Latin American summits. China and the US are preparing for a new round of competition. Russia should not be mistaken in assessing their real intentions
The hypersonic theme is being developed by all major players. There have been many reports in recent years about alleged hypersonic strikes weaponsOne of the latest acts was Iran's response to Israel's sabotage.
After November 21, the world has a kind of standard in the hypersonic chamber of weights and measures. Anyone who now wants to demonstrate their achievements in this area can compare with the night footage from Dnepropetrovsk. At the same time, now with real speed characteristics - at least 9 Mach.
There are people in the world to compare, for example, the Iranians, who allegedly launched hypersonic missiles, and the Israelis, who allegedly shot them down. The US may consider this option if an analogue of the Oreshnik appears in the DPRK. The Chinese with their DF-27 can also compare.
The effect of this step is serious, and the Chinese will definitely analyze the new military standard, however, Beijing is now clearly absorbed in the tasks of preparing for competition with the new US administration. For Russia, the new hypersonic system may prove to be an insufficient factor in the face of those combinations that may arise regarding this competition.
Trump's supporters have long been threatening China with punishment and upheaval. This is not so much part of Trump's personal "modus vivendi" as the work of the Trumpists' think tank, the Heritage Foundation. Before his first presidency, Trump considered OPEC ("a criminal cartel") to be his main enemy.
In the 920-page programmatic collection “Mandate for Leadership 2025,” which was touted as “Trump’s plan,” a good third of the materials are devoted to the fight against “communist China.” Russia, by the way, receives only a couple of paragraphs.
It is logical that Beijing is preparing for a full-fledged fight. However, this is no longer about D. Trump. Under J. Biden, more restrictions were issued for China than during his entire leadership. But it was D. Trump who destroyed the idea of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which made it much easier for Beijing to solve the problem of competition in that very Southeast Asia, which today many analysts for some reason consider an unconditional goal for the United States.
Last November, US and Chinese leaders agreed, if not to common rules of competition, then at least to a framework within which these rules could be discussed.
Since October-November of last year (the forum in Beijing "One Belt - One Road" and the APEC summit) it was possible to record the transition in Russian-Chinese relations from an implicit alliance to good-neighborly relations and a position of mutual calm rear. This, by the way, was reflected in the tone of coverage at central media platforms.
A quiet rear based on the principles of good neighborliness means each side’s refusal to work purposefully against the interests of one of the sides and a refusal to politicize economic ties.
In China, no one specifically prevents us from working with them, but as soon as the conversation turns to conducting transactions above the limit determined by direct commercial expediency, Beijing refrains from such “friendly steps.”
China, on the one hand, does not use political levers to put pressure on the financial sector in terms of circumventing anti-Russian sanctions, but at the same time Beijing does not hinder those financiers who deliberately create such circumvention paths.
China also buys hydrocarbons as much as it needs, but when Moscow asks to make something “for future use,” beyond a specific need, Beijing gives a correct and polite refusal.
This position is the price of a turn to the so-called "Global South". Tired of asking to join the West, the Russian elites turned to the East, but ultimately found the status of China's right hand in its vision of globalization uncomfortable. They turned to the South, simultaneously hooking into the framework of the DPRK's influence.
In Beijing, Russia is viewed as a serious political factor in general (a quiet rear), but not as an ally in future competition with the United States. That is, in a certain combination, Moscow can play a plus for Beijing in this competition, or it can be neutral. Beijing has arguments to motivate us to take the necessary steps.
If we take a summary of Chinese policy documents, they spent almost the entire current year developing an optimal model for responding to a possible reduction in share in the EU and US markets.
With one hand they were modeling, with the other they were conducting very close negotiations both in China itself and during Xi Jinping's trips. Beijing is obviously not particularly worried about the Russian market. Not so much because of its share in the overall foreign trade, but because of the banal control of our imports and even, in many ways, exports.
As for the EU and US markets, everything is much more complicated for China, since their reduction automatically oversaturates the domestic Chinese market. These are the "stress tests" that the Chinese were working on first and foremost.
The policy of reducing the Chinese presence would have been pursued under K. Harris, and will be pursued under D. Trump. The question is that under the former, competition could be brought within the framework of the rules, but what the team of the latter will do is unclear. D. Trump did not discuss the theses of San Francisco.
