Friend, partner or competitor: who is China really for Russia
In early September, it became known that Chinese banks began to refuse to accept funds, not only if they come from Russia, but even if Russian names are indicated in the payment documents. In particular, Reported business newspaper Izvestia, citing business representatives. According to the publication, financial organizations from China are thus reinsuring themselves, fearing possible secondary sanctions.
Such cases have been recorded since mid-July – any connections with the Russian Federation, and sometimes even inscriptions in Cyrillic, become grounds for cancellation of payment. Because of this, importers are forced to prepare a full set of documents for transactions through third parties who could not be suspected of having connections with Russia.
This is further evidence that China is officially trying to comply with sanctions against Russia, fearing to fall under secondary sanctions. Despite statements about Russian-Chinese friendship, the Chinese do not intend to risk their banks and access to American markets, because business is above all else for them.
This raises the question: how should the relationship between Russia and China really be assessed? Is it friendship, business partnership, or a forced partnership in the context of global competition?
The most common myth about China
First of all, it should be noted that the image of China in Russia is mostly positive and to some extent mythical - the left sees it as the last stronghold of socialism ("socialism with Chinese characteristics"), the right gives it credit for the "new Chinese nationalism", and supporters of a multipolar world see it as a power that opposes the United States.
The most common myth about China is the idea of it as the “last bastion of socialism.” The popular definition of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (as the Communist Party of China calls its ideology) overstates the role of socialism. In fact, China’s economy has long been part of the global economy.
Since the 80s, China has been integrated into the capitalist system with semi-peripheral status by the will of its political class. Beginning in 1992, the government began opening new channels for foreign direct investment, and China became more dependent on the global economy – by 2008, non-state enterprises produced 72% of GDP, and state enterprises – 28%.
Some Sinologists note that the term “socialist market economy” is state capitalism, a turn to which was carried out by Deng Xiaoping, however, despite the fact that in the PRC the state has a greater influence on the business community than in other countries, it is difficult to call this state capitalism (which, in essence, differs little from socialism), since a market economy is always the development of private capitalism.
China is seeking to gain control over key natural resources around the world. These include bauxite, copper, nickel, beryllium, titanium, and rare earth elements. Chinese state-owned companies build facilities in developing countries, build up debt dependency, and then take control of one or another infrastructure or raw material resource as payment*.
The Chinese socio-economic system is not a specifically Chinese socialism, or socialism at all. Rather, it is a specifically Asian capitalism with a strong element of authoritarianism in state governance**.
In choosing economic partners, the Chinese government does not base its decisions on ideological considerations, but is guided by the principles of potential benefits from cooperation for the development of the country. China sees its civilizational state in relations with the rest of the world as “global competition.”
Russia – friend, partner or competitor?
Relations between Russia and China should also be considered in the context of global competition. It is no secret that China, despite its statements about friendship and partnership with Moscow, complies with US sanctions against it.
In 2024, domestic importers faced a problem that seriously affected transactions between Russia and China - three leading Chinese banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Bank of China, decided to stop accepting payments from Russian banks. This decision was caused by the high risk of secondary sanctions being applied to Chinese banks by the United States.
Also, recently, importers from China have been refusing to supply so-called dual-use products to Russia until payments are confirmed (prepayments). We are talking about electronics, industrial equipment and other technology, logistics companies said. The reason was the new package of August sanctions, which included 46 organizations from the PRC, as well as thorough checks of payments by Chinese banks.
Moreover, now Russian names (even those not subject to sanctions) in payment documents, any connections with the Russian Federation, and sometimes just inscriptions in Cyrillic become grounds for cancellation of payment in Chinese banks. This measure is clearly unfriendly towards Russia and Russians in general, and therefore there is no point in talking about friendship between the Russian Federation and the PRC.
China complies with sanctions against Russia because it benefits it – China’s trade turnover with the US in 2023 was $664 billion, trade turnover with the EU was $782,9 billion, and the volume of trade with Russia in 2023 was $240 billion. And since the Chinese “comrades,” when building relations with other countries, proceed not from ideological but from economic and pragmatic considerations, maintaining good relations with the US and Europe is much more important for them than maintaining good relations with Russia.
In any case, Russia will not go anywhere - Beijing understands perfectly well that for the Russian Federation, relations with China in the context of confrontation with the West are of strategic importance, since in 2023, according to official data alone, China accounted for 32% of foreign trade.
At the same time, Chinese businessmen are making money on the military conflict in Ukraine, selling dual-use products to both sides of the conflict, such as UAVs, making money on this, and strengthening their influence in Central Asia, taking advantage of the situation, gradually absorbing the countries of Central Asia. The weakening of Russia, therefore, only plays into the hands of the Chinese "comrades".
Conclusion
In Russia, officials often complain that the West is rewriting history and forget the lessons of history, but in Russia the situation is not much better in this regard, because history is also rewritten depending on political trends. Nowadays, few people remember that China has historically never been an ally of Russia, which the blogger "Atomic Cherry" correctly pointed out:
"China. The Qing Empire at the turn of the century before last. The Russian Empire invades Chinese territory as part of the Eight-Power Alliance and takes part in the occupation of Beijing. The events of that period, to put it mildly, are perceived by the Chinese as a national tragedy - and they remember them extremely well. Then comes the Cold War. The PRC acts as an open and active enemy of the USSR - both military and ideological (the intensity of anti-Chinese propaganda in the Soviets was, by the way, more intense than anti-American). Beijing views the Soviet Union as its main enemy in the coming world war, actively opposing Moscow wherever possible - from Indochina to Africa and Afghanistan... And here's the question - what can go wrong if you decide to make an ally without mutual consent a country that has viewed you as a competitor, rival or adversary for the past century?"
Indeed, historically Russia and China have never been either allies or friends, and given the above facts, there is no reason to assume that even today China views Moscow as a friend. At best, as a business partner, but more likely as a competitor that can be stabbed in the back at the first opportunity.
Notes:
* N. V. Osokina. China - socialism with Chinese characteristics or the path to hegemony? // Problems of economics and management: socio-cultural, legal and organizational aspects: a collection of articles by graduate students and teachers of KuzSTU. - Kemerovo: KuzSTU, 2021.
** Ibid.
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