Chinese missiles with Russian character
About Chinese weapons in the world they are talking more and more. Especially in American specialized publications, everyone there is seriously preparing for a war with China, God knows why, but they are preparing. And therefore, the enemy's weapons should be known the better, the less noticeably you want to get this weapon. It's all very logical.
Hence the constant interest. Old planes, new planes, new ships, and so on. And in the materials about Chinese strategic bombers, very smart guys from American military publications admitted that the planes are old, yes, but missiles-they have new ones...
And it was impossible to argue with this.
In general, what difference does it make who will drag the missiles to the safe launch distance, the newest B-21 or the B-52 confidently flying to its centennial anniversary? The essence is the same: the launch of a batch of missiles from an aircraft located outside the kill zone Defense the country for which this pack is intended.
That is why, in light of the hypothetical conflict that the US is talking about so much, and also after the demarche of Chinese strategic bombers near Alaska, a lot of attention has begun to be paid to what these bombers can bring. The Patriot is certainly a good thing, the question is whether they will be able to fight back, since the PLA Air Force has the largest fleet of strategic bombers in the world, and the whole world already knows that a mass launch decides a lot.
Well, since we're talking about missiles, in addition to missiles that will demolish cities, it makes sense to talk about missiles that will be blown out of the sky by American fighters that will try to shoot down these missiles. Considering how many fighters the US has in the Air Force and Navy (more than 2), they will definitely try. Otherwise, why did they make so many of them, fighters?
But the US admits that China's missile weapons are a serious argument, both in quantity and quality. The quantity is clear, but what does it mean for the Chinese industry, led by the Communist Party of China, to perform a labor feat and provide the PLA with the necessary number of missiles? Two quantities? Three? Everyone understands everything perfectly well.
But it is worth saying a few words about quality. But for this we need to dive into history.
It is believed that it all began on September 24, 1958, when the People's Liberation Army Air Force of China received a crushing slap in the face from the Republic of China (Taiwan) Air Force in a battle over Wenzhou Bay.
For several days, his Chinese J-5s (licensed Soviet MiG-17s) fought with American F-86F Sabre fighters supplied to Taiwan.
The MiG-17 outperformed the Sabre in altitude, so the Chinese pilots could use their altitude advantage to the fullest extent. That is, they could safely circle the Sabres without worrying about them until they received the order to attack.
But things didn't go according to plan for the PLAAF that day, because in June, the U.S. Navy secretly upgraded 20 Taiwanese Sabres to launch the GAR-9 Sidewinder (soon renamed the AIM-9B), the most advanced missile at the time.
The F-86F suddenly fired a salvo of Sidewinders from a position below and scored hits. This forced the Chinese pilots to descend lower, where an air battle, already familiar to those times, began. This battle ended sadly for the PLA pilots: they lost four aircraft to missiles and six more in a dogfight from the Sabres' machine guns.
The Second Taiwan Crisis was a highly controversial affair: Taiwanese pilots claimed to have shot down 31 J-5s while losing two F-86s. The PLAAF claimed that Chinese pilots shot down 14 Sabres while losing five of their own. So who is telling the truth is not so important to us, what is important is that on this day, air-to-air guided/homing missiles made their successful entry into the theater of air warfare.
In general, the US, of course, came out a little ahead here. And although guns and machine guns continued to reap their harvest in the sky, it was already beginning to become clear that the future was not in the air. artillery, but for missile weapons. And here the Americans were great. Although the USSR had developed the K-5, a short-range radar-guided missile that China acquired for licensed production after the crisis under the designation Thunderbolt-1 (or PL-1), its short range and inflexible radar guidance system led to the cessation of PL-1 production in the early 1970s.
K-5M missile mounted on MiG-19
The Soviet K-5M radar-guided air-to-air missile was a pioneer, although at best it could be used against bombers, but was of little use against maneuverable fighters due to the need to precisely aim the narrow beam of the nose radar at the target. China produced its own PL-1 missiles under license, four of which were carried by the J-6 fighter (the Chinese version of the MiG-19).
However, the skirmishes with Taiwan turned out to be a big plus for China and the Soviet Union: on September 28, a damaged MiG-17 managed to limp back to base with an unexploded Sidewinder missile stuck in its fuselage.
