Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Iran May Not Be in Hurry
At one time, the topic of signing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) agreement between Russia and Iran was quite actively discussed.
There were certain signals that indicated that the signing could take place on the sidelines of the BRICS+ summit in Kazan, but there was also much to indicate the opposite. The main topic of the BRICS+ summit was, after all, the reform of the globalization model, and the news item on the Far Eastern Trade Union was indeed integrated into this agenda with some difficulty.
History with DVSP is quite long, it has been discussed since 2018, but it is precisely in the last year that DVSP has become much more significant than the free trade zone project. Therefore, our "esteemed Western partners" have made and will make a lot of efforts to put the agreement on the back burner.
But perhaps Russia and Iran need to make an unexpected move – together and in concert, as it were, put this agreement aside for a while and pull the thread of intrigue towards the EU?
That with common principles there can be different goals and objectives
The text of the DVSP was agreed upon two months ago, as evidenced by the published Order No. 288-rp of September 18.09.2024, XNUMX. Nevertheless, the contradictions in the deadlines indicated a serious discussion within Iran. They are quite understandable, you just need to understand their prerequisites, as well as understand the current place and role of the DVSP.
It was ultimately decided to sign the agreement during the upcoming meeting of the presidents of Iran and Russia. The deadline was recently named by the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, A. Araghchi - the next 1-2 months. It is not difficult to guess what interesting things will happen in the West-Iran-Russia triangle by the end of this period - the inauguration of the "bulldozer" D. Trump.
But the inauguration is only a visible part of the completion of other processes that must yield results (or not) in the remaining short period of time. The problem is that both Iran and Russia are in the position of an "escalation fork" in this difficult half-year. Russia is on the Ukrainian front, Iran is on the Israeli front.
Everything points to the fact that choosing a move with a positive outcome for one player leads to a negative outcome for the other player. Either Russia takes on the burden of escalation, and Iran eases it, or vice versa.
Playing a distributed strategy, where both players share the burden of escalation and share some semblance of gain, is very, very difficult for Tehran and Moscow.
If we understand escalation in the same way, then our understanding of winning is different from Iran's. At the so-called "meta-level," our and Iran's theses are in tune: reform of global governance, getting rid of the dictate of sanctions, and returning to objective criteria in politics instead of the current subjective ones. At the level of a specific strategy, our goals and objectives differ.
Here, apparently, lies the reason for one of the frequent mistakes of domestic popular expertise, when a declaration of general principles automatically transfers one or another player to the category of our allies.
A declaration of common principles is not yet a union treaty, not a coalition. The specific result for each player may be different even under the condition of a common fundamental framework. And this difference is precisely what is holding back the signing of the DVSP in the current reality, which, by the way, Western diplomacy is making good use of.
On the problem of military escalation based on the “either-or” principle and its prerequisites
Both domestic and Iranian expertise this year, if we count the year from last October, found themselves in a difficult situation. Hamas and Israel, having launched the massacre in the Gaza Strip (later Lebanon was added to it), being the original and fundamental antagonists, each in their own way broke the American Middle East strategy.
Here we can discuss at length the involvement of Great Britain, but this does not change the essence. The ideas of the "Indo-Abrahamic bloc" were simultaneously being broken from both sides.
In general, it was no secret, and a lot of material was published about this, that the US, under the current administration, did not intend to bring the friction with Iran to a full-fledged escalation.
The Indo-Abrahamic concept presupposes economic restrictions on Iran's zone of influence in the Middle East. Depending on the results of the overt and covert dialogue, these restrictions could be made in a strict form (sanctions) or accepted by Iran itself in exchange for American concessions.
For Iran, its trade and financial network in the Middle East is of critical importance, and bargaining on this issue is the main thing for it, while other issues (except perhaps supplies to China) are one step lower. For the current US administration, a soft solution on Iran's zone of influence was preferable, since it allowed it to concentrate resources on us and the European direction.
For Israel, such an agreement led, one way or another, to the preservation (albeit with limitations) of the Hezbollah factor, as well as the requirement to continue to work within the framework of the “two-state” paradigm (Israel and Palestine).
