“The bayonets have done their job well, but the rifle butts are also Russian!”
The Battle of Alma. Artist: Eugene Louis Lami
prehistory
On the morning of September 1 (13), 1854, the telegraph informed the Russian commander-in-chief, Alexander Menshikov, that a huge fleet heading towards Sevastopol. Nakhimov, from the tower of the naval library, observed in the distance a huge enemy armada – about 360 pennants. These were both warships and transports with soldiers, artillery, various kinds of supplies.
On September 2 (14), 1854, the Anglo-French-Turkish army landed in Yevpatoria and, without encountering resistance, moved along the coast to the south, to Sevastopol (How England, France and Türkiye Began the Invasion of Crimea). This city, which was the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, was considered the main target of the allies in the Crimean campaign.
Kornilov, Nakhimov, Istomin, Totleben and many other famous and unknown heroes had to meet the enemy head-on, saving Russia with their deaths. It was they, Russian soldiers and sailors, who would create the great Sevastopol epic, which would eclipse all previous sieges. In the Western press, after the end of the war, this miracle would be called the "Russian Troy".
The commander-in-chief of the Crimean army and the Black Sea fleet was the great-grandson of Peter the Great's favorite and the favorite of Tsar Nicholas I, Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov. He was showered with all possible favors and enjoyed the special favor of the emperor. Alexander Menshikov was the chief of the Main Naval Staff and the Naval Ministry, although he had never sailed and knew naval affairs purely as an amateur, studying it on his own.
He had enormous wealth and one of the best libraries in Russia, he was a very educated man, reading books in different languages. Menshikov was a smart and sarcastic person, clearly noticing the shortcomings of the dignitaries of that time. Menshikov was undoubtedly a brave man when he fought the Turks and the French. During the storming of Paris he was wounded in the leg, for which he was awarded the Order of St. Anne of the 2nd degree and a gold sword with the inscription "For Bravery". In the war of 1828-1829, commanding the troops besieging Varna, he was seriously wounded (by a cannonball in both legs).
He was undoubtedly a talented and brave man, but he was not a commander with a capital letter. In particular, he was unable to organize the defense of Crimea. After the enemy fleet entered the Black Sea and shelled Odessa, coastal and anti-landing defenses were not created in the most dangerous areas.
Therefore, the allies carried out the landing without problems, although such an operation, even in conditions of insignificant resistance, would have become a very difficult operation. Menshikov learned about the landing of the allies when he could no longer do anything. He did not even think of moving to the landing site. Even a small garrison at the landing site with artillery could cause terrible devastation in the enemy landing.
Sevastopol was not prepared for a long siege. An attempt to defend Sevastopol from the sea with Jacobi mines failed. Too much time was lost in peacetime, and it was not enough for the necessary experiments and installation work.
Menshikov hoped that the enemy had already missed the favorable time for landing troops in the Crimea. And the landing of the expeditionary army would be postponed until next year. Menshikov also treated the talented military engineer Totleben, who was sent from the Danube theater by Prince M. Gorchakov, coldly. In fact, Menshikov sent him back, but Totleben still managed to stay in Sevastopol, and in the end it was he who saved the city from a quick capitulation.
The Supreme Command also showed carelessness in the defense of Crimea. Large forces could have been sent to the peninsula, but they did not. A large army in Crimea could have disrupted the landing of enemy forces. Gorchakov's army, which had abandoned the Danubian Principalities, could have been sent to Crimea.
Excess forces defended the Baltic coast, although the enemy did not have significant landing forces there (They dreamed of Kronstadt, but only took Bomarsund). In St. Petersburg they believed that even if the enemy landed on the peninsula, it would be a short-term raid, since it would be very difficult to supply an expeditionary army only by sea.
Such mistakes eventually led to the tragedy of the Sevastopol defense. Russian commanders, soldiers and sailors, with their heroism, as best they could, corrected the political and military mistakes of the top leadership.
Portrait of A. S. Menshikov. Artist: Franz Kruger. 1851.
The ratio of forces and the location of Russian troops
The allied army numbered over 60 men. A small garrison was left in Yevpatoria. Therefore, about 55 soldiers with 112 guns (according to other sources, 144 guns) went to Alma: about 28 French, 21 English, and about 6 Ottomans. The allies had an advantage in small arms; almost all soldiers were armed with rifles.