The Chinese were overjoyed, but they failed miserably at reengineering the Sidewinder. They were simply not up to the task. So China made a smart move: it negotiated a transfer and reverse engineering deal with the Soviet Union, which successfully turned the weapon into the K-13 (NATO codename AA-2 Atoll). Beginning in the mid-1960s, North Vietnamese MiG-21 fighters began using the K-13 to attack U.S. combat aircraft, and they were quite successful.
Although relations between China and the USSR had all but collapsed in June 1960, in 1961 we kept our promise and handed over the K-13 missiles and production plans to China. However, it took the Chinese about another decade to begin mass production of a Chinese copy of the Soviet copy of the Sidewinder, designated the PL-2.
PL-2 missiles, a replica of the Soviet-era AIM-9 Sidewinder missile, are on display at the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution.
Over the next four decades, Chinese engineers repeatedly acquired foreign missiles through various means and learned to manufacture and improve them. Finally, in the early 21st century, Chinese designers reached a turning point, presenting designs that equaled and in some cases outperformed competing weapons.
White air-to-air missiles in the first row from left to right:
- PL-5, derived from the K-13 / AIM-9 Sidewinder;
- PL-9 (hybrid of Magic, Python and Sidewinder);
- PL-8 based on the Israeli Python missile;
- PL-11 based on the Italian Aspide/AIM-7;
- PL-12 is supposedly domestic, but uses the Russian R-77 seeker;
- a trio of Russian origin: the short-range R-73, the medium-range R-27R and the long-range R-77.
I can’t help but make my own historical remark: the Sidewinder wasn’t all that good against our K-5. Based on the unguided Zuni missile, the AIM-9B had no less stringent limitations than the Soviet missile: it had to be aimed extremely precisely – with a deviation of no more than four degrees from the target – and strictly from behind at the hot exhaust of the aircraft’s engine, so using it against aircraft approaching head-on was prohibited. It also had to be aimed away from the sun, which, as a rule, knocked the missiles off course. In this regard, the K-5, which had to be kept in the beam of the onboard radar, was simpler, although less accurate.
The PL-2 thus created went into mass production only in 1972, and by the time production was closed in 1983, 2950 units had been delivered. Poor test results in the 1970s and a host of complaints from pilots about premature detonation of the proximity fuse and blockage from the sun led to the missiles being returned en masse to the factories for modification.
Chinese engineers made several attempts to improve the PL-2, starting with the PL-3, which began testing in 1968. However, research progressed so slowly that it was abandoned in 1980 without much success.
In 1977, thanks to intelligence efforts, China obtained two new AIM-9E Sidewinders, which it used to create the improved PL-2B, with a new seeker, longer range (from 7 to 10 km), and a new cooling system. The Luoyang Electro-Optical Institute of Technology tried to create a radar-guided missile called the PL-5A, similar to the AIM-9C and K-13P, but this project was also cancelled in 1983.
However, the infrared-guided PL-5B was finally developed and entered production in 1986, with its range increased to 16 km. China managed to export lightweight PL-5s and improved PL-5EIIs (with low-smoke engines, laser proximity fuses, and dual-band IR seekers) to 10 countries in Asia, Africa, and South America. The PL-5 is still widely used on older Chinese aircraft that are unable to carry larger missiles.
Chinese PL-5 missile based on Sidewinder missile
That's where the story of China's Sidewinder ends. More precisely, as far as development goes, the missiles themselves, created on the basis of the aircraft pulled out of the fuselage in 1958, are still in service with the PLAAF.
Moving on.
Next we have 1966, when China's military institutes began developing the PL-4 long-range radar-guided missile. The prototype was the American AIM-7D Sparrow, which North Vietnam had acquired and given to China.
The missiles were fitted to J-6 fighters, based on the Soviet MiG-19, which could carry up to four PL-4s and shot down at least six US warplanes between 1965 and 1967, mostly over the South China Sea. The PL-4 was intended to arm the Chengdu J-9, which was retired in 1980, and then the Shenyang J-8II.
With China and the United States becoming closer in the 1970s and relations with the Soviet Union deteriorating, China gradually gained access to the defense markets of the United States, Western Europe, and Israel, as it scrambled to make up for the losses it had lost during the Cultural Revolution.
