Reflections on the future of VTOL aircraft in the Russian Armed Forces in general and the navy in particular
Not long ago, VO published articles in which the respected Roman Skomorokhov substantiates the advantages of creating a deck aviation based on vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL). I will express my thoughts on this topic.
A bit of history
Interest in such machines arose in the 50s. It was due to the rapid development of jet aviation: planes became faster, larger, heavier and required kilometer-long runways for their basing. But it was obvious that such large-scale structures would become the target of various types of enemy ammunition for tactical nuclear weapon inclusive. At the same time, the parameters of the latest aircraft engines allowed, in theory, to create VTOL aircraft that would not need such runways.
In the West, the first attempts to create a VTOL aircraft did not lead to anything good: the matter was limited to 1-2 unsuccessful prototypes. But in 1961, the NATO technical commission formulated the requirements for a vertical takeoff and landing fighter-bomber, with the total need for such aircraft estimated at 5 units. This, naturally, caused quite a stir among aircraft manufacturers. The Americans, Germans, French, Italians, English and even the Dutch presented their VTOL aircraft projects.
However, only the British managed to bring their project to series production. We are talking, of course, about the VTOL aircraft "Harrier".
This aircraft became a perfect illustration of the proverb: "a camel is a horse made in England." Low speed, short range, modest combat load, lack of radar made the "Harrier" in its combat capabilities no more than a subsonic attack aircraft with far from the best characteristics in its class. However, the unrestrained economy into which the sirs and peers of Foggy Albion fell led to the fact that the "Harrier" became the only aircraft that could receive the once formidable Royal Air Force. fleetThe admirals rightly decided that something flying was better than nothing at all, and tried to mold the Harrier into a fighter-bomber.
What came of this was demonstrated by the Falklands conflict.
VTOL aircraft in the Falklands conflict
The Argentines had a formal advantage in the air, but they had no airfield in the Falklands where modern fighters could be based. Accordingly, their aircraft had to operate at the maximum radius, and besides, the Argentine Air Force simply could not use its aircraft with high intensity.
By the time the British troops began landing, the Argentines had at least 75-85 Skyhawks, Mirages, Daggers and Canberras. This does not include all sorts of small stuff like the propeller-driven aircraft of the Pucara Malvinas Squadron, technically faulty aircraft, as well as units that were fully combat-ready but reserved in case of a Chilean invasion.
Nevertheless, on the most difficult and hardest day for the British, May 21, that is, the first day of the battle on the "bomb alley", the Argentine Air Force made only 58 sorties. And in general, during the culmination - that same battle on the "bomb alley", which lasted 5 days, the Argentines had enough for only 163 sorties or 32,6 sorties per day. And not all of them were directed against the British ships.
The British had 25 Sea Harriers plus 6 regular Harriers that were not equipped with radar. I do not know whether the latter were used to intercept Argentine aircraft in the air. Considering that of the 25 Sea Harriers, probably about 22 machines (80%) were operational, the British formally clearly had something to counter the Argentine raids.
But in practice it turned out to be a complete embarrassment.
Because of the short range of the Harriers, the British commander had to take a risk and bring his carrier group into an area where they could be attacked by enemy aircraft. There was no other way to ensure that VTOL aircraft were constantly on duty over the landing zone.
With no less than 22 radar-equipped and combat-ready aircraft, the British could not provide two combat patrols, one over the landing site and one over the aircraft carriers, although they were separated by only 80 miles. The choice was made in favor of the landing zone…
The result: the Argentines, having fixed the place where the Sea Harriers take off and land with radar from the Falklands, were able to determine the location of the British aircraft carriers and direct their Super Etendards at them. As a result, two launched Exocet missiles hit the Atlantic Conveyor, which greatly complicated the logistics of the British expeditionary forces, destroying a unit of heavy helicopters that this transport was transporting. The fact that none of the aircraft carriers were damaged can be attributed to the weakness of the attack (only two missiles), the low resistance to interference of the Exocet seeker and, undoubtedly, the great luck of the British.
Thus, the aircraft carriers, left without protection, were exposed to serious risk, but they also failed to cover the landing site. In just 5 days of fighting on the "bomb alley", the Argentines launched 26 air attacks, in which 85 aircraft took part. Of these, 22 (84,6%) were successful, and of the 85 aircraft, 72 (84,7%) broke through to the British ships. And this despite the fact that the Argentines did not cover their attack formations with fighters, which could have engaged the British patrol in air combat, paving the way for the attack aircraft.
