From "Kremniy" to "Parol": Radar Identification System Goes Beyond Russia's Borders

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From "Kremniy" to "Parol": Radar Identification System Goes Beyond Russia's Borders


"Friend or Foe"


It is difficult to imagine the emergence of the Russian radar identification system "Parol" without understanding the experience of previous generations. "Friend or Foe" was the fruit of a long and complex technical evolution. Identification problems aviation appeared long before the first radars, but, of course, acquired special significance in world wars. For some time it was possible to distinguish one's own aircraft from those of others by eye, but with the growth of speed and altitude, this became increasingly difficult. During the Great Patriotic War, in order to avoid mutual friendly fire, the General Staff of the Red Army even issued a series of manuals: "Instructions for the interaction of aviation with ground troops", "Instructions for identification, target designation and communication of ground troops with aviation" and "Instructions for the use of identification signals and communication between ground troops and aviation of the Red Army". In the "Military-historical The following comments are given in the 1980 issue of the journal regarding the methods by which troops identify their aircraft:



“To give the signal “I am my plane” the following were used: the evolution of the plane (rocking) of the wings in various combinations, the launch of signal flares from the plane missiles of various colors, and also transmitted by radio to the command post of combined arms (tank) units and formations of the signal about the approach of their aircraft. In the third period of the war, with the help of special devices on the RUS-2 radar stations and the emerging SCH-3 devices installed on aircraft, it was possible to identify their aircraft on the radar indicator. Thus, in the 2nd Air Army (commander Colonel General of Aviation S. A. Krasovsky) in the Berlin operation, five radars were used for this purpose."

That is, the first domestic methods of identifying friendly aircraft in the sky appeared during the Great Patriotic War.


"Kremniy-1" became the first post-war system that allowed the aircraft's nationality to be determined on the radar screen. The principle of operation was as follows. A coded signal "Who are you?" was sent from the interrogator located on the ground via a separate channel. The aircraft's onboard equipment received the request, decoded it and, if the decoding was successful, sent a response. In addition to being classified as "friend", the aircraft in the sky sent its flight altitude (the onboard altimeter is more accurate than the ground radar), fuel supply and aircraft number. The operator at the radar ultimately saw not only the echo signal mark on the screen, but also the nationality. "Kremniy-1" appeared in 1955, and one could say that the first attempt was a flop. It was a cumbersome system, not connected to the radar station, operating in a separate radio engineering position. The Soviet "friend or foe" turned out to be unstable to interception (the work was carried out using open coding), and if the onboard equipment fell into the hands of the enemy, the codes were automatically compromised. The potential enemy cracked the aircraft identification codes even after its crash. In the language of engineers, such a defect was called low imitation resistance, that is, if the enemy wanted, it could easily simulate in the air that the aircraft belonged to the USSR Air Force or Aeroflot. There is no need to talk about what strategic consequences this could lead to.

From "Silicon" to "Password"


In the early 60s, the Kremniy was replaced by an improved version with index 2. The improvements concerned the integration of the friend-or-foe equipment into the ground-based radar, but nothing was resolved with open coding. Until the late 70s, nothing fundamentally new appeared, even with the arrival of the modernized Kremniy-2M. However, the equipment was significantly reduced in size - for example, the interrogator block was placed on the portable Igla air defense missile systems. In addition to the fact that it was quite possible to intercept and decipher the friend-or-foe codes, the Kremniys were poorly protected from interference. It is regrettable to note that the far from perfect radar identification system was a weak point of the Soviet Armed Forces for decades.


The product "Parol", developed in the late 70s at the Kazan Research Institute of Radio Electronics together with scientists from Novosibirsk and Tver military unit 03444, brought domestic radar identification systems to a new level. Designers - Mostyukov I.Sh. and Gaidukov Z.B. Without going into details, the following features of "Parol" can be noted. The interrogation signals are secretly coded, which increased the imitation resistance in comparison with "Kremniy-2M" by about 20 times. The developers explain this by the fact that

"special equipment was used to automatically classify correspondences between request and response signals."