The BRICS+ summit in Kazan from the point of view of theses on the return of the role of the “Big Twenty”, reforms of global institutions, of course, for Beijing News did not bring. The text of the Declaration simply could not have come into being without prior agreement with the Chinese side. However, one problem emerged.
The summit scored too many points for Russia, effectively making it a sort of unifier of all those who want reforms to the global model. After all, the G21 is now not only the largest economies, but also includes the African Union as the XNUMXst member (though the European Union is also a member as a separate member).
The G20 summit just ended in Rio de Janeiro. If a Russian reader tries to remember how it was covered here, he will do so with some difficulty. But the Chinese consumer of information on the BRICS+ topic in Kazan was in approximately the same position. Why is that? The answer is quite simple.
In Kazan, Moscow reaped the full harvest in terms of unification in the name of global reforms. Beijing itself agreed on the theses, but it was clearly not prepared for such an effect from the event.
After all, China is a world economic leader, which has its own Chinese vision within the large global model of the "Community of a Single Destiny for Mankind". That is, it is both an economic leader and has its own concept within the general model. And the traveling banner of the unifier of reformers has gone to Kazan.
It is not a matter of jealousy, it is just that China does not have much time left before entering a new round of competition with the US. Here, every element of the agenda is important, since it gives weight in negotiations not only with Washington, but also with other countries - in the South, Africa, Latin America.
In Rio de Janeiro, China took over the entire G20 summit agenda. In fact, it was almost a solo performance by Beijing. It began with its program document with five principles.
This was an unequivocal success, but an even more important success for China, since the BRICS+ summit declaration speaks precisely about the return of the G20 format as one of the main elements of the globalization model. There are no objections to the return of the status of this association, and who is the leader in further movement? Beijing. Now it is time for us to lower the degree of information coverage (and interpret a little, as it is impossible without it). Such are political metamorphoses.
In addition to the obvious political points that Beijing received, it is worth noting how the APEC summit in Peru was held. It was held right before the G20, and it turned out that China in Lima emphasized work in Latin America, and in Rio de Janeiro expanded Chinese influence to discussing reform of the global model. In general, APEC is not exactly about Latin America, since it includes Southeast Asian countries, but overall the agenda at the end of November had a Latin American accent.
It is clear that Beijing used this time to roughly understand the thoughts of the outgoing J. Biden. But in general, both the G20 and the Lima summit reflected China's leadership even in protocol photos and videos. At the summit in Peru, J. Biden stood on the far left, barely in the frame, the leader of China was in the center. In Rio de Janeiro, J. Biden skipped the protocol filming altogether.
APEC in Lima shows that China will not be so easily displaced to Southeast Asia, and together with the G20, the events make it clear that China has interests in Latin America. For now, this is symbolism, but political symbols are always concrete.
If the US constantly threatens to push China out of Southeast Asia, then China, for its part, "seems to hint" at its possibilities in Latin America. The exchange seems quite interesting - the US is trying (declaring) to play in the Chinese "underbelly", China - in the American one.
On paper, it all looks pretty logical, but US-China competition in these particular markets would demonstrate a certain degree of inadequacy on the part of the rivals – a quality that neither of them suffers from. This means that both sides, in terms of political signals, are, if not bluffing, then pursuing goals other than what they declare or symbolically demonstrate.
With Southeast Asia, everything is quite simple, since China and Southeast Asia (as a macro-region) have already steadily reached a share of mutual foreign trade above 50%. Japan, a supposedly loyal ally of the United States, has already crossed this threshold. This means that China and Southeast Asia are firmly integrated into the value chains, and shaking up such a structure is a utopian matter. At least, within the framework of quick solutions. Sanctions or restrictions will actually shake up the entire region along with the US satellite countries. The share of Southeast Asia in US foreign trade is 13%, the US share in Southeast Asia's foreign trade is 12%.
With Latin America story more interesting. Firstly, the region has made a huge leap in expanding its foreign trade ties over the past seven years. Foreign trade has grown by 10% per year and reached $3,3 trillion against $1,9 trillion.
