India's Nuclear Arsenal in 2024

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has published the latest report from a group of authors led by Hans M. Christensen and his collaborators Matt Korda, Eliana Jones and Mackenzie Knight.
India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, developing at least four new systems weapons and several new delivery platforms that will complement or replace existing nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based delivery systems, and sea-based systems. Some of these systems are nearing completion and will soon be fielded. FAS experts estimate that India could have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for 130 to 210 nuclear warheads, but has likely only produced about 172, although the country’s warhead stockpile is likely growing. India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal and field its nascent triad. We estimate that India currently operates eight different nuclear-capable systems: two aircraft, five ballistic missiles, missiles land-based and one sea-launched ballistic missile. At least five more systems are in development, most of which are believed to be close to completion and soon to be delivered to the armed forces.
Research methodology
The Indian government does not publish figures on the size of its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, the analyses and estimates in the Nuclear Notebook are derived from a combination of open sources:
1. Data of government origin (e.g. government statements, declassified documents, budget information, military parades and treaty disclosure data);
2. Data of non-governmental origin (e.g. media reports, think tank analyses and industry publications);
3. Commercial satellite imagery. Because each of these sources provides different and limited information that is subject to varying degrees of uncertainty, we cross-check each data point using multiple sources and supplement them with private conversations with officials when possible.
Gathering and analyzing accurate information about India’s nuclear forces is more challenging than for many other nuclear-armed states. India has never disclosed the size of its nuclear arsenal, and Indian officials comment irregularly on the country’s nuclear capabilities. Although some official information can be obtained from parliamentary inquiries, budget documents, government statements, and other sources, India generally maintains a culture of relative opacity regarding its nuclear arsenal. India has previously refused to disclose the expenditures on certain nuclear weapons programs, and in 2016, the Indian government added the Strategic Forces Command to the list of security organizations exempted from India’s Right to Information Act, thereby preventing journalists, researchers, and the public from accessing critical information about India’s nuclear arsenal (Government of India 2016; Sarkar 2021). Furthermore, unlike geopolitical competitors such as China or Russia, the United States does not typically publish estimates of India’s nuclear arsenal; One of the Air Force publications that previously provided the information has not been released since early 2021, and that version appeared to include watered-down and outdated information.
Although the Indian government rarely makes official statements about its nuclear arsenal, the Ministry of Defence's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) often publishes useful information about the weapons systems it is developing. This information can be found in monographs, monthly reports and other publications. Although these reports very rarely contain information specifically related to India's nuclear programme, they sometimes offer data on dual-use delivery systems that can be used for analysis.
In the absence of much official information from the Indian government and military, as well as from Western governments, local news and media sources tend to embellish details about a country's nuclear arsenal. For example, some sources regularly claim that certain weapons systems are "nuclear-capable," despite the lack of any official evidence to support this claim. Many news outlets also tend to rely on anonymous "sources" for military information without identifying or providing evidence that these sources are actually familiar with the systems they are describing.
To this end, we generally rely on official sources and images, as well as commercial or freely available satellite imagery, to analyze India’s nuclear arsenal and, where possible, attempt to corroborate any unofficial claims using multiple sources. Satellite imagery can be particularly useful for monitoring construction at military installations, as well as identifying the types of missiles, ships, or aircraft present at bases. In particular, the research of open-source analysts such as @tinfoil_globe on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter) has proven to be highly valuable in analyzing Indian military bases using satellite imagery. In some cases, useful imagery about nuclear systems can also be obtained from social media posts — from both military and civilian accounts — and can be used in conjunction with satellite imagery for more specific analysis.
Estimates of stockpiles of fissile materials and warheads
India is one of the few countries believed to produce both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-grade plutonium, although its HEU production is believed to be focused primarily on fuel production for the growing number of nuclear-powered ships and submarines (Fries et al., 2024).
India's source of weapons-grade plutonium has been the operating Dhruva plutonium production reactor at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre complex near Mumbai and, until 2010, the CIRUS reactor at the same location. In March 2024, after more than a decade of delays, India also completed construction and began core loading of its first unguarded 500-megawatt prototype fast breeder reactor at the Indira Gandhi Atomic Research Centre near Kalpakkam (Department of Atomic Energy 2024). The new reactor produces more plutonium-239 than it consumes in fission and could therefore significantly increase India's future plutonium production if the reactor is operated efficiently. The research centre's director has additionally stated that six more fast breeder reactors will come online over the next 15 years (Kumar 2018).
