The state of Soviet anti-tank artillery after the end of the Great Patriotic War
During the Second World War the greatest losses tanks applied specialized artillery systems originally created to combat armored vehicles. Based on statistical data obtained during the examination of destroyed Soviet T-34, KV, IS tanks and self-propelled guns created on their basis, one can come to the unambiguous conclusion that the majority of the vehicles were hit by artillery fire - about 80% of irretrievably lost tanks and self-propelled guns. This number includes vehicles destroyed and burned by fire from tank, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns.
However, it should be understood that most often our tanks ended up in the sights of specialized anti-tank guns, heavy and expensive 88-mm anti-aircraft guns were used to fight armored vehicles only occasionally and forcibly, and tanks fought with tanks not as often as is commonly believed.
The proportion of tracked armored vehicles destroyed by other weapons as a result of poor driving and improper operation is relatively small. aviation even with total enemy air superiority and unfavorable conditions, they did not exceed 15%, and in the presence of organized Defense, proper camouflage and dispersal - no more than 5%.
Sometimes the distribution of losses from certain anti-tank weapons depended heavily on a specific section of the front and local conditions. For example, on the Karelian and Leningrad fronts, losses from mines and landmines in 1944 reached 30%. However, most of the tanks that were blown up by mines, if they were not finished off by the enemy, were restored after evacuation.
During assault operations to capture large cities, where tanks were forced to maneuver in cramped conditions and the firing range was reduced to a minimum, the number of vehicles destroyed as a result of armour penetration by hand-held and rocket-propelled cumulative grenades increased sharply.
The dependence of the share of destroyed medium and heavy tanks on the caliber of armor-piercing artillery shells is also very indicative. On average, one disabled T-34 tank was hit by 4,9 37-50 mm shells and 1,5-1,8 75-88 mm shells. Powerful 75-88 mm guns penetrated any section of our tanks' armor protection, with the exception of the IS-2's upper frontal armor.
In addition, with the advent of 75 and 88 mm caliber guns with a high muzzle velocity, the effective firing range against armored vehicles in the frontal projection increased significantly (up to 900 m for 75 mm and up to 1 m for 500 mm guns). Penetration of armor by 88–75 mm shells, which had high energy, often led to detonation of ammunition and ignition of fuel, which made tank restoration impossible.
Unfortunately, I have not been able to find reliable studies on the distribution of enemy tank losses suffered from various Soviet anti-tank weapons. But the recollections of German tank crews and the memoirs of our military leaders allow us to conclude that on the Eastern Front, the main threat to the Panzerwaffe was posed by Soviet towed anti-tank artillery of 45-76 mm caliber.
In this place, military experts stories Some may object to me, pointing to the very successful use of cumulative aviation PTABs during the battle of Kursk and the effective strikes on German armored vehicles by British and American aviation at the final stage of the war, as well as the role of minefields and infantry anti-tank weapons.
All this is true, but in the case of PTABs, which destroyed up to 20% of German tanks in local areas, there was a surprise effect. Later, this figure fell, in order to reduce losses, the enemy switched to dispersed marching and pre-battle formations, during stops, German tankers began to place their vehicles under various canopies, trees and install light metal nets over the roof of the turret and hull.
As for the successes of the Allied air forces, they operated in very significant forces under conditions of complete dominance, and mainly fought not even against armored vehicles, but paralyzed supplies, destroying tankers, trucks with ammunition and technical support vehicles. As a result, German crews were forced to abandon their tanks and self-propelled guns, left without shells, fuel and spare parts.
Mine-explosive barriers are very effective in blocking the movement of armored vehicles, but, again, only under the condition that enemy sappers do not have the opportunity to make passages through them, and the minefields are covered by machine guns and artillery.
Anti-tank 14,5 mm rifles played a significant role in the initial period of the war, but as tanks became more protected, their effectiveness dropped sharply. Hand-held anti-tank high-explosive and cumulative grenades can be used relatively safely only from cover, and nothing like the Bazooka ever appeared in our infantry units during the war.