On September 7 (19), the allies reached the Alma and were visible from Russian positions. The Russian commander chose a position on the left bank of the Alma River. The fairly high bank made the position convenient for defense, and in the rear there were heights to which the army could be withdrawn in case of failure. However, the position was too extended, which, given the superiority of the enemy forces, made it unfavorable. In addition, the left flank risked being hit by the enemy fleet; it had to be withdrawn from the shore, which made its position unstable and could lead to a general defeat.
The right wing was commanded by General Pyotr Gorchakov (brother of the Commander-in-Chief of the Danube Army, Prince M. Gorchakov). He was an experienced and brave commander who had fought in almost all the wars, starting with the 1808–1809 campaign in Finland. The Kazan, Vladimir, and Suzdal infantry regiments defended Kurgan Hill, fortified by two redoubts.
The left wing was led by the commander of the 17th Infantry Division, Vasily Kiryakov. According to the Crimean War historian Tale, he was "...ignorant, absolutely devoid of any military (or non-military) talents, a general who was rarely in a completely sober state." Under his command were the Minsk and Moscow regiments. He was supposed to meet the enemy with fire at the rise from the sea. The left flank only reached the road to Alma-Tamak. As a result, the section from Alma-Tamak to the sea was unprotected, which allowed the enemy to make a flanking maneuver.
Menshikov was directly in charge of the center of the position. Under his command were the Belostok, Brest, Tarutinsky and Borodinsky infantry regiments. In the center, the dominant height was Telegraph Hill. Three rifle battalions deployed chains in the vanguard, on the right bank of the river. Menshikov did not have a special battle plan, but he was confident of success.
Allied plans
The Allied command, having superiority in forces, planned to strike simultaneously from the front and bypassing both Russian flanks. The French troops were on the right attacking wing, the British on the left. The Turkish division of Ahmet Pasha was located in reserve.
The frontal attack was led by Marshal Saint-Arnaud, the French troops' objective was the dominant height of the center - Telegraph Hill. One of the French divisions under the command of General Pierre François Bosquet was to bypass the Russian left flank along the sea. He was a brave officer who had served in Algeria for almost two decades, where French troops regularly fought and had extensive experience (like the Russians in the Caucasus). The British troops under Lord Raglan were to bypass the Russian right wing.
The overall command, due to his vast experience, was carried out by the French Marshal Armand Jacques Achille Leroy de Saint-Arnaud. He was a very unique personality. The son of a simple townsman managed to rise to the very heights of military power. The beginning of his military service was unsuccessful - he was dismissed for bad behavior at the request of his company. Considering the very rough morals that reigned in the armies of that time, this was an achievement. Then the failed soldier sought his fortune in England, again in France (this time as an actor), then participated in the liberation war in Greece.
He was able to re-enlist in the French army with the help of relatives. He deserted, not wanting to go to Guadeloupe (in South America), where his regiment was sent. He was able to re-enlist in the army after the French Revolution of 1830. In 1836, he was transferred to the Algerian Foreign Legion. Saint-Arnaud lived the life of an adventurer and reveler. There was no crime that he would stop at, there were no "joys of life" that he would not undermine his health.
On the other hand, he showed himself to be a brave soldier. In Algeria, he went a long way from a soldier to a divisional general. The Algerian Foreign Legion had very strict morals. The local natives were not considered human beings. Even in this wild corner of civilization, Saint-Arnaud distinguished himself. Saint-Arnaud's band of cutthroats was called the "hellish column." He allowed the Arabs to be killed and robbed at the slightest disagreement, but he kept his own soldiers on an iron fist, shooting them at the slightest disobedience.
Saint-Arnaud had already shown how European civilizers “brought order”: for example, in Shelas, in 1845, Arabs were driven in crowds into caves and poisoned with smoke, killing them all without exception.
French Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the French Eastern Army Armand Leroy de Saint-Arnaud (1798 – September 29, 1854)
Louis Napoleon, who knew how to choose people, summoned him to Paris in 1851 and appointed him head of the 2nd division of the Parisian army, and then Minister of War. Louis Napoleon saw in Saint-Arnaud a completely unprincipled man. In preparing a coup d'état, the prince-president wanted to be absolutely sure that the Minister of War would shed rivers of blood without a doubt.
On December 2, 1851, the coup was successful, and exactly one year later, during the restoration of the empire, Napoleon III made Saint-Arnaud a Marshal of France. Saint-Arnaud was also appointed commander of the Eastern Army, directed against Russia.
