Alexey Mikhailovich or On the way to the big European game
"Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich with boyars on a falcon hunt near Moscow." Painting by artist N.E. Sverchkov. There is something imperial in the painting
By the way of the basileuses
Article "Alexey Mikhailovich the Quietest, or on the Threshold of the Empire" We stopped at the sovereign’s vision of the essence of monarchical service, reflected in the rooting of the Byzantine idea of Caesaropapism on Russian soil, as well as in the desire to revive the Eastern Roman Empire in the Russian expanses.
Such views have shaped a strategy in the field of geopolitics that, in my opinion, can be appropriately described as messianic expansionism.
It fits perfectly into the logic of ideas about Constantinian Christianity – we talked about it in: "Ivan the Terrible - a contract with God", as well as recommending for a deeper dive into the topic the monograph by the Italian medievalist F. Cardini “The Origins of Medieval Chivalry” – and in practice it began to be implemented by Charlemagne during the invasions of the Saxon lands, and later by the Crusaders in the Middle East and the Baltics.
However, the strategy of the Quietest was of a somewhat different nature, aimed at returning the territory that once belonged to the Rurikovichs - the outstanding medievalist and, unfortunately, recently deceased A.V. Nazarenko formulated the concept of "family suzerainty" to describe their power.
And here it is more appropriate to compare Alexei Mikhailovich with Justinian I, who restored the political space of Pax Romana.
An important detail: in Rome, and later in Constantinople, they believed that there could only be one empire. Hence the name of the Councils that formulated the dogmas of the Church – Ecumenical, and religion in that period was an integral part of the political agenda.
Therefore, the Councils took place under the auspices of the emperors. And in Russia, the deposition of Nikon at the Great Moscow Council should be considered not only in a religious context, but also, to no lesser extent, in a political one: as a triumph of the idea of Caesaropapism over Papocaesarism, which was discussed in the previous material.
In a word, the Most Quiet One also thought in the Eastern Roman imperial paradigm, seeing himself as the protector of all Christians, just as the latter, who mainly lived in the Balkans, viewed Russia as their patroness from the second half of the 17th century.
A quote from the appeal of the Jerusalem Patriarch Paisios to the Tsar with a call to free the Orthodox from the Turkish yoke, cited in the previous material, perfectly illustrates such a vision.
This, of course, inevitably led to conflict with the Ottoman Empire: the Sultan bore the title of Kaiser-i-Rum, also considering himself the patron of Christians as People of the Book, and refused to see either the Habsburgs or the Romanovs as equals.
Constantinople condescended to the latter only in 1739, recognizing Anna Ioannovna as empress at the conclusion of the Belgrade Peace.
But we have run almost a century ahead. Let us return to the foreign policy of Alexei Mikhailovich, taking into account that the Roman emperor who became an example for him remained in stories an outstanding military leader.
By the way, this side of Constantine's activity, with the exception of the famous battle at the Milvian Bridge, is little covered in Russian-language popular science literature. Although, according to the calculations of historian S. Devochkin, the emperor conducted 15 campaigns and won them all.
The Quietest One was less successful in the military arena as a commander, but he was quite successful as a strategist.
Having parted with the provincial isolationism mentioned in the previous conversation, ten years after the beginning of his rule, he began to solve large-scale problems in the sphere of foreign policy.
Everyone knows about the war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from 1654 to 1667, the outcome of which changed the balance of power in Eastern Europe and laid the foundations for the future world order, which would be unthinkable without Russia in the next century.
The Baltic as a key to Europe
However, its contours were also formed slightly north of the named region, in the roar of guns of the Russo-Swedish War of 1656-1658, less well-known, but, from the point of view of the results, more, as it seems to me, important.
We will hardly talk about the war itself, we will mention literally a couple of episodes, because it requires a separate conversation, but we will talk about its tectonic, in the long term, geopolitical consequences in the context of the events that took place on the European stage.
Siege of Riga by the troops of Alexei Mikhailovich
For those who are interested in the course of military operations, I recommend the best and to date the only monograph dedicated to this confrontation: Kurbatov O. A. “The Russian-Swedish War of 1656-1658.”
What caused the clash between Moscow and Stockholm?
The origins of the short Russian-Swedish clash in the mid-1655th century, writes the leading specialist in the Russian-Swedish military confrontation in the said century O.A. Kurbatov, should not be sought in the economy, the trade interests of the Russian merchant class, or in the desire to resolve the “Baltic question”. It is a completely natural, logical stage of the Russian-Polish military conflict, which in XNUMX grew into a coalition war for hegemony in Eastern Europe.
The last lines of the quotation are important for our topic. Let's compare: almost a century before that, Ivan the Terrible was fulfilling a local task: to gain access to the Baltic, guided by economic considerations. There was no talk of hegemony of the newly born kingdom in Eastern Europe, especially against the backdrop of the Girays' sabre raised above his head.