Let's get back to the subject of the conversation. Although, according to feedback from the active army, there was almost always a shortage of antitank guns, the saturation of troops with 45-76 mm guns occurred by mid-1943, and by 1944 the number of antitank divisions reached its maximum. As of January 1, 1944, the antitank artillery included 50 fighter-antitank brigades and 141 fighter-antitank regiments.
But in fairness it should be said that from the second half of the war, not all Soviet anti-tank guns in service fully met their intended purpose, which is why the troops had a significant number of captured 50-75 mm guns.
37-mm airborne cannon CHK-M1
This light anti-tank weapon, little known to the general public, was created in the OKBL-46 design bureau under the leadership of E. V. Charnko and accepted into service in mid-1944, but there is no information about its use in combat.
37-mm anti-tank gun ChK-M1 on display at the museum
The gun, weighing 209 kg in the firing position, allowed for air transportation and parachuting. It was specially designed for anti-tank units of paratroops, mechanized battalions and motorcycle regiments. If necessary, the gun could be disassembled into four parts: the mount, a 4,5 mm thick shield, a swinging part and a wheeled chassis.
The internal structure of the barrel, ballistics and ammunition were borrowed from the 37-mm anti-aircraft automatic gun 61-K mod. 1939. The wheel drive was intended only for rolling the gun over short distances and was separated during long-term transportation.
The ammunition load of the ChK-M1 could include a UBR-167P round with a sub-caliber projectile. The streamlined BR-167P sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile weighed 0,62 kg and had an initial velocity of 955 m/s. At a distance of 300 m, it could penetrate 90 mm of armor. A regular BR-167 caliber armor-piercing projectile weighing 0,77 kg with an initial velocity of 865 m/s could penetrate 50 mm of armor at the same distance.
When firing, a crew of four occupied a prone position. The horizontal firing sector was 45°. The vertical aiming angles were from –5° to +5°. The rate of fire was 15–25 rounds/min.
Thanks to the original design of the recoil devices, the 37-mm airborne gun mod. 1944 combined powerful ballistics of an anti-aircraft gun for its caliber with small dimensions and weight. With armor penetration values close to the 45-mm M-42 gun, the ChK-M1 is three times lighter and significantly smaller in size.
A much lower line of fire made it much easier to camouflage the gun, and its lighter weight made it easy for the crew to roll the gun. At the same time, the ChK-M1 was inferior to the 45 mm gun in terms of the lack of a full-fledged wheel drive, which made it impossible to tow at high speed.
In addition, the M-42 gun had a number of other advantages - the absence of a muzzle brake that would unmask the weapon when firing, a more effective fragmentation shell, and better behind-the-armor action of armor-piercing shells.
The light and compact 37 mm gun could be very effective in the initial period of the war, when enemy tanks did not have thick anti-shell armor. By 1944, the ChK-M1 gun occupied a narrow niche as an anti-tank weapon of highly mobile units. A total of 472 guns were produced, some of which were used until the mid-1950s.
To increase mobility, the ChK-M1 cannon could be mounted on a light cross-country vehicle or on a motorcycle with a sidecar.
Each gun crew was supposed to have two motorcycles. The first motorcycle carried the gun, driver, gunner, and loader. The second carried the driver, commander, shell carrier, and part of the ammunition. The motorcycle mount could fire on the move at a speed of up to 10 km/h when moving on a good road.
45 mm gun mod. 1942 M-42
In the initial period of the war, the basis of the Red Army anti-tank artillery was the 45-mm guns mod. 1937. In 1941, they were in the anti-tank platoons of rifle battalions (2 guns) and in the anti-tank divisions of rifle divisions (12 guns). They were also in service with separate anti-tank regiments, which included five four-gun batteries.