Somehow (it would be a good idea to ask the intelligence service) the specialists at the Zhuzhou Aircraft Engine Plant got their hands on (they say they bought it, but who saw the receipts?) a French short-range missile R.550 Magic, and they reverse-engineered it. The missile turned out to be basically comparable to the Sidewinder, but more maneuverable thanks to the second tail unit in the front part.
China immediately stopped production of the conceptually similar PL-6 missile (combining elements of the PL-5A and PL-3) and began mass production of cloned Magics, or PL-7s, which were rumored to be inferior in quality to the original but were quite effective weapons.
In the 1980s, China exported 400 PL-7s to Iran, along with 2500 PL-2s and PL-2As and several J-7 fighters. They have also been adapted for installation on Iranian American-made F-4E Phantom and F-5 Freedom fighters, as well as French Mirage F1s captured from Iraq in 1991.
Bangladesh Air Force F-7BG / Chengdu J-7 / MiG-21 armed with PL-7 missile.
Meanwhile, in 1983, China's Xi'an Eastern Machinery Factory acquired the licensing rights to produce the Israeli Python-III heat-seeking missile, which had attracted Chinese interest the previous year when Israeli F-16s shot down a fair number (30 to 50 depending on who was counting) of Syrian fighters with virtually no losses.
The Python-III was then renamed the PL-8, perhaps to disguise its Israeli origins from the Muslim client states to whom China was quietly supplying missiles that, in keeping with the age-old "almost the same, but much cheaper" principle, were being sold. The PL-8 was used on Chinese fighters until 1986, while Chinese factories became capable of producing a completely indigenous (import-substituting) missile, designated the PL-8A, a few years later.
The Python/PL-8 was capable of being used effectively in all aspects, much like the later Sidewinder models, but had a higher maximum speed of Mach 3,5 or 4. China introduced a helmet-mounted sight to help guide the PL-8 to its target after launch, as well as a PL-8B model with increased firing angles. These missiles can still be seen on modern PLA fighters.
In 1986, a new missile, the PL-9, was developed, combining elements of the PL-5 and PL-7 airframe with the PL-8 seeker—in other words, a hybrid of the Sidewinder, Magic, and Python III. Production of this missile was modest in terms of numbers, suggesting that something may have gone wrong.
The Chinese Air Force still needed a medium-range radar-guided missile for the J-8-II interceptor, which replaced the J-9 after the failure of previous radar-guided missile programs.
J-15 fighters on the aircraft carrier Liaoning with PL-8 and PL-12 missiles
The wingtip guides are equipped with PL-8 missiles based on the Israeli Python-3 with a characteristic large swept tail, while the middle section of the wing is equipped with PL-12 missiles, comparable in performance to the American AIM-120C missile.
China finally filled this gap when it licensed the Italian Aspide missile, which itself was derived from the AIM-7E Sparrow, although its internal components were significantly different from the original.
Although the Aspide's license was revoked after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the Chinese were undeterred, and the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology began producing Aspide clones called the PL-11 a few years later to arm J-8 fighters. The final model, the PL-11B, finally featured a Chinese-made AMR-1 seeker in the nose, allowing it to be used in a fire-and-forget mode.
Another important development helping China master beyond-visual-range air warfare has been the acquisition of Italian Grifo, Israeli ELM-2034 and American AN/APG-66(V) radars, the latter as part of the Peace Pearl program designed to upgrade Chinese aircraft (particularly the J-8-II fighter) with F-16 technology.
The Pearl of the World was again eventually abandoned due to US political preferences, but again the Chinese were not at all bothered by this.
Eventually, with a variety of models available, China began to move into the market. In the 1980s, Chinese air-to-air missiles were increasingly exported to African countries and client states, including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, Iran, and Venezuela, often bundled with low-cost export fighters, especially the older J-6, Q-5, and J-7, as well as the newer JF-17.
JF-17, aka MiG-21 in a new life
Export missiles typically have reduced range and different designations (example: PL-12 export model is SD-10) or have the letter E added to the model number (PL-15 export is PL-15E). However, export models of some older missiles have actually been upgraded to make them more marketable, allowing them to be used by the PLA as well.
The Russians are returning.
PLAAF J-11BS with R-73 missile
After Tiananmen Square, Western countries clamped down hard on their military technology, but something unexpected happened: the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the fallout from Moscow and Beijing's communist disputes. Cash-strapped Russia and Ukraine sought to sell off Soviet weapons at bargain prices to fund their fragile economies, which were undergoing the transition to capitalism as a result of "shock therapy."