The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates that India has produced approximately 2023 kilograms (plus or minus about 680 kilograms) of weapons-grade plutonium as of early 160 (Frieß et al. 2024). Assuming about four kilograms of plutonium per warhead, this would theoretically be enough to produce between 130 and 210 nuclear warheads. However, this calculation is subject to some caveats due to a number of uncertainties. In particular, it is unclear whether India is prioritizing the development and production of higher-yield thermonuclear weapons, lower-yield fission-only weapons, boosted single-stage weapons, or any combination of these designs; all of these could use varying amounts of plutonium enriched to different levels. India's 1998 nuclear tests provided strong evidence of a "fission" design, but the country's progress in "boosted fission" and thermonuclear weapons remains highly uncertain (Albright 1998; Levy 2015). It is also likely that India did not use all of its plutonium to produce warheads, but may have kept some in reserve.
The size of India’s nuclear arsenal also depends on the number and types of launchers that can deliver them, since most nuclear-armed states are unlikely to produce significantly more warheads than they can actually launch. Based on available information about the structure and strategy of its nuclear delivery forces, we estimate that India has produced about 172 nuclear warheads. It will need more warheads to equip the new missiles it is currently developing.
India's Nuclear Forces, 2024
Nuclear doctrine
Tensions between India and Pakistan are among the most worrisome nuclear flashpoints on the planet. The two nuclear-armed countries have engaged in open hostilities as recently as November 2020, when Indian and Pakistani soldiers exchanged artillery and gunfire across the Line of Control, killing at least 22 people. The clash followed another incident in February 2019, when Indian fighter jets dropped bombs near the Pakistani town of Balakot in retaliation for a suicide bombing by a Pakistan-based militant group. In retaliation, Pakistani jets shot down an Indian fighter jet and captured the Indian pilot before returning him a week later. The skirmish escalated into the nuclear realm when it prompted the convening of Pakistan’s National Command Authority, the body that oversees Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Speaking to the media at the time, a senior Pakistani official noted, “I hope you know what [the National Command Authority] means and what it represents. I said we will surprise you. Expect that surprise.… You have chosen the path of war without knowing the consequences for the peace and security of the region” (Abbasi 2019).
In this context, the risk of escalation of the conflict between India and Pakistan remains dangerously high. In March 2022, India accidentally fired what appeared to be a conventional BrahMos land-based cruise missile 124 kilometers into Pakistani territory, damaging civilian property. Pakistani officials subsequently claimed that India failed to alert them through a high-level military hotline, and India did not even make a public statement about the accident for two days (Dawn 2022). In the absence of any de-escalation measures from India, Pakistan reportedly grounded all military and civilian aircraft for nearly six hours and placed forward bases and strike aircraft on high alert (Bhatt 2022). Had the same accidental launch occurred during a period of heightened tension, it is possible that the incident could have escalated into a very dangerous phase (Korda 2022).
While India’s primary deterrence relationship has historically been with Pakistan, its nuclear modernization indicates that it is increasingly focusing on its future strategic relationship with China. In November 2021, India’s then Chief of Defence Staff told a press conference that China had become India’s biggest security threat (Sen 2021). In addition, almost all of India’s new Agni missiles have a range that suggests China is their primary target. This stance was likely reinforced after the 2017 Doklam standoff, during which Chinese and Indian troops were put on high alert due to an incident on the border with Bhutan. Tensions have remained high in the years since, particularly after another border skirmish in June 2020 that left both Chinese and Indian soldiers dead. Additional casualties have been reported from Chinese-Indian military clashes as recently as January 2021 (BBC 2021).
The expected expansion of India’s nuclear forces, increasingly geared toward a militarily superior China (in terms of both conventional and nuclear forces), will lead to the deployment of new capabilities over the next decade. Such developments could also potentially impact how India views the role of its nuclear weapons in a standoff with Pakistan.
India has long maintained a no-first-use policy. However, this policy was weakened by India’s 2003 statement that it could potentially use nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attacks, which would therefore constitute a first use of nuclear weapons, even if it was in retaliation. Moreover, during border skirmishes with Pakistan in 2016, India’s then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar indicated that India should not “bind” itself to a no-first-use policy (Som 2016). Although the Indian government later explained that the minister’s remarks represented his personal opinion, the debate highlighted the conditions under which India would consider using nuclear weapons. Current Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has also publicly questioned India’s future commitment to its no-first-use policy, tweeting in August 2019 that “India has strictly adhered to this doctrine.
“What happens in the future depends on the circumstances” (R. Singh 2019). Recent studies have further questioned India’s commitment to the no-first-use policy, with some analysts arguing that “India’s NFU [no-first-use] policy is neither a stable nor a reliable predictor of how Indian military and political leadership might actually use nuclear weapons” (Sundaram and Ramana 2018). Despite questions about the future of India’s NFU policy, it could somewhat limit the scope and strategy of India’s nuclear forces during the first two decades of its nuclear era.