In the hands of experienced and tactically skilled commanders and trained crews, the 45-mm anti-tank gun at the time of its appearance, provided that it had high-quality armor-piercing shells, posed a serious threat to enemy armored vehicles. Its positive qualities were high mobility and ease of camouflage. However, due to the increase in armored targets' protection, a more powerful weapon was urgently needed, which became the 45-mm M-42 gun mod. 1942, designed in the design bureau at Plant No. 172 in Motovilikha.
45 mm gun M-42 mod. 1942
The 45 mm anti-tank gun M-42 was obtained by modernizing the 45 mm gun mod. 1937. The modernization consisted of lengthening the barrel (from 46 to 68 calibers), strengthening the propellant charge (the mass of gunpowder in the case increased from 360 to 390 grams) and a number of technological measures to simplify serial production. The thickness of the armor of the shield cover was increased from 4,5 mm to 7 mm for better protection of the crew from rifle armor-piercing bullets. The weight in the combat position was 625 kg, which allowed the gun to be quickly deployed or changed position by a crew of 5 people. The low silhouette (height 1 mm) reduced visibility on the battlefield and provided the opportunity for good camouflage.
The upgraded gun's muzzle velocity increased from 760 to 870 m/s. At a normal range of 500 meters, the 53-BR-240 armor-piercing projectile weighing 1,43 kg penetrated 60 mm of armor. The 53-BR-240P subcaliber projectile with a tungsten core weighing 0,85 penetrated 300 mm of armor at a range of 83 m.
The presence of fragmentation and canister shots in the ammunition set made it possible to destroy enemy firing points and successfully repel attacks by enemy infantry. When exploding, a 45 mm fragmentation grenade produced about 100 fragments that retained their lethal force when scattered along the front by 15 m and in depth by 5-7 m. Canister bullets when fired form a damaging sector along the front by 45-50 m and in depth by up to 350 m.
According to the recollections of anti-tank veterans, the M-42 had very high shooting accuracy and relatively low recoil. This made it possible to fire at a high rate of fire without correcting the aiming. The rate of fire was up to 25 rounds/min.
The relatively simple and technologically advanced design allowed the M-42 to be mass-produced. By 1946, the Soviet industry had manufactured 11 of these guns. Most of them were lost during combat, but in 156, the troops and warehouses had more than 1947 M-2 guns, they remained in active service until the early 500s and were used by the Soviet Army for training purposes until the first half of the 42s.
But even before the victory over Nazi Germany, due to the increase in the thickness of tank armor, it became clear that even taking into account numerous advantages and the introduction of the sub-caliber projectile, the 45-mm guns did not have prospects for long-term use. The armor penetration of the M-42 was not enough to combat German heavy tanks with powerful anti-shell armor Pz. Kpfw. V and Pz. Kpfw. VI, and confident penetration of the frontal armor of the medium Pz. Kpfw. IV hull when using a sub-caliber projectile was achieved at a distance of about 200 m. Shooting at the sides, stern and chassis was more successful. Nevertheless, due to the established mass production, mobility, ease of camouflage and low cost, the gun remained in service until the very end of the war.
In the post-war period, the "forty-fives" were actively given to the allies, and they fought in large numbers on the Korean Peninsula.
U.S. soldiers from the 5th Cavalry Regiment examine a captured M-45 42mm cannon.
In hilly terrain, the light and highly accurate guns proved themselves to be good weapons against manpower and fire points. The M-42s served the longest in Albania, where artillery pillboxes were built for them in mountainous terrain. Guns of this type were finally removed from service in the Albanian army in the mid-1990s.
57-mm gun ZIS-2
In the second half of the 1930s, the development of tanks with anti-shell armor began, and the issue of creating anti-tank guns capable of fighting them became acute. Calculations showed the futility of the 45 mm caliber in terms of a sharp increase in armor penetration. Various research organizations considered 55 and 60 mm calibers, but in the end it was decided to settle on the 57 mm caliber. Guns of this caliber were already used in the army before the revolution and navy (Nordenfeld and Hotchkiss guns).
