"We will fight to the last!"
Anglo-French bombing reflection fleet from the side of the Alexander Battery on October 5, 1854. Sevastopol. Artist: F. A. Roubaud
Enemy at the gate
In the summer of 1854, the superior forces of the enemy fleet – 34 ships of the line and 55 frigates (including most steam ones) blockaded the Russian fleet in the Sevastopol Bay.
After the landing of the enemy army in Crimea and the defeat of the Russian Army on the Alma (How England, France and Türkiye Began the Invasion of Crimea; Alma) the difficult question of the future of Sevastopol, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, arose. The Anglo-French expeditionary forces, which had suffered heavy losses, were in no hurry to storm Sevastopol. But it was clear that they would come soon.
By the evening of September 12 (24), the allied army approached the Belbek River and from there the following day began a flanking movement to the southern side of the city. On the morning of September 14 (26), the French took up positions on the Fedyukhin Heights, and the British – Balaklava. The allied fleet entered Balaklava harbor.
In Balaklava, the Greek battalion of Colonel Matvey Manto fought the enemy. E. Totleben later wrote about this event: “While the English were approaching Balaklava, the commander of the Balaklava Greek infantry battalion, Colonel Manto, was holed up in the ancient ruins. With one company of his battalion, including 80 combatants and 30 retired soldiers. They had 4 copper half-pood mortars… The enemy’s vanguard, approaching Balaklava, was unexpectedly met with fire from Greek riflemen.”
The Greek riflemen entrenched themselves in the ruins of the former Genoese fortress. At the same time, British ships anchored in the roadstead from the Fortress Mountain. The allies experienced another case of "friendly fire". Artillery ground forces fired at the fortress and the English fleet, and the English fleet fired at the fortress and its own ground corps.
After a six-hour firefight, when the defenders ran out of shells, the British went on the attack. The wounded Colonel Monto, six officers and about 60 soldiers, almost all wounded, were captured. Part of the Greek battalion broke through into the mountains, repelled the attack of the Crimean Tatars and then joined the Russian Army at Yalta.
I.K. Aivazovsky. The Siege of Sevastopol
Kornilov and Nakhimov
During this most difficult period, the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet and the Northern Forces, and soon the actual commander of all the troops remaining in Sevastopol, Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov, came to the fore. This was not surprising, given the moral and intellectual qualities of this great Russian man.
Kornilov, like Nakhimov, was a student of Lazarev, a man of the type who evoked the love of ordinary sailors and the respect of enemies. Vladimir Alekseevich had a broad specialized education and showed more administrative abilities for organizing the fleet and port economy than Nakhimov. Pavel Stepanovich was more of a brilliant naval commander than an economic manager. Therefore, Nakhimov, although he had seniority in service, without the slightest hesitation in those terrible days handed over the issues of organizing the defense to Kornilov.
Kornilov and Nakhimov became the soul of the defense of Sevastopol. They were both ardent patriots and considered the defense of Sevastopol a matter of honor. They had long warned the command about the need to develop a steam (screw) fleet, and urgently strengthen the poorly defended Sevastopol. However, these warnings and reminders were ignored in St. Petersburg.
Russian squadron at Sevastopol roadstead. I. Aivazovsky, 1846
Six months before the landing of the allied army in Crimea, Kornilov presented Menshikov with a project for fortifications that were proposed to be immediately built in Sevastopol. Officers of the Black Sea Fleet and some city residents were ready to pay for the construction of fortifications. Menshikov indignantly rejected this reasonable proposal. Kornilov persisted, seeing what a terrible threat hung over Crimea and Sevastopol.
In the end, he was able to insist that contractor Volohov be allowed to build a tower at his own expense to protect the raid from the sea. This fortification was completed two days before the landing of the allied forces in Crimea. It was this tower that would save the raid from the enemy fleet approaching the shore during the first bombardment of Sevastopol.
After the enemy landed in Crimea, work on building fortifications was in full swing in Sevastopol. Kornilov noted in his diary that the work was proceeding with great success, people were working with enthusiasm and great enthusiasm.