Saint-Arnaud was a talented commander, energetic, quick, decisive and cruel. He was lucky in his decisions and personally brave. However, living in luxury, full of debauchery, undermined the soldier's former iron health. By the beginning of the expedition, Saint-Arnaud's vital forces were running out.
He was able to subjugate the British Lord Raglan, successfully land troops in the Crimea and give the first battle. This was the end of his campaign. On September 29, 1854, Saint-Arnaud died on the way to Constantinople.
The British commander Fitzroy James Henry Somerset Baron Raglan (Raglan) did not have such virtues, as well as vices. He was a typical representative of the British military caste - a slow, straightforward English aristocrat who followed all the rules accepted in his environment. Raglan served under General Wellington in the campaign on the Iberian Peninsula. After he was seriously wounded in the battle of Waterloo (his right arm had to be amputated), he did not see war, and understood little about modern warfare.
The British had fewer experienced ground commanders than the French and preferred to use foreign "cannon fodder".
French commander Pierre François Joseph Bosquet (1810-1861). Crimea, 1855. French writer Louis Boussenard in his novel "Heroes of Malakhov Kurgan" gave the following description of this commander: "A general approaches the Zouaves' camp on foot, alone, without a retinue. They recognize him and shout: "This is Bosquet, the fearless Bosquet! Bosquet, adored by the soldiers!" The most popular of all the generals of the African army. On the eve of the battle, he simply, like a father, goes around the division, without a retinue, without a staff, without ceremony, and this further enhances his charm!"
Battle on the left flank
Early in the morning of September 8 (20), 1854, French troops under General Pierre Bosquet moved to bypass the left flank of the Russian army. There were 14 thousand soldiers in the French-Turkish corps. According to the plan, Bosquet was supposed to distract the attention of the Russians when Saint-Arnaud struck in the center. At this time, the British were supposed to capture Kurgan Hill on the right flank.
The British were in no hurry, so Bosquet was forced to stop for a rest. At 12 o'clock the advance was resumed. A chain of skirmishers - Zouaves and Algerians - went ahead. Behind them were two columns: the 1st Brigade was in the left column, and the 2nd Brigade of General Bois in the right column, advancing along the sandbank at the mouth of the river. Behind them came the Ottomans.
The riflemen crossed the river and climbed the heights of the right bank of the Alma without hindrance. This surprised Bosquet, as the place was ideal for meeting the enemy. Then another pleasant surprise awaited them. In front of them were heights, in some places completely vertical. With the appropriate engineering preparation, they became completely inaccessible, especially for raising artillery. Bosquet ordered to take the heights, but then it turned out that they were not fortified properly and no one was defending them. There were only Cossack patrols here, which immediately left, having discovered such a mass of enemy troops.
Concerning further events there is no single picture. According to one version, the most common, the French arrows penetrated into the rear of the 2 Battalion of the Minsk Regiment. The battalion mixed up and, on orders, Lieutenant Colonel Rakovich left behind the village of Orta-Kisek.
According to a contemporary of the battle, I. F. Prikhodkin (Prikhodkin I. F. "The Battle of Alma"), after the French appeared on the left flank, Menshikov turned the Moscow and Minsk regiments there. As a result, the left flank of the Russian army was bent at a right angle. The Belostok, Brest and Tarutino regiments held positions in the center.
On the left flank, 5 Russian battalions met 10 battalions of the French division Bosquet. However, the Russian infantry was supported by artillery, and the French artillery fell behind. It was difficult to move it over rough terrain. The French went on the attack and suffered heavy losses under the murderous fire of the Russian artillery. Our artillery destroyed the French in whole rows, but they bravely continued to advance.
When the French approached the rifle range, their superiority in small arms made itself felt. Moreover, according to one version, at the same time the allied fleet opened fire, from which the Minsk regiment suffered heavy losses. The Russian troops resisted staunchly. They went into bayonet attacks. As a witness of the battle noted, "the bayonets worked hard, but so did the Russian butts!"
Here another mistake was discovered: the batteries had few charges. The spare charging boxes were placed at a great distance, for fear of being hit.
The absence of field artillery prevented the French from finally deciding the outcome of the situation on the left flank in their favor. At this time, another French division under the command of General Canrobert crossed the river on the left flank. It threw back the advanced units of the Moscow regiment and began to threaten the entire left flank.
The situation on the left flank became critical. At the same time, the French were able to raise guns onto the plateau and opened fire on the Russian positions. The Russian soldiers were forced to retreat somewhat. At the same time, the Russian regiments in the center also retreated.
