Battles of the Momysh Uly battalion in the area of ​​Matrenino station on November 17 and 18, 1941.

November 17 1941 city

The events that took place on this day at the defensive line of Goryuny, Matrenino station, elevation 231,5, are very poorly covered in the Red Army documents, and in the OS of the headquarters of the 316th rifle division [18] they fit into a couple of lines: “1/1073 – occupies the previous position. At 15.50 the enemy bombed the location of the 1/1073rd rifle regiment.”

The 1st Guards Tank Brigade database as of 11:50 on 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX also does not contain information about combat clashes, but it does indicate in great detail where the brigade units were holding the line:

It follows from the document that the positions of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade and the 27th Tank Brigade were in the same locations as the positions of the 1/1073rd Rifle Regiment, i.e. from 17.11 Momysh-Uly's battalion was not defending the occupied area alone. But for some reason, the documents lack information about the previously agreed upon interaction of the battalion with its neighbors or even about the establishment of "elbow communication" between them.

By the end of the day on November 17.11, Momysh Uly reported to the commander of the 316th rifle division [19]:

“…2. 17.30 mark 231,5. 2nd rifle company entered into battle with enemy infantry with one a tank. The enemy's attack was repelled, the enemy fled, leaving behind one vehicle (a briefcase with documents, a fireproof box), one tractor, one anti-tank gun on the battlefield. The trophies (vehicle, tractor, gun) are in full working order...".

Most likely, some spontaneously formed rear column of the enemy, not ready for battle, which was moving from Morozovo to Ivantsovo and missed the necessary turn to the right, accidentally stumbled upon the position at mark 231,5.

The following information was available in the OS of the 16th Army headquarters as of 24.00:17.11.41 on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX:

“…23.30 – up to two companies with tanks tried to attack the MATRENINO station, with a counterattack by the 1/1073rd Rifle Regiment and a motorized infantry company of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, the enemy was crushed and fled, leaving on the battlefield: 1 vehicle, a fireproof box with documents, 1 tractor, 1 anti-tank gun and much more weapons. Two enemy tanks were destroyed…”.

It is quite obvious that the same combat episode is described here, however, as often happened, “the dog had time to grow up during the journey”: two destroyed tanks were added to the trophies of the 2nd SR, and a company of motorized infantry from the 1st Guards Tank Brigade was mistakenly “included” in the battle.

Thus, the fleeting skirmish turned into a loud battle and in this form “went” to the headquarters of the Western Front.

By the end of that day, Momysh-uly wrote to the commander of the 316th SD with the following proposal [19]:

"...At the 231,5 mark there is a battalion of the 23rd motorized mechanized brigade with tanks. I consider it advisable to remove the 2nd company from the 231,5 mark and use it to strengthen the defense of Goryuny. I await your orders...".

There is an error in the text; it is about the 27th Tank Brigade, which, with five T-60 tanks and one T-34, and having its own motorized rifle battalion as infantry, took up positions in the area of ​​mark 13 at 00:17.11 on 231,5, with the task of destroying approaching enemy tanks from ambush [22].

It is also possible to clarify the situation by studying the enemy's documents.

As noted above, on November 15–16 the German command regrouped. The 5th Panzer Division, which had been operating in the area, had moved east by the end of the day on November 15.11, and on November 2 the 16.11nd Panzer Division broke through the battle lines of the 1075th Rifle Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 1073rd Rifle Regiment and eventually reached the north of the Volokolamsk Highway in the Lyscevo, Rozhdestveno area [9], [12]. Where it continued its offensive on November 17.11, operating north of the highway [20].

And by the end of the day on 2/16.11, the 11th Tank Division had arrived in the Shitkovo, Vasilyevskoye concentration area previously occupied by the 17.11nd Tank Division, and at the beginning of daylight on 21/XNUMX, it went on the offensive along the Morozovo, Ivantsovo axis [XNUMX].