On September 9 (21) – 10 (22), Menshikov’s troops, having suffered a defeat on the Alma River, arrived in Sevastopol, but did not stay in the city. Menshikov ordered the city to be abandoned on September 11 (23), and on September 12, he himself left Sevastopol. The troops retreated to Bakhchisarai.
As a result, the fate of the city was in the hands of Nakhimov and Kornilov. General Moller, appointed by Menshikov as the head of the Sevastopol garrison, did not actually lead the defense, only signed orders and sat in the rear.
Defense of Sevastopol
For defense from the sea, Sevastopol had the Black Sea Fleet - 14 battleships, 7 frigates, 1 corvette, 2 brigs, 11 steamships. Sevastopol, as the main military port in the south of Russia, was supplied with everything necessary to support the fleet's operations. There was an admiralty, docks, an arsenal, food warehouses, a warehouse for guns, gunpowder and other supplies, naval barracks and two hospitals. The city had up to 2 thousand stone houses and up to 40 thousand residents, almost exclusively Russian, mostly related to the fleet.
The coast was defended by 13 batteries with 611 guns. These forces were sufficient to repel the attack of the allied fleet on Sevastopol.
The greatest concern was caused by land defense, especially in the northern part of the city. The commanders of the Russian fleet expected an immediate enemy attack on Sevastopol, which was defenseless from the north. Regarding the defense of the city from land, the previously prevailing opinion was that it was impossible to land a large force on the peninsula and, consequently, it was impossible to attack Sevastopol with large forces from land.
The conditions of the terrain on which the city is located made it possible to create a powerful defense from the sea and at the same time made it extremely difficult to organize a defense from the land. The city, divided by the Sevastopol Bay into two parts, northern and southern, required a relatively large number of troops for its defense. The city itself and the naval structures were mainly located on the southern shore of the Sevastopol roadstead. At the same time, the northern shore occupied a commanding position, and therefore its possession was equivalent to possession of the roadstead and the port.
As the Russian military historian A. M. Zayonchkovsky wrote, Sevastopol was not fortified at all from the land side. The northern side had only a thin wall, which was not an obstacle for modern artillery. Moreover, the existing fortifications were located so ineptly that the surrounding heights dominated some of them, reducing their importance to zero. The northern side was protected by about 200 guns, but there were few large-caliber ones.
Sevastopol was also poorly defended from the south. In the southern defensive position, instead of the planned 6 bastions with 12 guns each, only the 6th bastion was actually ready. In total, the southern defensive line, 7 km long, had only 145 guns installed in unfinished fortifications.
The distribution of artillery weapons in Sevastopol was done ineptly. Thus, the key height of defense in the center of the positions - Malakhov Kurgan, was defended by only 5 guns. In addition, they were located in one tower, which was not protected, and they could be buried under the rubble with a lucky shot. By the beginning of the hostilities in Sevastopol, no reserves were made weapons, ammunition and food.
"We have the honor of defending Sevastopol!"
Only a mistake by the Allied command saved the northern part of the city from capture. Many officers in the French and English armies were convinced that the attack would be made on the Northern side. However, on the morning of September 10 (22), British General John Burgoyne (chief of the engineering service, before the war he helped the Turks build fortifications in the Dardanelles) came to the commander-in-chief of the English army, Lord Raglan, and proposed to refrain from attacking the Northern side and move to the Southern side.
Raglan did not make a decision himself and sent an engineer to the French commander-in-chief, Marshal Saint-Arnaud. Most of the French generals also proposed attacking the Northern side. But the gravely ill Saint-Arnaud (he had only a few days left to live), after listening to the Englishman, said that Sir John was right. Bypassing Sevastopol from the south allowed the use of Crimean harbors in this part of Sevastopol.
Thus, the allied forces stretched from the weakly defended Northern side to the south.
Kornilov and Totleben believed that God's providence saved Sevastopol. If the enemy had attacked the Northern side immediately after the Battle of Alma, the city, unprepared for defense, would have had no chance of a long-term defense. Kornilov noted in his diary: "God must not have abandoned Russia yet. Of course, if the enemy had gone to Sevastopol directly after the Battle of Alma, he would have easily captured it."