Rounds for 57mm anti-tank gun
A new artillery round was developed for this caliber: the muzzle of a standard 76 mm cartridge case from a 76 mm divisional gun was re-crimped, inserting a 57 mm projectile into it, which increased the initial velocity.
The design team headed by Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin achieved success in creating the 57-mm anti-tank gun. The main feature of the new artillery system was the use of a 73-caliber barrel. The gun penetrated 1 mm of armor with an armor-piercing projectile at a distance of 000 m.
The prototype was manufactured in October 1940, and in March 1941 the artillery system entered service under the official name 57-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941. In total, about 1941 guns were delivered from June to December 250.
57 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941
The 57 mm gun confidently penetrated the frontal armor of all tanks that existed at that time at real combat distances. Nevertheless, production of these guns ceased in 1941. Contrary to popular belief, this happened not because this anti-tank gun "was too powerful", but because under wartime conditions, Soviet industry could not ensure the stable production of long 57 mm artillery barrels.
Mass production of 57-mm anti-tank guns became possible in 1943, after the necessary metalworking machines were received from the USA. The restoration of serial production was difficult - technological problems with the manufacture of barrels arose again, in addition, the plant was heavily loaded with the production program of 76-mm divisional and tank guns.
The 57 mm guns of 1941 and 1943 differed in a number of parts and manufacturing technology. The anti-tank gun of 1943 is known as the ZIS-2.
The first batch of ZIS-2 was delivered in May 1943, and the production of these guns made extensive use of the stock that had been mothballed at the plant since 1941. Mass production of ZIS-2 was organized by November 1943, after the commissioning of new production facilities equipped with equipment supplied under Lend-Lease.
The gun's mass in the firing position was 1 kg. The horizontal aiming sector was 050°, the vertical aiming angles were from -57° to +5°. A well-trained crew of 25 people could fire 5 shells per minute. With aiming, with adjustment of the point of impact and lead, it was possible to fire 25 rounds per minute at a moving target.
The UBR-271 armor-piercing projectile weighing 3,19 kg had an initial velocity of 990 m/s and at a range of 500 m, when hitting at a right angle, was capable of penetrating armor protection more than 100 mm thick. The UBR-271P subcaliber coil-shaped tracer, weighing 1,79 kg, accelerated to 1 m/s and penetrated an armor plate more than 270 mm thick at a normal angle of 500 m.
The capabilities of the ZIS-2 allowed it to confidently penetrate the 80-mm frontal armor of the most common German medium tanks Pz. Kpfw. IV, as well as the side armor of the heavy tank Pz. Kpfw. VI at typical combat distances. At distances of less than 500 m, the frontal armor of the Tiger was also damaged. In addition to armor-piercing rounds, there were rounds with a UO-271 fragmentation grenade, weighing 3,68 kg and containing an explosive charge weighing 218 g.
In 1943, the ZIS-2 was used to arm anti-tank artillery regiments (IPTAP), with 20 guns per regiment. Since December 1944, the ZIS-2 has been introduced into the organization charts of guards rifle divisions – into regimental anti-tank batteries and into the anti-tank division (12 guns). In the summer of 1945, regular rifle divisions were also transferred to a similar organization chart.
After production resumed, more than 9 guns were delivered to the troops by the end of the war. Production of the ZIS-000 continued until 2 inclusive, and about 1949 more guns were produced in the post-war period. 3-mm barrels were manufactured until 500.
In terms of cost and production technology, combat and service-operational characteristics, the ZIS-2 became the best Soviet anti-tank gun of the war, which allowed it to be used in the Soviet Army until the 1970s.
ZIS-2 were supplied to a number of countries and took part in several local conflicts, the first of which was the Korean War. There is information about the successful use of 57-mm Soviet guns in the Arab-Israeli wars. Guns of this type were in service with the Chinese army for a long time and were produced in the PRC under the index Type 55. In the 2st century, ZIS-XNUMX were still in service in the armed forces of Algeria, Guinea, Cuba, North Korea, Congo, Namibia, Nicaragua, Togo and Yemen.