For example, Ukraine sold China 1309 R-27R medium-range radar-guided missiles and 124 R-27ER long-range missiles between 1994 and 2010, as well as a license to manufacture them in China. Of course, a Ukrainian license for missiles whose main parts were manufactured in Russia is less than nothing, but still.
When China purchased Su-27 and Su-30MKK fighters from Russia, they were equipped with short-range R-73 missiles and at least 400 medium- and long-range RVV-AE missiles - an export model of the Russian R-77 missile, in which the built-in active seeker freed the carrier aircraft from the need to constantly keep the target locked on by the radar until the missile hit. But China could also have received the improved R-77-1 missiles, which could have been transferred along with the purchase of Russian Su-35S fighters in 2015.
In general, Russian aid has been a great help to the Chinese military industry. The MiGs, which used to be the basis for the creation of Chinese fighters, have given way to the Su. And new Chinese aircraft were created on the basis of the Su-27. But it was never possible to completely clone the missiles, although the R-77 9V-1348 active radar seeker was built into the PL-12 missile, which ultimately helped China achieve approximate parity with Russian and American long-range weapons. This missile, which can be recognized by its pentagonal rear tail, has a range of 68 to 100 km depending on the model and can be quietly guided via a data link, without triggering the target's radar warning receiver, before switching to a "noisy" active seeker in the final phase of approach.
China has finally nailed a truly world-class short-range missile, the PL-10 (originally PL-ASR). It is in the same class as the American AIM-9X and the Russian R-74. Its key features include:
- 90-degree long-range sight (HOBS) targeting capability using a helmet-mounted sight. This means the pilot can turn his head to aim the missile instead of turning the entire aircraft to aim;
- the ability to block after launch via the data transmission channel;
- high maneuverability provided by engines with variable thrust vectoring;
- high resistance to overloads;
- the ability to conduct combat in all projections in relation to the enemy aircraft;
- False-signal-resistant infrared guidance system using a focal plane array and forced cooling;
Admittedly, the PL-10's claimed maximum range of 20 km is, however, below the 35-40 km of the AIM-9X and R-74.
But in any case, for a country where reverse engineering was the only way to replenish the ranks of the army with technology, this is undoubtedly a breakthrough.
But the "Great Leap Forward" factor of Chinese air-to-air missiles is really troubling many in the world. But what can you do if at the turn of the century several factors came together that allowed China not only to overtake the US in the field of air-to-air missile technology, but to significantly push it aside and puzzle it?
First and foremost, the Pentagon itself is to blame for this, having cut back on investment in air-to-air technology as it became preoccupied with counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the development of stealth aircraft.
And, on the Chinese side, the defeat of Iraq's large ground army in 1991 by Western air power forced the PLA to try to follow a U.S.-style "network-centric" warfare strategy, in which dispersed platforms could pool sensor data and feed it to units launching guided weapons to maximize firepower.
China’s military industry increasingly offered technical capabilities, thanks to advances in the country’s growing commercial consumer electronics and communications sectors. This allowed China to outpace Russia in rapidly deploying AESA radars, combat drones, and digital networks. Combined with new early-warning aircraft and long-range missiles, these became essential links in forming a “kill chain” linking dispersed radars, SAMs, and munitions delivery systems.
In 2015, China first unveiled the PL-15, designed so that four nearly 4-metre-long missiles could fit into the weapons bay of the J-20 stealth fighter. Its two-stage engine is thought to give it a range of somewhere between 200 and 300 km, significantly longer than the US AIM-120D missile.
J-20 with open combat bay showing PL-15 and PL-10 missiles
In addition to the active radar homing system, the PL-15 retains a two-way data link and inertial and satellite navigation, making it easy to operate "stealthily" without detecting the launching fighter or alerting the target too late.
It is possible that the next-generation PL-X missile that China has begun to deploy is in fact just one of two streams of research and development. The PL-17 is currently a large (6 meters long) long-range missile that is believed to be in the 380-500 km class, but overall it is at least as good as the Russian R-37M.