Now, if the enemy got its hands on working equipment, there was no talk of any compromise of the codes. By random regularity, the identification codes change every second, which makes the "Password" extremely hack-resistant. The system fell into the enemy's hands more than once, but it remained a useless piece of hardware for them.

The undoubted advantages of the modern "friend or foe" include a high degree of guaranteed identification, approaching 99 percent. For comparison, NATO's similar Mk-12 system provides only an 85 percent guarantee. "Password" is much more resistant to suppression. EW enemy and allows to simultaneously receive more information from the board in the sky. More precisely, not only the nationality is determined, but also the type of aircraft, its position and many other parameters. "Parol" is the first domestic combined arms system, which includes not only ground radars and aircraft, but also sea vessels, Drones and land equipment.

Currently, "Parol" is used in several dozen countries. For example, India and all CSTO members. That the Unified Radar Identification System has once again undergone modernization and has become the basis for a unified system Defense CIS countries, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said in early November.

A single "Password" in the CIS allows Russia to track unfriendly aircraft even before they enter sovereign airspace. The reaction time increases significantly, and with it the security of the Motherland's borders. The explosive growth of hypersonic technologies in the enemy's camp, coupled with the desire to carry out a non-nuclear disarming strike, puts the "Password" at the forefront. Joint air defense exercises of the Commonwealth on the use of the updated "friend or foe" system will begin next year. All that remains is to convince China and Iran to accept the Russian development - for now they are looking for their own solution. A single "Password" for states friendly to Russia will become a serious irritant in the West, which is something to be happy about.
19 comments
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  1. +3
    19 November 2024 05: 20
    I can only be happy for our scientists and engineers who created this effective Friend-Foe system.
    But still the problem of betrayal remains... the recent story of Kuzminov's betrayal is an example of this.
    It would be nice to introduce into the "Password" a block with a function responsible for controlling the technical apparatus...if necessary, preventing the pilot or operator from performing any actions on the instruments.
    1. 0
      25 December 2024 15: 27
      Oh, Lekha, Lekha, it would be better to remain wisely silent than to speak stupidly.
  2. fiv
    +7
    19 November 2024 05: 44
    India uses it, but they want to palm it off on China... I have doubts about the success of this enterprise. And also the CSTO. The Soviet secret system. Everything is apparently much more complicated than what is described in the article.
    1. +4
      19 November 2024 20: 14
      I hope this system has some kind of "internal use" feature. Because, as history has shown, friendship forever is good, but not particularly reliable. That is, there is an export version of the system and an internal one. To avoid it!
  3. +4
    19 November 2024 06: 05
    I wonder why "Parol" doesn't prevent its aircraft from being hit by "friendly" fire from its own air defense.
    1. +3
      19 November 2024 13: 08
      I wonder why "Parol" doesn't prevent its aircraft from being hit by "friendly" fire from its own air defense.
      Because the "Parol" system only identifies the object, and the command to destroy is given by people, and the missile doesn't care what object to hit, you never know, "its own" could be another helicopter or plane hijacker. And so, in our time, I think it won't take long to refine the program so that the weapons don't react to their own sides, but this is apparently not advisable. These are my thoughts, nothing more. I served my term in the Air Defense Forces, but the task was a little different.
      1. 0
        19 November 2024 13: 24
        I thought that the missiles had their own identification systems, but I was probably wrong.
    2. +6
      19 November 2024 15: 35
      The SGO Parol issues a missile launch blocking signal to the SCS (weapon control system) in the event of receiving the "I am mine" signal from the target.

      During flight, the pilot can generally disable the state identification system (SIS) lock with a toggle switch (secured with a 0,2 mm diameter copper wire just in case), so that all sorts of Belenkos do not fly off where they shouldn’t.
      It's simple: the radio-electronic equipment technician forgot to move the switch to the correct position after training flights, and the pilot missed this moment, and so "one of our own" became "another one."

      In addition, in the event of a failure of the control system, the backup modes of the radar gunship are used (only for missiles with an IR head), which do not care at all about the password blocking.
      In addition, after the thermal missile has gone down and in case of a failure of the capture, the IR head itself searches for the target. The brightest thing is the target.