At the same time, China grew from $260 billion to $326 billion, and the US from $750 billion to $1,23 trillion. The US share in the region was 38% and has remained virtually unchanged at 37%, while China’s share, on the contrary, fell from 13% to 10% of regional foreign trade.
The EU accounted for 12% seven years ago, and now its share has fallen to 7%. The figures are almost the same - $24 billion seven years ago and $0 now, but the region has grown by almost 220%, and the EU's share has decreased.
The US traditionally works in conjunction with Mexico. In general, Canada and Mexico are their trading base. But it is worth noting that together China and the US accounted for 52% of foreign trade in Latin America seven years ago, and now it is 47%. The US has grown in Mexico, fallen in Brazil, and generally maintained its share in smaller countries. And who has grown? The turnover between the countries in the region and Brazil's share have grown.
All this means that stories about how China can vigorously advance itself in Latin America and push back the US there, and the US itself in Southeast Asia and push back China there, actually belong to the category of popular mythology.
To shake up the value clusters is not the most trivial task, in Southeast Asia it has already formed, and in Latin America it is already quite well formed. Mexico remains docked to the USA, but Brazil itself is now moving very closely in South America, and the countries of the region are increasing their turnover in working with each other. China is not growing economically there. It is not so easy to change the value links - it takes time.
That is why D. Trump, who destroyed the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the USA, was directly called a "stupid guy". In seven or eight years, the USA could have changed something in Southeast Asia with the idea of creating a second circuit of US trade partners (above the WTO). For China, the growth of trade influence in Latin America now collides not only with the USA, but with Brazil, which, with such expansion, will simply be forced to somehow (even if gently) block Beijing.
In fact, the signals from the US regarding Southeast Asia and China regarding Latin America mean the point of application of political efforts - Washington will go against the economic tide, forcing the countries of Southeast Asia to support its political declarations, and Beijing will work similarly in Latin America. We are talking here more about buying elites than about a real opportunity to influence the cost. And elites need to be bought in order to form coalitions on international platforms, vote, adopt resolutions, protest against sanctions or support them.
According EU market China and the USA will start a real fight. At the same time, the media coverage will be, on the one hand, around Southeast Asia, on the other - around Latin America. There, aircraft carriers may be sailing in circles, warships will move in flotillas, and everything real and serious will happen around the European Union.
For Russia, the most important thing in these combinations is the influence on the results of the military campaign. The main international players have different tasks here. It is more likely that China's interests are served by freezing it, while the interests of the United States are served by continuing it in any form other than "terminal".
Ending the military campaign will require an economic re-evaluation from the EU. This is linked to the discussion about economic recovery and transition to growth - this is not the best option for either the US or China.
The pause is a revision of military spending specifically, where free but limited funds will be able to work more for China. This option does not suit the US.
Continuing the campaign would mean throwing Europe's resources into the firebox and continuing to hypnotize the EU's political elites - something that China is categorically not happy with.
However, neither the Chinese nor the American version of the struggle for this market implies strengthening the EU as a subject through new cooperation with Russia, including simply lifting sanctions.
In this situation, there is a non-zero probability that if we persist on the Ukrainian issue, Russia will be pushed either to an active position in Latin America or in Southeast Asia, including through participation in the BRICS+ and G20 formats. At the same time, any combination on the scales between the US and China is essentially alien to us. The danger is that we may think that something depends on our positions in Southeast Asia or Latin America in the context of the confrontation between China and the US, and try to play on this somehow. But these are purely political combinations that will not affect the main battlefield, nor the views of the parties regarding this battlefield and ourselves. I really want to hope that the talk about the US now throwing all its forces at Southeast Asia and leaving Europe is still only an element of our internal media program.
International formats will seemingly demand an "active role" from us, but in reality this role will be a diversion of resources. How to play in such a game strictly for ourselves and for ourselves is a question for the Nobel Prize.
The complexity of the situation is also in the fact that China is not going to break anything in terms of the system of international settlements. This is precisely what moves it away from its main goal in terms of the fight for the European market. And since our relations are those of a "good neutral neighbor", then payments for exports and imports are based on not very solid ground. Here, the main levers are held by China and the United States at the same time, although we are looking more at the balance of power on the battlefield and positions precisely within the framework of the logic of military escalation.