Zouave. Artist: Victor-Armand Poirson. The name of a soldier of the light infantry units (zouaves) of the French colonial troops. The French Zouaves were organized in Algeria in 1830 by Marshal Clausel.
Fight in the center
The French troops in the center – the 1st and 3rd French divisions (20 battalions) – began their offensive at about 6 a.m. The Zouaves were in the lead. The Moscow regiment’s riflemen retreated, leaving the village of Alma-Tamak on the left bank of the river. The French crossed the river. As a result, the retreating regiments of the Russian left flank – Moscow and Minsk – found themselves caught between two fires.
The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Moscow regiment opened fire on Canrobert's division. The French suffered some losses, and General Canrobert was wounded. To support the offensive, Marshal Saint-Arnaud threw the 3rd reserve division into battle. Around 14 p.m., the Russian troops began to retreat. Both commanders of the Russian Minsk and Moscow regiments, Prikhodkin and Kurtyanov, were wounded.
The Belostok, Brest and Tarutinsky regiments, which were supposed to hold positions in the center, retreated without much resistance. They were demoralized by the sight of the retreating troops of the left flank. In addition, they came under artillery fire. Only the Borodino regiment courageously repelled the enemy attacks in the center (Lacy Evans' division was advancing here) and pushed the British back beyond Burliuk. Only having lost half of its strength, the regiment retreated.
As a result, only the right-flank battalions of the Moscow Regiment were left to defend the key position of the center. It must be said that, according to English data, this hill was not defended at all. Lord Raglan, in search of a convenient position for observation, went to the location of the French troops and occupied Telegraph Hill. Having assessed its convenience, he ordered a battery to be placed on it. The allied battery fired at the right-flank Vladimir Regiment, which at that moment was advancing towards the river. Having come under flanking fire, the regiment stopped the attack and retreated.
According to the Russian version, units of the Moscow regiment put up a final resistance to the enemy on Telegraph Hill. The French stormed the heights. After a stubborn fight, Russian soldiers were forced to yield to the numerically superior enemy. After this, the French delivered 42 guns (seven batteries) to the hill. The Minsk regiment also resisted the enemy to the last and retreated only when it learned of the withdrawal of the entire army.
Capture of the Telegraph Ridge by the Zouaves. 1854 illustration
Fight on the right flank
The English troops also set out in the morning. They were supposed to make a flanking maneuver. However, during the movement it became clear that flanking the Russian flank would create a dangerous gap between the troops. Lord Raglan ordered the divisions to shift to the right. As a result, the British not only began their offensive several hours later than planned, but also launched a frontal attack instead of a flank attack. If not for the success of the French, the English could have suffered defeat that day.
The English troops advanced in two lines. The first consisted of the Light Division under George Brown (left wing) and the 2nd Division under George de Lacy Evans (right wing). The second line consisted of the 1st Division under the Duke of Cambridge (left wing) and the 3rd Division under Richard England (right wing). The 4th Division under George Cathcart and the cavalry under the Earl of Lucan remained in reserve.
Brown's division attacked Kurgan Hill, which was defended by the Kazan Jaeger Regiment. There were also redoubts here - Bolshoi and Maly. They were held by the Vladimir and Uglich Regiments. The Suzdal Regiment was on the right wing. The troops on Kurgan Hill were led by the commander of the 17th Division, General Onufriy Aleksandrovich Kvitsinsky. He was an experienced combat commander who had participated in many battles.
During the movement, the British divisions of the first line were mixed up, the officers were unable to restore order, and the troops went into the attack as a poorly organized crowd. The British began to climb up the slope when they were attacked by the 8th and 4th battalions of the Kazan Jaeger Regiment. This attack did more harm than good. The attacking Jaegers prevented the Russian artillery from firing at the enemy. In addition, when they were overthrown by intense rifle fire (the regimental commander Seleznev and both battalion commanders were killed), the British broke into the Great Redoubt on their shoulders.
The Russian artillery belatedly opened fire on the enemy, but due to the uneven terrain, which allowed them to hide behind the folds of the terrain, and the British formation – they were not moving in a dense formation, but in separate chains, the damage was insignificant. The other two battalions of the Kazan Regiment, demoralized by the unsuccessful attack of the first two battalions, could not withstand and retreated. The British captured the redoubt and several guns.