The 11th TD's combat log describes the actions of the division's combat groups on 17.11 as follows:

"...At 10.30, the Fricke battle group together with II./SR111 went on the offensive on a broad front, overcame Lama. After a short, heavy battle with the enemy defending well-fortified positions, the village of Morozovo was taken at 13.00, and at 15.20, also after a heavy battle, Ivankovo.
The division commander, who is in the combat formations of the Fricke group, sends K.61 to Danilkovo. The battalion crosses Lama at 12.00:14 and before sunset, together with the 5nd Battalion SRXNUMX (XNUMX Pz.D.), which has already arrived in this village, fights the stubbornly defending enemy in Kopytovo and the forest to the south.
SR110 together with the remnants of the tank regiment and artillery arrives late in the evening in the area east of Spasskoye. Due to icy roads and difficult marching conditions, only a small number of SR110s can be brought into action..."

It should be noted here that the terrain in this area is complex: numerous streams, ravines, swamps, heights, and all of this is also overgrown with forest. And the German tanks had mediocre cross-country ability, which forced the enemy combat groups to stick to the roads and the adjacent strip when developing the offensive.

Apparently, BG Fricke, having begun the offensive from Shitkovo, then proceeded along the road to Morozovo, and after its capture, again using several dirt roads, turned east and captured Ivantsovo. These villages were defended by units of the 50th Cavalry Division, and its documents confirm the information provided in the ZhBD of the 11th Tank Division.

As a result, on November 17.11, the offensive of the 11th TD stopped on the left flank in the village of Ivatsovo, and on the right in the vicinity of the village of Kopytsevo, which had not yet been captured by the Germans.

Thus, the information contained in the documents of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht is completely consistent with each other, allows us to weed out erroneous data and ultimately makes it possible to draw a completely objective conclusion: on 17.11.41, the 1/1073rd Rifle Regiment (like the other units of the 16th Army, located in the area of ​​Goryuny, Matrenino station, mark 231,5) did not engage in heavy fighting with the enemy and had no losses. And they could use the lull to strengthen their positions.

November 18 1941 city

There are few documents that allow us to reconstruct the events that took place on 18.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX in the area under study, so I consider it necessary to present their contents in full and then compare the information contained in them.

In his report [7] Momysh uly reports:

"4. On November 18.11.41, 9.00, at 9.30:3 a.m., GORUNY was subjected to intense mortar shelling. At 50:300 a.m., the enemy, up to an infantry company with 1 tanks on the shoulders of the retreating units of the 2th Cavalry Division, from the village of MATRENINO raided my command post /a separate house located 231,5 meters east of the ANINO siding/. The command post was fired upon point-blank by tanks, the raid was repelled by flanking fire from a heavy machine gun under the command of Junior Political Instructor BOGDANOV and Junior Captain Comrade GORELINOV. The enemy, having suppressed the command post and heavy machine gun, 11.00 anti-tank gun under the (inaudible) 2nd rifle company, which had arrived by that time /from mark 12.00/, retreated to the southeast. At 5:763 the situation was restored, the 2nd rifle company took up defensive positions at the ANINO siding and the highway. At 3:1 the enemy, up to an infantry battalion, a company of machine gunners with 8 tanks, launched an offensive on GORYUNY from the east, northeast. The gun of the 2rd artillery regiment that had arrived was suppressed while it was being established in position. The XNUMXnd and XNUMXrd rifle companies stubbornly held their positions, repeatedly counterattacking the enemy infantry. The battle was fierce, both sides suffered heavy losses. I asked for help three times from the commander of the XNUMXst tank brigade group /lieutenant colonel, I don’t know his last name/, who was in the area of ​​the MATRENINA station with XNUMX tanks and XNUMX motorized infantry battalions. The tank commander. The group refused to help, citing that his light and medium tanks could not fight the enemy’s heavy tanks /“You hold on, and we’ll knock them out in the evening,” he told my liaison delegate, political instructor Comrade TOLSTUNOV/.

The battle lasted until 17.00:3. The enemy, having the upper hand, surrounded the 2rd rifle company, drove the 2nd rifle company out of its position /it had not yet managed to dig in/ and attacked GORYUNY with 2 columns, where my new command post with 2 tanks was located, as a result the enemy captured GORYUNY, cutting off my rear and the 3nd rifle company. The enemy lost 200 tanks /knocked out by our fighters/, the losses of manpower on both sides cannot be calculated, but approximately the enemy lost up to 100 soldiers and officers, I lost 150-XNUMX people.