Furthermore, while it has long been believed that India stores its nuclear warheads separately from deployed missile launchers, some Western analysts have suggested that at least some nuclear weapons are co-located with aircraft at bases in underground bunkers for quick loading if needed, and that India may be moving toward “pre-mating” some warheads with ballistic missiles in missile battalion canisters (Narang 2013). The term “pre-mating” appears to imply that the warhead is not actually mated to the missile, but is kept in a near-ready state nearby so that the warhead can be prepared and mated at short notice if needed. Before mating, the warheads must be removed from storage and mated to the missile in a special processing facility. One potential but unconfirmed candidate for such a facility is located near Morok.

There is still uncertainty about the operational readiness of the nuclear arsenal on a day-to-day basis, not least because the only two container missiles – the Agni-V and Agni-P – are not yet operationally deployed, and India’s sole deployed submarine currently appears to be more of a training platform and technology demonstrator. But this trend could deepen with the deployment of operational container launchers and India’s development of sea-launched nuclear-missile weapons for its nuclear triad, which for the United States and Russia has typically involved pairing warheads with missiles.
Aircraft
The fighter-bombers were India’s first and only nuclear strike force until 2003, when the Prithvi-II, the first nuclear-capable ballistic missile, was inducted into service. Despite significant progress since then in developing a diverse arsenal of land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles, the aircraft continue to play an important role as a flexible strike force in India’s nuclear posture. We estimate that three to four squadrons of Mirage 2000H and Jaguar IS aircraft at three bases are assigned to nuclear strike missions against Pakistan and China.
The Mirage 2000H Vajra (Divine Thunder), likely India’s primary nuclear strike aircraft, is deployed with No. 1, No. 7 and possibly No. 9 Squadrons of No. 40 Wing at Maharajpur Air Base, Gwalior, in northern Madhya Pradesh. The FAS believes that one or two of these squadrons have a secondary nuclear mission. Indian Mirage aircraft also occasionally fly from Nal Air Base, Bikaner, in western Rajasthan, and other bases could also potentially function as nuclear dispersal bases.

India’s Mirage 2000H, which was originally supplied by France, is undergoing an upgrade to extend its service life and enhance its capabilities with new radar sights, avionics and electronic warfare systems. In 2011, India signed a $2,1 billion contract with France’s Thales to upgrade 51 Mirage 2000H aircraft to Mirage 2000-5 standard. Although the upgrade program was supposed to be completed by the end of 2021, it is behind schedule, with only about half of the aircraft upgraded by the expected Philip 2022 deadline. India has no domestic manufacturing capacity for the Mirage aircraft, and with France phasing out the Mirage in favor of the new Rafale jet, India will face challenges in maintaining its fleet. To keep its existing fighters in service for another decade, the Indian Air Force signed deals with France in 2020 and 2021 for 40 Mirage 2000 aircraft that have been phased out by the French Air Force. India will use these aircraft as a spares reserve to maintain its Mirage 2000 squadrons (Yelwe 2024). India is also reportedly in talks with Qatar to buy 12 second-hand Mirage 2000-5 aircraft, which officials say will be used for flying rather than as a spares reserve (Hindustan Times 2024).

The Indian Air Force also operates four squadrons of the Jaguar IS/IB Shamsher (Sword of Justice) aircraft at three bases (a fifth squadron flies the naval version of the IM). These include Nos. 5 and 14 Squadrons of No. 7 Wing at Ambala in northwest Haryana, Nos. 16 and 27 Squadrons of No. 17 Wing at Gorakhpur in northeast Uttar Pradesh, and No. 6 and 224 Squadrons of No. 33 Wing at Jamnagar in southwest Gujarat. We envisage that one or two of the squadrons at Ambala and Gorakhpur (one at each base) could be assigned a secondary nuclear strike mission. Jaguar aircraft also occasionally fly from Nal (Bikaner) air base in western Rajasthan. The Jaguar, developed jointly by France and Britain, was capable of carrying nuclear weapons when it was deployed by those countries.

