What role did the ten-inch pipe play in history?

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What role did the ten-inch pipe play in history?
Panorama of oil fields in Northern Sakhalin


What role in stories What difference can a ten-inch pipe make, and one that hasn't been laid yet? In certain circumstances, quite a significant one. We are talking about the Japanese attempt to build an oil pipeline on the Sakhalin oil concession, which they failed to achieve.



Easy to get - hard to get


Japanese oil concessions on Sakhalin in the interwar years are something like a test of deep knowledge of history. They say that if a person knows that the Japanese extracted oil in the northern, Soviet part of Sakhalin, then he is involved in some mysteries of history inaccessible to mere mortals.

However, as far as the technical equipment of these Japanese oil fields in northern Sakhalin is concerned, it is very difficult to find specific information. In addition to the wells, there were also intra-field oil pipelines, tanks, narrow-gauge railways. There was even an oil refinery in Okha. What was located, where and what capacity - it is difficult to find information about this even in Japanese sources, which are very scrupulous about the accuracy of information.

One might think that the author has finally fallen into economic "riveting". However, this is an important question in the following sphere. Why did the Japanese extract so little oil in Northern Sakhalin?

The Japanese estimated their oil reserves at 210 million tons, and these were, in essence, estimates after the initial exploration. But even in this volume, Sakhalin oil could satisfy Japan's oil needs. In the remarkable work "Showa Kogyo Shi", which has everything about everything, it is indicated that in the 6th year of Showa (1931), Japan consumed only 1,5 million kiloliters of oil, while its own production amounted to 331,5 thousand kiloliters, and import - more than 1 million kiloliters. The Japanese, as already mentioned in another article, made large reserves and in the same year had 782 thousand kiloliters in warehouses. Therefore, their consumption could be greater than current consumption and import.

In Northern Sakhalin in the 6/7th year of Showa (1931/32) 186,7 thousand tons or 215,8 thousand kiloliters were extracted, and 272,7 thousand tons or 315,2 thousand kiloliters were exported. Sakhalin oil made up only 21% of current consumption or 14,9% of the oil resources received by Japan during the year.

If a Japanese company extracted about 2 million tons in Northern Sakhalin, it would cover all of Japan's current needs. The peak of oil consumption in the pre-war years occurred in the 14th year of Showa (1939) and amounted to 3,4 million kiloliters. And in this case, there would be enough oil for about a hundred years.

To understand the essence of the situation, you need to know the technical details. There was a fair amount of oil in Northern Sakhalin, but it was difficult to transport it. The wells were located several kilometers from the shore, and the oil still had to be loaded onto a tanker. In the first years of developing the Sakhalin fields, the Japanese transported oil from in-field storage facilities to coastal storage facilities by tank cars along a narrow-gauge railway, and then loaded it onto boats, from which the oil was loaded onto tankers anchored at sea.

Difficult navigation conditions from June to October, strong surf and poor infrastructure development set insurmountable limits to oil production. In the first year, the Japanese, through such backbreaking labor, exported 13,8 thousand tons of oil, in the second year - 44,8 thousand tons (2/3rd year of Showa - 1927/28), although 34,3 thousand and 77,1 thousand tons were extracted respectively. Then, not far from Okha, 6-inch marine oil pipelines were built, which began from coastal storage facilities and went to anchor barrels 2-3 km from the shore, where a large tanker could approach and moor. This made things more fun. Soon the shipment exceeded 200 thousand tons per year.


Japanese oil fields in Northern Sakhalin.


A series of photographs of a power plant in Japanese oil fields.

Thus, the equipment of the Sakhalin oil fields had great economic and military significance.

The oil pipeline was never built


In the 12th year of Showa (1937), the Japanese began to build a second offshore oil pipeline, this time south of Okha, near the village of Katangli, in the vicinity of which there were also oil fields. The scheme was the same: a narrow-gauge railway to the shore, where it was planned to build an oil storage facility, and the oil pipeline itself from the tanks in the sea to two anchor barrels. Unlike the oil pipelines in Okha, which were 6-inch, this project envisaged the use of a 10-inch pipe.

