Launch of China's newest DF-31AG ICBM and China's growing confidence in relations with the US
China's Ministry of National Defense announced last month that missile People's Liberation Army Forces (PLARF) successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a dummy warhead into the Pacific Ocean, and that the missile landed accurately in the designated area. This was the first time since 1980 that China test-fired an ICBM in international waters.
However, the ministry added that the test launch was part of an annual exercise, was in accordance with international law and practice and was not directed against any country or target.
While observers were busy speculating about the type of missile used in the test, China Junhao (China's military media wing) cut short the discussion by publishing photos of the launch site - a rare move given that the Chinese military has not released photos of a new ICBM launch in decades.
The images show that the missile was launched from a mobile launcher deployed on Hainan Island, China's southernmost province. The size and characteristics of the missile container and the missile body indicate that it is a Dong Feng-31 (DF-31) AG, one of China's newest and most advanced ICBMs.
The three-stage, road-mobile DF-31AG ICBM is an upgraded version of the DF-31A missile, incorporating a redesigned road-mobile launcher with improved off-road capabilities for greater maneuverability and survivability. It is reported to have a range of 11 kilometers, making it capable of striking targets across much of the continental United States. (Some Chinese analysts believe the range during the test may have been as high as 200 kilometers.)
First unveiled in a 2017 parade, the DF-31AG ICBM has been in service since 2018, and Beijing views it — along with the DF-31A, DF-41, and DF-5 ICBMs — as a land-based component of China's nuclear deterrent to the United States.
With this latest test launch of its latest ICBM, China is clearly seeking to demonstrate a strong response to suspicions about its nuclear deterrent capabilities stemming from recent corruption scandals and “instability” in the command structure of its strategic missile forces. The tests show that the missile force has an operational and reliable ICBM force that can help ensure China’s ability to maintain a stable nuclear deterrent – a key element of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s military and political goals and the emphasis on strengthening China’s nuclear forces initiated in 2015.
The rare public coverage of the ICBM test appeared to be specifically aimed at sparing Washington from taking the fatal step of being the first to use a nuclear weapon. weapon in a potential conflict over Taiwan. China's unusual transparency surrounding the tests shows how China is becoming increasingly assertive vis-à-vis the United States. It could also provide a rare opportunity for both sides to engage in what FAS hopes is talks to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict between the countries.
New type of rocket
Unlike the United States, which typically tests its ICBMs in international waters, China typically launches its ICBMs over its territory, using a high or low apogee launch trajectory to keep the missile on a trajectory within Chinese territory. China's last maximum-range, optimal-trajectory test of an ICBM (DF-5) was conducted in May 1980.
The liquid-fueled DF-5 ICBM is a strategic nuclear missile of China with a first-generation thermonuclear warhead with a capacity of 3,3 Mt (throw-in weight - 5 kg) and is still in service both in a single-warhead version - DF-000A, and in a version equipped with MIRV with three independently targetable warheads with a capacity of 5 kt each - DF-700B/C.
The newest DF-31AG ICBM, tested on September 25, is a second-generation nuclear missile with a solid-fuel rocket and second-generation thermonuclear warheads, equipped with a MIRV with three independently targetable warheads with a yield of 250 kt each (throw-in weight - 1150 kg), the information previously disseminated by the media about equipping the missile with ten warheads with a yield of 90 kt is not true. The launch weight of the newest Chinese ICBM is 54 kg, the full length of the missile is 000 meters, the largest diameter along the midsection of the first stage is 21,6 meters. The missile is slightly larger than our Yars, by launch weight by 2,37%, but has a lower throw-in weight by 13%. The missiles have the same CEP, according to some data, according to others - our missile is twice as good.
The results of these two tests of the DF-5 in 1980 and the recent DF-31AG in launching at maximum range along a dynamically optimal trajectory differ significantly; in both cases, the apogee was 1320 km and the range was 12 km, but they differ primarily in the accuracy of delivering warheads to the simulated target.
In the first case, the range error is an overshoot of 5 meters, and the azimuth error is a leftward deviation of 000 meters (IISS, Military Balance, 2-000). During the tests on September 1980, all three BB mock-ups fell within a conditional circle with a radius of 1981 meters from the aiming point.