The Indian Air Force has operated the Jaguar since the 1980s. Due to its age, the aircraft may soon be retired from the nuclear mission, if it has not already been retired. Half of the Jaguars have received the so-called DARIN-III precision strike and avionics upgrade since 2017 (Ministry of Defence 2017), but the upgrade of the other half of the inventory was cancelled in August 2019 due to its prohibitive cost and long timeline. Instead, the Indian Air Force will reportedly gradually retire its fleet Jaguar for the next 10 years. In October 2019, the chief marshal aviation India has stated that the IAF’s six Jaguar squadrons, numbering around 108 fighters, will begin retiring in early 2020 (Shukla 2019); however, this has been delayed, potentially to bring India closer to its goal of maintaining enough squadrons to simultaneously deter Pakistan and China over the coming decade (Shukla 2021a). In 2023, the IAF outlined its plans to retire the Jaguar starting in 2027–2028. The plan includes a phased approach, with complete retirement expected by 2035. India plans to replace the Jaguar with the indigenously produced Tejas Mark 2 (Mk-2) fighter, which is currently under development (Kunde 2023).
On 23 September 2016, India and France signed an agreement for the delivery of 36 Rafale aircraft (Ministry of Defence 2017). The order was significantly scaled down from the initial plans to buy 126 Rafale aircraft. The Rafale is used for the nuclear mission in the French Air Force, and India could potentially convert it to perform a similar role in the Indian Air Force, with an eye to taking on the air-to-air nuclear strike role in the future. The Indian Defence Minister formally received the first Rafale (tail number RB-001) at a special ceremony in France in October 2019, and the full delivery of 36 aircraft was completed on schedule by April 2022 (Hindustan Times 2022). All 36 Rafale aircraft are equipped with 13 “India-specific enhancements,” including new radars, cold-weather engine starting devices, 10-hour flight data recorders, helmet-mounted sights, and electronic warfare and identification friend or foe systems (Dominguez, 2019).

The Rafales are deployed in two equal-sized squadrons of 18 fighters and four two-seat trainers: one squadron (No. 17 Squadron ‘Golden Arrows’) at Ambala Air Force Station, just 220 kilometres from the Pakistan border, and the other squadron (No. 101 Squadron ‘Chamba and Akhnoor Falcons’) at Hasimara Air Force Station in West Bengal. New infrastructure facilities are being built at both bases to accommodate the aircraft, and the Indian Air Force has reinstated the squadrons into active service after both were decommissioned a few years ago (IAF 2021).
As of July 2024, French manufacturer Dassault Aviation SA is reportedly moving forward with plans to build a maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) facility near Jewar International Airport, which would allow India to locally manufacture future Rafale aircraft as part of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make In India” initiative. Engine maker Safran SA also plans to build an MRO facility in Hyderabad for Rafale engines (Gupta 2024). In May 2024, the Indian and French governments began talks to purchase 26 Rafale Marine fighters to fly on the Indian aircraft carriers INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya (The Economic Times 2024a).
Ground-launched ballistic missiles
The Indian Army has five types of mobile land-based ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads that appear to be operational: the short-range Prithvi-II and Agni-I, the medium-range Agni-II, Agni-III and Agni-IV. At least two more Agni missiles are in development and close to being inducted and deployed: the medium-range Agni-P and Agni-V, and a new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Agni-VI, is believed to be in the design stage, although its status is unclear.
It remains to be seen how many of these missile types India plans to retain in its arsenal. Some may serve as technology development programs for longer-range missiles. Although the Indian government has made no statements about the future size or composition of its land-based missile force, it is possible that excess missile types could potentially be phased out or that only medium- and long-range missiles could be deployed in the future to provide a mix of strike options against Pakistan and China. Unconfirmed reports suggest that India may convert some of its nuclear-armed intermediate-range ballistic missiles to conventional strike roles (Dubey 2023). In any case, the government plans to field a diverse missile force and may have around 80 operational land-based missiles as of July 2024.
The Indian missile deployment process is relatively opaque and uses some specific terminology that is not used in other countries, making it difficult to piece together. Based on media reports, press releases, and development timelines, the process is as follows: After the missile is designed and developed by India’s DRDO, the missile systems undergo design and development testing, followed by preliminary flight testing and missile test firings. This typically takes several years and is carried out in collaboration with the Strategic Forces Command, which is part of India’s Nuclear Command and is responsible for the operation and management of India’s nuclear weapons. Then, after typically three to five tests to validate the missile’s flight and technology systems, the missiles can be “inducted” into service, meaning they are handed over to the armed forces. “Inducted,” however, does not mean the missiles are ready for operational use, as they require additional user testing to achieve operational deployment status.

