Three questions to ATACMS
In fact, there are many additional questions to the array of information that has been thrown into the information space recently. Having read many opinions, having listened to Putin, one can conclude that not everything is so clear-cut. And here are several questions for the court on the merits, caused precisely by an attempt to understand what is happening.
I will immediately stipulate that I made no attempt to understand Zelensky's logic, that's why he is on the sidelines. In general, to understand the logic of a drug addict who is so eager to send the largest possible number of Ukrainians to the next world - you know, the old Germans could shed some light on what is happening, they had one historical a character who loved to shoot a funny guy in the vein and fight until the last German.
But we are not talking about drug addicts in power, we are talking about rocketsAlthough the inadequate Zelensky is also very much involved here, but first things first.
Question one: is this permission necessary at all?
In general, this show looked strange, as for more than a year the Ukrainians begged for permission to hit somewhere with a powerful American weapons. UAVs - not that, although, as we see from the reports, they can reach Izhevsk. S-200s were launched at one time (apparently, while they were still around), one of these missiles did not reach the airfield in Buturlinovka by two kilometers. Of course, when there is ATACMS and everything else, your little hands are itching.
What is the efficiency of ATACMS? Let's take it as an example simply because the algorithms of this tactical complex are known.
The main advantages of ATACMS are accuracy and efficiency. The missile flies very accurately, we have already assessed this. The launcher reaches its position, launches very quickly, rolls up and leaves. If there are no "eyes" hanging in the area of its exit, it is practically impossible to counteract.
But our Iskander works exactly the same way. One to one.
So, the ATACMS launcher moves into position. While the crew works with the launcher, the commander is engaged in a very important process: he determines the launcher coordinates with very high accuracy, up to hundredths of a degree. That is, he calculates "point A" from where the missile will fly.
Then the program sews the data into a file, and it flies off via satellite communication somewhere. And where? To where the file will be placed in a special program, which will set another "Point B" and connect these points with the rocket's route. And another file is sent via the same satellite channel to the launcher, which will be the flight mission for the rocket.
That is, I emphasize boldly: the target at which the missile will fly is not chosen at the launcher or even at the headquarters of the missile and artillery unit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The target is chosen where the flight mission is carried out. That is why ATACMS fly precisely and where they need to, and not where Zelensky would like.
So it is clear and understandable who is running the show. Not the Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen. The launch complex commander is solely engaged in determining the launcher's location and entering the completed flight mission into the rocket's computer. Oh, and he presses the red button.
In fact, the Ukrainians here are nothing more than service personnel. The actual launches are handled by completely different people in other places. And they do it really well, because in order for the flight mission to be dropped onto the Link 16 terminal in the HIMARS launcher in a few minutes, more than a dozen people must work hard.
Yes, I'll digress for a second, for air-launched cruise missiles like the Storm Shadow, everything is exactly the same, the only difference is that the carrier does not stand still, so everything is a little more complicated. But even there, the finish point is fixed tightly, and the missile can adjust its course using an inertial reference system, satellite signals, and a radar map of the route's terrain. Plus, the missile's computer has a radar or optical "portrait" of the target, which allows it not to miss and compensate for inaccurate entry into the missile's launch point or time spread in the event of an early or late exit to the point.
Well, in the case of the Ukrainian Su-24, which “can’t” do “Storm Shadow,” it is clear and understandable that the aircraft is simply a delivery vehicle, the data is entered on the ground, and then the missile’s computer itself handles the flight mission.
This is why the "Storms" were only good for use against stationary objects such as "factories".
And here it is worth emphasizing once again: Ukrainian servicemen do not have access to missile control systems. All target designation is carried out by NATO servicemen.
Why? You know, do you remember the old Soviet joke about the blue hands of the man who flew into space?
Yes, the same ATACMS has a defense system that does not allow a missile to be launched at the territory of a NATO country. Well, yes, and the Patriot has a friend-or-foe identification system, and an F-16-type aircraft has a responder... And did this really prevent the Ukrainian anti-aircraft gunners from shooting down their own F-16?
I will add one more interesting point, which, it would seem, has nothing to do with this topic, but...
A very interesting document was re-signed in Kyiv:
This is the so-called law on the decommissioning of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and the replacement of the Shelter facility with a modern and environmentally friendly safety system.