It is quite obvious that the combat debut of the Sea Harriers as air superiority fighters did not take place at all. Despite the presence of radar, these aircraft, apparently, were never able to detect an air enemy on their own. There was one case when the Sea Harriers seemed to detect an attack by the Mentors, but even there, most likely, they were called in for help by an attacked British helicopter. That is, even being in close proximity, the British pilots could not work ahead of the threat, but only responded to the threat, receiving information from the attacked ships.
Things would probably have gone better if the British had had AWACS helicopters at their disposal. But it must be understood that even if they had, due to their short time in the air, such helicopters still could not have provided round-the-clock coverage of the landing zone.
The fact that the British Sea Harriers managed to achieve success at all (they shot down 1 aircraft in air combat between 25 and 18 May) is explained primarily by the antediluvian tactics of the Argentine Air Force, which was forced to throw its strike aircraft into attacks with free-fall bombs. Moreover, without air cover capable of tying down the British air patrol in combat.
In those cases when the Argentines used more modern methods: opening the enemy's order with the help of AWACS aircraft (they had them!) and the subsequent attack with supersonic attack aircraft equipped with Exocet anti-ship missiles, the British pilots could not resist them at all. The Argentines carried out three such attacks in the complete absence of any counteraction from the British VTOL aircraft. Moreover, their ancient AWACS aircraft became completely unusable after the first attack, so that in the future the Argentines used other aircraft for reconnaissance, including regular passenger airliners.
Of course, it can't be said that the Sea Harriers were useless in the Falklands. By shooting down enemy aircraft, they ultimately contributed to the exhaustion of the Argentine air force, but they succeeded only because of the latter's weakness. But as a means of preventing air attacks, the British VTOL aircraft suffered a complete fiasco.
What would happen if the British were faced with a well-organized air force capable of conducting American-style air operations?
When the enemy formation is found and monitored by ELINT and AEW aircraft. When a specially assigned air clearing group is engaged in combating the aircraft covering the formation. When strike aircraft deploy, hiding behind the radio horizon for the time being, preparing to attack from several directions. When a demonstration group begins the attack, with the aim of forcing the enemy to turn on their fire control radars, and then these radars are jammed by a suppression group using interference and anti-radar missiles. And, while the enemy Defense overloaded, strike groups carry out a massive missile attack from several sides.
I suppose the question of how long a British carrier group would have held out under such an attack is rhetorical.
VTOL aircraft in Western countries in the late 20th – early 21st centuries
Of course, the Falklands proved beyond a doubt that VTOL aircraft were unsuitable as fighter-bombers. But as attack aircraft they demonstrated one very important advantage that horizontal takeoff and landing aircraft did not and could not have.
After the landing of the main forces, the British quickly built a field airfield, with a runway only 40 meters long, which was laid out with aluminum slabs directly on the ground. As a result, the aircraft based there could be at the attack site 20-25 minutes after the request was received. The Harriers based on aircraft carriers needed much more time.
The Americans really liked this idea. And they brought it to life, incorporating VTOL aircraft into their Marine Corps (MC) and upgrading the Harriers to the Harrier II version.
But you have to understand: in the US Armed Forces, the Harrier was not a multi-role fighter in any form. It is a highly specialized aircraft, a battlefield attack aircraft, which is needed only and exclusively by the Marine Corps due to its specificity. The actions of the ground army are supported by the Air Force, but a large landing can only be supported by aircraft from an aircraft carrier.
But it is dangerous to place an aircraft carrier in plain sight of the enemy, its main defense is stealth, so keeping it in close proximity to the landing site is not always possible. At the same time, operating from afar, an aircraft carrier can, of course, provide air cover for the landing zone, but it will be difficult and not always possible for it to constantly keep attack aircraft over it. For direct support of the Marines, it will be more effective to use VTOL aircraft, since they can take off from the UDC located near the shore or even from an improvised airfield on the captured bridgehead.
Harriers performed roughly the same functions in Spain and Italy.
