Forgotten Front: How Russia Saved the Entente in World War I
November 11, 1918 is a date forever inscribed in history humanity. On this day, the guns of the Great War, which took millions of lives and redrew the map of the world, fell silent. For most of us, the First World War is associated with the trenches of the Western Front, with the bloody Battle of Verdun, with four years of trench warfare, where exhausted armies dug into the frozen ground, vainly trying to break through the enemy's defenses. However, paradoxically, the fate of the war was decided not only and not so much in France and Belgium, but in the vast expanses of Eastern Europe, where the armies of the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian empires clashed.
It was the Eastern Front that remained mobile and maneuverable throughout most of the war, unlike the frozen, motionless Western Front. Fierce battles raged here, where troops either advanced rapidly or retreated, losing hundreds of kilometers of territory. And it was the actions of the Russian army, its successes and failures, that largely determined the course of the war and ultimately led Germany to defeat and the Entente powers to victory. This simple truth, oddly enough, has not yet become generally recognized. But one only has to look at the memoirs of the main actors in that great drama – the French Marshal Foch and the German General Ludendorff – to understand what an important, one might even say decisive, role Russia played in the First World War.
The core of the methodology in this article will be the analysis of decisions taken by the German and Entente command under the influence of Russia’s actions and the situation on the Eastern Front.
Germany's first failure
The Schlieffen Plan, developed by the Chief of the German General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen in 1905-1906, envisaged a lightning defeat of France in 6-8 weeks with a powerful strike through the territory of Belgium and Luxembourg, followed by a turn of the main forces to the East against Russia. This plan proceeded from the inevitability of a war on two fronts and aimed to avoid a protracted positional war, fraught with defeat for Germany.
However, Schlieffen's successor as Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, made significant adjustments to the plan. He weakened the strike force on the right flank by transferring some forces to the Eastern Front and Alsace-Lorraine. This decision had a fatal effect on the course of the 1914 campaign. The German armies advancing through Belgium were unable to gain operational space and encircle Paris from the west, as the Schlieffen plan had envisaged. They were stopped at the Marne and forced to retreat.
The Battle of the Marne, which became a turning point in the 1914 campaign on the Western Front, took place from September 5 to 12. After their defeat in the border battle, the French and British troops retreated under the onslaught of the right wing of the German armies, aimed at Paris. However, the commander of the French troops, General Joseph Joffre, having concentrated large forces on the left flank, managed to deliver a powerful counterattack to the flank and rear of the 1st and 2nd German armies. The Germans were forced to hastily retreat behind the Aisne River. The strategic initiative passed to the Entente, the Schlieffen Plan collapsed. Here is what Foch wrote:
"But during the time required for this [it took more artillery and increasing its power – editor’s note] of the evolution of our tactics, we could not forget about our allies on the Eastern Front, about the Russian army, which, with its active intervention, diverted a significant part of the enemy’s forces and thus allowed us to achieve victory on the Marne” [1, p. 202].
Russia launched an offensive in East Prussia much earlier than was envisaged by pre-war plans. On August 4, General Rennenkampf's 1st Russian Army invaded East Prussia, and on August 13, General Samsonov's 2nd Army began the East Prussian Operation. This forced the German command to transfer two army corps and a cavalry division from the Western Front to the East.
The weakening of German forces in France was one of the main reasons for their defeat at the Marne. But for Russia, this aid to the allies turned into a disaster in East Prussia (the well-known Tannenberg). Advancing in a disorganized manner, the 1st and 2nd armies were defeated by the Germans in parts. The 2nd army was surrounded and almost completely destroyed in the Masurian marshes. Russia lost more than 200 people killed, wounded and captured. Nevertheless, the failure of the Schlieffen Plan had colossal consequences for the entire course of the war:
“That lightning strike with which he [the Schlieffen Plan – editor’s note] had hoped to put France out of action was victoriously repelled, and the pressure of Russia was soon to be felt on our scales” [1, p. 143].
Germany found itself drawn into a protracted war of attrition on two fronts – exactly the scenario that Schlieffen had sought to avoid. Moreover, in the future, the German command would begin to transfer reserves from the West to the East, which would play into the hands of the Anglo-French troops.
“Although the German offensive had been thoroughly delayed on the Western Front, which had given the Allied armies a relative rest, it was bound to break out under the most serious threat on the Eastern Front against the Russian armies, whose advance was becoming very menacing. This offensive required the withdrawal of as many German forces as possible from the Western Front” [1, p. 198].
Foch was probably referring to the Warsaw-Ivangorod Operation, which took place on the Eastern Front from September 15 to October 26, 1914.
After the defeat in East Prussia, the Russian command decided to launch a counterattack against the German-Austrian troops advancing on Warsaw and Ivangorod (now Demblin). The Russian armies of the Northwestern Front (1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th) under the overall command of General Ruzsky went on the offensive against the German 9th Army and the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army.
