Su-25 and Mi-28 – all of them, into history?
Tank. Since its appearance on the battlefields of the First World War, the multi-ton monster, bristling with barrels of various calibers, not afraid of practically any natural obstacles, became the basis of attack in all armies that could afford tank troops.
During the First World War, tanks had virtually no opponents, armor-piercing shells for land forces artillery were not invented due to the lack of targets for them, grenades existed exclusively in fragmentation form, so the only means of disabling a tank were mines, and anti-tank mines were invented quite quickly by all warring parties. No one bothered much, the Germans buried large-caliber shells with the fuse facing upwards, many countries simply used a box with 3-5 kg of explosives and a pressure fuse.
The Second World War brought to the battlefield anti-tank artillery with armor-piercing and cumulative shells, “normal” mines, anti-tank rifles and grenades.
Plus appeared aviation, which by that time had grown from airplanes to planes. And quite naturally, military heads began to think about how to apply this new weapon against tanks, which were becoming an increasingly difficult target.
The pioneers in attacking tanks from the air were the Germans. Their Henschel Hs-129 (1939) became the world's first armored anti-tank aircraft. At least, that's what it was designed to be.
The Hs-129 was a completely unsuccessful aircraft both in terms of flight capabilities and armament. But more than enough has been written about this. 20 mm aircraft cannons were already worthless in 1941, an attempt to install a 30 mm Mk.101 or Mk.103 in a suspended container did not give any tangible results, and the 37 mm BK 3.7 was produced in small quantities and was used in the Junkers. Installing the BK 7.5 on the Hs-129 brought certain results, the cannon penetrated the T-34-85 very easily, but here's the problem - the Hs-129, which was already flying in the "devil's iron" category, practically stopped responding to the controls with such a container.
The effect of the Hs-129 was negligible. It is very hard to believe the figures of destroyed Soviet equipment that the Germans cite, because you read the memoirs of pilots who spoke about how difficult the Henschel was to control and how difficult it was to aim.
But, having understood the “zen” of aviation, the Germans continued their experiments, and so in 1942 the Junkers Ju.87G appeared, equipped with container 37-mm cannons under each wing, specifically for fighting tanks.
This Rustsatz was somewhat more effective than the Henschel, but only under reliable cover, because the already slow Ju.87 with two huge containers was a very easy target for Soviet fighters. Not as easy as the Hs-129, after all, was the gunner defending the rear hemisphere, but usually this only prolonged the agony and nothing more.
Well, it is not surprising that by 1944 only the very sad-headed Rudel was flying the Ju.87G, while the rest of the pilots preferred to switch to the FW.190...
The British tried to equip their Hurricane with 40 mm Vickers S cannons, but there was little use in this experiment: the 40 mm cannon shell penetrated the armor of German and Italian light tanks in Africa very well, but the Hurricanes themselves were very vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, since the Hurricane, which was not distinguished by its maneuverability, with the installation of two large containers, became equal to the Junkers-87. But the Hurricanes of the IID version, albeit in small quantities, played the role of anti-tank aircraft.
The United States took a different approach by mounting a 75mm cannon on the B-25 Mitchell bomber.
But shooting at tanks was not used; during the process of creation, this aircraft changed orientation, and its targets became Japanese submarines in the Pacific Ocean.
Perhaps the most successful anti-tank aircraft of that war was our Il-2.
It is a paradox, but the aircraft's rather decent (compared to the Germans) number of destroyed armored vehicles was not provided by the guns, on which all the developers in the world relied. The 23-mm VYa gun was powerful for the aircraft, but it was completely insufficient for penetrating tank armor. The rockets, which were widely used from the Il-XNUMXs, flew, to put it mildly, "at whomever God sent."
The most effective means of destroying tanks and other armored vehicles were the PTAB-2,5 cumulative anti-tank bombs. A bomb weighing only 2,5 kg easily hit any German tank in the upper projection near the engine compartment, putting it out of action. Having dropped a bunch of such bombs, a squadron of Il-2s could easily burn down an entire column on the march. And they did, which is typical.