Yes, these are the first amendments to the law, new ones will be sent too, but the documents are not as important as the euros that came to Kyiv for the final and irrevocable destruction of power units 1 and 2.
And why should Europe spend millions of euros to destroy power units that could work? The third one was shut down in 2000 for absolutely no apparent reason. And here we need to look at the invisible reasons, namely, that RBMK-type power units are very well suited for producing “weapons-grade” plutonium. They call it “weapons-grade” to distinguish it from “reactor-grade”. In general, plutonium-239 is formed in any nuclear reactor running on natural or low-enriched uranium, which contains mainly the uranium-238 isotope, when it captures excess neutrons. But VVER-type reactors run on more enriched fuel, and a large number of plutonium-240 and 242 isotopes are formed there, which do not have a long half-life. But RBMK is more suitable for producing weapons-grade plutonium, even if it will have to be further enriched later.
There is only one conclusion: Europeans, alas, do not trust their Ukrainian brothers. A monkey with a nuclear landmine is not very pleasant. Especially with the cries of a "dirty" bomb and Zelensky's constant complaints about the "allies".
Today the enemy is Russia, but tomorrow, you know, it could be anyone. For example, a European country that did not provide shells.
I understand both the Europeans and the Americans perfectly well. That is why I understand why they do not allow the Ukrainian military to control the missiles. They can easily fly in the wrong direction. That is why the Ukrainian launch crews and the pilots of the aircraft carrying the American missiles are simply drivers and service personnel. Their job is to drive the vehicle to the position, take their own coordinates, transmit them to the control center, and when the flight mission is ready, press the "Start" button. The actual control of the target selection and preparation of the flight mission remains with NATO - most often American - servicemen.
If this is not NATO's participation in the conflict on the side of one of the participants, then I don't even know what to call participation in the conflict.
So the answer to the first question is rather rhetorical. Naturally, permission is necessary, but solely for the sake of Zelensky's political bubbles. It is not he who decides where to send the missiles (and, I suspect, when).
Question two: is it possible to do without NATO?
Theoretically, yes. But here we need to understand how the selection of data for flight missions occurs. Technically, it all starts with satellite reconnaissance.
In fact, the topic can be almost finished here: the orbital group of US military satellites has more than 400 devices, including several dozen reconnaissance ones. The European Union has about 150 of its own. Ukraine has none. It is clear that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are completely dependent on information coming from NATO.
But here's another difficulty: it's not enough to photograph some part of the earth's surface from a satellite; these images need to be processed to turn them into data that will be understandable to the rocket's control computers. That is, converting the image into a map that the rocket will fly along.
This "noble" business is carried out by a very small number of special centers, and, as you understand, there is not a single one on the territory of Ukraine. Probably, it is necessary to know the enemy by sight, and therefore here is a list of satellite information processing centers to support military operations:
USA - National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA);
France - Center d'Expertise de la Défense (CED);
UK - Defense Intelligence Organisation;
Belgium - NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) and Allied Command Operations (ACO);
Italy - Allied Joint Force Command.
These centers, linked together by top-secret and encrypted communication lines, process and analyze data to support military operations. Naturally, they are all involved in helping the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
These centers process not only satellite data in real time, they are happy to receive any intelligence information. The processed information becomes the basis for obtaining the exact coordinates of the target, and the coordinates are then used to send some type of weapon to them.
And here is the question: can't Ukrainian craftsmen use things like open data from Yandex Maps or Google Maps to obtain target coordinates, or use civil aviation flight data? aviation?
In general, it is possible. And, most likely, it is these coordinates that the structures of the Ukrainian Armed Forces use to send crowds drones daily to Russian territory. And the coordinates of an airfield, military plant or energy facility can be obtained and used in this way. But there is a small hitch here: two types of data cannot be found in these services.
First: operational data on troop groups and their movements, the presence of aircraft at airfields, ships at bases, and facilities DefenseSuch data changes quickly and needs to be processed quickly, but neither Yandex nor Google provide it.
Second: high-precision terrain profile data. In general, this is more necessary for drones and cruise missiles, because it is essentially a radar portrait of the terrain, without which the same cruise missile or drone flying along the route embedded in it can easily fly into some obstacle.
For example, in my city, these obstacles have repeatedly been high-rise new buildings, which drones “didn’t know about”, as a result of which they flew into residential buildings on the upper floors.
