The Central Asia-Germany Summit: How Scholz Brought Specifics to the Region and What to Do About It
On September 11-12, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan launched a number of major projects, many of which had been in the calculation and discussion stages for years. The main ones were the TAPI gas route and the development of the energy bridge within the TAP-500.
On September 15–17, the German delegation led by O. Scholz visited Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and O. Scholz himself took part in the Central Asia – Germany summit.
The proximity of dates of international events is not always a consequence of the interconnectedness of certain events, but in this case there are indeed connections. We will try to assess their nature and influence, as well as the degree of significance for Russia through the agenda of negotiations and the international context.
On the C5+ format and its position in the international context
There have already been many articles published on VO about the Central Asian format "C5+" and the negotiations that are being held within its framework. In this case, we will briefly summarize that the idea, initially proposed by Turkmenistan, about a consultative mechanism that includes all five countries of the region at once, yields very specific practical results.
This format has already been recognized, and events are held regularly. Both individual countries (Russia, China, the USA, Germany) and collective platforms like the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) and the European Union act as “+1”. South Korea and Japan are next in line.
"C5+" for obvious reasons increases the weight of the negotiations, and for investors it gives a certain confidence that, having entered the project of one of the "C5+" countries, the funds will be used within the region as a whole, and they will work in a relatively calm environment. Significant constitutional reforms in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan also had an investment focus in many ways. And O. Scholz noted this separately during the visit.
It should be emphasized that Astana and Tashkent periodically make attempts to transform the “C5+” into a full-fledged international institution, but Turkmenistan so far insists on a consultative form of relations, adhering to its political line of “active non-alignment.”
Nevertheless, the C5+ has allowed the countries of the region to move themselves to a different level of interaction with China and the EU – now major investors and foreign policy players are forced to fight for the region. But just a few years ago, the Europeans were talking about democracy “from the top down”, and the representatives of Beijing were trying to talk by distributing “valuable instructions”.
Since 2022, competition has gradually developed between the EU and China for the region, with each player now trying to find some limits to their economic borders in Eurasia. Just as the Chinese “macroeconomic cluster” cannot be formed without Central Asia, the EU has a very specific understanding of the need for access to both energy resources and the production base of Central Asia.
They have yet to fully form this base, but since Russia and China have dragged their feet on this issue, the EU still has a window of opportunity to do so. However, South Korea and Japan are hot on the heels of the Europeans, for the same reasons, and they do not believe that only the EU can use this window.
On the function of "C5+" in limiting the influence of a number of global raw materials players
A logical question arises: hasn’t Western business been firmly based on the resource base of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and partly Uzbekistan for decades?
In Kazakhstan, part of this business has been transferred to a separate jurisdiction of “British law”.
A kind of collision here is that raw materials TNCs, as well as projects associated with the odious Rothschild family, are not equal in terms of their interests to the appetites of the EU. It is clear that for us, as a whole, they are all greedy globalists and liberal totalitarians, but the vector of these interests is still different.
The Rothschild family name, regardless of which branch of their family business operates in a particular region, carries the burden of conspiracy. But by and large, there is no conspiracy in their regional politics.
Economic systems are indeed separating and moving away from each other. Almost everyone sees this process, but they call it differently: "currency zones" (absurd in essence, but also a kind of characteristic of the process in sensations), "pan-regions", the author, for example, is closer to the term "value cluster".
Following the quite reasonable principle of "if you can't win, lead", transnationals are no longer fighting for past globalization projects, but are creating their own model, which will allow them to become a kind of logistical link between these macro-regions in the future. The author has an image for this - "New East India Company", but this is only one of the options.
And the most reasonable thing in this logistic model is control of raw materials, and also gold mining. So the greedy globalists have their own logic here, and the methods are old and time-tested. The information world is very good, but control of gold and black viscous (or liquid) substance is better. In Central Asia, including Mongolia, all this is very clearly visible.
If they cannot free themselves from this raw material influence, then at least the C5 countries are trying to reduce this dependence through competition and building balances between several large interest groups at once.
It's not just "China-EU", there's also "Turkey-EU", financial flows. In the latter case, if Brussels or China continue to promise golden investment mountains, like the Global Gate project, international funds are in no hurry to fork out, and raw materials producers do not want to get off the high rent and reinvest it, then sovereign Arabian funds come to the rescue.
Everyone is in competition and interconnection at the same time, and C5 essentially supports this dynamic in relation to its region. And not without some success.
On the role of Scholz and Germany's position in the region
Understanding this not-so-simple system of connections gives a counter-understanding of the agenda with which O. Scholz came to Central Asia. In our country, he is often called by not-so-flattering epithets, like "liver sausage" (although the author is not Russian), but if you break away from these cliches, then many things fall into place. Whether we like it or not is another question.
If we summarize and generalize the program of visits and the results of the Central Asia – Germany summit, we will discuss three main aspects of interaction.
The first is the launch of construction of German enterprises of the "medium business+" level in Uzbekistan and partly in Kazakhstan. We are talking about several thousand production facilities - from household chemicals to electronics, and these thousands will have to be added to those that already exist. Germany is allocating an additional $9 billion, but it should be understood that the total volume of direct EU investment in the region is already more than $100 billion. This is the first indicator, China is in second place, Russia is in third.
For objective reasons, Uzbekistan is number one here, as it has the best ratio of labor force to its cost. The energy deficit can potentially be covered by Russian supplies.
At the same time, Uzbekistan still adheres to the policy of low rates for the national currency. All this is happening against the backdrop of the opposite policy of its neighbors, but Tashkent expects that in the end it will work to attract investors to industry. The visit and the program of O. Scholz provide grounds for this.