This was already a significant difference. If a 6-inch oil pipeline could pass 18,5 tons per hour, then a 10-inch pipeline could pass 69,2 tons per hour. A naval tanker of the Shiretoko type, of which seven units were built in 1920-1922, could take on board 8000 tons of oil.


The Shiretoko-class tanker Tsurumi in 1922.

The new pipeline allowed it to be loaded within 114 hours or 4,7 days, while the old pipeline would have needed 18 days to be fully loaded. And that's if the sea would give it those days.

Interestingly, the Shiretoko-type tankers carried oil on coal and took 1350 tons of coal for their steam engines. At 10 knots, the tanker could travel 7000 miles, so these tankers were often used to deliver oil from abroad in the interwar years.

The president and director of the Kita Karafuto Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha company, Vice Admiral Seizo, took up this matter.


He was appointed head of the company on July 1, 1935, after he had already transferred to the reserves; he was 56 years old that year. He held the post of head of the company until July 17, 1941, after which he was appointed Minister of Industry and Trade in Prince Konoe's third cabinet the following day.

Vice Admiral Seizo's career as a naval commander was unsuccessful. At the end of 1923, he was entrusted with command of the battleship Nagato, but he steered it in such a way that he collided with the battleship Mutsu. Seizo was about to resign, but the commander of the United fleet Admiral Suzuki transferred him to the Ministry of the Navy. Being a good administrator, Vice-Admiral Seizo spent almost all his time in the ministry; he was only occasionally assigned to ships. Before leaving the reserves, he was on the naval General Staff. This is the kind of person who dealt with issues of building an oil pipeline in Northern Sakhalin.

In general, the Kita Karafuto Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha company had only three presidents and directors, and all three were vice admirals: Juji Nakazato (1926–1935), Sakonshi Seizo (1935–1941), and Jiro Kozo (1941–1944). The latter, by the way, was also the head of the Technical Naval Department and participated in the founding of the Nippon Steel Corporation. So there is reason to believe that the company for concession oil production in Northern Sakhalin was initially and always a creature of the Japanese Navy and mainly filled the naval storage facilities with oil and fuel oil. As we can see, random people were not appointed to manage this company.

Among the documents related to this issue was a copy of a report on the construction of an oil pipeline in the Katangli area, which Seizo sent to the Japanese Foreign Ministry on February 25, 1937. The report itself was addressed to the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Yonai. It outlined a plan for the construction of a 2300-meter-long oil pipeline from coastal storage facilities to anchor casks, with some drawings.


Plan of all infrastructure in the Katangli area


Drawing of an anchorage for a tanker.

Apparently, the Japanese brought 210 tons of pipes to Sakhalin and began construction in the summer of 1937; in any case, letters to the Japanese Foreign Ministry sent in July and August 1937 state that installation had already begun but was suspended due to the need to obtain permission from Moscow. The Foreign Ministry was involved in this matter because their diplomats had to reach the necessary agreements. For a company created by government decree, this was normal.

The Japanese must have thought that the issue would soon be resolved, but time passed and permission to build did not arrive. Finally, on July 5, 1938, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a decree "On the oil concession on Sakhalin", which denied the laying of an underwater ten-inch oil pipeline in the Katangli area.

This resolution mentions a six-inch land oil pipeline in the Katangli area that was authorized in 1937, but no specific information could be found about what kind of oil pipeline it was, where it led to, or where it came from.

This is how we know history. Of course, against the backdrop of a heart-rending discovery like “the USSR sold oil to the Japanese during the war,” all sorts of pipes and tanks look boring and uninteresting. But that was the root of the issue.

This ten-inch oil pipeline, which was never built, could well have been the last straw that pushed Japan into a world war.