Their fleets are NATO fleets, with their assigned roles and division of responsibility. The small aircraft carriers of the British, Spanish, and Italians performed primarily anti-submarine defense functions, and secondarily, strike functions, including as a means of supporting landings. But no one set the task of gaining air supremacy before them and their air groups, of course, and they are incapable of solving it. Perhaps in a confrontation with some African country, but even among them there were some that it would be better not to go to on the Giuseppe Garibaldi without the support of the "big good guys" in the form of the Air Force or American aircraft carriers.
The Harrier II is a highly specialized naval attack aircraft, which, of course, will fight in the air if attacked, but such a situation is force majeure for it. Since air combat is certainly not included in the typical list of tasks of an attack aircraft.
In fact, this is the niche that VTOL aircraft have historically been able to occupy.
Yak-141 USSR and US JSF program
The American program (Joint Strike Fighter) was extremely ambitious, because within its framework it was planned to create an aircraft capable of replacing several combat aircraft at once, including the F/A-18 C/D and F-16 multirole fighters and the A-10, AV-8B and EA-6B attack aircraft.
It turned out, of course, with major reservations, because it is impossible to replace both a pure attack aircraft and a multi-role fighter-bomber with one machine without serious compromises. Especially considering the requirement that one of the aircraft modifications must be a VTOL aircraft.
Nevertheless, the Americans ended up with a rather interesting family of aircraft, represented by three modifications: the F-35A for the Air Force, the F-35C for their naval aviation, and the F-35B – a VTOL aircraft for the Marine Corps.
This family of aircraft, let's say, albeit limited, is still suitable for air combat. In close air combat (CAC), the F-35 is inferior to American 4th generation aircraft, such as the latest F-16 modifications and the F/A-18 Super Hornet, but can still stand up for itself.
At the same time, the F-35 family is a stealth fighter and as such has an advantage in long-range air combat (LRAC). Unlike the Harriers and our Yak-38, they have a full-fledged avionics of a light fighter, with a first-class radar, optical location station, etc. The maximum combat load of the F-35 exceeds that of the Harrier and is quite comparable to the A-6E attack aircraft. But, of course, only if the F-35 carries it on an external sling, and then - goodbye to stealth.
In other words, the Americans managed to change the role of VTOL aircraft, shifting them from pure attack aircraft to albeit ambiguous, but still multifunctional fighters. It should be said that the USSR managed to do this even earlier - the Yak-141 VTOL aircraft in a number of performance characteristics (of course, not all) reached the level of the contemporary MiG-29 and could quite successfully conduct air battles with the same F/A-18 and F-16.
Of course, due to the need to carry additional equipment to ensure vertical takeoff and landing, neither the Yak-141 nor the F-35B could match the capabilities of horizontal takeoff and landing aircraft. Thus, the Yak-141 was equipped with as many as three engines, two of which were needed only for takeoff and landing operations, and the F-35B had to spend space in the fuselage for a powerful fan.
F-35B vs F-35A
Let's see what the designers had to sacrifice to provide a conventional aircraft with VTOL capability. To do this, let's compare the performance characteristics of two maximally similar aircraft, created at the same technological level and designed to solve similar problems. Namely, the F-35A, made according to the classical scheme, and the VTOL F-35B. The data on their performance characteristics differ somewhat in Russian-language sources, I took the most accessible ones.
The result, as they say, is obvious. The F-35B is heavier, but carries one and a half times less payload. At the same time, there is a strong suspicion that the data, so to speak, is slightly embellished in favor of the F-35B. The point is this.
As you know, the F-35B is not exactly a VTOL aircraft, it is a short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft. As you can see from the table above, the F-35A carries 37% more fuel than the F-35B. But for some reason, its range is only 33% greater. This could only be possible if the F-35B were more fuel efficient.
Meanwhile, it is obvious that during landing operations, when the F-35B lands vertically, its engine operates at full power, and fuel consumption should be greater than that of the F-35A. Therefore, I have an assumption that the flight range of 1 km for the F-670B is indicated for the case when it takes off and lands horizontally, that is, like a normal aircraft.
Even if I'm wrong, the stated flight range is only achieved with a short takeoff rather than a vertical takeoff. And with what payload can the F-35B take off vertically?
I didn’t find any precise data on this matter, but let’s look at the domestic Yak-141.
As you can see, the Yak-141's payload was reduced by almost one and a half times when replacing short takeoff with vertical takeoff. Assuming that the ratio will be similar for the F-35B, we will come to the conclusion that VTOL aircraft with vertical takeoff will carry only 36% of the payload (fuel, weapons) of what an equivalent horizontal takeoff and landing multi-role fighter can lift!