5. On 19.11.41 at 5.00:1 the commander of the group of the XNUMXst tank brigade, lieutenant colonel, called me to him and said, “I am leaving the encirclement, you also need to get to your own people, I called you to warn you about this…”

(the following are details of the exit from the encirclement, reprinted verbatim with the original punctuation preserved).
Another document has been preserved: a diagram drawn up on 20.11.41 by the 1st adjutant of the headquarters of the 1/1073rd regiment, senior lieutenant Rakhimov:

If we assume that the situation that developed on the morning of 18.11 is depicted on it, it turns out that one platoon, reinforced by a gun, is located on the height 298,0 with a front to the north, another is on the northern outskirts of Goryuny, one of the companies defends the southern outskirts of Goryuny with a front to the south, and one platoon is on the northern side of the railway east of Goryuny. Further we see the battalion headquarters command post, which covers the combat outpost deployed to the south, and behind it the company is deployed with a front to the southeast.

The enemy strikes from the south and from the east, first at the command post, and then at Goryuny, at the right flank of the 3rd Sr.’s defense.
The enemy document [21] describes the events more briefly:

"18.11. The Fricke battle group with the left flank battalion goes on the offensive at 7.30. At 8.45, Matresino is taken. From here, at 10.45, tanks break through to the highway and block it. The weakened rifle battalion that remained in security in Ivantsovo and Matresino advances on the village of Goryuny on the highway from 14.45 and captures it by 16.00, after which it organizes a circular defense here. In the evening and at night, several attempts by individual cut-off enemy tanks to break through from west to east are successfully repelled, with several tanks destroyed."

(Matresino refers to the village of Matrenino, the time indicated is Berlin time).

The enemy also retained the battle plan for November 17-18.11:

It follows from it that on 18.11 the area of ​​the Matrenino station, mark 231,5, was outside the enemy's offensive zone, and the Red Army soldiers who were there on the defensive (1 medium tank of the 1/1073rd regiment and 6 tanks of the 27th tank brigade with the motorized rifle battalion "sitting" in ambushes) did not participate in the battles of the day - the Germans bypassed their positions to the east, and by the end of the day the Red Army soldiers were surrounded.

Comparison of the information presented in the above documents allows us to construct the following version.

17.11 Momysh-uly, fearing another enemy air raid, decided to move his command post to a safer (as he thought) place near the Annino junction. And as a result, on the morning of 18.11 he found himself on the left flank of the offensive line of tanks and motorized infantry of BG Fricke, which drove the Red Army soldiers from their positions and consolidated their positions in the Annino junction area.

In the afternoon (after 15:45), the positions of the 1/1073rd Rifle Regiment near Goryuny were attacked by a weakened enemy rifle battalion, and as a result, by 17:00 Goryuny was captured by the enemy [7], [21].

Apparently, then the remnants of the 3rd SR together with the battalion headquarters retreated west to the Matrenino station, after which the battalion commander had only two options: 2) take up all-round defense, and then die an honorable, but completely senseless death of the brave; 1) leave the position at the station and lead the remnants of the people out of the encirclement, breaking through to the east.

Of stories war, it is known that Momysh Uly chose option 2 and did the right thing – as a result, he saved his own and others’ lives, which allowed the division command to use the remnants of the battalion in subsequent battles.

And the unnamed lieutenant colonel from the battalion commander’s report, who refused to support the companies of the 1/1073rd regiment, was most likely the commander of the 27th tank brigade, Fyodor Mikhailovich Mikhailin, who was in the area of ​​mark 18 on November 19 and 231,5 and personally commanded his men [22].

An excerpt from the 11th TD’s combat log, “In the evening and at night, several attempts by individual cut-off enemy tanks to break through from west to east were successfully repelled, with several tanks destroyed,” apparently recorded an attempt by two tanks from Burda’s group to break through. The former commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, M.E. Katukov, recalled after the war that while attempting to break out of the encirclement through Goryuny, the T-34 tanks of Senior Lieutenant A.F. Burda and Lieutenant S.S. Ivchenko were hit and caught fire. Burda’s crew managed to abandon the tank, but Ivchenko was killed [23]. It will no longer be possible to establish whether this recollection is reliable…

I think it would be interesting to consider the issue of the losses of the Momysh-uly battalion for the period from November 16 to 19.