Battle of the Alma, British troops on the heights of the Alma, The Great Charge of the Guards. W. ThomasThe British did not have time to consolidate their success. The 1st Division of the Duke of Cambridge (Guards and Scots Brigade) from the second line had only just crossed the river. The 1st and 2nd battalions of the Vladimir Regiment, led by the division commander General Kvitsinsky himself, launched a furious counterattack on the Great Redoubt. The Russian soldiers launched a classic bayonet attack, and with virtually no shooting, they broke into the redoubt and overthrew the Royal Fusiliers. The commander of the Vladimir Regiment, Colonel Kovalev, was wounded during this battle.
The retreating British soldiers mixed up the formations of the Scots Guards regiment, and the guards also began to retreat. The attack of the 3rd and 4th battalions of the Vladimir regiment, personally led by the commander of the right flank, Gorchakov, completed the success. The Vladimirites pushed the enemy back to the river itself.
But this success could no longer change the outcome of the battle. The French had already pushed back the Russian left flank and occupied the center, opening flank fire on the Vladimir Regiment. The Russian right flank was also forced to retreat. The Vladimir and Kazan Regiments lost about 1 men each in this fierce battle, killed and wounded.
Kvitsinsky, left without support from the flank, was forced to begin a retreat and at that moment was wounded twice in the arm and leg and shell-shocked in the side with a broken rib (the general, due to his severe wounds, had to leave military service).
The British noted the great courage and fortitude of the Russian soldiers during their retreat. Kinglack, a participant in the battle who served on Lord Raglan's staff, wrote that the Russians were being smashed by French artillery, "beating them terribly," and they were unable to respond. And under these extremely difficult conditions, "order was maintained, and the column, being increasingly exterminated from minute to minute, marched majestically."
The battle ended at six o'clock in the evening.
Richard Woodville, The Charge of the Coldstream Guards (1896)
Results
The allies did not dare to pursue the retreating Russian troops.
The French, after winning the left flank and capturing the central heights, did not complete their victory with a general pursuit at the end of the battle. They did not even dare to finish off the battalions of the Moscow and Minsk regiments, which, snapping back, held back the enormous mass of French troops, compared to them. The French smashed them with artillery, but did not throw the infantry into battle.
The English cavalry also remained in reserve. The allied command feared that this was only the vanguard of the Russian army and expected a new battle. Thus, Raglan was afraid of a night attack by Russian troops, continuing to keep the troops in combat readiness and occupy the commanding heights.
The Russian troops lost more than 5,7 thousand people in this battle, two or three guns were destroyed. The allies lost about 3,5 thousand people (according to other sources - 4,3-4,5 thousand people).
The allied army won a victory, opening the road to poorly defended Sevastopol. The allies were in no hurry to reach the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, advancing extremely slowly and cautiously. They did not believe that Crimea was defended by such insignificant forces. For a long time they thought that they had encountered only the advance corps of the Russian army.
Despite the enemy's numerical advantage, naval support and better small arms, military researchers believe that Menshikov could have delayed the enemy for longer and inflicted serious damage on him. In particular, the question remains controversial: was the left flank left unprotected deliberately by order of the command or was it a mistake by Kiryanov and Menshikov. It is also noted that Menshikov did not pay attention to the construction of more serious fortifications, although the position and time allowed this to be done.
The interaction of troops was also poorly organized. While the Moscow, Minsk, Borodino, Kazan and Vladimir regiments met the enemy head-on, suffered huge losses and fought fiercely, almost half of Menshikov's army did not smell gunpowder at all. The Brest, Belostok, Tarutino and Uglich regiments left the battlefield without actually realizing their potential.
Thus, not all army forces were used to deter the enemy. With a more skilled leadership, as on the right flank, the Menshikov troops had good chances to prolong the battle and cause serious damage to the enemy.
The impression made in Petersburg by the Battle of Alma was enormous. It was the first battle, and it had a depressing effect. Now everyone was waiting for news of the fall of Sevastopol.
Monument to soldiers and officers of the Vladimir Infantry Regiment. Sculptor Baskerini, 1902. Destroyed by vandals in the 1950s. Restored in 1999, architect V. Gnezdilov, sculptor M. Korotkevich. The monument to the Vladimir Regiment was the first in the Russian Empire to feature a figure of a soldier – a low-ranking warrior. The slabs nearby contain a brief description of the regiment’s actions at Alma. And for some reason the regiment is called by its old name – musketeer: “Here on September 8, 1854, the Vladimir Musketeer Regiment under the command of Colonel Kovalev repelled the attacks of the British, charging three times with bayonets and driving them back to the Alma River, losing 51 officers and 1 lower ranks killed and wounded.”
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