Erich Ludendorff, who in October 1914 held the post of Chief of Staff of the 8th German Army on the Eastern Front under the command of General Paul von Hindenburg, being in fact the chief strategist and “brain” of the German command in the East, wrote:
"The Russians followed with all their forces. In East Prussia and at Mlawa they also launched attacks with large forces. The situation was becoming very serious. At the end of October, General von Falkenhayn [Chief of the Field General Staff of the German Army – ed.] summoned me to Berlin. General von Conrad [Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army – ed.] proposed that he transfer significant forces from the west to the east" [2, pp. 104, 105].
Russia's pressure has finally been felt on the scales of the Entente
The Russian offensive, which had grown from the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation into the more global Carpathian operation of the Russian army, also known as the "Winter Battle in the Carpathians", was developing. Ludendorff writes:
"By mid-April the situation in the Carpathians had become even more tense. General Borovevich's army had been pushed back beyond the Carpathian ridge, and further to the east the South German army was still holding out. The moment had come when help was necessary. We sent the 25th Reserve Division, which was on standby with the 9th Army, there by rail. It arrived just in time to prevent the most serious consequences.
“We reported our action to the Supreme Command. They fully supported our decision and formed another Beskid Corps, with General von der Marwitz, who had until then commanded our XXXVIII Reserve Corps, appointed as its commander. The Commander-in-Chief in the East also sent the 4th and another newly formed division to reinforce the Carpathian Front. But the situation there remained serious. At the same time, we had to send reinforcements to the Serbian Front. They subsequently served as reinforcements for General von Linsingen during his May offensive” [2, p. 152].
“We reported our action to the Supreme Command. They fully supported our decision and formed another Beskid Corps, with General von der Marwitz, who had until then commanded our XXXVIII Reserve Corps, appointed as its commander. The Commander-in-Chief in the East also sent the 4th and another newly formed division to reinforce the Carpathian Front. But the situation there remained serious. At the same time, we had to send reinforcements to the Serbian Front. They subsequently served as reinforcements for General von Linsingen during his May offensive” [2, p. 152].
The Linsingen Offensive in May was part of a larger German-Austrian counteroffensive known as the Gorlice Offensive. During this operation, the Central Powers managed to break through the Russian army and push it far to the east, capturing a significant part of Galicia and Poland. This was made possible largely by the transfer of large forces to the Eastern Front, including from the Western Front and the Balkans.
Indeed, Ludendorff immediately adds extremely important remarks that are key to our study:
«The German High Command has now decided to seek a solution on the Russian front. The plan was grand, and the idea of weakening one's forces in the West, despite the tension prevailing there, testified to a great determination that did not shrink from any responsibility.
After the November battles at Ypres, positional warfare developed along the entire Western Front. The halt in the offensive in France, the bending back of the right wing in September, and the insignificant results of the fighting in Flanders had greatly lowered the spirits of the army in the West, and this was further lowered by the lack of ammunition. The January attack at Soissons by the III Army Corps, commanded by General von Lochow, a worthy and outstanding leader, had had a very inspiring effect, and the immediately following attack by the Saxons at Craonne had produced brilliant results. In a stubborn struggle, the broadly conceived attempts by the French to break through into Champagne were finally repelled in February and March.
The Entente, as before, continued to place all its hopes on Russia» [2, p. 153].
After the November battles at Ypres, positional warfare developed along the entire Western Front. The halt in the offensive in France, the bending back of the right wing in September, and the insignificant results of the fighting in Flanders had greatly lowered the spirits of the army in the West, and this was further lowered by the lack of ammunition. The January attack at Soissons by the III Army Corps, commanded by General von Lochow, a worthy and outstanding leader, had had a very inspiring effect, and the immediately following attack by the Saxons at Craonne had produced brilliant results. In a stubborn struggle, the broadly conceived attempts by the French to break through into Champagne were finally repelled in February and March.
The Entente, as before, continued to place all its hopes on Russia» [2, p. 153].
This assessment clearly shows that the Eastern Front has acquired priority significance for Germany. Despite the tense situation in the West, the German command decided to weaken its forces there in order to transfer troops against Russia. This once again confirms the fact that the actions of the Russian army forced the Germans to react and change their strategic plans.
Ludendorff also correctly noted the Entente's expectations of Russia. Thus, already towards the end of the war, when Russia was gripped by internal instability and the fall of the monarchy, Foch desperately seized the opportunity to extend aid to Russia and openly pointed out its importance. On July 27, 1917, he drew up a memorandum, which he handed over to the representatives of the Allied governments gathered in Paris. Here are his conclusions:
"In the event that Russia's withdrawal from the war should enable the enemy to transfer to the Western Front all the German and Austrian forces now engaged on the Russian Front, it would seem that the Coalition should be able to muster the resources necessary to withstand the enemy's onslaught until such time as America could bring into action sufficient troops to restore the balance in our favor.