76-mm gun ZIS-3
During the war, divisional 76-mm guns were widely used to provide fire support to infantry units, suppress firing points, and destroy light field fortifications and barbed wire. However, due to the prevailing circumstances, the "divisional guns" very often had to fire at tanks. Moreover, due to the shortage of specialized anti-tank guns, the 76-mm ZIS-3 guns were put into service with fighter-anti-tank units.
Structurally, the ZIS-3 was a hybrid of the F-22USV divisional gun (oscillating part) and the carriage of the ZIS-57 2-mm anti-tank gun. At the same time, the recoil force was compensated by a muzzle brake, which was absent on the F-22USV barrel. Also, the ZIS-3 eliminated an important drawback of the F-22USV - the placement of the aiming handles on different sides of the gun barrel. This allowed the crew of four (commander, gunner, loader, carrier) to perform only their functions.
When creating the new gun, much attention was paid to its technological effectiveness, and the design itself was immediately designed for mass production, which made it possible to obtain a gun that was almost three times cheaper than the F-22USV, while being no less effective. The ZIS-3 gun, created under the supervision of V. G. Grabin, entered service on February 12, 1942.
76mm ZIS-3 gun
Three types of 76 mm guns mod. 1942 were produced, differing in elevation angles, riveted or welded frames, push-button or lever trigger, breech and sighting devices. 76 mm guns, sent to anti-tank artillery, were equipped with direct-fire sights PP1-2 or OP2-1.
The gun could fire at targets in the horizontal plane in a sector of 54°, depending on the modification, the maximum aiming angle was 27° or 37°. The weight in the combat position did not exceed 1 kg. The gun could be aimed horizontally in a sector of 200°, vertically - from -54° to +5°. Like the ZIS-37, the ZIS-2 gun could be transported by mechanical traction at a speed of up to 3 km/h.
The 53-BR-350A armor-piercing projectile weighing 6,3 kg had an initial velocity of 662 m/s and could penetrate 300 mm of armor at a distance of 73 m by normal. The 53-BR-354P subcaliber projectile weighing 3,02 kg with an initial velocity of 950 m/s at 300 m by normal penetrated 100 mm of armor.
76mm rounds for the ZIS-3 gun
The 53-OF-350 fragmentation grenade weighing 6,2 kg, loaded with 540 g of explosives, produced more than 850 lethal fragments upon explosion, which was enough to destroy unsheltered manpower within a radius of 15 m.
While the 76mm gun did a good job of destroying enemy infantry and light field fortifications, its effectiveness in firing at medium and heavy tanks left much to be desired.
The frontal armor of the heavy tank Pz. Kpfw. VI was invulnerable to the ZIS-3 and slightly vulnerable at distances closer than 300 m in the side projection. Even in the frontal projection, the Pz. Kpfw. V tank was slightly vulnerable to the ZIS-3, as well as the modernized Pz. Kpfw. IV Ausf H/M/N. However, the Panther and all modifications of the Four were confidently hit by the ZIS-3 in the side. The introduction of a sub-caliber projectile into the ammunition loadout improved the situation somewhat, but such rounds were in short supply and were under special control.
Since 1944, due to the slowdown in the production of 45 mm M-42 guns and the shortage of 57 mm ZIS-2, the ZIS-3 gun, despite its insufficient armor penetration for that time, became the main anti-tank artillery system of the Red Army. This was a strictly forced decision, but by the end of the war it was not possible to replace the ZIS-3 in fighter-anti-tank units. In 1943-1944, 57 2 mm ZIS-4 anti-tank guns were produced, and 375 ZIS-3s during the same period, about half of which were sent to fighter-anti-tank units.
The relatively low armor penetration of 76 mm guns was partially compensated by the tactics of use and shooting at vulnerable points of medium and heavy tanks. The fight against German tanks and self-propelled guns at the final stage of the war was largely facilitated by the reduction in the quality of armor steel.