On the historical role of the ten-inch pipe


In the late 1930s, Japan still had a fair amount of oil. In Showa 12 (1937), reserves exceeded 1 million kiloliters, which was 42% of current consumption. The following year, they grew to 1,9 million kiloliters, or 67% of current consumption. But clouds were gathering on the horizon.

Imports for the needs of the army and navy doubled from 1931 to 1936, from 400 to 800 thousand kiloliters, and imports for the civilian sector increased from 616 thousand to 1,6 million kiloliters. Japan is consuming more and more oil, while its own production, that is, production in Japan itself, is almost not growing and reached its peak in 1936 - 401 thousand kiloliters. The country depends on imports, and relations with exporting countries are increasingly worsening, mainly due to Japanese policy in China.

The Sakhalin concessions were probably seen as a way to ensure a reliable flow of oil without getting involved in a major war. Since the USSR had the right to receive a portion of the oil from Japanese production, the calculation was based on interest in concession benefits.

The Japanese would have been in a much better position and perhaps would not have been drawn into the world war if they had secured all of Sakhalin. Returning Northern Sakhalin to the USSR turned out to be not very far-sighted.

But there was a very good reason for this. The unsettled relations with the USSR threatened an armed conflict, which after the phenomenal failure of the "Siberian Expedition" of 1918-1922 looked like an excessively high risk. This military campaign, completely unsuccessful, cost Japan a colossal 1 billion yen, wasted. After the crisis of 1923, exacerbated by the consequences of the earthquake of the same year, the Japanese government was not in the mood for major military adventures. In addition, in the mid-1920s, oil consumption in Japan was not very high and was covered by about half of its own production. The fleet ran on coal, there were almost no cars, aviation had just appeared. Only the navy had begun the transition to fuel oil and therefore had a great interest in oil. But the navy's leadership was also against military adventures and carried out the idea of ​​the Sakhalin concession.

A little more than ten years passed, the situation had changed radically in every sense. But now, after the capture of Manchuria, the USSR had no particular reason to give oil to the Japanese. The idea of ​​building an offshore oil pipeline arose before the impending war in China, and the USSR began to support China. Give the Japanese oil - they will take over China.

But this decision also had a non-obvious side. The lack of reliable sources of oil, if the USSR does not give oil to the Japanese, will lead to the Japanese starting to forcefully break down the doors closed to them.

Most likely, the plan of war against the USSR developed in March 1938 by the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, which resulted in unsuccessful battles for the Japanese at Lake Khasan, had the ultimate goal of ensuring conditions for the capture of Northern Sakhalin. The failure was more than indicative. Therefore, the Japanese had to abandon the use of force to solve their Sakhalin problems.

But then, due to the limited options, they were left with only oil in Southeast Asia, primarily in the Dutch East Indies. There they could count on the weakness of the colonial troops, the remoteness of the main forces of the metropolis, as well as the discontent of local Asians with the European colonizers, which would make the capture easier. But in order to implement this plan, it was necessary that aid to these colonies did not come from either Europe or the United States. From this it followed indisputably that Japan needed Hitler as an ally, and from this followed the plan to attack the US naval forces in the Pacific Ocean.

So the ten-inch pipe could indeed have played a big role in history, even without being built.
11 comments
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  1. +2
    27 November 2024 06: 55
    It may be a pipe, but most likely it is Khasan, and behind it Khalkhin Gol.
    And the article is interesting! I love war-time rivets.
  2. +2
    27 November 2024 08: 03
    Interesting interpretation. New aspect of well-known events. Respect to the author.
  3. +4
    27 November 2024 08: 16
    Returning Northern Sakhalin to the USSR turned out to be not very far-sighted.
    Farsighted indeed. If the Japanese had calmly pumped oil in the north of Sakhalin, there would have been no Khasan, and therefore they might not have lost the temptation to attack the USSR. And when to do this, if not at the end of 1941? The result would have been bad: a war on two fronts for the USSR and a neutral USA, waiting for its share...
  4. bar
    +5
    27 November 2024 09: 36
    The Japanese would have been in a much better position and perhaps would not have been drawn into the world war if they had secured all of Sakhalin. Returning Northern Sakhalin to the USSR turned out to be not very far-sighted.

