IRBM "Oreshnik" with a conventional warhead: it happened
Yes, it happened!
Well, gentlemen "haters", how are we now with the impossibility and inexpediency of creating ballistic missiles? missiles strategic class with a conventional warhead (W)?
With the impossibility of ensuring the required accuracy of the approach of warheads?
With the inevitable start of the “Third World War” in its nuclear version in the event of the use of such weapons?
As soon as reports appeared that an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a non-nuclear warhead had been used against Ukraine, it was clear that it was most likely an MRBM, that is, a medium-range ballistic missile, but this does not matter at all, since the difference between an ICBM and an MRBM is very conditional and, from a legal point of view, can be only a couple of kilometers.
The maximum range of a missile of 5499 kilometers is an IRBM, and the maximum range of 5501 kilometers is an ICBM, and the difference between them can be determined by the mass of the payload being thrown. The same American Trident II can technically work as both an ICBM and an IRBM, depending on how it is “loaded” and along what trajectory it is sent to the target, although, again, from a legal point of view, classification as an ICBM or an IRBM is determined by the maximum range.
Launch of UGM-133A Trident II (D5)
The Long Road to Dnieper
It is unlikely that we will ever know who first asked the question: "Is it possible to use ICBMs in conventional combat equipment?" This topic is covered by too deep a veil of secrecy, especially earlier in the USSR, and now in Russia.
The author first became acquainted with this direction of weapons development after information about the American concept of a prompt global strike (PGS) appeared in the open press in April 2010, although work on it had presumably been underway since 2005.
At that time, the Americans were planning to use conventionally armed ICBMs, hypersonic missiles and orbital strike systems in order to be able to destroy all sorts of “Bin Ladens” anywhere on the planet within a few dozen minutes.
Visualization of the BSU concept
Of course, all this is a fairy tale - such missiles were needed by the US as a means of delivering a sudden disarming strike to eliminate the remnants of Russian strategic potential, since it was assumed that by the time the BGU elements were accepted into service, our strategic nuclear forces (SNF) would be precisely the “remnants”, which was quite realistic, given what happened in the 90s - early 2000s.
However, in reality, ICBMs and hypersonic missiles with conventional warheads are not capable of providing an acceptable probability of hitting enemy ICBMs located in highly protected silo launchers (SLLs), and mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK) on routes and at base, as well as strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) stationed at naval bases, are better hit using special (nuclear) warheads, so the BGU topic somehow gradually faded away.
However, what is not so important for the US, for others may be critical. The US has a huge network of military bases around the world, a colossal military budget, armadas of ships, including nuclear aircraft carriers, and aircraft, and most importantly, experience in hacking air defenses (Defense) and defeating states from the air, that is, conducting complex, comprehensive air and space operations - this is their "thing", they focus on this when developing their armed forces. But all this is very, very expensive.
Those who oppose the United States but do not have comparable military power rely on missiles – North Korea, Iran, and partly China with its anti-ship ballistic missiles and missiles with hypersonic glide vehicles.
Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod-4)
Russia can also globally counter the US only with the help of missiles, and in a nuclear version, at least that was the case before.
In August 2019, the author published a series of articles on the pages of Military Review on the need to develop Strategic Conventional Weapons (SKO) и creation of Strategic Conventional Forces (SCF).
Among other things, they mentioned the advisability of creating ICBMs and SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) in a version with conventional warheads, and also formulated the ideology of the SKO and SKS - inflicting damage on the enemy, significantly reducing his organizational, industrial and military capabilities, from a distance that minimizes or eliminates the likelihood of a direct combat clash with the enemy's armed forces.
It was possible to return to this topic only three years later, after the start of the special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine, in August 2022 in the material “Fast global strike in Russian performance", which discussed the advisability of creating MRBMs with conventional equipment based on obsolete ICBMs and SLBMs.
If it weren't for the low clouds, something similar could have been observed in Ukraine by witnesses of the arrival of the Oreshnik
Well, finally, in December 2023 and January 2024, two more materials on this topic were published, respectively, “Swept away by fire: ICBMs with shrapnel warheads to hit targets deep inside Ukraine" and "Organizational and technical issues of using ICBMs with a conventional warhead».
In the comments to the materials mentioned, many expressed doubts about the advisability and possibility of creating ICBM-MRBMs with non-nuclear warheads, about the possibility of ensuring the necessary accuracy of the warheads’ fall, about the risks of starting a nuclear war, and so on and so forth.
As we can see now, all these problems have been solved, the Oreshnik MRBM with a conventional warhead has been created and used against the enemy - this is a fact, and a fact, as they say, is the most stubborn thing in the world. However, there will be those who will deny this, but God bless them, the wretched ones.