Unfortunately, the published documents do not provide a direct answer to this question, so we again have to grope our way to the truth by constructing hypotheses.

As of 2.11.41, the 1073rd Rifle Regiment had 1416 men [24]. But we are interested in the number of combat personnel - rifle battalions. It is well known that during combat operations they (compared to other units) suffered the greatest losses, so with the arrival of marching reinforcements, their composition was restored first. Consequently, it is quite reasonable to assume that on 2.11.41, the 1073rd Rifle Regiment had at least 800 "active bayonets".

This number allowed the division command to form either three incapacitated battalions or two combat-ready ones. Since it follows from the documents that by 16.11 the regiment had only two battalions, it turns out that the command of the 316th RD chose the second option, already knowing from experience that in a tense combat situation the demands on an incapacitated battalion are the same as on a combat-ready one, so it would be better to have two of them. Consequently, most likely, on 16.11 there were about 400 people in Momysh-Uly's battalion.

There is information that by the end of the day on November 19.11, only 1973 people remained in the entire 200rd regiment [25], and by the end of the day on November 20.11, there were already 300 (there were no losses in the regiment on this day) [26].

Let's assume that the losses of the 1st and 2nd battalions during this period were approximately the same, and the increase of 100 people occurred thanks to the Red Army soldiers of the battalions who managed to break out of the encirclement (there is also the option of the arrival of marching reinforcements). Then it turns out that by the end of the day on 20.11 the number of 1/1073 Rifle Regiment was about 150 people. Consequently, in 2 days of fighting (16 and 19 November) and during the breakout from the encirclement, Momysh-uly's battalion lost about 250 people (63% of the original composition).

This is the sad statistics...

In the following days, this practically incapable regiment continued to fight hard, retreated, was partially replenished, then retreated again, suffering heavy losses. And in the end, thanks to the greatest fortitude, courage and heroism shown by the soldiers and commanders, it slowed down the pace of the German offensive, inflicted significant losses on the enemy and stopped it near the village of Kryukovo (now a district of the city of Zelenograd), preventing Moscow from being surrounded.
But this stage of the glorious combat path of the 1073rd infantry regiment requires a separate story...

Sources:

[1] OS headquarters 316 SD No. 33 01.11.41.
[2] Staff No. 04/601 of the Rifle Regiment of the reduced rifle division.
[3] Report map of the Western Front headquarters from 11.11 to 15.11.41.
[4] Combat report of the headquarters of the 43rd Cavalry Regiment no. 15.11.41/14.15/XNUMX to XNUMX:XNUMX.
[5] OS headquarters 316 SD No. 58 15.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
[6] DB of headquarters 1075 joint venture No. 17 15.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
[7] Report from the commander of the 1/1073rd joint venture B. Momysh-uly to the commander of the 8th Guards. SD 20.11.41.
[8] Instructions for the use of combat groups of the Operational Department of the 2nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht from 13.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
[9] ZhBD 2nd TD Wehrmacht entry for 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
[10] Order of the operational department of the 2nd rifle brigade of the 2nd tank division of the Wehrmacht from 15.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
[11] BD No. 22 of the headquarters of the 316th rifle division 16.11.41/13.00/XNUMX at XNUMX:XNUMX.
[12] ZhBD 2nd rifle regiment 2nd tank division of the Wehrmacht, entry for 16.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
[13] BD 50 cd No. 154 16.11.41/9/40 at XNUMX:XNUMX a.m.
[14] BD of the headquarters of the cavalry group Dovator No. 79 16.11.41/19.00/XNUMX at XNUMX:XNUMX.
[15] OS of the 16th Army Headquarters No. 51 17.11.41/5.00/XNUMX at XNUMX:XNUMX.
[16] OS of the headquarters of the 1073rd regiment No. 83 18.11.41/23.00/XNUMX at XNUMX:XNUMX p.m.
[17] Combat order of the headquarters of the cavalry group Dovator No. 29 16.11.41/19.00/XNUMX XNUMX:XNUMX.
[18] OS of the headquarters of the 316th rifle division No. 60 by 20.00 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX
[19] BD of the commander of the 1/1073rd regiment 17.11.41/18.00/XNUMX no number presumably after XNUMX:XNUMX.
[20] ZhBD 2nd TD Wehrmacht entry for 17.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
[21] ZhBD 11 TD Wehrmacht records for 17-18.11.41.
[22] BD of the headquarters of the 27th tank brigade No. 013 19.11.41/14.00/XNUMX at XNUMX:XNUMX.
[23] M.E. Katukov. At the forefront of the main blow.
[24] BD No. 19 of the headquarters of the 316th rifle division 2.11.41/19.00/XNUMX at XNUMX:XNUMX.
[25] BD No. 25 of the headquarters of the 316th rifle division 19.11.41/20.00/XNUMX at XNUMX:XNUMX.
[26] OS No. 62 of the headquarters of the 316th rifle division 20.11.41/24.00/XNUMX at XNUMX:XNUMX.