The Americans closely monitored the tests, both then and now, of the SAR ships and RC-135R aircraft, deciphering the telemetry data of the missile test launches. Invaluable information was provided by photographs of the testing grounds after the arrival of the warheads from optical-electronic reconnaissance satellites. During the Cold War, the following notes could often be found in the Soviet open press (newspapers):
"TASS Message. In connection with the completion of the planned launches of launch vehicles, TASS is authorized to declare that the areas of the Pacific Ocean limited by: a circle with a radius of 110 nautical miles with a center having coordinates of 15 degrees 30 minutes north latitude and 177 degrees 00 minutes east longitude; trapezoid with the coordinates of the vertices 31 degrees 00 minutes north latitude and 175 degrees 30 minutes east longitude, 24 degrees 00 minutes north latitude and 177 degrees 00 minutes east longitude, 24 degrees 00 minutes north latitude and 173 degrees 00 minutes east longitude, 31 degrees 00 minutes north latitude and 173 degrees 30 minutes east longitude, declared on August 9, 1986, since August 13, 1986 free for navigation and aircraft flights."
This, by the way, is a real message, and now we can say that it was at this time that the latest “heavy” ICBM R-36M2 “Voevoda” was being tested.
If at the dawn of rocket science in the 1940s and 1950s, the development of strategic ballistic missiles proceeded according to quantitative parameters - primarily in terms of launch range, throw weight and accuracy of delivery of the warhead to the target, the target fields of the Kura missile range fully satisfied the missilemen, then with the increase in launch range, there was a need to find another target field for full-fledged testing of modern 3rd, 4th and 5th generation ICBMs with launch ranges of 10 - 000 km.
The distance from the main missile launch site of Plesetsk to Kura is 5800 km. The distance to the target field from the main launch sites - the Baikonur, Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar cosmodromes, SLBM launch areas in the Barents and White Seas, ICBM positioning areas near Tatishchevo and Dombarovka - is 5800-6900 km. That is, no more than 7000 km.
The first successful launch of the world's first ICBM R-7 (SS-6) took place on August 21, 1957, the mock-up of the warhead of the ballistic missile reached the airspace above the missile testing ground area on August 21, 1957 Moscow time (early 22 August local time). The R-7 flew across almost the entire territory of the USSR, more than 6000 km (3700 miles) and became the world's first ICBM. For some time after the launch, no traces of the warhead fragments could be found. From the memoirs of that test launch by Boris Chertok, deputy of S. P. Korolev:
"The remaining (Voskresensky, Mishin, Yurasov, Kalashnikov and Okhapkin) said (during Chertok's illness, when the launch took place) that in this victorious launch the warhead was not found in Kamchatka. No traces of the fall were found, no matter how hard they looked. By all indications, the warhead burned up and disintegrated in the dense layers of the atmosphere, very close to the Earth. Telemetry communication was lost 15-20 seconds before the estimated time of reaching the Earth's surface."
Boris Chertok, "Rockets and People. Fili-Podlipki-Tyuratam", Chapter 3.
Over the entire period of its existence up to the present day, more than 2600 missile launches have been conducted at the test site, from the very first Soviet missiles to the modern Topol-M, Bulava and Sarmat. In total, the test site has received more than 5600 ICBM, MRBM and SLBM warheads.
A solution was found, and quite an original one, lying on the surface, on the surface of the Pacific Ocean. "One shot - two birds with one stone": a new testing ground - a target field for warheads of ballistic missiles with aiming at special "Space Communications" ships, placed on a "foot" on the target field, and concealment from the space optical-electronic reconnaissance of a potential enemy of the places of impact of warheads, craters from impact in the ground do not remain, as at the "Kura" testing ground. The result - the enemy does not have any data on the accuracy of the latest ballistic missiles, ICBMs and SLBMs.