Alexey Mikhailovich began to cut out a window half a century before his son, but without losing his cultural and religious identity:
“In the Western manner,” notes philosopher M.S. Kiseleva, “the authorities tried to coordinate military innovations with traditional Orthodox rites, without which setting out on a campaign, accepting orders, and other military rituals could not take place.
The innovations yielded positive results. Russian troops showed themselves well in the confrontation with the advanced army of Europe, largely due to the regiments, both reitar and new formation.
Spearman. 17th century
In general, according to the assessment of the military historian and specialist in the 17th century V.S. Velikanov, the army of the Quietest One fully corresponded to the standards of the armed forces of the leading European powers, which, in fact, in addition to the Swedish campaign, was demonstrated against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire.
For more details on the army building by Alexei Mikhailovich, see my article "From pike to musket: military reforms on the Western model began in Russia during the Time of Troubles." It is of a review nature. For those interested in a strictly scientific view, brilliantly executed within the framework of source study analysis and with reference to archival materials, many of which are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time, regarding the military building of Alexei Mikhailovich, I recommend the works of O.A. Kurbatov, N.V. Smirnov, A.V. Malov, A.N. Lobin.
Let us return to the Russo-Swedish War, which Russia waged in alliance with its former enemy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which fought with the Scandinavians for dominance in the Baltics and was considered by the latter as a food supply.
One should also take into account the claims of the King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Jan II Casimir, to the Swedish crown, which was worn by his father, Sigismund III – the same one who captured Smolensk in 1611. But the complex dynastic issue in the relations between Warsaw and Stockholm is a separate topic.
Russia also began the campaign in alliance with the Swedes' main rival in the Baltic – Denmark, fleet which was supposed to provide a blockade of Riga, besieged by Russian troops, from the sea. However, the Danes did not accomplish this task, although they had superiority at sea.
But on land, the advantage remained with the Swedes, who forced the enemy to capitulate and sign peace in Roskilde in 1658.
In turn, on land, Russian troops acted quite successfully; in particular, under the command of Prince I. A. Khovansky, they defeated one of the best Swedish commanders, Magnus De la Gardie.
The war ended with the Treaty of Cardis in 1661, which preserved the status quo between the two states. But its geopolitical consequences are important for us.
As I noted above: let us consider them in the broader context of the events taking place on the European stage, in which Moscow is becoming a participant, albeit indirectly for now.
Echo of Westminster
To understand them, let us touch upon another peace treaty, concluded seven years before Cardis, in Westminster, and which put an end to the first Anglo-Dutch War.
The so-called Four Days' Battle, which ended with the victory of the Dutch fleet; the Second Anglo-Dutch War. It is unlikely that anyone in Russia knew about it, except perhaps a small circle of diplomats of the Ambassadorial Prikaz. Just as it is unlikely that anyone in the Prikaz then thought about the geopolitical consequences, in the long term, of both the battle itself and the war as a whole for the Russian Tsardom.
It would seem, how is it connected with our topic? It is connected. The fact is that in the middle of the 17th century, events took place in the vast expanses of Europe that led to a rearrangement of key figures on the chessboard from the Dnieper to Gibraltar.
The defeat of the previously invincible tercios at Rocroi in 1643 led to the decline of Spain's power and its transformation into a peripheral kingdom.
Even earlier, Portugal had said goodbye to its imperial ambitions, and for a time even to its independence; part of its overseas possessions were taken over by the Dutch East India Company, and part, in the form of Bombay and Tangier, by England.
The Austrian Habsburgs, like Spain, and Venice, which was approaching its decline, were constrained by the confrontation with the Ottoman Empire. The former would only fully straighten their shoulders in 1699, signing the Karlowitz Peace with the Turks, which was advantageous for them.
France laid claim to hegemony in Europe. And what is important for us: among its allies it saw Sweden, which it had patronized since the Thirty Years' War.
Gustav II Adolf
In fact, the union of the Catholic Cardinal A. Richelieu and the Protestant King Gustav II Adolf testified to the transformation of the emphasis in European Realpolitik from its religious plane to a strictly pragmatic one, the foundations of which were laid by the cardinal’s predecessor, Francis I, who in 1528 became friends – it is clear that in a conversation about politics this term is conditional – with Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent.
But from the second half of the 17th century onwards it became increasingly clear that Stockholm was laying claim to a place in the concert of leading European powers not by Madrid and Venice, but by Amsterdam.
For the Peace of Westminster was the first nail in the coffin of the Dutch great power. The Republic of the United Provinces was England's main competitor on the oceans and France's rival on land because of the latter's claim to the Spanish Netherlands, that is, modern Belgium.
France considered the left bank of the Rhine as its natural border, which determined the strategic direction of its military campaigns from Louis XIV to Napoleon inclusive.