Due to a shortage of alloying additives, the armor smelted in Germany since 1944 had increased hardness due to the increased carbon content and was quite brittle. When hit by a shell, even without penetrating the armor, there were often chips on the inside, which led to crew casualties and damage to internal equipment.
Although the ZIS-1950 was already considered obsolete in the 3s, and more advanced divisional guns were mass-produced, its mass production ensured a long life for this gun, and it participated in many local conflicts. In the USSR, 76-mm guns were still in storage in the 1980s, and they were also actively used for training.
100 mm BS-3 cannon
The 100-mm BS-3 gun was created by the design team of V. G. Grabin in response to the requirements of the State Defense Committee to strengthen anti-tank defense. When choosing the caliber, the determining factor was the development of the pre-war production of the 100-mm B-34 naval universal gun, as well as unitary loading rounds, and in this part it was only necessary to additionally develop an armor-piercing projectile, which was absent from the B-34 ammunition nomenclature.
It was clear from the very beginning that such a weapon would have a significant mass, which would exclude rolling by the crew and would require the use of tracked tractors for off-road towing, and that the development of an 85-mm anti-tank gun, which would be lighter and cheaper, would be more optimal. At the same time, the use of a 100-mm shot allowed the use of a new artillery system for the destruction of fortifications and counter-battery combat.
When the Red Army switched to offensive operations, the need for such a weapon was high, since the existing 107-mm divisional gun of the 1940 model (M-60) was taken out of production, and the 122-mm corps gun of the 1931/37 model (A-19) was too heavy and had a low rate of fire. A fairly heavy 100-mm armor-piercing projectile in combination with a voluminous case of a naval universal gun made it possible to achieve high armor penetration without introducing a sub-caliber projectile, which required scarce tungsten.
By the State Defense Committee decree of May 7, 1944, the gun was accepted into service under the name "100-mm field gun mod. 1944", its factory index became BS-3. It was under this designation that this artillery system became widely known.
100 mm BS-3 cannon
The phrase "field gun" first appeared in the designation of a gun created in Soviet times. The specialists of the Main Artillery Directorate spent a long time deciding what to call the new gun. As a divisional gun, the 100-mm gun turned out to be too heavy, and as an anti-tank gun, it did not meet a number of the conditions of the time. Moreover, the creator of this gun, V. G. Grabin, never considered the BS-3 to be an anti-tank gun, which, apparently, was reflected in the name.
To ensure high power, reduced weight, compactness and high rate of fire, a wedge semi-automatic breech and a two-chamber muzzle brake with 60% efficiency were used for the first time on a gun of this caliber. The wheel problem was solved in an original way; wheels from the GAZ-AA or ZIS-5 were usually used for lighter guns. But they were not suitable for the new gun. The wheels from the five-ton YaAZ turned out to be too heavy and large.
Then a pair of wheels from the GAZ-AA was taken, which allowed it to fit into the specified weight and dimensions. The wheels from the GAZ-AA truck had a reinforced rubber tire and a special hub. Guns equipped with such wheels could be transported by mechanical traction at fairly high speeds and not get stuck in soft soils.
Due to the presence of a wedge breech with a vertically moving wedge with semi-automatics, the location of the vertical and horizontal aiming mechanisms on one side of the gun, as well as the use of unitary shots, the rate of fire reached 10 rounds/min. Shooting was carried out with unitary shots with armor-piercing tracer shells and high-explosive fragmentation grenades.
The UBR-412B armor-piercing tracer projectile, weighing 15,88 kg, left the barrel with an initial velocity of 897 m/s and at a range of 500 m at an angle of 90° penetrated 160 mm of armor. At a distance of 1 m, armor penetration was 000 mm. The direct fire range was 135 m. The maximum firing range of a high-explosive fragmentation grenade was 1 m.