Comments

[Lech from Android.]

Thanks to the author for the article with documentary evidence.
It was the hardest time for the country... the Red Army's regular army was exhausted by heavy losses in border battles and could not stop the enemy until Moscow itself... while our people and state were gathering reserves from their depths.
I have reread Momysh-uly's memoirs several times... the descriptions of his battalion's defensive battles while surrounded are very impressive... he was a strong-willed commander.

[Lewww]

The beginning of the article is published here:
https://topwar.ru/253613-boi-batalona-momysh-uly-v-rajone-stancii-matrenino-16111941.html

[Konnick]

The question arises, why didn't the commander of the 16th Army give orders? Why was there no interaction between units and formations? It seems that Rokossovsky covered up his weak command with the exploits of Panfilov's men and became infallible.
Why is there not a single monument to the south, in the area of ​​today's Novaya Riga highway, between Padikovo and Zakharovo, where the Germans were stopped? There is a huge monument near Dubosekovo... and where the trenches on Novaya Riga were, which were still visible 10 years ago, there is now a shopping center... a mass grave with 1000 soldiers, most of whom are unknown, is hidden in a small forest near the cottage village of Knyazhye Ozero.
Why does everyone know about the feat of the Podolsk cadets and almost no one knows about the battles between Padikovo and Zakharovo where the 37th separate brigade of cadets from the Central Asian schools fought heroically? Why is the feat of the cadet regiment of the Supreme Council School, which held the line in the October battles at the junction between the Panfilov Division and the Dovator Division, almost unknown? Maybe that's enough about the Panfilovites

[Olgovich]

Quote: Konnick

The question arises, why didn't the commander of the 16th Army give orders? Why was there no interaction between units and formations? It seems that Rokossovsky covered up his weak command with the exploits of Panfilov's men and became infallible.

The question is, why not read Rokossovsky's "Soldier's Duty" so as not to have such "impressions"?
It describes in detail the activities of the 16th Army since mid-October.
And at the time described in the article, this was the attack of the 16th Army on Skirmanovo, on Volokolamsk, the attack of Beloborodov, a successful defense against the newly launched offensive with maneuvers of artillery, cavalry, sappers and infantry with the overwhelming advantage of the enemy.

If the leadership had been weak, the Nazis would have been in Moscow.

Rokossovsky gave a brilliant characterization to the Kursan regiment

[Konnick]

The question is, why not read Rokossovsky's "Soldier's Duty" so as not to have such "impressions"?

If you had read the first part with comments, then you wouldn't have given this advice.