Obviously, the Russian commanders were being modest. In fact, Sevastopol was saved from immediate collapse not only by the enemy's mistakes, but also by the decisive actions of Nakhimov, Kornilov and Totleben.
After Alma, Menshikov did not know what the enemy would do. On September 12 (24), he assumed that the enemy wanted to cut off Sevastopol and the entire Crimea from Perekop, that is, from the rest of Russia. And he decided to prevent this, preserving freedom of maneuver. In Sevastopol, the commander-in-chief left a very weak garrison - eight reserve battalions. Such a garrison could not resist the enemy army. In fact, Sevastopol was left without land defense. Time was needed to form naval units and organize defense. And the enemy could strike at any moment.
Kornilov objected to the withdrawal of the army from Sevastopol. But he could not persuade Menshikov. He believed that his task was to maintain contact with Russia and prevent the complete siege of Sevastopol, since his army created a flank threat to the troops of the Western coalition. At the same time, he even withdrew the entire cavalry, worsening the reconnaissance capabilities of the Sevastopol garrison. On September 13 (25), Menshikov's army reached Belbek. On September 14 (26), Russian troops were located on the Kacha River. Admiral Nakhimov did not approve of these maneuvers and called Menshikov's actions a game of blind man's buff.
On September 13 (25), 1854, a state of siege was declared in Sevastopol. The city's defense was headed by Vice-Admiral Kornilov, who was officially considered the chief of the defense staff. His closest assistants were the squadron commander, Vice-Admiral Nakhimov, who was appointed head of the Southern Side, and Rear Admiral Istomin (chief of defense of Malakhov Kurgan). General management of the engineering work was carried out by engineer Colonel Totleben.
The work of Kornilov, Totleben, Nakhimov and Istomin after the departure of Menshikov's army was simply titanic. They did everything possible and impossible to prepare Sevastopol for a difficult fight. People worked in three shifts, even at night by the light of lanterns. Every morning, 5 to 6 thousand people went to work, and in the evening, others replaced them.
In his letters of September 14 (26) and 16 (28), Kornilov wrote: “We have been fortifying the city all day… Work is in full swing on the fortifications; we know neither sleep nor fatigue; even the prisoners are working hard… Meanwhile, the enemy is approaching Sevastopol… We are not losing heart here, we are fortifying ourselves as best we can, as our resources allow. The chain of redoubts, bastions and various types of batteries will soon present a continuous line of cannon fire.”
At the same time, fortifications had to be built not only in conditions of constant expectation of an enemy attack, but also in the absence of literally the most basic things. Thus, in Sevastopol there was the brilliant engineer Totleben, and sappers, and selfless workers, but there were no iron shovels and picks. Apparently, someone had been stealing money allocated for entrenching tools for years. They rushed to Odessa, but there were no picks there either, and the shovels were sent only on October 3 by horse-drawn carts, and they arrived on October 17. Until that time, they had to dig and chisel the soil, often rocky, and then daily restore the parapets destroyed by enemy artillery - with the help of wooden shovels.
Totleben significantly expanded the frontal position on the North side and virtually re-equipped the defensive line on the South side. Due to the lack of time, it was not possible to build powerful, long-term fortifications. It was necessary to work along the entire line, using what the city and the fleet could provide.
Totleben applied the following principles: he chose the closest, most convenient position to the city, and deployed artillery there; these positions were connected by trenches for riflemen; separate batteries were placed here and there between the main points of defense. Sevastopol received quite strong frontal and flank defense.
As a result, where previously there had been only separate fortifications, not connected to each other and with large unprotected gaps, a continuous defensive line was set up with artillery positions, dugouts, shelters, powder magazines and communication lines. The enemy missed the moment for an open assault and began siege work.
“We did more in a week than we had previously done in a year,” Kornilov wrote about this feat of the Sevastopol people in his diary.
