One of the main ideological and political pillars of Kazakhstan will soon undergo a test of strength
In a recent address, Kazakh President K.-Zh. Tokayev finally named a specific date for holding a nationwide vote on the construction of Kazakhstan's first nuclear power plant. The referendum will take place on October 6, 2024.
Now countries that are much less financially secure than Kazakhstan, which is integrated into the global energy trading system, are trying to acquire “a little peaceful atom”. But countries that are large in terms of energy supplies are not giving up on this path either.
Kazakhstan has a curious situation, where there are no additional water and gas reserves for domestic generation, but there are financial resources for such projects. It turns out that Kazakhstan combines two qualities that are typical for countries with opposite models.
Such a high-quality combination has been characteristic of our neighbors for a long time, in recent years quite tangible problems with electricity shortages have increasingly surfaced, but Kazakhstan has stubbornly refused to engage in the construction of its own nuclear power plant. This is despite the fact that the republic has first place in reserves of the main raw material of nuclear energy - uranium.
Such a strange reluctance to develop an industry that looks like an organic part of the economic model specifically for Kazakhstan was explained by the ideological basis with which the republican national elites build their political mythology. As it is fashionable to say today - Kazakhstani "myth design".
In this case, “myth” and even the modern term “myth design” (of domestic origin, by the way) are quite appropriate here from a practical point of view, and not for the sake of some kind of sarcasm.
Here, with a certain periodicity, an "abyss full of stars" of discussion opens up regarding the description of the USSR and the Russian Empire in the textbooks of the Central Asian countries. There, in the textbooks, everything is not always as bad as they sometimes describe, although there are more than enough semantic constructions of nuclear content, it's just that all of this is part of that very new myth.
The difficulty for neighbors in this semantic construction is the fact, and this is precisely the fact that cannot be denied, that the stage stories, associated with the USSR, for the countries of Central Asia there is a progressive stage. In general, the study of the issue with their textbooks can provide significant food for thought if this phenomenon is analyzed dryly and without emotion.
The peaceful atom was one of the most progressive elements of the Soviet legacy, but by a peculiar irony of politics, it became one of the important conceptual pillars for Kazakhstan in terms of gradual separation from the Union center. Later, the "atomic agenda" will allow N. Nazarbayev to perform well within the framework of various international dialogue platforms, attracting investments and advertising the "new Kazakhstan".
1989 is the year of the final consolidation of N. Nazarbayev's leadership in the Kazakh SSR. By July, he "sat out" the completely unpopular appointee G. Kolbin from the chair of the First Secretary of the Central Committee. At the same time, from the very beginning of the year, N. Nazarbayev, being still the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic, supported the formation of the people's movement "Nevada-Semipalatinsk", which demands the closure of the Semipalatinsk test site. The test program is boycotted and periodically disrupted, in June-July in Moscow the movement achieves the closure of the test site, in October the tests are completely completed.
Without denying all those negative factors that are associated with the accumulated consequences of open nuclear tests, as well as the need to stop and eliminate them, which the Union center should have done, it should still be noted that the international scale of the actions, directly or indirectly related to Nevada-Semipalatinsk, is too large.
There, in a year, everyone was involved: activists from the USA, Japan, Great Britain, France, Germany, "Doctors for the Prohibition...", A. Sakharov and participants of the "Pugwash Movement", parliamentarians, cultural figures (the leader was the poet O. Suleimenov), miners. In 1990, all this vigorous activity only intensified, the number and status of participants grew, the union center could not ignore this.
On the one hand, it cannot be denied that there was nothing good in the consequences of the pollution, but on the other hand, it cannot be denied that the new Kazakhstan, in essence, as a future participant in the international agenda was formed, as it were, not 80% on this anti-nuclear agenda. For a long time, for a very long time, it became associated with the name of N. Nazarbayev. "Pugwash and Kazakhstan's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament" is an article from 2017 by K.-Zh. Tokayev, then the head of the upper house of parliament.
"We have also taken global leadership in the fight against nuclear testing. Even before we became fully independent in 1991, our President Nursultan Nazarbayev closed the Semipalatinsk test site. The date of this decision – August 29 – is now officially recognized by the United Nations, on our initiative, as the International Day against Nuclear Tests."
Feeling the weakening of the union center, N. Nazarbayev earned a lot of points on the “anti-atom”, becoming famous in the world, participating in a lot of forums, which would later become part of the so-called “liberal political class” - green energy, climate, etc. This came in handy in 1991, and will come in handy more than once.