They say that such data is in the flight routes of civilian airliners, and the smart guys of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could take it from there, but civilian aircraft fly along specially designated corridors, and it is impossible for air defense forces to block them. EW In principle, it’s as easy as pie, because we know these corridors very well.
The algorithm is then simple: data on targets that can be hit is transmitted from data centers to Ukrainian military headquarters, where decisions are apparently made on which of the provided targets are worthy of attack. Then there are the little things left, like giving the order to deploy a specific HIMARS launcher to carry out the mission.
Yes, without NATO assistance, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will not be able to attack targets far from the front line. This is clear from where the Ukrainian Armed Forces receive data for missile and other strikes, as well as from who and where creates flight missions for missiles.
In general, permission to strike deep into Russia with all NATO missiles does not cause strong feelings, despite the fact that I live in that very "depth", which is quite achievable. And there is so much stuff lying around in the forest plantations here, fortunately, scrap metal methods are strictly prohibited from accepting drones. By the way, there have been quite a few precedents performed by young people.
The third and final question: what will they hit with?
There is some kind of chaos and complete confusion in the media here. I will allow myself to quote from one very well-known media outlet:
"First of all, we are talking about the American ATACMS ballistic missiles (range 300 km), the American JASSM cruise missiles (370 km), the British Storm Shadow cruise missiles and their French version SCALP-EG (both up to 560 km). Although both the British and French leadership currently deny this possibility, it is still worth considering."
This looks more like panic, to be honest.
The Americans have given Kyiv the MGM-140A ATACMS Block 1. The range is 165 km, and these missiles do not require satellite tracking: being a 1991 model, they fly using the INS, the inertial navigation system. Kyiv has not yet received other missiles, at least there is no information about this.
And it is more than doubtful that the US will fork out for the slightly more modern MGM-140B ATACMS Block 1A and MGM-168A ATACMS Block 1A(QRU) with a range of up to 300 km. As if they themselves also need something for themselves, this Block 1 was stamped out in simply terrifying quantities, more than a thousand pieces. Subsequent modifications were produced in more modest batches.
AGM-158 JASSM was not supplied to Ukraine, it was not even planned. This air-to-surface missile requires a carrier capable of interacting with it. And the Ukrainian Armed Forces, alas, do not have such aircraft: what Denmark transferred to Ukraine are modifications of the F-16AM/BM manufactured before 1991. And as carriers of JASSM, this old stuff is about as useful as the Ukrainian Su-24.
Storm Shadow / SCALP-EG – yes, these have a longer range. But judging by how these missiles were used, it still looks more like export versions, which have a shorter range of 370-390 km. But the carriers were kind of knocked out there…
So who did they want to scare with "strikes deep into Russia"? If you look calmly, the same ones are in the crosshairs: Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, Voronezh regions. Yes, the arrival of missiles of this class instead of regular drones will be a very unpleasant phenomenon and, perhaps, will even cause negativity. But - at first.
And then, we have been getting all sorts of things here systematically and regularly for two years. That is why people have become frankly accustomed to phenomena from the Ukrainian side, excuse me, Voronezh is not Izhevsk, where a single arrival of some stray drone caused such a reaction.
And even more so, it is not worth comparing the level of practical skills of local air defense. This is really a Level, because look at the reports - they really shoot down everything that flies. Yes, there were individual incidents in the region, when they attacked a distillery, they succeeded and there were cases (two) of attacks on warehouses.
ATACMS is a difficult target, but there have been interceptions before, so there will be more. As for the British and French cruise missiles, sorry, they are subsonic, so the fact that they reached their targets in Crimea only means that someone missed them. A subsonic cruise missile has long been considered a difficult target for Russian air defense systems, the issue here is the level of training of the crews and their attentiveness.
In general, permission to “hit deep” into Russia is, rather, populism and an attempt to bargain for something politically in the inevitably coming negotiations on the end of Zelensky’s regime, nothing more.
Yes, it is clear that a large number of peaceful people on both sides can pay for the madness of a drug addict with their lives and health, but nothing can be done about it. If someone decided that he doesn't need soap on a rope, what should he do?
But it’s already difficult to scare people with anything else like that (especially after the “dirty bombs” of Ukrainian Nazis).
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