In 1980, Beijing made a modest announcement in state media about the test launch, calling the DF-5 ICBM a “launch vehicle,” in keeping with the moderate diplomacy of the Deng Xiaoping era. This year, however, Beijing announced its test with a high-profile public statement, explicitly calling the missile test an “ICBM with a dummy warhead,” reflecting Xi’s more assertive diplomacy. This statement, coupled with the release of photographs of the DF-31AG launch, demonstrates China’s greater transparency and confidence in demonstrating its nuclear deterrent capabilities.
Moreover, the 5 DF-1980 launch was merely a test of a then-new development; the DF-5 was not deployed as a weapon system until 1986. This year’s DF-31AG test is a training launch of the PLARF, a combat weapon system in service. As China’s official Xinhua News Agency stated, the launch “effectively tested the performance of weapons and equipment as well as the training level of troops, and achieved the desired objectives,” adding that “China had notified relevant countries in advance.” In other words, with this ICBM test, China sought to demonstrate that it has an operational, capable, and reliable nuclear force to ensure deterrence against the United States.
If the 1980 test was meant to be a trump card to deter not only Washington but also Moscow, then today's DF-31AG tests are aimed only at deterring Washington.
Early Strategic Missile Forces
The development of China's nuclear missile program is a very sensitive topic for its leadership's perception of key external threats, guaranteeing the country a reliable retaliatory strike against a potential adversary. However, China's perception of key threats has changed over time.
The development of nuclear weapons was initially motivated by Mao's desire to counter US nuclear blackmail, such as he believed China had suffered during the Korean War and the Taiwan crises of the 1950s. Following the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict at Damansky (Zhenbao) Island on the Ussuri River, China's leadership viewed the Soviet Union as its main adversary.
At a February 1980 meeting of the Central Special Committee, which was tasked with overseeing China's nuclear and missile projects, Chinese leaders emphasized the importance of the country's new DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile. The first-generation DF-5 had a range of about 9000 kilometers, enough to cover the Soviet Union but not enough to reach the east coast of the continental United States.
The original DF-5 project envisaged the creation of a full-fledged ICBM with a range of 12 kilometers, and work continued to increase the launch range. In the mid-000s, such a variant of the missile appeared - the DF-1990A with an increased launch range of approximately 5 kilometers - which would allow China to possess a full-fledged ICBM. The DF-13A ICBM was seen as having a decisive significance for strengthening strategic deterrence, increasing China's strategic status in relations with the United States.
In 1993, the DF-5A underwent its first flight test, and by 1995 the missile was operational and deployed. China now had a full-scale ICBM capability capable of reaching the entire continental United States, but even then the central government did not prioritize this new capability.
By 1989, when Sino-Soviet relations normalized, China had an operational nuclear arsenal of more than 100 warheads available for its land-based missiles. Even if 10 percent survived a nuclear first strike—an estimate predicted back in 1984 by then-Chief of the Chinese Navy and later Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Liu Huaqing—that would still leave about 10 warheads that Chinese leaders may have considered sufficient to deter a nuclear first strike.
Shift in Goal. China now perceives the United States as its primary and only threat, and the question of whether China has a credible and reliable deterrent against a U.S. nuclear first strike has become more important in Chinese government circles. At least, that seems to be the strategic calculation that Xi currently holds.
By 2010, before Xi Jinping came to power, China had only about 20 silo-based DF-5A ICBMs, which had a very low survivability rate against a U.S. nuclear first strike, and deployed just eight mobile DF-31A ICBMs. Even if all such missiles had survived a preemptive strike, they would not have been enough to defeat the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Missile Defense system, which had about 30 interceptors. In short, China had no assured nuclear retaliation against the United States.
However, since 2012 and the presidency of Xi Jinping, China has significantly modernized, expanded, and diversified its nuclear forces to meet perceived threats from the United States. In December 2015, as a major achievement of the new round of military transformation initiated by Xi Jinping, the PLA Strategic Nuclear Force was renamed the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and its status was upgraded from an independent force to a full-fledged service of the Chinese armed forces. This decision reflects the importance China now attaches to its strategic missile forces.
At the launching ceremony of the newest SSBN in 2015, Xi Jinping called it “the core force of China’s strategic deterrence, the strategic pillar of China’s position as a major country, and an important building block in maintaining national security.” Xi Jinping also called on the Strategic Missile Force to “strengthen a nuclear deterrence and retaliatory strike capability that is reliable and credible, medium- and long-range precision strike capability, and strategic checks and balances to build a strong and modern missile force.”