In fact, even with such a load, a VTOL aircraft can solve some combat tasks, but only a few. For example, a pair of our Yak-141s, located on the deck of a Kiev-class heavy aircraft carrier, could perform a quick, emergency vertical takeoff to intercept air targets in the immediate vicinity of the formation – and then the rest of the Yaks would follow, taking off with a short run and a full supply of fuel. Or, say, the same F-35B, standing at the “jump airfield” on the beachhead where the landing force has landed, could also urgently take off and drop a couple of small bombs on the enemy in the immediate vicinity of its location.
This is quite clear, but it is also obvious that relying on tactics in which VTOL aircraft will take off vertically, rather than with a short takeoff run, is completely counterproductive. In this case, we will simply turn the VTOL aircraft into a “mainmast defense aircraft” with extremely limited combat effectiveness.
Deck for VTOL aircraft
In view of the above, creating aircraft carriers, like the Project 1123 anti-submarine cruisers, that do not have a flight deck of sufficient size to ensure the shortened takeoff of a VTOL aircraft, would be akin to a state crime.
If we suddenly want to create a multi-role VTOL fighter for the fleet, then we will have to worry about suitable ships for it.
Of course, VTOL aircraft can be placed on universal landing ships, which are currently being built according to Project 23900. But why?
Aircraft carriers from the UDC project 23900 (Ivan Rogov type) are frankly worthless. The main task of the landing ship is, oddly enough, the transportation and landing of troops, and the Ivan Rogov is capable of delivering up to 1 marines with 000 units of equipment to the landing site. The ship naturally has the necessary premises for them, in addition, a lot of space is taken up by the dock chamber, which accommodates up to 75 landing craft.
Naturally, these people and equipment must be supplied with everything necessary, including, but not limited to, food, fuel and ammunition. And not for a short battle, but for long-term intensive combat operations. It is not surprising that all this takes up a lot of space on the ship, and there is regrettably little space left for everything else.
For example, there was no room for a powerful power plant on the Ivan Rogov, which is why the maximum speed of the Project 23900 UDC does not exceed 22 knots. Consequently, a formation created on its basis will obviously lose speed - frigates, large anti-submarine ships and other ships will have to adapt to the slow flagship. At the same time, the Rogov's air group is frankly small - up to 20 helicopters. That is, using it as an aircraft carrier, we can count on 12 VTOL aircraft, 3-4 AWACS helicopters, 1-2 rescue helicopters and 2-3 ASW helicopters.
At the same time, the standard displacement of the ship is 30 tons. A specially built aircraft carrier, even a small one, will be superior to a UDC in all respects as a sea airfield. Thus, the Indian Vikrant has a standard displacement of 000 tons. But at the same time, its speed is 39 knots, and it is capable of basing a full-fledged air regiment of multi-role fighters (000 Rafale-M) and 30 helicopters.
The Japanese, creating their "helicopter-carrying destroyers" Izumo with an eye on basing the F-35B, built ships with a continuous flight deck 248 m long and 38 m wide. But at the same time, their speed reaches 30 knots, and the standard displacement is only 19 tons. Despite the fact that in terms of the composition of the air group, Izumo and Ivan Rogov are, if not equivalent, then comparable.
Short takeoff is the death knell for VTOL aircraft
If we want naval aviation to use VTOL aircraft to their full 100% potential, then we need to build aircraft carriers with a continuous flight deck along the entire length of the ship, that is, similar to classic aircraft carriers.
But if so, why not create a ship of approximately the same size and equip it with a ski-jump and arresting gear so that it could provide a base for horizontal take-off and landing aircraft?
Perhaps it is not worth landing heavy fighters on such an aircraft carrier, but something like a "maritime" version of the Su-75 "Checkmate" would fit quite well. Well, there are no heavy fighters among the VTOL aircraft either.
Perhaps the Su-75 will not be able to take off from a ski-jump with maximum takeoff weight, but so what? If we make a VTOL aircraft based on it, then such a VTOL aircraft will lose one and a half times in payload weight, as happened with the F-35B relative to the F-35A. And the fact that a VTOL aircraft based on the Su-75 will be able to take off “in full combat mode” will not result in any gain in combat radius, patrol time, etc. compared to a regular Su-75 – no matter what the loss.