The OF-412 high-explosive fragmentation shell weighing 15,6 kg contained 1,46 kg of TNT and was very effective not only in destroying field fortifications and killing enemy manpower, but also when firing at armored vehicles. Although a direct hit from a 100 mm high-explosive fragmentation shell did not penetrate the frontal armor of the Pz. Kpfw. IV Ausf H medium tank, the combat vehicle was guaranteed to be out of action.
At the same time, the 100-mm field gun had a number of shortcomings that made it difficult to use as an anti-tank gun. When firing, the BS-3 gun jumped a lot, which made the gunner's work unsafe and knocked down the sighting settings, and in turn led to a decrease in the practical rate of aimed fire - a quality very important for a field anti-tank gun. The presence of a powerful muzzle brake at a low height of the firing line and flat trajectories, typical for firing at armored targets, led to the formation of a significant smoke and dust cloud, unmasking the position and blinding the crew.
The gun's mass in the firing position was 3 kg, which, given the barrel length of 650 mm, created certain difficulties during transportation, and rolling it by the crew on the battlefield was practically impossible. While the 5 mm, 960 mm and 45 mm guns were towed by horse teams, GAZ-57, GAZ-76, GAZ-AA, GAZ-AAA, ZIS-64 vehicles or Dodge WC-67 ("Dodge 5/51") vehicles supplied from the middle of the war under Lend-Lease, towing the BS-3 required tracked tractors, or, in extreme cases, all-wheel drive Studebaker US4 trucks.
The length of the gun in the traveling position reached 9 mm, width - 370 mm, height - 2 mm. The horizontal aiming angle is 150°. The range of vertical aiming angles is from -1° to +500°. The maximum towing speed is 58 km/h. Crew - 5 people.
Although the BS-3 was capable of destroying any German mass-produced tank or heavy self-propelled gun, the importance of this weapon as an anti-tank weapon is greatly exaggerated. By the time the BS-3 appeared, the Germans had hardly used tanks in large numbers. The 100-mm field gun was produced in small quantities during the war and could not play a significant role.
In addition, most of the guns supplied to the troops were, as a rule, located far from the “front line”, serving as a “special anti-tank reserve” in case of a breakthrough by large groups of enemy heavy tanks.
Moreover, the first issue guns only had sighting devices for firing from closed positions - the S-71A-5 panorama. The OP1-5 optical sight for direct fire was only installed a couple of months after the start of serial production of the guns.
The BS-3 guns were in units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 9th Guards Army, and the 6th Guards Tank Army. Three corps artillery brigades (61st, 62nd, and 63rd) were attached to rifle corps. Each of these artillery brigades had one artillery regiment armed with 3 BS-20 guns, meaning that the three artillery regiments had a total of 60 BS-3 guns.
Another unit of the 9th Guards Army that had BS-3 guns was the 76th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, which received 16 100-mm guns. In addition, the 6th Guards Army included the 202nd Separate Light Artillery Brigade, one of its three artillery regiments of which was armed with 20 BS-3 guns.
In total, the 2nd Ukrainian Front units had 1945 BS-96 guns in March 3, but they were used sparingly as anti-tank guns, and mainly fired from closed positions, as well as counter-battery combat. For example, the gunners of the 408th Artillery Regiment destroyed only one medium German self-propelled gun with BS-3 fire in March, having spent 6 armor-piercing tracer shells, and in the 37th Artillery Regiment, they were able to destroy one German tank with BS-3 fire in the whole of April.
The artillerymen of the 409th regiment reported the most destroyed enemy armored vehicles (10 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns), whose positions were counterattacked several times. At the same time, the consumption of armor-piercing shells per destroyed tank or self-propelled gun exceeded 10 units, which indicates that the shooting was conducted from a long distance. In the firing range conditions, well-trained gunners at a distance of 500 m when firing at moving targets spent an average of 2,2 shells with a combat rate of fire of 4,5 rounds/min.