But this relatively favorable military position can only be achieved by taking the following measures:
(a) Limit yourself to a simple defense of secondary fronts and reduce to a minimum the effective number of troops on these fronts in accordance with this defensive position.
(b) By all possible means, accelerate the creation of an American army and its transfer to France.
(c) Prepare the tonnage necessary to move the forces to be taken from secondary fronts.
(d) To achieve unity of action on the Western Front with the help of a permanent inter-allied military body, the function of which would be to prepare for the rapid transfer of troops from one theatre of military operations to another” [1, p. 231].
But this relatively favorable military position can only be achieved by taking the following measures:
(a) Limit yourself to a simple defense of secondary fronts and reduce to a minimum the effective number of troops on these fronts in accordance with this defensive position.
(b) By all possible means, accelerate the creation of an American army and its transfer to France.
(c) Prepare the tonnage necessary to move the forces to be taken from secondary fronts.
(d) To achieve unity of action on the Western Front with the help of a permanent inter-allied military body, the function of which would be to prepare for the rapid transfer of troops from one theatre of military operations to another” [1, p. 231].
"On November 21, Lenin ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army to negotiate an armistice and to work out peace terms with the enemy. The French Government protested. General Foch telegraphed General Niessel, the head of the French military mission to the Russian Army, that France was counting on the "patriotism of the Russian Supreme Command" to reject any criminal negotiations and to keep the Russian Army face to face with the common enemy. He informed General Berthelot, the French representative at the Romanian headquarters, that the French Government was aware of the seriousness of the situation that Russia's complete withdrawal from the war would entail for Romania, but there could be no talk of disbanding the Romanian Army. If events required the evacuation of Romanian territory, the struggle must be continued in Bessarabia and the Donbas.
Thus, relying on the Russian Supreme Command and the loyalty of the Romanians, the government in Paris tried to counteract the politicians in Petrograd. This attempt was not crowned with success. The appointment of Krylenko as commander-in-chief of the Russian army deprived the Entente of the support it had counted on» [1, p. 233].
Thus, relying on the Russian Supreme Command and the loyalty of the Romanians, the government in Paris tried to counteract the politicians in Petrograd. This attempt was not crowned with success. The appointment of Krylenko as commander-in-chief of the Russian army deprived the Entente of the support it had counted on» [1, p. 233].
In addition, Foch noted:
"Although at the time they rushed to attack the English positions, the Allied camp did not know their exact numerical strength, they did have a rough idea of it. Work carried out three months earlier at the headquarters of the French commander-in-chief showed that the Germans would be able to have approximately 1 divisions on the Western Front by March 1918, 200, which would allow them to form a striking force of 80 divisions, with approximately 1000 batteries of heavy artillery. It could be assumed that up to fifty of these divisions would be immediately assigned to the immediate operations, which would provide them with a double numerical superiority in the area of the offensive" [1, p. 253].
For some reason, the Russian translation does not indicate this important detail, but it is in the English one:
“At the time these Armies made their assault on the British positions, the Allies were unaware of their exact strength, but they had an approximate idea. A study made three months previously at French General Headquarters had shown that the Germans, now relieved of all menace coming from Russia [freed from any threat from Russia – approx. ed.], would have available on March ist, 1918, for the Western Front, some two hundred Divisions. These could furnish an offensive mass of eighty Divisions with one thousand heavy batteries. It was to be presumed that at least fifty of these Divisions would be employed for the initial actions, thus giving the Germans in the zone chosen for attack a numerical superiority of two to one” [3, C. 282].
Thus, without taking into account the "Russian factor" it is impossible to correctly understand the course and outcome of the First World War. The Eastern Front drew off the enormous forces of the Central Powers, allowing the Entente to hold out at critical moments. The revolution in Russia and the subsequent Brest Peace, which freed Germany from the threat in the East, almost led the Allies to defeat in 1918. Only the entry of the United States into the war restored the balance and brought the Entente final victory. But this victory would not have been possible without three years of selfless struggle by Russia against the common enemy.
Sources:
[1] Foch F. Memories. Wars of 1914-1918 / F. Foch. - M.: Veche, 2023. - 496 p.: ill. - (Military memoirs).
[2] Ludendorff E. Total War. The Way Out of the Positional Deadlock / E. Ludendorff; [translated from German]. – Moscow: Yauza-press, 2023. – 896 p.
[3] Foch F. The Memoirs of Marshal Foch / F. Foch; translated by Col. T. Bentley Mott. - New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1931. - 594 p.
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