Yes, an aircraft carrier without catapults will not be able to provide basing for AWACS aircraft. Well, VTOL carriers are even more incapable of doing this. At the same time, in terms of construction costs, the difference between a ship capable of basing a Su-75 regiment and a ship capable of receiving a VTOL regiment based on the Shakhmat will be minimal. But creating a carrier-based version of the Su-75 is generally not difficult, especially since we already have extensive experience in "navalizing" the Su-27 and MiG-29. And creating a VTOL aircraft is a huge financial outlay that, alas, will never pay for itself.
VTOL aircraft – there are more disadvantages than advantages
The whole point is that the number of VTOL aircraft in the armed forces will never be large. The Aerospace Forces simply do not need them in any form, which, by the way, we can clearly see in the example of the same USA. The American Air Force is not at all eager to acquire the F-35B, and the reasons are quite clear.
Firstly, the F-35B’s payload is one and a half times smaller than that of the F-35A.
Secondly, the cost. No matter how you look at it, the F-35A is almost a quarter cheaper. It doesn’t seem like much, but for the money needed to purchase three F-35B regiments, you can buy four F-35A regiments – of course, without taking into account operating costs, but still.
And thirdly, it is impossible to ignore the fact that, despite all the scientific and technological progress of recent decades, vertical takeoff and landing remains a complex aviation stunt, the implementation of which greatly affects the safety of VTOL aircraft compared to horizontal takeoff and landing aircraft.
VTOL aircraft have never been a model of reliability and, alas, are not one now. I will not recall the "formidable Yak flies in the sky", I will take the "kosher" aircraft of the "enlightened West". So, for example, out of 81 Sea Harriers received by the British armed forces, 27 were lost for non-combat reasons. Out of 30 Sea Harriers transferred to India, 12 were lost for the same reasons. The Americans pointed out that in 2003 the number of incidents with the AV-8 Harrier II per 10 flight hours was five times higher than the same indicator for other aircraft.
It is too early to talk about the F-35B accident rate, but it should be noted that out of 11 F-35 crashes that have occurred from 2018 to the present, F-35Bs account for six, or 54,5%. And this is despite the fact that the share of F-35B production in the total production of Lightnings is about 20%. It is obvious that the accident rate of American vertical-lifters is many times higher than that of the F-35A and F-35C, and is actually in the same accident range (4,8 times higher than conventional aircraft) as the Harrier.
Prospects for VTOL aircraft in the Russian Armed Forces
Today, the Russian Federation's military space forces are in a severe crisis. They lack specialized radio-technical reconnaissance (RTR) aircraft, EW and AWACS, and much more. All of these are priority needs, and until they are met, spending money on developing and producing small series of VTOL aircraft and the AWACS helicopters needed for them is not just irrational – it is criminal.
The same applies to the fleet. What does the Russian Navy lack... The latest minesweepers, equipped with modern systems to combat the mine threat, and reconnaissance aircraft, and anti-submarine aircraft, and modern helicopters, and ships to protect the OVR, as well as corvettes, frigates, multi-purpose submarines, modern non-nuclear submarines - none of this is available at all, or is not available in sufficient quantities. And what about modern mine weapons, torpedoes, anti-torpedoes, decoys, and underwater situation lighting?
Against the background of the total shortage of the fleet of all of the above and many other equally important things, funding for the design and construction programs of VTOL aircraft, AWACS helicopters and carrier ships for them will be a feast during the plague. Until the safety of the near sea zone from underwater, surface and air threats is restored, until we are ready to ensure the unimpeded withdrawal of our submarines from their bases, until the fleet receives a sufficient number of modern patrol aircraft and helicopters to detect enemy submarines, at least in the adjacent seas, etc., etc., it is clearly premature to talk about the development of the fleet's deck aviation.
The VTOL concept itself is undoubtedly interesting. Over the years, VTOL aircraft have evolved from pure attack aircraft to multi-role fighters of sorts, albeit with significant limitations. But it is important to understand that VTOL aircraft were and remain highly specialized aircraft, and it makes sense to work on them only when all other problems have been solved at an acceptable level. It would certainly be a good idea to have 4-6 VTOL aircraft on the deck of the Ivan Rogov, which is going to land troops: as a last line of defense against enemy aircraft and to support the marines. Of course, the ability of VTOL aircraft to operate from improvised airfields, including in mountainous terrain, could prove decisive in a number of tactical situations.