After November 21, the world has a kind of standard in the hypersonic chamber of weights and measures. Anyone who now wants to demonstrate their achievements in this area can compare with the night footage from Dnepropetrovsk. At the same time, now with real speed characteristics - at least 9 Mach.
There are people in the world to compare, for example, the Iranians, who allegedly launched hypersonic missiles, and the Israelis, who allegedly shot them down. The US may consider this option if an analogue of the Oreshnik appears in the DPRK. The Chinese with their DF-27 can also compare.
The effect of this step is serious, and the Chinese will definitely analyze the new military standard, however, Beijing is now clearly absorbed in the tasks of preparing for competition with the new US administration. For Russia, the new hypersonic system may prove to be an insufficient factor in the face of those combinations that may arise regarding this competition.
China, Russia and Trumpists - General Position
Trump's supporters have long been threatening China with punishment and upheaval. This is not so much part of Trump's personal "modus vivendi" as the work of the Trumpists' think tank, the Heritage Foundation. Before his first presidency, Trump considered OPEC ("a criminal cartel") to be his main enemy.
In the 920-page programmatic collection “Mandate for Leadership 2025,” which was touted as “Trump’s plan,” a good third of the materials are devoted to the fight against “communist China.” Russia, by the way, receives only a couple of paragraphs.
It is logical that Beijing is preparing for a full-fledged fight. However, this is no longer about D. Trump. Under J. Biden, more restrictions were issued for China than during his entire leadership. But it was D. Trump who destroyed the idea of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which made it much easier for Beijing to solve the problem of competition in that very Southeast Asia, which today many analysts for some reason consider an unconditional goal for the United States.
Last November, US and Chinese leaders agreed, if not to common rules of competition, then at least to a framework within which these rules could be discussed.
Since October-November of last year (the forum in Beijing "One Belt - One Road" and the APEC summit) it was possible to record the transition in Russian-Chinese relations from an implicit alliance to good-neighborly relations and a position of mutual calm rear. This, by the way, was reflected in the tone of coverage at central media platforms.
A quiet rear based on the principles of good neighborliness means each side’s refusal to work purposefully against the interests of one of the sides and a refusal to politicize economic ties.
In China, no one specifically prevents us from working with them, but as soon as the conversation turns to conducting transactions above the limit determined by direct commercial expediency, Beijing refrains from such “friendly steps.”
China, on the one hand, does not use political levers to put pressure on the financial sector in terms of circumventing anti-Russian sanctions, but at the same time Beijing does not hinder those financiers who deliberately create such circumvention paths.
China also buys hydrocarbons as much as it needs, but when Moscow asks to make something “for future use,” beyond a specific need, Beijing gives a correct and polite refusal.
This position is the price of a turn to the so-called "Global South". Tired of asking to join the West, the Russian elites turned to the East, but ultimately found the status of China's right hand in its vision of globalization uncomfortable. They turned to the South, simultaneously hooking into the framework of the DPRK's influence.
In Beijing, Russia is viewed as a serious political factor in general (a quiet rear), but not as an ally in future competition with the United States. That is, in a certain combination, Moscow can play a plus for Beijing in this competition, or it can be neutral. Beijing has arguments to motivate us to take the necessary steps.
BRICS+, APEC in Lima and G20 in Rio de Janeiro
If we take a summary of Chinese policy documents, they spent almost the entire current year developing an optimal model for responding to a possible reduction in share in the EU and US markets.
With one hand they were modeling, with the other they were conducting very close negotiations both in China itself and during Xi Jinping's trips. Beijing is obviously not particularly worried about the Russian market. Not so much because of its share in the overall foreign trade, but because of the banal control of our imports and even, in many ways, exports.
As for the EU and US markets, everything is much more complicated for China, since their reduction automatically oversaturates the domestic Chinese market. These are the "stress tests" that the Chinese were working on first and foremost.
The policy of reducing the Chinese presence would have been pursued under K. Harris, and will be pursued under D. Trump. The question is that under the former, competition could be brought within the framework of the rules, but what the team of the latter will do is unclear. D. Trump did not discuss the theses of San Francisco.