[Konnick]

Rokossovsky gave a brilliant characterization to the Kursan regiment

I'm not interested in Rokossovsky's assessment, I'm interested in the fact that everyone is fixated on Panfilov's men, who were promoted in the press without any measure. You'd better read about the defense of Moscow by Lelyushenko, he was the one who commanded the neighboring 5th and then the 30th armies.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Konnick

I'm not interested in Rokossovsky's assessment

how is that? you wrote it yourself:

Quote: Konnick

Why the feat of the cadet regiment of the Supreme Council School is almost unknown

It was precisely about these cadets that Rokossovsky wrote several times

Quote: Konnick

about the defense of Moscow at Lelyushenko, it was he who commanded the neighboring 5th, and then 30th armies

Yes please:

The units of the 30th Army that were attacked by the Germans were the 107th Division, numbering about three hundred men, and the 58th Tank Division, which had no tanks. were thrown back and scattered.
In connection with the breakthrough of the defense in the area of ​​the 30th Army and the retreat of units of the 5th Army, the troops of the 16th Army, fighting for every meter, were pushed back to Moscow in fierce battles along the line: north of Krasnaya Polyana, Kryukovo, Istra, and on this line in fierce battles they finally stopped the German offensive,

[Konnick]

how is that? you wrote it yourself:

Enough of the distortion. And why cite the events of October when we are talking about mid-November

[Olgovich]

Quote: Konnick

And why cite events from October when we are talking about mid-November?

November and there is - see Soldier's debt.

[Lewww]

I'm not interested in Rokossovsky's assessment, I'm interested in the fact that everyone is fixated on the Panfilovites, who have been promoted in the press without any measure.

Well, the division was “promoted” in Soviet historiography for good reason.
As far as I remember, this was the first of the divisions participating in the Battle of Moscow to receive the title of Guards.
The 316th Infantry Division also disrupted the plans and timing of the German offensive on Moscow in the Volokolamsk direction, which is no small feat.
And in addition, the battle at Dubosekovo, for which 28 Panfilov men received the GSS.

[Konnick]

Well, the division was “promoted” in Soviet historiography for good reason.

All of them were justified. Especially the 12 divisions of the People's Militia, which fought better than the divisions of Lukin and Rokossovsky and fought their way out of the Vyazemsky encirclement, from where Rokossovsky escaped with his staff, and Lukin surrendered. Well, you continue to spin these stories about the saviors from the 316th division. They were saved by tanks of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, 8th Tank Brigade, 22nd Tank Brigade and 27th Tank Brigade, and the Moscow Air Defense Aviation played a particularly important role, not only landing the German pilots, but also attacking the tank columns.

[Lewww]

Well, you continue to spin these stories about the saviors from the 316th division.

I am not promoting anything - the material has accumulated, I have analyzed it and put forward my version of the development of events, without insisting on its absolute chronological accuracy.
And if you complain that some other military units that defended Moscow are deprived of domestic historiography, collect the material and publish your essay about them.

[gsev]

Quote: Konnick

All of them were justified. Especially the 12 divisions of the People's Militia, which fought better than the divisions of Lukin and Rokossovsky and fought their way out of the Vyazemsky encirclement,

In Moscow, 16 divisions of the People's Militia were formed. These formations were poorly armed and poorly trained. Often, they simply mobilized the sick and disabled. For example, information about the fate of the 13th division of the People's Militia was classified until the mid-1990s due to its failures. The highest-ranking communist Zhilenkov went to serve Hitler in the ROA after he surrendered as an officer. It was he who was entrusted with the formation of the 13th Rostokinskaya division of the people's militia. By October 13, the 13th division of the people's militia had lost 95% of its personnel. It should be remembered that fighting against the Germans in 1941 was the hardest of all. All the famous military leaders of the Red Army experienced the bitterness of heavy defeats in 1941. Lukin, and accordingly him and his troops, fought quite successfully in Ukraine and near Smolensk. When the British were deciding on the extent of cooperation with the USSR in the war, they received assurances from Stalin that the Germans would be stopped west of Kyiv and Smolensk. Lukin allowed Stalin to demonstrate that the Red Army was resolutely fighting for Smolensk during the negotiations.

[Mazunga]

once my native region))) studied for a year in Rostokino

[Konnick]

The people's militia division had lost 13% of its personnel by October 95

But they didn't give up. And Zhilenkov shouldn't be brought into this.

[gsev]

Quote: Konnick

But they didn't give up. And Zhilenkov shouldn't be brought into this.

But did they fight better than Lukin's 2 divisions near Smolensk? My uncle died near Smolensk at the Solovyova crossing. In a letter from his unit received before his death it was written that he had knocked out 4 German tanks. I was simply shocked that Lukin's divisions, which for the first time prevented the Wehrmacht from realizing its military plans, were rated lower than the militia divisions that were routed within a few days.