Situated at the mouth of the aforementioned river, the Netherlands were doomed by their physical geography to be relegated to a secondary role in the context of political geography.
And the Dutch naval power also displeased France, which forced the former to return Brazil to the Portuguese. I will note that in the next century, the main struggle for supremacy in the ocean expanses will unfold between France and England. Moreover, for a long time, the British will be inferior and will find themselves on the verge of losing India.
They will be helped, oddly enough, by Louis XV, who short-sightedly cut funding for the fleet. As a result, France lost not only India, but also Canada, logically, already in the 19th century, having come to Aboukir and Trafalgar – to the latter together with the decrepit Spaniards.
But I'm getting ahead of myself. Let's go back to the 17th century.
Doomed by Geography
Thus, in its second half it became obvious: the Republic of the United Provinces, despite all its wealth and the presence of outstanding admirals, M. Ruyter and M. Tromp, would not be able to cope with simultaneous rivalry with France and England in the long term.
Although after the first war with the English the Dutch still retained their naval supremacy and prevented Sweden from taking a leading position in the Baltic in 1658. But the determinism conditioned by geography took its toll: two more wars with England and the so-called Dutch War with France reduced the Republic of the United Provinces to the rank of secondary powers, although it was not, strictly speaking, defeated on the battlefield/sea.
But geography sometimes strikes harder than cannons, and the fate of the aforementioned Venice, as well as Genoa, which in the 1918th century found themselves on the periphery of the pulse of economic life; Germany, whose armies met November XNUMX on enemy territory, are vivid evidence of this.
The same is true of Holland: not situated, like England, which was not burdened with the need to spend a significant part of its budget on a land army, on an island, but having a strong France nearby, it was doomed by geography to a too short stay in the top league of the European concert.
And in Paris, Sweden was seen as the optimal candidate to replace the Dutch.
The latter, thanks to the military-administrative reforms and the military leadership talent of Gustav II Adolf, created a combat-ready army, as demonstrated by Breitenfeld and Lützen. As a result, Stockholm received territorial gains in Pomerania, that is, in the southern part of the Baltic.
However, the Swedes were following the dead-end Dutch path – a mismatch between ambitions and potential, primarily demographic and economic, as well as the intersection of their interests with Russian ones.
Here, by and large, Alexei Mikhailovich played the same role in the fate of Sweden that O. Cromwell and Louis XIV played in the fate of Holland.
Neither of them broke the back of the Dutch great power, but they struck the first blow at it, just as the Quietest struck the Swedish one. For it was becoming obvious that the Cardis Peace would not satisfy Moscow in the long term, just as Stockholm’s inability to keep the Baltics under its control was becoming increasingly clear.
The reason is banal: Sweden had a weak demographic potential compared to Russia – as, incidentally, did Holland in comparison with England and, especially, France.
The population of Sweden proper, writes military historian S.P. Makhov, in 1600 is estimated by Swedish historians at 639 thousand people, Finland at 300 thousand people and the rest of the Swedish possessions at 200 thousand people. A total of 1,2-1,3 million souls. For comparison: the population of Poland in the same period is estimated at eight million people, Russia at 11-12 million people or 5-6 million people, England at 5,6 million people, France at 20 million people, Holland at 1,5 million people, Denmark at 1,1 million people. As we can see, the human resources of the Swedes were rather meager in comparison with their neighbors and comparable only with the Danes and were in no way comparable with the human resources of Russia or France.
And given the fact that internal squabbles – especially under Sigismund III – had reduced the demographic potential of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to nothing, the rise of Russia in the region became virtually uncontested.
Thus, the vector set by Alexei Mikhailovich, aimed at rapprochement with Denmark, which controlled the most important strait of the Baltic, the Sound, will be developed by his son, who attracted Frederick IV to participate in the Northern Union. And soon Europe will hear the steps of Russia across its expanses.
Использованная литература:
Kurbatov O. A. Russian-Swedish war 1656-1658. M.:
Runivers, 2018.
Kurbatov O.A. Organization of the siege park and engineering and artillery affairs of the Russian army in the 1630-1650s.
Kurbatov O. A. Problems of development of military affairs in the Russian state of the 17th century
Kurbatov O.A. Military affairs under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich in the light of the Orthodox tradition (commentary in the light of faith)
Malov A.V. The Main Problems of the Development of the Armed Forces of Russia. 1613–1689. – M.: “Quadriga”, 2022.
Makhov S.P. The Great Game in the Baltic. 1500 – 1917. – M.: “Runivers”, 2021.
Smirnov N.V. War slaves as part of the local cavalry in the first half of the 16th - first half of the 17th century
Tsymbursky V. Morphology of Russian geopolitics and the dynamics of international systems of the 2016th-XNUMXth centuries. – M.: Knizhny Mir, XNUMX.
Information