The BRICS+ summit in Kazan from the point of view of theses on the return of the role of the “Big Twenty”, reforms of global institutions, of course, for Beijing News did not bring. The text of the Declaration simply could not have come into being without prior agreement with the Chinese side. However, one problem emerged.
The summit scored too many points for Russia, effectively making it a sort of unifier of all those who want reforms to the global model. After all, the G21 is now not only the largest economies, but also includes the African Union as the XNUMXst member (though the European Union is also a member as a separate member).
The G20 summit just ended in Rio de Janeiro. If a Russian reader tries to remember how it was covered here, he will do so with some difficulty. But the Chinese consumer of information on the BRICS+ topic in Kazan was in approximately the same position. Why is that? The answer is quite simple.
In Kazan, Moscow reaped the full harvest in terms of unification in the name of global reforms. Beijing itself agreed on the theses, but it was clearly not prepared for such an effect from the event.
After all, China is a world economic leader, which has its own Chinese vision within the large global model of the "Community of a Single Destiny for Mankind". That is, it is both an economic leader and has its own concept within the general model. And the traveling banner of the unifier of reformers has gone to Kazan.
It is not a matter of jealousy, it is just that China does not have much time left before entering a new round of competition with the US. Here, every element of the agenda is important, since it gives weight in negotiations not only with Washington, but also with other countries - in the South, Africa, Latin America.
In Rio de Janeiro, China took over the entire G20 summit agenda. In fact, it was almost a solo performance by Beijing. It began with its program document with five principles.
This was an unequivocal success, but an even more important success for China, since the BRICS+ summit declaration speaks precisely about the return of the G20 format as one of the main elements of the globalization model. There are no objections to the return of the status of this association, and who is the leader in further movement? Beijing. Now it is time for us to lower the degree of information coverage (and interpret a little, as it is impossible without it). Such are political metamorphoses.
China's Focus on Latin America
In addition to the obvious political points that Beijing received, it is worth noting how the APEC summit in Peru was held. It was held right before the G20, and it turned out that China in Lima emphasized work in Latin America, and in Rio de Janeiro expanded Chinese influence to discussing reform of the global model. In general, APEC is not exactly about Latin America, since it includes Southeast Asian countries, but overall the agenda at the end of November had a Latin American accent.
It is clear that Beijing used this time to roughly understand the thoughts of the outgoing J. Biden. But in general, both the G20 and the Lima summit reflected China's leadership even in protocol photos and videos. At the summit in Peru, J. Biden stood on the far left, barely in the frame, the leader of China was in the center. In Rio de Janeiro, J. Biden skipped the protocol filming altogether.
APEC in Lima shows that China will not be so easily displaced to Southeast Asia, and together with the G20, the events make it clear that China has interests in Latin America. For now, this is symbolism, but political symbols are always concrete.
If the US constantly threatens to push China out of Southeast Asia, then China, for its part, "seems to hint" at its possibilities in Latin America. The exchange seems quite interesting - the US is trying (declaring) to play in the Chinese "underbelly", China - in the American one.
On paper, it all looks pretty logical, but US-China competition in these particular markets would demonstrate a certain degree of inadequacy on the part of the rivals – a quality that neither of them suffers from. This means that both sides, in terms of political signals, are, if not bluffing, then pursuing goals other than what they declare or symbolically demonstrate.
Neither China nor the US can fully compete in Latin America and Southeast Asia
With Southeast Asia, everything is quite simple, since China and Southeast Asia (as a macro-region) have already steadily reached a share of mutual foreign trade above 50%. Japan, a supposedly loyal ally of the United States, has already crossed this threshold. This means that China and Southeast Asia are firmly integrated into the value chains, and shaking up such a structure is a utopian matter. At least, within the framework of quick solutions. Sanctions or restrictions will actually shake up the entire region along with the US satellite countries. The share of Southeast Asia in US foreign trade is 13%, the US share in Southeast Asia's foreign trade is 12%.
With Latin America story more interesting. Firstly, the region has made a huge leap in expanding its foreign trade ties over the past seven years. Foreign trade has grown by 10% per year and reached $3,3 trillion against $1,9 trillion.