This is not an Il, this is a Yak, but this photo perfectly demonstrates the use of the PTAB-2,5.
It is clear that all this is the beginning of a whole journey, therefore the numbers of armored vehicles disabled by air attacks, understandably, are not impressive in quantity. And if we take into account certain factors, then the available numbers should be divided by 4 or 5.
Overall, the results show that while tank destroyers played a role in the war, admittedly their role was largely limited to exerting psychological pressure on the enemy, and their direct involvement in destroying tanks was limited.
In general, the value of attack/anti-tank aircraft was in attacking more vulnerable targets, disrupting supply lines and forcing the enemy to maneuver their equipment in order to preserve it, rather than in destroying tanks.
After all, if one tank superfighter Rudel destroyed 2530 tanks in 547 combat sorties, and the rest of the Reich's "heroes" were at least a little bit his equal, then the question is: who entered Berlin then? Infantry on camels and horses?
It must be admitted that the value of anti-tank aircraft was not great, but this was really the initial stage.
Having assessed the capabilities of tanks following the Second World War, many countries began not only to build tanks, but also to develop anti-tank weapons. Especially in Europe, when the Cold War began, the design bureaus were hot: something had to be put up against the armadas of Soviet tanks, which, according to many, were sure to reach the English Channel.
The 60s became the years of mass production of anti-tank weapons, and the evolution of these weapons rushed forward as if on steroids. And it was precisely in this era that new principles for the creation of new aviation anti-tank devices began to be laid. Moreover, helicopters joined airplanes, which had even greater prospects than airplanes.
A helicopter that doesn’t need a runway, that can land on any terrain, and if necessary, quickly take off, detect targets (tanks) and fire ATGMs at them – this was a prospect that appealed to everyone except the tank crews.
The Mi-24A and Bell AH-1 Cobra, born in those years, changed the generally accepted tactics of combat. And indeed, the tactics had to be changed: a helicopter cannot be detected in advance, like an ATGM operator in position, and then attacked with artillery or some other method. But helicopters were planned to be used exactly like this: approach at low altitude to previously detected enemy tanks, reach attack distance (including altitude), attack the tanks with ATGMs, and leave.
Considering that both the Americans' TOW and our "Falanga-M" were simply "from the heart", it is probably not surprising that such a terrible weapon for aviation as the ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" appeared in those same years. An ideal means to calm down any helicopter. By the way, the Germans got the "Gepard" "only" 10 years later, and the Americans never managed to protect their armored vehicles. "Stingers" on jeeps appeared much later.
And the planes. And not just any planes, but attack planes.
In general, this class has never been large. We understand stormtroopers a little differently than they do in the West, but in principle, if we brush aside the herd that the US calls "stormtroopers", then according to our canons they had 2-3 models worthy of being called that.
The main one, of course, is the A-10 Thunderbolt II, also known as the Warthog.
It appeared in 1972, that is, when the concept of using helicopters had already been thought about, accepted, and it was understood that a helicopter is not really for the battlefield. That is, it is possible on the battlefield, but there the helicopter does not last long: it becomes like a colander.
So, the US Air Force, using the Vietnamese experience of using helicopters, realized the need for flying equipment capable of withstanding intense ground fire and delivering precise and powerful strikes on armored vehicles. Soviet, Vietnamese – it’s not so important. What’s important is that an airplane appeared, which was quickly built around a six-barreled cannon.
The GAU-8 Avenger is, of course, to a Soviet tank what grapeshot is to an elephant: unpleasant, but not fatal. But for armored vehicles of a lower class, such as infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, yes, it is fatal.
Plus, the unique features of the A-10 include a titanium "bath" that protects the pilot and vital systems of the aircraft, allowing it to withstand significant damage and continue flying. In general, the Warthogs demonstrated all their skills in the wars around the Persian Gulf, destroying an impressive number of armored vehicles there.
The Su-25 is practically an analogue of the A-10, which has been compared to the American aircraft more than once.