MRBM "Oreshnik"
So, what do we know about the Oreshnik MRBM with a conventional warhead?
Presumably, according to unconfirmed data from foreign sources, the developments of the RS-26 Rubezh ICBM-IRBM were used in the creation of the Oreshnik MRBM, which has caused particularly hyperactive individuals in Ukraine and some Western countries to become terribly excited, as if we should not use the groundwork we have, but rather reinvent the “wheel” every time, while all the developments of Western countries are absolutely new and are often not based on products that are half a century old.
According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the approach speed of the warheads is about 10 Machs, which is about 3 kilometers per second; foreign sources indicate the “landing” speed as 11 Machs, or 3,3 kilometers per second – this is a huge flight speed, which is confirmed by video recordings in which the fall of the warheads in the atmosphere resembles shots from a “blaster” in science fiction filters.
Creepy? Attractive? Creepy attractive – it’s simply impossible to take your eyes off it!
Moreover, it is possible that the speed of the warheads’ fall is even somewhat underestimated, since for nuclear warheads of ICBMs it can reach 7 kilometers per second; however, the speed of the warheads’ fall could have been reduced to ensure their controllability and increase the accuracy of hitting targets.
What could be the range of the Oreshnik IRBM?
At the very least, it is not less than the one it was used against the target at the Ukraine test site. It can be assumed that the flight range of the Oreshnik MRBM is in the range of 0,5-5 thousand kilometers, while the missile's combat load can vary, for example, the number and/or type of warheads can decrease or increase.
In the video recordings of the "arrivals", one can clearly see the successive landing of six warheads, and in the final section, it is clearly visible that each warhead divides into six more submunitions. It can be assumed that the warheads have individual guidance and at a certain specified altitude above the target they open up in order to increase the probability of hitting the target with the already unguided submunitions.
"Arrows of God"
At the moment, it is unknown whether the submunitions contain explosives, or whether the damage occurs purely kinetically, due to the energy released when an inert blank (tungsten?) hits a target.
There is also no reliable information about the warhead weight, Ukrainian sources say 1,2 tons, but the RS-26 Rubezh could have such a warhead weight if it were equipped with nuclear warheads for throwing to the maximum range. A conventional warhead requires a larger weight, which can be achieved at the expense of range, so it can be assumed that the Oreshnik MRBM has a warhead weight of about 3 tons.
Much will become clear after/if photographs of Yuzhmash, whose production facilities were hit by the Oreshnik MRBM, appear.
To confirm that the strike did not pass without a trace, we can cite footage from a video published on the TRT channel in Russian, where several powerful explosions are visible some time after the fall of the Oreshnik warheads.
Powerful explosions, presumably something serious "banged" at the Yuzhmash plant
Organizational matters
Judging by the embassies, the closure of which on 21.11.2024 was announced by the Americans and Spaniards a day before the "event", the use of ICBM-IRBM with a conventional warhead was not a surprise for them - they got wind of something. According to open US data, we warned only half an hour before the strike.
Many see this as almost “betrayal”, like, how is it possible – to warn the enemy that they will strike at him, why, so that he can prepare?
In the situation with the use of IRBMs with a conventional warhead, this is not so critical. Yes, the deputies from the Ukrainian Rada will definitely run away like cockroaches, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) will remove the planes from the air bases, but they will not be able to relocate the factories. It is unlikely that ours told them the exact target of the strike - that would definitely be idiotic.
If you don't know the exact time and location of the strike, then you can't keep the personnel in the bomb shelters all the time, which means that the personnel will have only a few minutes after the alarm is given until the US discovers the exact time of the IRBM launch, until they pass the information on to the Ukrainian authorities, then they must pass it on to all potential targets, and then there's time to give the alarm. No, in this case, advance warning won't work, according to various sources, the Oreshnik IRBM takes only 7-15 minutes to reach its target.
And if the warning works, if the personnel are sent home for the whole day, then what is the use of such a plant? After all, theoretically, we can send a warning every day, but we are not obliged to guarantee the strike, and let the enemy sit in bomb shelters all day.
Conclusions
All of the above is only a small part of what can be said about the Oreshnik. In the future, we will examine this system in more detail and its prospects from a military and political point of view, as well as possible directions for its further development.
In Ukraine, they are “putting on courage,” trying to cheer up the population with various fairy tales about how “Oreshnik” is supposedly a rusty old thing that simply fell apart in the air, while in the meantime, the “expired” President Zelensky has already requested THAAD anti-missile systems from the US.
THAAD missile defense system, Zelensky's new "wish" – without it you can't win
Well, as they say, "we'll see"...
In the meantime, we would like to congratulate the developers of the Oreshnik MRBM and wish them further successful and fruitful work on creating a new generation of strategic weapons!
Information