[Konnick]

There were other army commanders, but they were underestimated compared to Rokossovsky and his Panfilovs and Dovatorites. He invited the necessary journalists.
But from Lelyushenko's memoirs, a much tougher fight went completely unnoticed by journalists.

No sooner had I got to know the staff at the headquarters than I had to act. The commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General P. S. Ivanov called and said:

- After the strike of 22 bombers, the enemy with 55 tanks and infantry supported by artillery broke through the defense on the left flank of the division, 6 km west of Spas-Zaulka. I am bringing in a reserve - two dismounted squadrons with six guns. Please help with aircraft and tanks.

- Comrade Ivanov, stop the enemy at any cost. Let's take action!

The reserve of the army commander was sent to his aid - the 46th motorcycle regiment and 9 guns. The result was not slow to show itself - the enemy was stopped.

So...everyday...9 forty-fives...55 tanks

[Lewww]

But from Lelyushenko's memoirs, a much tougher fight went completely unnoticed by journalists.
So...everyday...9 forty-fives...55 tanks

Colleague, I don’t want to upset you, but usually memoirs and other recollections of veterans in terms of accuracy and reliability occupy an honorable second to last place.
Below them are only newspaper articles.
All this needs to be carefully checked and not taken at face value as an absolute truth.

[Lewww]

The question arises, why didn't the commander of the 16th Army give orders? Why was there no interaction between units and formations? It seems that Rokossovsky covered up his weak command with the exploits of Panfilov's men and became infallible.

In those days, Rokossovsky's head was occupied with the completely unnecessary offensive that his army had launched on the right flank on November 16.11, on Zhukov's orders.
And it can’t be said that he didn’t control the situation on the left flank - he did allocate tanks to help the 316th rifle division and Dovator’s cavalry group.

[Konnick]

Rokossovsky was at Panfilov's observation post on November 16

[Lewww]

In which CA document is this recorded?

[Konnick]

In which CA document is this recorded?

In Rokossovsky's "Soldier's Duty".

After some time, tanks rushed at us, accompanied by dense chains of machine gunners. They acted in groups of 15-30 vehicles. Lobachev and I observed this whole picture from the observation post of the commander of the 316th division, General Panfilov.

It was on this day that twenty-eight heroes from the Panfilov division, led by political instructor Vasily Klochkov, performed their world-famous feat at the Dubosekovo junction. His words “Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat - behind Moscow” spread throughout the country and the army.

Rokossovsky is one of the authors of the mythical battle 28

[Lewww]

In which CA document is this recorded?

In Rokossovsky's "Soldier's Duty".

Since when did memoirs become a CA document?
I think Rokossovsky should have been at headquarters on 16.11 and led the offensive operation that had begun on the 16th Army.

Rokossovsky is one of the authors of the mythical battle 28

Every memoirist who participated in the battles in the Volokolamsk direction considered it necessary to mention this battle. Moreover, to mention it, presenting the details with the confidence of an eyewitness.
This was one of the glorious Soviet traditions.

[Konnick]

every memoirist who took part in the battles in the Volokolamsk direction.

For some reason, Zhukov did not mention the 28 Panfilov men, but noted Katukov's brigade, unlike Rokossovsky

[Seal]

Quote: Konnick

Rokossovsky is one of the authors of the mythical battle 28

Konstantin Konstantinovich was lucky that Colonel L.I. Brezhnev did not end up in his army. Otherwise, Konstantin Konstantinovich would have had to see not only dense groups of tanks of 15-30 pieces, but also how Colonel Brezhnev reads political information to grenade launcher soldiers while they, having thrown some grenades, prepare to throw others.

[gsev]

Quote: Seal

Konstantin Konstantinovich was lucky that Colonel L.I. Brezhnev did not end up in his army.

I had a history teacher at school who was a dyed-in-the-wool Stalinist. In 1977, he complained in class that Rokossovsky and especially Zhukov wrote memoirs that were not entirely correct. He did not directly call them anti-Soviet, but he noted that what was written in their memoirs was not entirely Soviet.