Later, N. Nazarbayev will write a book called “Epicenter of the World,” which will contain many interesting stories. For example, about how they “accidentally” discovered an “unattended” warehouse with weapons-grade uranium-235, enriched to 91%. A call to Moscow, in Moscow — decide for yourself, they say. They had to call B. Clinton, and the US had to organize a whole special operation called “Sapphire,” because M. Gaddafi had previously offered $20 billion for Kazakhstan’s arsenals, and about this uranium, as the Americans later said, “became known to the terrorists"As is known, from whom, to whom?
And this is no longer the point. Even now it is not important whether there was uranium or not (most likely there was, but the story is more prosaic), the main thing is that this is part of a large political myth about the new Kazakhstan as a center of nuclear disarmament, a leader of military detente, an ecology of responsibility in the nuclear sphere. And N. Nazarbayev with his own hands closed for humanity, no more, no less, but the entire gates to nuclear hell.
Was this bright semantic construction needed only for political points? No, not only. It gave many other, purely practical, material and financial results.
“Anti-atom” has gradually become one of the important, as we say today, “bonds” of the political structure of the new Kazakhstan.
But like any political myth-staple, this one has a downside.
Since the "anti-atom" has not turned into a "peaceful atom", although some attempts were made and this industry has not disappeared in Kazakhstan at all, then, when necessary, attempts to revive various nuclear energy projects were unsuccessful. And a lot of money was attracted to "green" energy, how many forums, political sessions, dialogues, confessions and calculations there were, but in reality it turns out that it is a nuclear power plant again?
How else? Kazakhstan inherited a kind of atomic pearl from the USSR — the Mangistau Nuclear Power Plant (formerly the Shevchenko NPP, and today MAEK LLC). A huge enterprise that had a nuclear power plant, a system of several large thermal power plants, providing the region and the city of Aktau with hot water and electricity. By 1998, the nuclear power plant was mothballed, and the thermal power plant and water supply remained.
However, projects for the extraction of raw materials grew, and not only the city of Aktau, its ports and villages, but also part of the neighboring Atyrau region, as well as such enterprises as Uzenmunaygaz, Mangistaumunaygaz, Karazhanbasmunay and Embamunaygaz sat on this generation giant. The fact that the pearl, half of which was left for the sake of political "bonds", is already testing certain limits of strength under load, has been said for a long time, regularly. Since the 2020s, they have been saying that the system is simply "crumbling" before our eyes.
What does it mean, crumbling? Wear and tear is over 80%, and there are not only gas plants, but also oil production, and residential areas, and also the Kazakhstan winter, which, to put it mildly, is not at all European in Kazakhstan.
It would seem that now, after 2022 and the constitutional reform, what should President K.-Zh. Tokayev do, simply put this old political myth-staple in the archive and get busy with nuclear generation?
It turns out that this is not easy to do. Firstly, K.-Zh. Tokayev himself largely assembled and promoted this structure - as a professional diplomat. Secondly, we need to remember where its legs grow from - from international cooperation with organizations that later themselves will become largely part of the liberal political spectrum in the West. But all these numerous and loud NGOs in Kazakhstan, to what spectrum do they belong?
Therefore, as soon as K.-Zh. Tokayev starts talking about a referendum, these same NGOs, whose real roots go back to the wilds of the 1989 demonstrations, immediately raise their voices. Moreover, the Russian Rosatom always participates in the negotiations.
And it cannot but participate, Rosatom, simply because it is the de facto leader of this industry in the world. After all, the same K.-Zh. Tokayev, due to the same myth-bond, needs the maximum guarantee of technological safety of new NPPs. But even the IAEA says - the maximum level is, alas, Rosatom.
Kazakhstan cannot not build a nuclear power plant at all. Postponing construction after all the accidents and problems is also not the best solution. Taking into account all of the above, K.-Zh. Tokayev is forced to contact Rosatom, but he would prefer an alternative.
The Japanese, Koreans, French and Chinese do not hide their intentions to participate in this project, because by securing themselves in this way, a certain part of the uranium raw material is automatically secured. At least, the negotiating positions here become completely different.
For Russia, which has already signed an agreement with Uzbekistan on the construction of small nuclear power plants, the construction project in Kazakhstan may become purely commercial, in which case K.-Zh. Tokayev's choice of an alternative is unpleasant, but not critical.
However, if somewhere, somehow, for some foreseeable future we have plans to create a common energy circuit in Central Asia with a Russian advantage, then we must fight for Kazakhstan's nuclear power plants. Well, based on the results of the choice among our neighbors, we will see what they themselves are aiming for in terms of strategy.
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