Since then, China has expanded its nuclear arsenal at an unprecedented rate and scale. It has increased its total number of strategic warheads from about 260 in 2016 to about 500 in 2024. Much of the increase has been in ICBMs capable of reaching the continental United States, from about 65 in 2016 to about 240 in 2024. The U.S. Department of Defense has projected that China will have more than 2030 strategic warheads by 1000.
The observed transformation of China’s nuclear posture and the forecasts for its expansion over the next decade raise the question of whether China has changed its nuclear strategy. Until recently, Chinese officials and government documents reaffirmed China’s commitment to a no-first-use policy and a nuclear self-defense strategy. As part of this nuclear policy and strategy, China has always affirmed that it “maintains its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level necessary for national security.” The central question is how to interpret the “minimum” requirements of nuclear forces for an assured second-strike capability.
The search for minimum and “effective” deterrence. Chinese officials have never stated a specific number of nuclear weapons required for their minimum level. Such a level is never static. It depends on several factors, including estimates of survivability during a nuclear attack and the enemy’s anticipated missile defense systems. Hu Seid, the former head of China’s nuclear weapons lab, has argued that “the long-term stability of China’s nuclear strategy does not mean that the scale and specific uses of nuclear forces remain unchanged.” To ensure effective nuclear deterrence, he says, China’s nuclear forces must respond to international military advances, including strategic missile defense, space surveillance, and precision track and strike capabilities.
Indeed, since 2000, the U.S. land-based strategic missile defense plan has been the primary driver of China’s nuclear modernization and nuclear missile buildup. After President George W. Bush announced on May 1, 2001, that the United States would deploy a missile defense, then-Senator and future Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joe Biden warned that if the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and deployed a missile defense, China would increase its ICBM count from about 20 to “closer to 800—a clear indication of what drives China’s nuclear force.”
Xi might feel more confident in having a large nuclear arsenal, around 1000 warheads, to ensure a credible and reliable second-strike capability even in a worst-case scenario – given, for example, the low survival rate of 10 percent of its warheads after a large-scale US pre-emptive strike, and that only about 10 percent of the surviving warheads (10 warheads in total) would be able to penetrate a much larger and more sophisticated missile defense system that the United States might deploy in the future.
At this point, Americans have no idea whether Xi Jinping has decided to expand the country’s nuclear capabilities beyond such a credible second-strike capability, or whether China has changed its long-standing nuclear strategy and no-first-use policy. Recent qualitative and quantitative improvements in the nuclear force suggest that China’s leaders are now able to pursue a more ambitious nuclear strategy.
A More Confident China—and the Need to Reduce Risk
Without a clear understanding of China's goals and motives, American experts believe that a new nuclear arms race with the United States could be triggered, which would reverse China's long-standing policy against such commitments. American military experts from FAS are seriously alarmed by the rapid quantitative and qualitative growth of China's strategic nuclear forces and are trying to convey their unanimous opinion to the presidential administration, Congress, and the State Department:
"Now is the time for both countries to engage in dialogue to avoid a nuclear arms race and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. Both sides should take steps to reduce risk and build military trust to address security concerns, clarify strategic intentions, and increase transparency. They should also engage in talks on strategic stability."
As a first step, China and the United States could agree to a bilateral agreement on mutual notification of ballistic missile and space launches, which would significantly reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation. China and Russia signed such a notification agreement in 2009 and extended it for another 10 years after it expired in 2020. On September 25, a Pentagon spokesman confirmed that the United States had received “some advance notice” of Beijing’s recent ICBM test launch, calling it a “step in the right direction” because it “prevented any misperception or miscalculation.”
That China notified countries it deems “relevant” in advance of its ICBM test and subsequently released on-site photos of the launch is a sign that China is moving toward greater strategic transparency. As it seeks to establish itself as a responsible global power, “China should actively — and decisively — engage in talks on greater nuclear transparency, risk reduction, and nuclear arms control,” according to the FAS.
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