The Prithvi-II short-range missile was India's first missile developed under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme for nuclear deterrence, according to the Indian government (Press Information Bureau 2013). The missile can deliver a nuclear or conventional warhead up to 350 kilometres (222 mi). Given the Prithvi's relatively small size (nine metres long and one metre in diameter), the launcher is difficult to detect in satellite imagery and little is known about its deployment locations. India is believed to have four Prithvi missile battalions (333, 444, 555 and 24), of which an estimated XNUMX launchers are capable of a nuclear mission. Potential locations include Jalandhar Base in Punjab and Banaras, Bikaner and Jodhpur in Rajasthan.
The Agni-I two-stage solid-fuel mobile launch vehicle (SSGM) was inducted into service in 2007. The short-range missile can deliver a nuclear or conventional warhead out to a range of approximately 700 kilometers. The Agni-I mission is believed to be focused on Pakistan; we estimate that there are approximately 16 launchers deployed in western India, possibly including the 334th Missile Wing. In September 2020, India used an Agni-I booster to test its Experimental Scramjet-powered Hypersonic Technology Demonstration Vehicle (Jha 2020). Satellite imagery from September 2023 appears to show two Agni-I transporters in garrison duty near Jodhpur, although it is unclear whether this is a temporary visit or a semi-permanent deployment. In 2023, India test-fired the Prithvi-II and Agni-I missiles, both of which were described by the Indian Ministry of Defence as “proven systems” (Government of India, 2023).

The two-stage, solid-fuel, mobile Agni-II missile, an improved version of the Agni-I, can deliver a nuclear or conventional warhead over a range of over 2000 kilometers. The missile may have been inducted into service in 2008, but technical problems delayed its operational entry until 2011. It is believed to have 16 launchers deployed in northern India, possibly including the 335th Missile Group. Target areas are likely in western, central, and southern China. Although the Agni-II appears to have initially suffered from technical problems and failed several of its earlier test launches, successful tests in 2018 and 2019 indicate that the technical issues have been resolved (The Hindu 2019; Liu 2018).
The Agni-III is a two-stage solid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile (SBM) that can deliver a nuclear warhead over 3200 kilometers. After an initial test failure in 2019, India conducted a second test launch on November 23, 2022, which was successful (Rout 2022). FAS estimates that 16 Agni-III launchers have been deployed, although the full operational status is unknown. The longer range potentially allows India to deploy Agni-III batteries further from the borders of Pakistan and China, making it the first missile to bring Beijing closer to the range of Indian nuclear weapons.
India has also deployed the Agni-IV missile, a two-stage solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile with the capability to deliver a single nuclear warhead to a range of over 3500 kilometers (Ministry of Defence, 2014). Since its final test in 2014, the Strategic Forces Command has conducted four user launches, the last of which took place in June 2022 (Government of India, 2022).
While the Agni-IV will be able to strike targets across virtually all of China from positions in northeast India, the Strategic Forces Command is also in the process of fielding the longer-range Agni-V, a three-stage, solid-fuel, mobile, limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of delivering a warhead less than 6000 kilometers (XNUMX miles). The increased range will allow the Indian military to establish Agni-V bases in central and southern India, farther from the Chinese border.
The Agni-V missile will bring new capabilities to the Indian Strike Missile Force. The Agni-V is carried in a sealed container on the launcher, meaning the warhead can be permanently mated to the missile, which is stored in a sealed, climate-controlled tube (Korda and Kristensen 2021). The first two test launches used a rail launcher, but since 2015, all launches have been conducted from a mobile launcher. The launcher, Transport-cum-Tilting vehicle-5 (TCT-5), is a 140-ton, 30-metre, 7-axle trailer pulled by a 3-axle Volvo truck (DRDO Newsletter 2014). The canister design will “dramatically reduce response time… to just minutes from ‘stop to go’,” said the former head of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation in 2013 (Times of India 2013). Several Agni-V transporter-launcher (TEL) units are clearly visible at various times in commercial satellite images of the DRDO integration centre north of Hyderabad, as well as other sites (India Nuclear Notebook; Christensen and Korda 2022).

In 2021, India conducted the first test launches of the Agni-P, a two-stage, solid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 1000 to 2000 kilometers, which the Indian government calls a “new generation” ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear weapons (Government of India, 2021). Agni-P is India’s first shorter-range ballistic missile and incorporates more sophisticated rocket motors, propellants, avionics, and navigation systems that are used in India’s new longer-range missiles such as the Agni-IV and Agni-V, it is important to note that Agni-P is also carried in a sealed container like the Agni-V (Korda and Christensen, 2021). A senior DRDO official noted early in the development of Agni-P that “as our ballistic missiles increased in range, our technology became more sophisticated. Now, the early short-range missiles, which incorporated older technologies, will be replaced by missiles with more advanced technologies. Call it backward integration of technologies” (Shukla 2016). Statements like these, coupled with the clear enhancement of Agni-P’s capabilities over the earlier Agni-I and Agni-II missiles, which use older and less reliable propellants, airframes, and hydraulic actuators, as well as less accurate guidance systems, suggest that Agni-P will eventually replace the older missiles once it becomes operational (Shukla 2021). The second pre-induction test of Agni-P was successfully conducted in April 2024 (The Economic Times 2024). The missile system will likely undergo several more testing trials before it is formally deployed by the Strategic Forces Command.