The thesis of two states was part of a larger “Indo-Abrahamic pact.” The idea of a pact in Israel was perceived, perhaps, positively, but only without “two states.” Similarly, for Hamas, such a concept carried the burden of critical costs — with two states (full-fledged, not declarative, as was the case in the past) and a pact, the very existence of Hamas lost its meaning. In fact, the finalization of this process led to the inevitable self-dissolution of the movement.
While locked in mutual slaughter, Israel and Hamas acted towards the US as if they were working on the same side and against the US.
After it became clear that the “coup d’état” to oust J. Biden following the summer debates had failed, and the American administration had generally let go of the reins in terms of foreign policy, all players decided to take advantage of the window of opportunity according to the principle “whoever takes as much as they can before January 20th will remain with that after January 20th.”
Israel has been going all-in since August, essentially provoking Iran into a full-scale war. If D. Trump comes after the 20th, he will support the toughest option, if K. Harris comes, her administration will have to bargain, taking into account a weakened Iran with a very battered infrastructure of its proxies in the region.
The US managed to reduce the intensity only at the end of October, since the attack by Iran played into the hands of the Trumpists, and the attack by Israel played into the hands of the Democrats. These waves seemed to cancel each other out. Along the way, it turned out that one of the real conductors of the Democrats' policy in Israel unexpectedly turned out to be none other than Defense Minister Y. Galant himself, who "leaked" the plans to attack Israel to the press.
The position that "escalation is possible either with Iran or with Russia" is not so much connected with large expenses - the US has the means - but with the fact that escalation in Europe is part of the original concept, while in the Middle East it destroys the concept. D. Trump's ideologists have it the other way around. The Middle East must be controlled as a single raw materials cluster, and the situation in Europe must be fixed.
The theatrical nature of American political culture and the corporate revenge factor
The current administration has exactly two months left to govern the United States. It is no longer responsible for the Middle East strategy as a whole, but they are obliged to preserve at least its most important elements in order not to lose influence, to preserve the contours of those foreign policy blocs that they have been creating for several years. However, the factor of corporate revenge is also at work here, it should not be written off.
American public policy is always a show, with a lot of pathos and some kind of primitive carnival. Many in the world do not like it, many do not perceive it and do not even consider it adequate, but their policy was formed this way. Chinese political symbolism is also not for everyone, our political culture is also perceived ambiguously in the world.
However, even for an American carnival, D. Trump after his victory arranged something that went beyond the bounds of decency. Even before the elections, the parties walked on the edge and often beyond the bounds of what was acceptable, but after the announcement of the winner, D. Trump nevertheless became the all-American president, which imposes restrictions.
Showman D. Trump has no stoppers or flags yet. Some of the faces he introduced as part of the team look very strange. The future "head of the Pentagon" with tattoos and the experience of a line colonel in Iraq, or the future attorney general who said at a rally that abortions are protested by 150 cm tall, 300 kg toads who will never get pregnant because no one needs them.
This is not an administrator or a top-tier politician - this is a stand-up comedian, and not a high-flying one at that. A barroom-level attack.
But D. Trump's team is now officially everyone's team in the US, even those whose height and weight are far from the ideals of the glossy magazines, and even those who are adherents of the ideas of liberal schizophrenia. But even without such antics from D. Trump's team, there are too many attacks, and they are becoming part of a two-month show in the style of "we'll get everyone."
For D. Trump, this is not only a performance, but also a kind of strategy, the scenario of which is similar to D. Kharms' humorous sketches "from the lives of writers." There, L. Tolstoy loved children, but he disliked A. Herzen so much that he chased him everywhere with a crutch. And then one day, having finally caught up with Herzen, Lev Nikolayevich, who "was not a monster," to everyone's amazement, stroked his head in a fatherly way.