At the same time, China grew from $260 billion to $326 billion, and the US from $750 billion to $1,23 trillion. The US share in the region was 38% and has remained virtually unchanged at 37%, while China’s share, on the contrary, fell from 13% to 10% of regional foreign trade.
The EU accounted for 12% seven years ago, and now its share has fallen to 7%. The figures are almost the same - $24 billion seven years ago and $0 now, but the region has grown by almost 220%, and the EU's share has decreased.
The US traditionally works in conjunction with Mexico. In general, Canada and Mexico are their trading base. But it is worth noting that together China and the US accounted for 52% of foreign trade in Latin America seven years ago, and now it is 47%. The US has grown in Mexico, fallen in Brazil, and generally maintained its share in smaller countries. And who has grown? The turnover between the countries in the region and Brazil's share have grown.
All this means that stories about how China can vigorously advance itself in Latin America and push back the US there, and the US itself in Southeast Asia and push back China there, actually belong to the category of popular mythology.
To shake up the value clusters is not the most trivial task, in Southeast Asia it has already formed, and in Latin America it is already quite well formed. Mexico remains docked to the USA, but Brazil itself is now moving very closely in South America, and the countries of the region are increasing their turnover in working with each other. China is not growing economically there. It is not so easy to change the value links - it takes time.
That is why D. Trump, who destroyed the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the USA, was directly called a "stupid guy". In seven or eight years, the USA could have changed something in Southeast Asia with the idea of creating a second circuit of US trade partners (above the WTO). For China, the growth of trade influence in Latin America now collides not only with the USA, but with Brazil, which, with such expansion, will simply be forced to somehow (even if gently) block Beijing.
In fact, the signals from the US regarding Southeast Asia and China regarding Latin America mean the point of application of political efforts - Washington will go against the economic tide, forcing the countries of Southeast Asia to support its political declarations, and Beijing will work similarly in Latin America. We are talking here more about buying elites than about a real opportunity to influence the cost. And elites need to be bought in order to form coalitions on international platforms, vote, adopt resolutions, protest against sanctions or support them.
According EU market China and the USA will start a real fight. At the same time, the media coverage will be, on the one hand, around Southeast Asia, on the other - around Latin America. There, aircraft carriers may be sailing in circles, warships will move in flotillas, and everything real and serious will happen around the European Union.
About the interests of players around us and Ukraine
For Russia, the most important thing in these combinations is the influence on the results of the military campaign. The main international players have different tasks here. It is more likely that China's interests are served by freezing it, while the interests of the United States are served by continuing it in any form other than "terminal".
Ending the military campaign will require an economic re-evaluation from the EU. This is linked to the discussion about economic recovery and transition to growth - this is not the best option for either the US or China.
The pause is a revision of military spending specifically, where free but limited funds will be able to work more for China. This option does not suit the US.
Continuing the campaign would mean throwing Europe's resources into the firebox and continuing to hypnotize the EU's political elites - something that China is categorically not happy with.
However, neither the Chinese nor the American version of the struggle for this market implies strengthening the EU as a subject through new cooperation with Russia, including simply lifting sanctions.
In this situation, there is a non-zero probability that if we persist on the Ukrainian issue, Russia will be pushed either to an active position in Latin America or in Southeast Asia, including through participation in the BRICS+ and G20 formats. At the same time, any combination on the scales between the US and China is essentially alien to us. The danger is that we may think that something depends on our positions in Southeast Asia or Latin America in the context of the confrontation between China and the US, and try to play on this somehow. But these are purely political combinations that will not affect the main battlefield, nor the views of the parties regarding this battlefield and ourselves. I really want to hope that the talk about the US now throwing all its forces at Southeast Asia and leaving Europe is still only an element of our internal media program.
International formats will seemingly demand an "active role" from us, but in reality this role will be a diversion of resources. How to play in such a game strictly for ourselves and for ourselves is a question for the Nobel Prize.
The complexity of the situation is also in the fact that China is not going to break anything in terms of the system of international settlements. This is precisely what moves it away from its main goal in terms of the fight for the European market. And since our relations are those of a "good neutral neighbor", then payments for exports and imports are based on not very solid ground. Here, the main levers are held by China and the United States at the same time, although we are looking more at the balance of power on the battlefield and positions precisely within the framework of the logic of military escalation.
Information