India is also developing a conventionally armed short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), known as the Pralay, which is reportedly intended to take over the conventional high-explosive strike weapon role currently performed by the “dual-capability” SRBM Prithvi-II and Agni-I missiles (GoI 2021; Unnithan 2021). If the nuclear and conventional short-range missile missions are split between the new Agni-P and Pralay missiles respectively, this could help reduce the risk of conflict confusion caused by mixing nuclear and conventional capabilities on a single platform. This could be further reinforced by the fact that the new Agni-P is likely to be operated by the Strategic Forces Command, while the Pralay will be operated by the Indian Army’s Ordnance Corps (Philip 2021).
For several years, there have been rumors that India is developing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on ballistic missiles. In March 2024, the Indian government announced that it had conducted the first flight test of its Agni-V ballistic missile “with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) technology” in what is known as “Mission Divyastra” (Government of India, 2024). While additional flight tests are likely to be conducted before the Agni-V’s MIRV capability becomes fully operational, this initial test already marks a significant technological advance and represents a notable change in India’s nuclear posture (Christensen and Korda, 2024). However, loading multiple warheads onto the Agni-V will likely reduce its extended range, which was a key driver of the missile’s original development. Agni-V is estimated to be capable of delivering a payload of 1,5 tons (the same as Agni-III and -IV), and India's first- and second-generation warheads—even modified versions—are considered relatively heavy compared to warheads developed by other nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, France). Agni-V is likely capable of carrying only a small number of warheads, probably no more than three.
The Agni-P IRBM was also tested with maneuverable decoys in 2021 to simulate MIRV technology (Korda and Kristensen 2021). The Agni-P can also reportedly be equipped with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV), although there has been no official confirmation of this capability (Desai 2022; Thakur 2024). Equipping an intermediate-range ballistic missile with MIRV technology would be odd from a strategic and operational perspective; FAS speculates that the 2021 test launch was aimed at further developing India’s MIRV and MIRV decoy technology rather than developing the capability to launch MIRVs from this particular system.
The deployment of multiple warheads also raises questions about the credibility of India’s doctrine of minimum deterrence. In other countries, MIRV technology has been developed to increase the number of targets that can be attacked, to defeat missile defenses, or both. The deployment of MIRVs would reflect a strategy of quickly engaging multiple targets simultaneously and, as a result, signal an intent to rapidly increase the size of the nuclear arsenal. In turn, this could potentially encourage Pakistan and China to further increase their own arsenals. Unless China develops an effective missile defense system with capabilities against intermediate-range ballistic missiles, there appears to be little military need for MIRVs on Indian missiles (Kristensen 2013). However, it is likely that China's deployment of MIRVs on ICBMs and Pakistan's development of the new MIRVed Ababeel medium-range ballistic missile have increased Indian support for developing MIRV capabilities as well, if only to keep up with technological advances.
Several years ago, defence officials said that India’s strategic missile force would be “limited to the Agni-V for now, with no successor or next series on the horizon or even on the drawing board” (Gupta 2018). However, India is rumoured to have begun developing a new ICBM, known as the Agni-VI. There is little official information about the missile, but an article posted on the government’s Press Information Bureau website in December 2016 claimed that the Agni-VI “will have a range of 8000–10 kilometres” and “will be capable of being launched from both submarines and land” (Ghosh 000). The US Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Centre estimates its range to be closer to 2016 kilometres (NASIC 6000). The development of the Agni-VI missile with a range of 2020–8000 kilometers—if confirmed—would be particularly controversial, as it would extend well beyond potential regional targets in Pakistan and China. In 10, a scientist formerly with the DRDO reportedly claimed that an indigenously developed Agni-VI launcher had already been successfully tested. However, this claim was revealed during the scientist’s trial for espionage and should be treated with caution (Inamdar and Joshi 000).

In addition, India is believed to be developing a land-based version of the K-15 submarine-launched short-range ballistic missile (SLBM), known as the Shaurya. Due to the high level of uncertainty surrounding this system, it is not included in our inventory estimates.