On September 15 (27), Kornilov delivered a speech to the Sevastopol garrison:
"Comrades, we have the honor of defending Sevastopol, defending our native fleet! We will fight to the last! We have nowhere to retreat, the sea is behind us. I forbid all unit commanders to beat the retreat, the drummers must forget this battle!"
Monument to General E. I. Totleben on the Historical Boulevard in Sevastopol. Created in 1903, opened on August 5 (18), 1909, restored due to damage during the Great Patriotic War in 1945. Authors of the monument: amateur artist, General A. A. Bilderling and sculptor I. N. Schroeder
"What to do with the fleet?"
When Kornilov asked Menshikov, "What to do with the fleet?" The commander-in-chief replied: "Put it in your pocket." Kornilov still demanded instructions at the expense of the fleet. Then Menshikov answered more definitely: remove the guns, send the sailors to the defense of the city, drill and prepare the ships for flooding, block the entrance to the bay with them.
On September 9 (21), Kornilov held a meeting and proposed, despite the enemy's enormous superiority, to go out to sea and strike the enemy. Death was almost inevitable, but the Russian fleet would retain its honor, avoiding shameful captivity, and could cause serious damage to the enemy, which could disrupt the coalition army's offensive in Crimea.
The Russian fleet could take advantage of the disorder in the disposition of the British and French ships at Cape Ulukola, strike first, get to close range and board. In extreme cases, when the crews had exhausted their means of combat and the ships were seriously damaged, it was proposed to blow themselves up along with the enemy.
This daring plan was supported by some, rejected by others. Kornilov went to Menshikov and declared his readiness to take the fleet to sea and strike the enemy.
The commander categorically forbade this. He again ordered the ships to be sunk. Kornilov continued to stand his ground. Then Menshikov reported that if Kornilov did not obey, he would be sent to serve in Nikolaev. Kornilov cried out: “Stop! This is suicide… What are you forcing me to do… But for me to leave Sevastopol, surrounded by the enemy, is impossible! I am ready to obey you.”
Admiral Nakhimov also advocated decisive action by the fleet. But he was forced to admit: "...The use of a screw engine will finally resolve the issue of our current insignificance in the Black Sea... we are left with one future, which can only exist in Sevastopol... if we lose Sevastopol and the fleet, we will lose all hope for the future; having Sevastopol, we will also have a fleet... without Sevastopol it is impossible to have a fleet in the Black Sea; this axiom clearly proves the need to decide on all measures to block the entrance of enemy ships to the roadstead."
Admiral Nakhimov. Hood. Georg Wilhelm Timm, also known as Vasily Fedorovich Timm
Kornilov addressed the sailors with an order, which stated that they had to give up "the beloved idea of smiting the enemy on the water," and they were needed to defend Sevastopol. "We must submit to necessity: Moscow burned, but Rus' did not perish from this."
At dawn on the 11th (23rd) the sinking of ships began. In Sevastopol Bay, across the roadstead, the following ships were sunk: Silistria, Varna, Uriel, Tri Svyatelitelya, Selafail and two frigates: Flora and Sisipol.
In February 1855, to strengthen the barrier, the ships Dvenadtsat Apostolov, Svyatoslav, Rostislav, and the frigates Kagul, Mesemvria, and Midia were additionally sunk. A detachment of six combat-ready ships of the Black Sea Fleet remained in Sevastopol, including the ships Chesma, Velikiy Knyaz Konstantin, Empress Maria, Khrabry, Parizh, and Yagudiil. They were sunk on August 28 (September 9), 1855, when the garrison abandoned the city.
The importance of this event was also recognized by the enemy. The French admiral Gamelin noted that if the Russians had not blocked the entrance to Sevastopol Bay, then, without a doubt, the allied fleet would have successfully entered it after the first sustained fire and established contact with the ground forces.
The sinking of the ships is a matter of debate among researchers. Some believe that it was a necessary step, motivated by military expediency. Most military historians have concluded that the sinking of the ships was a rational act. However, there is also a completely opposite opinion.