But there have also been reports of the PL-21 missile being powered by a ramjet, similar to the European MBDA Meteor missile. The advantage of ramjets is that they are “regulated,” meaning they can slow down to increase range while still being able to accelerate to maximum speed in the terminal phase to increase the chances of a kill. However, a ramjet is more expensive and complex than a solid-fuel rocket engine.
Chinese J-16 fighter with a stretched PL-17 missile.
There are also unconfirmed claims that China is working on a compact PL-16 missile, supposedly combining the long-range capabilities of the PL-15 class with a smaller form factor than the short-range PL-10 missile. The goal is for the J-20 stealth fighter to be able to carry six PL-16s instead of the current four PL-10s or PL-15s.
Why are Chinese air-to-air missiles of such interest?
The air war in Ukraine’s skies since 2022 has largely been characterized by the dominant influence of ground-based air defenses, sharply limiting the use of manned aircraft on both sides. Meanwhile, air-to-air missiles (mostly fired from Russian aircraft from undetectable distances) account for a relatively smaller but significant share (around 11%) of Ukrainian air losses.
However, air-to-air missile capabilities would be important in any conflict with Taiwan, especially in preventing American warplanes from coming to Taiwan's aid. Interdicting any airborne aid would require Chinese fighters to patrol north, south, and especially east of Taiwan, beyond the reach of friendly land-based and perhaps even sea-based air defenses. But this is a distinct possibility, especially in light of the possible use of long-range missiles.
Well, in general, the better a country's air-to-air missiles are, the more you can rely on aircraft, and this primarily means that any air adversary, from a UAV to a strategic bomber, can be encountered far from the point where it drops its munitions.
After half a century of aggressively acquiring and repurposing foreign technology, China has developed a genuine indigenous missile capability and closed a serious technological gap with the US and Russian militaries. And it has done so against the will of the West and with the help of Russia, which, it should be noted, has shared its developments more generously and less mercenarily than any Western country.
Today, Russian aircraft and Chinese aircraft with a Russian character, armed with the same missiles in the service of the PLA, really represent a very weighty argument in any conflict, even in such a high-tech one as we are all seeing in Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine showed, first and foremost, that technological innovation is a very good thing, but it must be coupled with an evolution in training, tactics, and strategy, especially to fight as part of a joint force that fully exploits such technological capabilities. The air war over Ukraine, after all, demonstrated that air forces can do much worse or better than technology alone would suggest.
The bet that the former drug-addicted president of Ukraine and his General Staff made, yes, that same historical bet on a "miracle weapon" that would break the back of the Russian army, led to the fact that we are watching the front crumble. And those same long-awaited F-16s can do nothing with Russian missiles and aircraft that are practically smashing Ukraine's energy system into dust and broken bricks. Kyiv, buzzing in every way with gasoline generators, will not let you lie.
Chinese specialists are watching everything that is happening there very closely and are drawing roughly the same conclusions as everyone else in the world: the future of aviation is not in "dog fights" and battles at "pistol" distances (in aviation this is 20-40 km), but in work at great distances, from beyond the enemy's air defense, avoiding mobile ambushes. That is, with long-range missiles.
Russia was the first to cross the 200 km threshold for its air-to-air missiles, and China is clearly following the same course. And we have already written about what the Americans are doing, trying to catch up. The Sea Sparrow on the wing mount is more of a gesture of despair than a reasonable step.
And why is China's success so exciting? It's simple: China has long been supplying various weapons to those who do not have money for American and Russian ones, or today to those who are afraid of sanctions. And the Chinese have developed a very decent clientele in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
In general, it is not so important which missile, Russian or Chinese, launched from a Pakistani plane, will shoot down a Mirage or Rafale of the Indian Air Force. What is important is that it will be shot down. And this is primarily unpleasant for the manufacturers of equipment, who are now rushing to replace Russia on the international arms market. This is a reputational loss. This, in the end, will lead to the fact that no one will care about sanctions, because who will refuse modern weapons?
At one time, politicians of the two countries, the Soviet Union and China, committed many stupidities, practically breaking off relations between the countries. Today, interaction between the two countries has been established, at least, I am sure, the time is not far off when Russian and Chinese arms manufacturers will work together, as the Russians and Indians once worked.
China will never be able to replace Russia on the arms market, the Chinese lack too much in the country for that. But why not work as it was in the 50s of the last century?
The question is who will bite their elbows.
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