However, if the A-10 was originally planned as an anti-armor aircraft, the Su-25 is more of a general-purpose attack aircraft, similar to the Il-2, with all the ensuing consequences in terms of equipment.
The Su-25 design lacks a radar, which limits the use of guided weapons with visual and laser guidance.
Both attack aircraft have been through the crucible of many military conflicts, confirming their importance on the battlefield. And at present, Su-25s are participating on both sides of the war between Russia and Ukraine.
Half a century has passed since anti-tank helicopters were “registered” in the troops, and these fifty years have given birth to true monsters of destruction: the AN-64 Apache, the Mi-28N, and the Ka-52.
In essence, different names, helicopters are almost equal in their capabilities (although, if anything, of course, I would prefer the Ka-52) in terms of destruction. You can argue for a long time about which is cooler, "Attack", "Whirlwind" or "Hellfire", but ... For a tank, the difference is very small. You can throw a turret from any missiles from this list.
With 10-degree radars on top of the hub, advanced targeting systems that allow the ability to track and engage multiple targets simultaneously, and the ability to fly at extremely low altitudes while hiding behind terrain, the development of these specialized aircraft and helicopters advanced anti-tank doctrine throughout the Cold War and for another twenty years afterward. The A-25 and Su-64, the AH-52 and Ka-XNUMX have proven their effectiveness in a variety of conflicts, adapting to new roles and technologies over the decades.
Their legacy lies not only in the innovations they brought to military aviation, but also in how they changed the tactics of warfare on the ground, moving from passive defense to active precision strikes against one of the most formidable threats on the battlefield: tanks.
And now what, that's it?
In general, the development of different types of weapons began in different years, and each made its own path up the evolutionary ladder.
The advent of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) has dramatically changed the nature of air-to-ground combat. These compact, shoulder-fired missile systems are highly effective against low-flying aircraft, whether airplanes or helicopters. Their unspoken motto of “simplicity and lethality,” as well as the ability to use them with minimal training, make them the weapon of choice for infantry units in various armies and rebel groups.
Today, MANPADS are commonplace, the latest modification of the Stinger costs only $70. And you can launch 000, 21, 000 missiles at a helicopter that costs $000 (the price of the Ka-52 for the Russian Aerospace Forces). The game will still be worth the candle.
And if you hit an Apache with an Igla, everything will be even sadder: the Igla is cheaper than the Stinger (not much, $50), but the Apache "weighs" about $000 million. So there will be universal sadness, like in November 50, when the Houthis landed an Apache of the Saudi Arabian Air Force with some homemade device. Or maybe not a homemade device, who can tell the truth.
In modern conflicts, the MANPADS threat continues to dictate air tactics. Modern close-in support aircraft must operate with increased caution despite their advanced defenses. Technological advances in MANPADS, with improved targeting and resistance to countermeasures such as flares and electronic jamming, further complicate the operating environment for these combat vehicles.
ATGMs are not at the level of the 70s of the last century either. Missiles have become smarter and more independent and are capable of hitting not only tanks. A helicopter is now a completely legitimate target for an anti-tank missile. And what does a cumulative jet designed to burn through 700 mm of armor do, no need to say, everyone probably saw the video from 2022, when an ATGM hit a helicopter. No chance. And again, it is the same system as MANPADS - “fire and forget”, the missile is smart, it will figure out where to go. And they figure it out.
In general, frontline aviation in the form of helicopters and attack aircraft has a very hard time. At altitudes above 1 km there is nothing to catch at all, except for anti-aircraft missiles, and they themselves will catch anyone.
But there is nothing good below either: MANPADS, ATGMs at very low altitudes, and what can I say, if the ZSU-23-2 acquired a personal radar five years ago, capable of operating at short distances, but the large 23-mm twins are not needed at all - at low altitudes it is also tense.
All that remains is to work from safe distances, but here too there is a problem after a problem: yes, the Su-34 is capable of launching the UMPK from its territory, and the operator will guide the bomb to the desired location practically without straining himself, if necessary. Modern radars easily draw a map of the area in the radar range, take it and use it.