[Konnick]

In those days, Rokossovsky's head was occupied with the completely unnecessary offensive that his army had launched on the right flank on November 16.11, on Zhukov's orders.

This counterattack ended on November 15.

[Lewww]

It could not have ended on 15.11, since in the second half of that day the headquarters of the 16th Army had only just begun to develop a plan for the offensive, which began on the morning of 16.11.
You are confusing it with the operation to liberate the Skirmanovsky Heights area (Volokolamsk operation) that began on 4.11.

[Konnick]

Then what kind of attack is this? You've got me intrigued.

[Lewww]

The offensive on Volokolamsk, which began on 16.11

On the night of November 16, the 16th Army made a partial regrouping and went on the offensive at 10 a.m. In turn, the enemy decided on the morning of November 16 to attack the left flank troops of the 16th Army with forces of more than two infantry regiments with tanks (5th Tank Division). The Nazis advanced at the junction between the 316th Infantry Division and Dovator’s cavalry group and began to press back our units. The offensive of both sides developed simultaneously on opposite flanks.

[Seal]

Quote: Konnick

This counterattack ended on November 15.

However, the Western Front Combat Journal noted...

[Konnick]

However, the Western Front Combat Journal noted...

Well, this is a valid reason for Rokossovsky not to command his troops, but to "prepare an offensive at headquarters," as the author of the article put it.

In those days, Rokossovsky's head was occupied with the completely unnecessary offensive that his army had launched on the right flank on November 16.11, on Zhukov's orders.

His armies...i.e. parts of Dovator's group...and that's all

[Seal]

Quote: Konnick

Why is the feat of the cadet regiment of the Supreme Council School, which held the line in the October battles at the junction between the Panfilov Division and the Dovator Division, almost unknown?

But this is strange. Since in the Journal of Combat Operations of the Western Front the cadet regiment is mentioned separately, in the list of information about combat operations of the army divisions. And on November 15, 1941, the description of the combat operations of the 16th Army begins with the description of the combat operations of the Cadet Regiment.

[Konnick]

This is strange.

That's right, in all military documents they are heroes, but in literature there are only Panfilov's men.

[Seal]

Quote: Konnick

That's right, in all military documents they are heroes, but in literature there are only Panfilov's men.

All claims, as I believe, should be addressed to the then head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, right?

[Konnick]

I think the minusator is as always a bun crunch. If anyone read about the 46th MCR stopping 55 tanks, it was an everyday battle like many near Moscow, only journalists were afraid to go further than Rokossovsky's headquarters...
And my grandfather fought in the 46th motorcycle regiment.

[vovochkarzhevsky]

I wonder if rear-wheel drive strategists will ever run out? It's a shame that in reality they never commanded a platoon, but they can easily analyze mistakes at the level of at least a front commander.
True, if you put them in those conditions, everything will be leaked for sure. The enemy, he also won't react to the change in the situation and all the after-knowledge will go down the drain.

[PC]

He was a heroic man! Eternal glory! Eternal memory!

[Frank Muller]

A. Bek first told the Soviet people about the heroic personality of Bauyrzhan Momyshuly in his story "Volokolamsk Highway", written back in 1942-44 and almost documenting some episodes of the combat activities of the Panfilov Division during the most difficult time of the defensive battle for Moscow. Naturally, the book did not mention his pre-war army service and his combat path, which began in 1938 on Khasan. And the author could not have predicted the further military biography of the senior lieutenant - Panfilov's man, who then went through the war through the counteroffensive near Moscow, the Demyansk offensive operation and ended it with the defeat of the Kuryansk group. He entered the war as a senior lieutenant - battalion commander, and ended it as an actual division commander with the rank of colonel. And the fact that in the post-war period the aforementioned hero – Panfilov’s man – would become a fairly well-known Kazakh writer and translator, no one could have predicted. Probably not even he himself, who nevertheless left behind a multi-volume edition of his collected works. Of which, his book “Moscow is Behind Us” with his autograph is still kept in my library. As for the aforementioned “inconsistencies” in the combat reports of those who fought on the front lines and the real picture of the military operations, they pale in comparison to the monumental result of the battle that ended more than eighty years ago: “We defended Moscow and reached Berlin!”