The second aspect is the launch of a program for the mass recruitment of labor from Uzbekistan to Germany, simultaneously with training programs in German institutes and German production facilities.
The third aspect, more related to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, is the increase in exports of Kazakh oil, including via the Druzhba pipeline, and the discussion of Germany's strategy as one of the main consumers of gas in the EU, and Turkmenistan's strategy. Ashgabat has shown that TAPI is being launched, the potential of TAPI is 33 billion cubic meters, the fourth line to China is 15 billion cubic meters, how much will ultimately pass through Iran and Turkey to the EU and what timeframes can we talk about? And what is Germany ready to offer, taking into account the Chinese project and TAPI, is a counter question.
By the way, almost simultaneously with the launch of TAPI, Moscow signed an agreement with Beijing on the early withdrawal of gas supplies to the maximum level.
O. Scholz has a peculiar reputation with us, but in Central Asia he acted more on the side of German business, although he is constantly reproached for the opposite.
For what market, besides Central Asia itself, will the products of the new (and old too) German enterprises in Uzbekistan be intended? An interesting question, although with a practically obvious answer – for the Russian market.
And that is why at the Central Asia-EU summits, topics related to the region's rupture along the EAEU line usually fade away. The banking sanctions there are not so much European as American, although they do not bring anything positive to the common market.
Our media sometimes say that the Central Asian countries are bending under sanctions, and sometimes, on the contrary, they even praise them for some resistance, but in fact there are counter processes going on here, it’s just that the Germans in this case spoke out more clearly and specifically.
When O. Scholz speaks out categorically against Western long-range strikes weapons, you always have to look at the general agenda. O. Scholz is going through a tense election, but both the program for the Central Asian countries and the related issues a priori exclude such a formulation of tasks, no matter how Russophobic the European political class may be.
What new volumes of oil or the creation of production facilities, including for the Russian market, can we talk about if Germany officially advocates such strikes against Russia?
This rhetoric is left to other Western countries.
O. Scholz is also forced to act as a kind of leader from industrial Europe in Central Asia by the political realities of the current EU.
Who will act as negotiator with these countries from the European Union – U. von der Leyen and her protégé in the post of foreign policy commissioner, the representative of Estonia, K. Kallas?
This is not serious, and given China’s pressure in the region, it is simply dangerous.
U. von der Leyen will be engaged in "consolidation" within the EU and the fight against her personal opposition and various frondes, and K. Kallas will focus on Ukraine and narratives of Russophobia. She was appointed precisely for this. But these and similar characters cannot and will not be able to solve any practical problems in Central Asia. German business and O. Scholz will be working here.
In the materials dedicated to this summit, one can often come across the expression "the transfer of German production to Central Asia", supposedly, everything is so expensive and everything is so bad in Germany that enterprises are fleeing from there as in the children's poem "Fedorino grief". They say, "both cups and glasses are gone, only cockroaches remain".
One must approach assessments of the flight of European production with a certain caution, so as not to fall into the old expression "into charm". When, for example, the Volkswagen Group built factories in Russia, for some reason no one said that German manufacturers were actually fleeing to us.
But the EU does have problems: economic growth of 0,4–0,5% every year is a reality, in which 0,5% is actually a statistical error.
The market is not growing, and it is not very easy to predict how long it will be artificially slowed down (and this is precisely the "handbrake"). Small and medium businesses in the EU will not show growth, or rather even negative dynamics, but large industrial groups operate everywhere and can receive income from different economic geographies.
On Turkey's Potential Difficulties
It is impossible to ignore the fact that the Central Asia-Germany summit is aimed at Turkey from one side. Ankara is preparing for its event through the Organization of Turkic States.
Recently, a single Latin alphabet was finally agreed upon, Turkish business is gradually present everywhere in the region, but the question is, what can Türkiye put forward against Germany’s plans?
It should not be discounted that Turkey has for a long time formally positioned itself as the leader of the Turkic world, but in fact Turkey has become a kind of springboard to the West for Central Asia, a kind of crossroads, a bridge, and even, figuratively speaking, a translator.
Such a bridge to the West was very attractive to the educated part of the population of Central Asia, but what will Ankara do if Germany works without intermediaries and directly, integrating the educated workforce and preparing it for its production?
It is clear that this is not the fastest process, and there are no guarantees of the result yet, but Turkey will have to respond with something, so O. Scholz, no matter what we call him, has created a very significant problem for R. Erdogan.
For Russia
From Russia's point of view, this summit cannot be called negative. By and large, everything here depends on the formal concept that is being promoted and on the actual state of affairs.
Our formal concept for now is the EAEU as a common economic and political space. From this point of view, the “C5+” format itself works against it, no matter whether it will be “C5 + EU”, “C5 + China”, “C5 + Germany”, Turkey, etc.
We and Central Asia still do not have a common value, but, on the other hand, the current EAEU is a kind of "expanded Eurasian Customs Union." In this regard, we want, for example, to sell more of "our everything" to Central Asia - natural gas, well, new enterprises will need it - not ours, then German ones.
Some German manufacturers have left Russia and will supply to Russia from Central Asia, saving on logistics and bypassing obstacles.
Germany and Kazakhstan want to use the Druzhba highway and are ready to pay for it – let them use it and pay. Brussels is fighting us and is ready for almost anything, but we are not actually fighting with the EU, and, strangely enough, we still trade directly or indirectly. And if that is the case, then let the highway work and let them pay for it.
Undoubtedly, "C5+" is potentially the format into which the EAEU will sooner or later transform, but for now the single transit space suits everyone. No one is ready to give it up, and we objectively do not have the strength or special (what can I say) desire to transfer it into a common value space.
So let China and Germany, as the frontman from the European Union, fight for Central Asia for now, and then we’ll see.
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