But the Su-25 has no radar and will not have one. It is a direct contact aircraft. Yes, we have seen this stupidity - launching NURSs with a pitch-up attitude. Somewhere there, towards the enemy. Normal NURSs have never been particularly accurate, and here we have them throwing them around in general.
Yes, generals at the headquarters of many countries will have to reconsider all strategies and concepts regarding support of the front line.
Well, here comes His Majesty Drone.
And effectively put an end to the anti-tank war. UAVs They have a unique combination of stealth, accuracy and low cost, making them ideal for engaging heavily armored targets without risk to operators and pilots.
What can I say, you can't even compare it to an ATGM operator. A simple comparison:
1st generation, wire control. You shoot, unmask yourself, but you sit and work the joystick, aiming the missile.
2nd generation, laser. This is a total boredom for the operator, not only does the shot give away the camouflage, but the tank can easily detect the laser radiation and fire somewhere there...
3rd generation, IR guidance. Yes, good, fired and didn't forget, but ran very fast. There are chances for survival.
Everything is at point-blank range. In position, as they say. And if an enemy drone is hanging over the battlefield, in front of the positions, and its operator, God forbid, notices an ATGM operator with the characteristic Javelin canister - that's it, consider him dead. The tank itself will hit it or they'll send some petty nasty thing - the result will be the same: the ATGM operator won't have time to cool the matrix, so he'll end up in heaven with an uncooled one (possibly).
The drone operator sits at a relatively safe distance, he does not need to see the target to aim at it, like an ATGM operator or a Su-25 pilot. Usually, a reconnaissance aircraft hangs at a high altitude and transmits a picture of the area, and the killers follow his data.
And unlike a missile, a UAV can repeat the approach if something goes wrong. In general, different UAVs can be used in different ways. There are devices that can bring missiles to the launch range and illuminate targets with a laser.
And without human losses.
And when an ordinary modified household drone costing $1000 easily destroys a tank or, even worse, an air defense system costing millions of these same dollars, then there is a feeling of some kind of universal injustice: people developed, tested, and perfected a real combat vehicle, and then a buzzer assembled in a garage with an RPG-7 munition suspended on it simply reduces all their efforts to scrap metal.
That's all true, but we're talking about planes and helicopters, aren't we?
Helicopter. It is still a very useful character in the frontline: it can quickly throw ammunition into the encirclement or behind the front line, take out the wounded, bring in fresh fighters, move the sabotage and reconnaissance group, and so on. The anti-tank and combat role in general is increasingly questionable. The battlefield is now too saturated with weapons systems that can turn a helicopter into a pile of junk: MANPADS, ATGMs, large-caliber machine guns and small-caliber cannons - all of this, in addition to the SAMs, for which the helicopter is also a tasty target, can disable the helicopter.
And the FPV drone can light up the helicopter's body, and the speed to catch up and the altitude will be enough. Well, the helicopter won't climb high today. Above 1000 meters is already mortally dangerous.
But the main thing is that chasing tanks, infantry fighting vehicles/armored personnel carriers and other means of delivering anything is much more efficient and cheaper using drones.
"Vikhr", which is 9M-127-1, is a great missile! It flies 10 km in 28 seconds, can rise to a height of 4 km and hit someone there with a cumulative charge, penetrates 1000 mm of homogeneous armor, in general, it is much better than their "Hellfire", and, according to the assurances of the Tula gunsmiths, there is room for development.
I don't know how much one 9M-127-1 missile costs, but it's much more than a battery-powered ground beetle with an RPG-7 warhead attached with electrical tape. But the essence is the same.
Besides, this unhealthy excitement at the front, when they detect the roar and whistle of the blades, with the words "now we'll get them", unsheathing the MANPADS and gently stroking the tanks with liquid nitrogen - it forces the helicopters to work either at very low altitudes at night, or at a distance from the zone of possible destruction. Well, and I have already spoken about the effectiveness of launching a pack of NURS with a pitch-up "there".