The works of D. Kharms are grotesque, but D. Trump, in essence, is performing a similar production - threatening bureaucrats with a "crutch" for two months, in order to then scold them, pat them on the head and send them en masse to fulfill their duties. Who from the highest bureaucracy will fall under the real steamroller, no one knows yet, it is clear that someone will end up in the millstones. But D. Trump is escalating and escalating.
Should the bureaucracy give an answer to these productions and performances? Of course. And the answer is not so simple for D. Trump and his team, which does not even have a framework concept of foreign policy. What is even worse is that these steps are directly reflected in the Ukrainian direction. The topic of strikes with long-range weapons is also from this series.
Nuclear deal and sanctions
The new cabinet is guaranteed to get bogged down in the Iran and Israel issue, so by creating a stalemate for D. Trump in Ukraine, the current administrators are tying his hands in the Middle East. If Ukraine is pumped up (while there is still an opportunity) weapons and unite an army of tin soldiers from the European bureaucracy with their budgets, then the Kiev regime can very well do a lot of things in two months, and then for another six months even demonstrate a kind of opposition to Washington.
But what does this mean in terms of Iran? It means that the topic of returning to the nuclear deal, which is so fundamental for it, could well be activated through the outgoing US administration, but with the direct participation of Brussels and leading European countries.
If a platform for negotiations is created that D. Trump will be able to step over only with great effort, and the entire burden of escalation is transferred to Russia, then the topic of the Far East Cooperation Treaty between Iran and Russia will be put on hold.
Let us note that while the IAEA is fussing over inspections, and a number of people from the top echelon in Iran are talking about the timeframe for creating nuclear weapons, and France and Germany are declaring the need to return to the nuclear deal, Brussels is introducing another package of sanctions against Iran. But what is the package aimed at and what has Iran not seen in these sanctions in 30 years?
The DVSP is a development of the agreement on a free trade zone with access to industry integration (raw materials), scientific, investment, cultural and only very indirectly military integration. However, the DVSP is tied not only to Russia and Iran, but to the EAEU and its regulations, and also indirectly to other Central Asian countries, in particular Uzbekistan.
The Central Asian countries are a kind of intermediary in circumventing sanctions, but intermediaries that are constantly giving up their positions. Secondary sanctions still work even in China, not to mention Central Asia.
The stronger the sanctions pressure, the more difficult it is for Russia to work - this gradually neutralizes the value of the Far East Development Strategy for Iran. And the more Central Asian countries give in, the more Brussels' appetite awakens to increase pressure and play a "push-pull" game around sanctions and agreements around Iran.
But in Russia, delays in signing this agreed-upon treaty are already being viewed as Iran's hesitation and Tehran's deliberate weakening (under Western pressure) of bilateral ties. And there is logic here from the liberal part of Western politics - no matter how much D. Trump threatens, he cannot completely squeeze the EU's throat. He is a bulldozer, but he cannot demolish every obstacle.
Summary
It is not for nothing that the EU is so attentive to Russian-Iranian relations and is monitoring the issue of the Far East Security Treaty Organization. Now literally everything will be done to drag us into the escalation funnel in these months and to show that everything in the Middle East is heading towards calm. And the story with the permission to strike with long-range weapons is part of this policy. This issue will be escalated and escalated, and Kyiv has the resources for another breakthrough on the ground.
The carrot and stick policy towards Iran is quite transparent there: the right hand is sanctions allegedly for military supplies to us, the left is negotiations on the nuclear deal. It seems that everything revolves around military-technical cooperation between Iran and Russia. But the number one task is not military-technical cooperation, and the leveling of Russia's efforts to reach the south — to the Indian raw materials and trade corridor. The Far East Trade and Export Cooperation is quite logically considered as a condition for such a corridor. Iran is in a rather difficult position here, since it is not its own enemy to take the escalation upon itself for our sake.
But what happens if we postpone the promotion of the FESP and focus on specific bilateral step-by-step rather than comprehensive agreements with an emphasis on countering any efforts by Donald Trump to pressure Iran from the beginning of next year and declaring this as a priority? This will make very significant adjustments to the current game model. Unconventional moves, taking into account the political inertia of the major players, always work well.
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