    We would undoubtedly be in a better position, and perhaps would not have been drawn into the Second World War. But would that have been good for us? In the East there would now be another far from friendly and belligerent superpower, to which our Sakhalin and bordering China would belong. What would have happened to the rest of China is also a big question. And there would certainly have been military conflicts with this superpower on our borders, in which our chances of winning would have been so-so. Far-sighted or not, but it turned out as it did. Japan got involved in a war that was waged mainly by the United States. We only got the Kwantung Army at its very end. And Sakhalin is ours, and Japan did not become a cheeky superpower. Conclusion - whatever happens, everything is for the best wink
    1. 0
      30 November 2024 13: 13
      On the other hand, an oil production concession (oil production without transferring territories) could have changed the history of the Cold War, in which the parties would then have been the Yamato Empire and the United States, and their confrontation could have been calmly watched from the outside.
      In this version, the conglomerate of the USSR + GDR + CMEA could take the place of China, becoming the "world workshop", the largest economy - and what's more, it would have succeeded better than the Chinese, since it had its own ready-made technological base, provided that it would have early and gently transitioned to moderate capitalism with broad social guarantees, without any shock therapy or other economic upheavals, or the fight against corruption.
      1. bar
        0
        30 November 2024 13: 28
        Quote: ycuce234-san
        On the other hand, an oil production concession (oil production without transferring territories) could have changed the history of the Cold War, in which the parties would then have been the Yamato Empire and the United States, and their confrontation could have been calmly watched from the outside.

        It would hardly have worked out to watch from the side. The USA was far away for Japan and would not have entered the war on its own initiative. And Japan would have had a common large border with the USSR. At the same time, it is unknown how our war with Germany would have ended without allies. In any case, by the end of the war the USSR would have been greatly weakened, and it would have been problematic to contain the aggression of a strong Japan in the Far East. And there is no doubt that Japan would not have limited itself to a concession, but would have tried to bite off more from us. So it really turned out not bad at all. Firstly, Japan forced the USA to enter the war, and thus helped in our fight against Germany. Secondly, in this war it committed suicide against the USA, eliminating the threat to us from the East.
        1. 0
          30 November 2024 16: 28
          Japan had an alternative in the form of expanding its penetration into the already captured territories of Asian countries. Getting involved for the sake of some potential additions with a very strong industrial continental state without strong internal crises and with a large army, actively trading with you any resources, which the USSR was then, is not a good idea for an island country. Obviously, the signature move - a naval blockade, is useless against such a continental giant, which, in addition, all sensitive pain points are removed from the coast by the "armor of distance" for thousands of kilometers and the theater of war with it is a huge, uninhabited and very difficult in terms of climate and passability terrain, and on land any Japanese army would be rolled over by continentals, having recovered from the surprise, and only the fleet would have time to take off. It is more logical to have such a state as a "window to the world economy", well, and the USSR could massively acquire technologies in such cooperation and more resources could be allocated to it to defeat the Germans.
          It would have been entirely possible to steer politics in such a way as to avoid the Cold War and grow into an economic superpower - after all, an economically stronger Japan would have been able to defend its zone of interests in a war with the USA and would therefore have become the main enemy of the Americans in the Cold War.
          Japan would have started a war with the USA anyway - there was a pressing issue of control over Japanese sea routes.
          1. bar
            0
            30 November 2024 20: 04
            Quote: ycuce234-san
            Japan had an alternative in the form of expanding its penetration into the already captured territories of Asian countries. Getting involved for the sake of some potential additions with a very strong industrial continental state without strong internal crises and with a large army, actively trading with you any resources, which was the USSR at that time, was not a good idea for an island country.

