political consequences for the Balkans
Litvinenko I.V. The British delegation at the Berlin Congress: a team of like-minded people or political rivals?
Kenkishvili S.N. On the question of the relationship between the Anglo-Turkish Convention and the Berlin Congress of 1878
Speech by I. S. Aksakov on the Berlin Congress and its subsequent reference in letters and documents of June – November 1878 / Published by D. A. Badalyan // Censorship in Russia: story and modernity. Collection of scientific papers. Issue 6. St. Petersburg, 2013. P. 361.
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