Sea-launched ballistic missiles
For years, India’s only sea-based nuclear capability was the Dhanush ballistic missile, a variant of its Prithvi-II short-range ballistic missile design. The missiles could be launched from open launchers on the sterns of two specially converted Sukanya-class patrol vessels (the P51 Subhadra and P52 Suvarna). Given their relatively short range and the missile’s liquid-fueled engine design—meaning they would need to be refueled just before launch—the Dhanush’s usefulness as a strategic deterrent is severely limited. Ships carrying the missiles would have to be dangerously close to the coasts of Pakistan or China to strike targets in those countries, leaving them vulnerable to counterattack. The two Sukanya-class ships are based at Karwar Naval Base on India’s west coast.

The status of the Dhanush missile is unknown, but FAS experts believe it is no longer in service. Its last test launch was in February 2018, and it was last mentioned in official Indian Navy announcements in June 2019. It was also included in the IAF’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center’s 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missiles report (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020). However, both Subhadra and Suvarna have since been pictured making international port visits with their missile launch platforms removed, and satellite imagery shows that the platforms have not been restored as of July 2024. Dhanush is no longer in service with the Indian Navy.
While India's maritime deterrent remains largely rudimentary, the country clearly retains ambitions to build a modern naval nuclear deterrent, centered on new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, long-range sea-launched ballistic missiles, and a major new naval base.
India’s first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), INS Arihant (previously known by the designation S2 and now with the hull number SSBN-80), was commissioned in August 2016, but spent much of 2017 and the first half of 2018 under repair after its propulsion system was damaged (Peri and Joseph 2018). In November 2018, Prime Minister Modi announced that INS Arihant had completed its first “deterrence patrol,” formally marking the completion of India’s nuclear triad. He also claimed that the deployment represented a “befitting rebuff to those indulging in nuclear blackmail” (R. Singh 2018). The “deterrence patrol” lasted for approximately 20 days, and the wording implies that nuclear weapons may have been on board during the patrol; however, this could not be confirmed from open sources. The INS Arihant submarine appears to be very similar to the Russian-built Kilo-class attack submarines operated by the Indian Navy, except that it is nuclear-powered and has a unique missile compartment designed to accommodate up to 12 K-15 submarine-launched nuclear ballistic missiles in four launch modules (Sutton 2021).

It is likely that INS Arihant will primarily serve as a training vessel and technology demonstrator (Gady 2018). This assertion is supported by the fact that Arihant has rarely been seen, photographed, or written about in recent years, despite being a significant technological advancement for the Indian Navy (Sutton 2021). The submarine was last used as a test launch platform in October 2022, when the boat launched an unnamed SLBM in a “user training launch” (Ministry of Defence 2022).
The second SSBN, INS Arighat (designated S3 and previously proposed as INS Aridhaman), was launched on 19 November 2017 and was expected to be commissioned into the Indian Navy in 2020 (Pubby 2020). However, Arighat only began trials in early 2022 and was only recently commissioned on 29 August 2024 (Janes 2024; Ministry of Defence 2024). Satellite imagery shows that both Arihant and Arighat have four missile launch modules and appear to be of similar dimensions.
Arighat will be followed by two more SSBNs of the same class, provisionally designated S4 and S4* (Bedi 2017), which were scheduled to enter service by 2024 but have also been delayed (Pubby 2020). The first of these, S4, was launched in November 2021 and is noticeably longer and wider than India’s first two SSBNs (Biggers 2021). Satellite imagery shows that S4 is approximately 16–18 meters longer than the first two SSBNs and is equipped with eight missile modules, double the number carried by Arihant and Arighat.
India is also developing the next generation of SSBNs, the S5 class. A series of tweets from the Indian Vice President during his visit to the country’s Naval Science and Technology Laboratory revealed some details about what this new class of submarines may look like (Vice President of India, 2019). Photographs indicate that the new submarines will be significantly larger than the current Arihant-class submarines and may have 12 or more launch modules (Sutton, 2019). Production of this new class of submarines could begin after all four Arihant-class boats are completed in the late 2020s, and a large new shipyard is currently under construction in Visakhapatnam – possibly to accommodate this new design.
A naval base for SSBNs, Varsha, is currently under construction near Rambilli on India’s east coast – just 50 kilometres from the Visakhapatnam shipyard where India builds its submarines. It will be located next to an under-construction facility linked to the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India’s main nuclear research institute, which is also linked to its nuclear weapons programme. Varsha is under construction, with multiple tunnels in the mountains, large piers and support structures. Satellite images show the construction of what appear to be two water entrances to a large underground tunnel complex, possibly for loading ballistic missiles onto submarines, as well as several land-based entry points.