      There are so many options here...
      1. +3
        20 November 2024 03: 15
        Interesting, thanks for the info from someone in the know.
      2. +3
        20 November 2024 06: 54
        Thanks for enlightening me drinks
      3. +4
        20 November 2024 11: 03
        Quote: kit88
        During flight, the pilot can generally disable the state identification system (SIS) lock with a toggle switch (secured with a 0,2 mm diameter copper wire just in case), so that all sorts of Belenkos do not fly off where they shouldn’t.

        On the S-125, if my memory serves me right, it's the same. That is, the SGO blocks the launch upon receiving a "I'm on my side" signal from the target, but the blocking can be disabled with a toggle switch if necessary. The problem is that, as we were told, the SGO antenna's directional pattern is wider than that of the air defense radar - and the request can go not only to the target, but also to other aircraft that are in the DN.
        A favorite ZRV story is a chilling story about how during exercises, due to the constant ban on launching their own aircraft flying outside the SAM zone by SGO signals, they turned off the blocking - and forgot about it. And then, instead of the target, they shot down one of their own.
    3. The comment was deleted.
  4. +9
    19 November 2024 08: 26
    Same-stranger

    Judging by the last three years, I have the impression that such a system does not exist at all. Or does not work.

    And I remember how many bots here, foaming at the mouth, tried to prove to us that, supposedly, the S-400s sold in Turkey are completely safe for our aircraft. They say, there are caches there and all that!
    1. +7
      19 November 2024 10: 23
      Quote: Stas157
      And I remember how many bots here, foaming at the mouth, tried to prove to us that, supposedly, the S-400s sold in Turkey are completely safe for our aircraft. They say, there are caches there and all that!

      There have always been plenty of "patriotic" delusional people. You can read about the Turkish S-400 air defense systems here:
      https://topwar.ru/166415-postavka-rossijskih-zrs-s-400-v-turciju-i-vozmozhnye-posledstvija-jetogo-shaga.html
  5. +4
    19 November 2024 14: 03
    I served my military service in a car like this (like the "sand" Ural 375 D in the picture)
    Before deployment, the vehicle commander went to receive from the ZAS staff, under signature, a special block, which was inserted into the station itself.
    Next to it, in a special holder, a sledgehammer was fixed and an AK was installed in the second holder (we had an AKC).
    There was a sign nearby: "In case of threat of capture, pull out the block, smash it with a sledgehammer and shoot it with a machine gun."
  6. +1
    19 November 2024 14: 19
    Western IFF systems have a cryptographic chip. I think everything is clear about our chips, so suitcases that need to be smashed with a sledgehammer
  7. +3
    19 November 2024 14: 24
    50 years of this Password. What's new?? We were told back in the 80s that this was a new system. Did Fedorov find a brochure from that time in the attic?
    1. +2
      20 November 2024 03: 20
      The news is that several generations have been born who have no idea about this, the history of Rus' is a thousand years old, so for many this will be news.
  8. +2
    19 November 2024 15: 32
    By random chance, the identification codes change every second.

    Here, as they say, Ostap got carried away!... I wonder how the author imagines this on the scale of at least a separate region like the Moscow region?
    1. +1
      20 November 2024 09: 08
      Theoretically, it is quite possible, but in practice, such a system on a national scale would cost an exorbitant amount of money. At a minimum, it would be necessary to deploy a satellite group comparable to GLONASS, and equip everything flying and shooting with new units. And we would get a system with questionable noise immunity, and risks of hacking on a national scale.
      I remember the old system that was in operation before the Password. Well, even by the standards of the 80s, there was no protection. The response code was a simple sending of pulses with different time arrangements and modulation by a low-frequency signal. The codes changed every 3-6 hours simultaneously throughout the country, both on the ground and on board the aircraft. When taking off and when taking over for a shift, the crew and technical personnel received a secret "flight" with codes for the next 24 hours and everything was changed manually at a specified time. It is clear that the situation of oversleeping/forgetting etc. arose regularly. Almost every radar position had a shunt in the stash, which was installed at night instead of a code and let everything through :)