By the time the BS-3 was first delivered to the troops, the need for such a weapon was not obvious. At the end of 1944, the backbone of the Panzerwaffe was broken; the Red Army already had fairly effective 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns, SU-100 self-propelled guns, T-34-85 and IS-2 tanks. In extreme cases, 122-mm A-19 guns and 152-mm ML-20 howitzer-guns, as well as ISU-122 and ISU-152 heavy self-propelled guns, could be used to combat the enemy's few heavy tanks.
General assessment of the effectiveness of Soviet anti-tank artillery at the end of World War II
To summarize, I will try to assess the effectiveness of the Soviet anti-tank guns by type of guns and their suitability for current tasks.
Inexpensive, fairly easy to operate, maneuverable and easily camouflaged, the 45mm M-42 cannons at the final stage of combat operations no longer provided reliable destruction of the frontal projections of medium and heavy tanks even when firing from extremely close range.
At the same time, the "forty-fives" remained in demand, thanks to their ability to accompany infantry with fire and wheels, being directly in combat formations to destroy exposed firing points with direct fire and participate in repelling enemy counterattacks. When performing anti-tank missions, they tried to use them in combination with more powerful guns and arrange camouflaged firing positions taking into account the folds of the terrain, so that there was the possibility of firing at the sides of enemy armored vehicles. But after the first shots, good camouflage no longer helped, and the crews of the 45-mm guns often died, and the guns themselves were destroyed by enemy fire.
The 76 mm ZIS-3 divisional guns, which were forced to be used in antitank guns, also had an insufficient direct fire range for an antitank gun and low armor penetration. The use of subcaliber shells gave a good effect at very close combat distances. It was much more difficult to camouflage the ZIS-3 than the M-42, and the muzzle brake produced a clearly visible flash when fired and led to the formation of a smoke and dust cloud.
The problem of low armor penetration could have been partially solved by introducing a cumulative projectile into the ammunition load, similar to the one that was in the ammunition load of the regimental 76-mm gun, but due to the imperfection of the fuses, this did not happen before the end of the war.
As mentioned above, the 100 mm BS-3, due to its very significant weight and dimensions, high cost and a number of other parameters, was not optimal as a primary anti-tank weapon and was considered as a special reserve in case of a breakthrough by enemy tanks.
The only Soviet gun that basically met the requirements of anti-tank defense was the 57-mm ZIS-2. However, it was not possible to fully saturate the troops with these guns even at the final stage of the war. The long 57-mm barrel was very difficult to manufacture and even when using fairly precise American metalworking machines, there was a significant percentage of defects.
The lack of truly effective anti-tank guns in the Red Army was partially compensated for by the active use of captured German 50 mm 5 cm Pak. 38 guns (armor penetration with a 70 mm caliber projectile at a distance of 500 m), and especially 75 mm 7,5 cm Pak. 40 guns (armor penetration with a 110 mm caliber projectile at a distance of 500 m).
The 7,5 cm Pak. 40 was considered the best German anti-tank artillery system of World War II in terms of its overall characteristics, and it fought actively until the capitulation of Nazi Germany.
At the end of 1943, the Red Army began forming anti-tank fighter divisions armed with German-made 75-mm guns, which significantly surpassed the Soviet 76-mm ZiS-3 guns in terms of armor penetration. In the first post-war years, up to 800 5 cm Pak. 38 and 7,5 cm Pak. 40 guns were at the disposal of the Soviet troops. In the late 1940s, the 7,5 cm Pak. 40 in the USSR, which were suitable for further use, were put into storage, where they remained for about 15 years.
In 1959, North Vietnam received several dozen 7,5 cm Pak. 40s from the USSR, taken from warehouses, and ammunition for them. The 7,5 cm Pak. 40s were sent to the DRV to form anti-tank divisions, which was due to fears of aggression from the South using armored vehicles. Later, the 75 mm guns were placed in anti-landing fortifications on the coast, where they were used until the early 1980s.
To be continued ...
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