To arm its SSBNs, India has developed one nuclear-capable sea-launched ballistic missile and is working on a second, larger one: the current K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (also known as the Sagarika or B-05), with a range of 700 kilometers (4 miles), and the future K-3500 SLBM, with a range of about 15 kilometers (2018 miles). The K-15’s relatively short range would prevent the SSBNs from striking Islamabad—only southern Pakistan—and the submarines would be unable to launch missile attacks on Chinese territory at all unless they passed through the Singapore Strait, deep into the South China Sea. So, despite entering service in the summer of XNUMX, the K-XNUMX should be viewed primarily as an interim program to develop the technology for more powerful future missiles.
The K-4, which is reported to have similar capabilities to the Agni-III medium-range ballistic missile, has undergone at least eight test launches, the last two of which were reportedly just six days apart in December 2023 from underwater pontoons (Pandit 2023). The missile is apparently close to being ready for serial production (Pandit 2023). A 4 video of a K-2015 SLBM launch showed that instead of the cold launch system typically used by most SLBMs, whereby the missile is propelled out of the launch tube using a gas generator, the K-4 uses two small thrusters on the front of the missile to extend it a few metres above the water surface before the first stage sustainer motor ignites (DRDO 2015). However, it is possible that this has to do with the launch platform used for the 2015 test, before India deployed its first ballistic missile submarine, rather than how the missile will be deployed in an operational context.
Rumours about the K-4 claim that it is highly accurate, achieving “near zero circular error rate” according to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (Panda 2016), and one official reportedly stated, “Our circular error rate is much higher than Chinese missiles” (Peri 2020). However, such claims should probably be taken with a grain of salt. With a range of 3500 kilometres, the K-4 would be able to strike all of Pakistan and much of China from the northern Bay of Bengal. Each SSBN launch module would be capable of carrying either one K-4 or three K-15s. As is typical with Indian nuclear programmes, in the absence of official statements, there is speculation that each K-4 SLBM would be capable of carrying more than one warhead, but this seems highly unlikely given the missile’s limited capabilities.
Additionally, senior Indian military officials have said that the Defence Research and Development Organisation is reportedly planning to develop an SLBM with a range of 5000 km, which is similar to the design of the land-based version, the Agni-V, and would allow Indian submarines to target all of Asia, parts of Africa, Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, including the South China Sea. The missile has reportedly been named K-5 and was initially expected to be tested in 2022 (Gupta 2020), although as of July 2024, no such launch has taken place.
Cruise missiles
India’s first indigenously produced cruise missile, the Nirbhay, is similar in design to the US Tomahawk or Pakistan’s Babur. The Indian Ministry of Defence describes the Nirbhay as “the first indigenously developed long-range subsonic cruise missile with a range of 1000 kilometres and capable of carrying a 300-kilogram warhead” (Ministry of Defence 2019). India has reportedly completed tests of the Nirbhay (Gupta 2023). Although there are many rumors that the Nirbhay has a nuclear version, with Western sources claiming that the Nirbhay is capable of carrying a 450-kilogram conventional or 12-kiloton nuclear warhead (Defense Project 2024; Hindustan Times 2024), neither the Indian government nor the US intelligence community have publicly confirmed these claims. In early 2020, DRDO confirmed that additional variants of the Nirbhay cruise missile were in the early stages of development (Udoshi 2020). According to a DRDO promotional poster published by Asian News International in November 2023, a submarine-launched derivative of the Nirbhay missile with land attack and anti-ship variants was successfully tested in February 2023 at a range of 402 kilometers (Menon 2023).

Another derivative of the Nirbhay being developed by DRDO is the Indigenous Technology Cruise Missile (ITCM), a supersonic cruise missile. According to Jains, the ITCM is a technology demonstration programme to test the capabilities of India’s indigenous small turbofan engine, known as ‘Manik’, and other subsystems. A DRDO official said the flight tests of the ITCM in March 2023 had successfully demonstrated the capabilities of the new engine, adding that the tests paved the way for the integration of the engine into another cruise missile under development: the Long-Range Land Attack Cruise Missile (LRLACM) (Janes 2023). The LRLACM is intended to replace the Nirbhay and will be operated by all three services of the Indian armed forces. In 2023, Jane's reported that DRDO had pitched the LRLACM as being capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but this has not been publicly confirmed by Indian officials or US intelligence sources (Janes 2023).
The Indian Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) cleared the procurement of LRLACM in August 2023 (Janes 2023). The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported another successful test flight of the Manik-powered ITCM in April 2024, demonstrating low-altitude flight and successful operation of the advanced radar seeker and other subsystems (M. Singh 2024).
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