But spending serious money on creating VTOL aircraft in conditions when the armed forces are clearly short of multi-role fighters, when their operations are not supported by AWACS, ELINT and EW aircraft, when the fleet does not have any modern patrol aircraft, etc., is completely counterproductive. It is necessary to first satisfy basic needs and only then move on to secondary and specific ones.
On the future of Russian carrier-based aviation
Of course, if we are ever going to return Russia to the ranks of first-class naval powers, we will need aircraft carriers. And it would be a shame to lose the experience that the Russian Navy gained by operating the only heavy aircraft carrier in its composition, the Admiral Kuznetsov, even if it was largely negative. And experience in building large combat ships is not gained so quickly either. Experience in providing basing and repairs is also important.
To understand all this, it is enough to look at the national disaster that the two newest British aircraft carriers have become. It seems that England was the mistress of the seas not so long ago, it seems that the British built large aircraft carriers, and operated small ones only recently, and even used them in combat. But the period of downtime in the creation of large aircraft carriers led to the loss of continuity in design, construction and operation, and the result? The Queen Elizabeth and the Prince of Wales "now go out, now go out": all the time some kind of breakdowns, force majeure and downtime.
In order not to end up in the same mess the British have found themselves in today, it makes sense to build an aircraft carrier to replace our only heavy aircraft carrier. Given the time it takes to design and build it, it will probably be ready for service in about 15 years, that is, just in time for the Admiral Kuznetsov to be on the verge of exhaustion.
It is important to understand that the main task of a prospective aircraft carrier is not some kind of unparalleled combat power in the world, but the role of a "training desk" for industry and pilots of carrier-based aviation. Industry must be able to build, the fleet and naval aviation - to operate, and ship repair - to provide the necessary repairs in the shortest possible time, for the full growth of the operational tension coefficient (OTC) and the maximization of combat effectiveness. If a big mess happens, then the aircraft carrier, based in the North, will be able to supplement the forces available in the theater, covering the deployment of the same "Yasen-M" from enemy patrol aviation. In the conditions of the dominance of NATO naval aviation, it will, of course, not live long, but it will do its job.
"Nimitz" is not needed for these purposes. A relatively small, nuclear (since large non-nuclear power plants are somehow not working out well here) aircraft carrier, capable of providing basing and effective use of 18-24 "sea-going" Su-75, and 6-10 helicopters of various purposes for them, will be enough.
It is quite possible to fit such a ship into approximately 45 tons of standard displacement, providing space on it for the placement of an electromagnetic catapult during future modernization. Of course, ideally we would like a heavy aircraft carrier with a displacement of 000 tons with 75-000 catapults and the ability to base 3 heavy fighters, AWACS aircraft, etc. But in the absence of stamped paper, it is quite acceptable to write on plain paper.
This 45-ton aircraft carrier will cost the fleet no more than two Project 23900 UDCs, which are currently being built in the Black Sea. And it is unlikely to significantly exceed the price of a pair of non-nuclear VTOL carriers like the Japanese Izumo, which together will be able to provide basing for a similarly-sized air group. It will significantly increase our capabilities in the North, but at the same time will not require increasing the fleet's budget from the current level and will not force us to spend huge amounts of money on developing VTOL aircraft and creating production facilities for its production.
Thus, if we, giving priority to the primary tasks of the fleet, still find money for the development of carrier-based aviation of the Russian Navy, then it is more promising and cheaper to develop it not through VTOL aircraft, but through classic carrier-based horizontal takeoff and landing aviation.
The funds saved on developing VTOL aircraft and AWACS helicopters would be better spent on creating something important, something that would bring undoubted benefits to the Russian armed forces. For example, a “people’s” AWACS aircraft, an analogue of the American “Advanced Hawkeye”, which could become the “workhorse” of the Aerospace Forces and the Navy. And let its capabilities be more modest than those of the giants A-100 “Premier” currently being developed. But the price will be significantly lower, which means the number of aircraft transferred to the armed forces will be greater.
Then our air warriors of the Aerospace Forces and naval aviation will receive support from "flying radars" (which are also excellent radio-technical reconnaissance aircraft) on a permanent basis, and not on major holidays, as today. And in the bright future, which may certainly come, such an aircraft can be adapted to the deck.
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