Thus, the military writer D. Likhachev in 1902 concluded that blocking the entrance to the Sevastopol roadstead with sunken ships of the Black Sea Fleet had a negative tactical and strategic significance. In his opinion, the land defense could have been strengthened with naval guns without sinking the ships. At the same time, he acknowledged that the Black Sea Fleet's exit to sea (which had 45 ships, including small ships) to attack the enemy fleet (89 ships, including 50 paddle and screw steamers) had no hope of success.
Likhachev believed that the hasty decision to sink the ships affected the defense of Sevastopol. If the ships had been saved, there would have been a serious threat to the enemy fleet and the enemy's sea communications. This would have forced the enemy to maintain a tight blockade of Sevastopol from the sea throughout the siege in order to secure its operational base and communications.
The ship "The Twelve Apostles" on the lithograph by V. A. Prokhorov
Everything for the front!
The sinking of the ships was perceived with deep pain by all the sailors. For them, their native ships were living creatures, their home. However, the sailors did not fall into despondency, but on the contrary, mobilized all their forces to repel the enemy. New units were formed, experienced commanders were put at their head, combat areas were distributed.
Kornilov and Nakhimov defined the main tasks of the units and subdivisions. Fortifications were built. Guns were removed from the ships. As a result, almost the entire defensive line (except for the 6th bastion) was armed with naval guns. Thus, the Black Sea Fleet became the defensive line that protected Sevastopol.
On September 11–12 (23–24), 17 naval battalions were formed, with a total of 12 people. When people were taken from the ships, according to the recollections of Captain-Lieutenant Voevodsky, the hardest thing was to select the crew that remained on the ship. Voevodsky noted: “What can’t you do with such people? Any praise for the people will not be enough, only in such difficult times can you appreciate them.”
Along with the guns, various ship items and materials were transported. For example, water tanks were adapted as powder magazines. Gunpowder, shells, various artillery accessories, telescopes, etc. were transported. Day after day, the bastions of Sevastopol were reinforced with new structures and batteries.
People worked with amazing energy, typical of Russian people in the days of the most difficult trials. Difficulties and dangers made Russians only stronger, forced them to show their unprecedented potential. From morning till night, sailors dug ditches, trenches, laid walls, carried guns and various supplies, equipment to the mountains, and at night they carried out patrol duty.
Every day the defense of Sevastopol grew stronger. In just three weeks of continuous work (from September 15 to October 5), which was in full swing day and night, the defenders built 20 batteries. The artillery armament of the outer fortifications doubled – from 172 to 341 guns. And during the heroic defense of Sevastopol, 2 thousand guns from the Russian fleet were installed on land positions. At the same time, from the very beginning of the battle, naval guns showed greater effectiveness in destroying enemy fortifications than ordinary light siege and field guns.
Menshikov's army reached the Northern side of Sevastopol on September 18 (30), when Sevastopol had long since decided to fight to the death and was actively working to equip positions. Until that moment, there had been no news from him. Menshikov transferred three infantry regiments to the Southern side, thereby strengthening the city's defense.
The commander-in-chief still showed little interest in what was happening in Sevastopol. He located his headquarters near Belbek. Menshikov informed Kornilov that he would try to organize a "sabotage" to distract the enemy from the city. Kornilov and Nakhimov doubted the usefulness of such an event and did not believe in the commander's strategy. On October 2, Nakhimov led the remaining ships out of the South Bay and positioned them so skillfully that they provided artillery support for the defense of Sevastopol until their end.
Thus, Russia owes Kornilov, Nakhimov, Totleben and Istomin that a strong enemy did not take Sevastopol on the move and did not capture Russian ships. Menshikov failed to organize the land defense of Sevastopol. Only the iron will and skill of these great men saved the Russian Empire from the shame of the city's rapid fall.
Thus began the heroic 349-day defense of Sevastopol, which became one of the most striking pages in Russian history. In Europe, this defense was called the "Russian Troy".
I. A. Vladimirov "The Sinking of the Black Sea Fleet Ships in the Sevastopol Roadstead on September 11, 1854"
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