The helicopter's biggest problem is its relatively low speed, which prevents it from properly maneuvering to evade enemy weapons.
It's a bit easier for a Su-25-type aircraft: more powerful engines provide higher speed and allow for more active maneuvering. But that's at, let's say, normal altitudes. And there are enemy aircraft and air defense systems. The same set of problems as a helicopter.
On the ultra-small ones, it's all the same. And even the "flying tank" of the attack aircraft, despite its armor, has problems above the keel.
And all this ends with one thing: losses in crews and combat vehicles. Yes, it would be nice to provide statistics on losses here, maybe not ours, which we don’t have, but the ones the British keep, but here you understand, all this is a lie and discreditation with all the consequences. Therefore, let’s just say this: given the current situation with personnel, the losses could become critical in terms of their replenishment.
And why not?
And because, if you look at the official website of the Ministry of Defense, military pilots in Russia are trained by only one educational institution - the Military Educational and Scientific Center (VUNC) of the Air Force "Air Force Academy named after Professor N. E. Zhukovsky and Yu. A. Gagarin", located in Voronezh.
Of course, not everything is so sad and clear-cut, because VUNTS also has branch faculties, where they train flight personnel, who never show their noses in Voronezh because they are completely unnecessary. It is a pity, of course, that once full-fledged schools with a glorious history have shrunk to the size of faculties, but at least something and somewhere:
- Fighter pilots are trained in Armavir;
- in Borisoglebsk – attack aircraft and bombers;
- in Balashov – crews of long-range and transport aviation;
- in Chelyabinsk – navigators;
- in Syzran – helicopter pilots;
- in Krasnodar – managers;
- in Voronezh – airfield specialists and aircraft technicians.
Does VUNC graduate enough personnel? Let's leave this question aside. We can only note that, for example, ChVAKUSH plans to recruit 500 people every year, another question is how many it recruits and how many reach graduation. It has long been known that we have so-so personnel for aviation. The matter is both in the somewhat complicated attitude towards the army as a whole, and in the fact that the people have not gone for health reasons in the majority.
That is, every pilot who is trained and experienced is worth his weight in diamonds. Gold can no longer be a measure, so to speak, due to its low cost. Therefore, if it is really possible to replace attack aircraft and helicopter pilots with the help of drone operators and destroy enemy armored vehicles as is happening now, it must be done.
Each Ka-52 helicopter costs the budget 21 million dollars. How many tanks can a Ka-52 destroy is a question, because everyone understands perfectly well that it may not have time to destroy even one, depending on how things go.
"Lancet", which is great at gutting European tanks, costs $35. That is, instead of one helicopter, you can order 000 "Lancets". Let's take it broadly and from the lordly shoulder that to destroy one "Leopard-600" you need 2 "Lancets". Misses, work EW enemy, breakdowns and everything else. 10 per tank. That is, with such a set you can take out 60 tanks. "Leo-2" costs from 4 to 10 million dollars depending on the modification and configuration. Let's take the average - 6 million.
That is, for the price of one Ka-52, you can knock out 60 tanks, the cost of which will be 360 million dollars.
Will one Ka-52, even taking into account that it is the best attack helicopter in the world, be able to score so many? No. Even the Americans couldn't do that, although they beat Iraq's tank divisions to the punch.
It must be recognized that forward support aviation requires a complete revision of the concept of its use in light of recent changes on the battlefield.
Both attack aircraft and fire support helicopters can no longer be used in the same way as they were just 10 years ago. More precisely, they can, but this leads to losses of both equipment and crews.
In fact, the Su-25 has already been sentenced: it is being replaced by the Su-34, which can iron out the enemy's front line of defense, but do so from absolutely safe distances. And the UMPKs will be more accurate than the Su-25's NURS and bombs, everyone understands that.
And with the use of helicopters, the generals will have to rack their brains. However, conflicts on our planet are not always caused by the dense use of Defense, so the "turntables" will have work. Just reconsider their use.
But what else should we do if cheap drones are actually more effective in terms of combating enemy equipment than multi-million dollar flying combat vehicles?
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