            Exactly. And one of such Asian territories was our Far East. As for the attack on the "state trading its resources", it did not stop the same Hitler, although trade between our countries was quite active until 22.06.1941. And now nothing has changed. Gayropa and the same Germany as part of NATO are quite at war with us, despite our close economic ties and not giving a damn about their own economy. So in politics, the logic of business does not always work.
      2. 0
        30 November 2024 14: 02
        Yes, that would be an interesting combination.
        But, alas, the preconditions for this did not arise.
  5. 0
    27 November 2024 12: 30
    Quote: Aviator_
    Interesting interpretation. New aspect of well-known events. Respect to the author.

    I join!
  6. +2
    27 November 2024 17: 51
    "This ten-inch oil pipeline, which was never built, could well have been the last straw that pushed Japan into a world war."... Dear author! And why not assume that the last straw was the ban in September 1937 on the coal concessionaire "Kita Karafuto Koogyo Kabushiki Kaisa" from operating a mine in the Agnevo area in Northern Sakhalin? Although the concession agreement was not officially terminated. The concessionaire was engaged in coal mining in the Due area (Northern Sakhalin) for its local needs and was engaged in the export of accumulated reserves to Japan... And why don't you mention another company from Japan, "Sakai Kumiai", which also worked in Northern Sakhalin, in your article?... Another point. The plots were allocated to the Japanese in a checkerboard pattern with the plots that were being developed by the Sakhalin State Trust
    oil and gas industry "Sakhalinneft". Section XI. On the plan of production activities of the North Sakhalin Oil Concessionaire for the 1938/39 operating year" of the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the oil concession on Sakhalin" dated July 05.07.1938, 1938 states: "To permit the concessionaire to produce, drill, explore, and construct housing and technical facilities in the volume stipulated by the concessionaire's plan for 39/1, with the exception of the following work items: 73. Drilling of well No. 2 and technical structures in the Okha area, as it is located close to the boundary of the Sakhalin Oil Trust site and to the Soviet railway line. 22. Drilling and technical structures at sites 27 and 19 in Katangli, at site 10 in Ehabi II, and the division of the Ehabi I exploration area into production sites, since this will allow the latter to predatory develop the field and by suction exhaust our areas." In section "VIII. On permission for the Severo-Sakhalinskaya Oil concessionaire to expand the coastal area in Katangli (Nabil) for unloading operations" it is stated: "Refuse the concessionaire's request to expand its coastal area in Katangli (Nabil), since the area it requests has been allocated for unloading operations and warehouse construction to the Sakhalin-Oil trust." Section "XIII. On the construction of a 10" underwater oil pipeline in the Katangli area by the concessionaire of Severo-Sakhalinskaya Oil" states: "To refuse the concessionaire the construction of a 1937" underwater oil pipeline in the Katangli area, since the construction of a 6" overground oil pipeline, permitted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in 13.11.1940, ensures normal exploitation of the field."...And on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX, when in Berlin the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop brought to the attention of V. M. Molotov the draft agreement between the powers
    "Axis" (Germany, Italy, Japan) and the USSR on political cooperation and economic mutual assistance, "Kita Karafuto Koogyo" and "Kita Karafuto Sekiyu" worked in Northern Sakhalin. On the evening of November 25, 1940, in Moscow, Molotov invited the German ambassador Schulenburg to his office and acquainted him with the conditions of the Soviet leadership, which stipulated the adoption by the USSR government of the draft pact of four powers. Among several points, the condition of agreeing on a secret protocol between Japan and the Soviet Union was put forward.
    Union on Japan's renunciation of oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin in exchange for appropriate compensation. However, all the secret protocols proposed by the Soviet Union, including the protocol on Sakhalin concessions, were never signed.
    In 1941, the USSR signed a neutrality pact with Japan, which served as the basis for a subsequent agreement on oil and coal concessions. On March 30.03.1944, XNUMX, a protocol was signed in Moscow, according to which the concessions in Northern Sakhalin with all property and free of charge were transferred to the Soviet Union.