The Navy's Last Hope: New Corvette Will Save Surface Forces and the Country
A multi-purpose (with anti-submarine capabilities) small corvette based on the Karakurt missile ship could prove to be a lifesaver for fleet, but the project needs to get going.
On "Army-2024" showed a ship that could become the salvation of the Navy's surface forces. We are talking about the ship of Project 22800E "Karakurt-E". The ship is a highly specialized strike ship with a missile weapons became multi-purpose, capable of fighting submarines, while maintaining all the combat capabilities of the Karakurt missile ship.
Of course, this is just a project.
But it could become a salvation for the surface forces of our fleet. Especially considering the blow that domestic shipbuilding has received from sanctions, and the fact that the protracted war in Ukraine demands an increase in spending on the Ground Forces and Aviation, which means a reduction in fleet costs.
But this ship needs to be built for the Russian Navy as well. With a number of changes.
And preferably faster, so that it doesn’t turn out to be too late.
Anti-submarine warfare and nuclear deterrence, a refresher
The theoretical basis for how the ability of surface forces to fight submarines affects a country's ability to ensure nuclear deterrence was revealed by the author in a theoretical article Anti-submarine ships and nuclear deterrence.
At that time, it was still possible to build ships of Project 20380 and its modifications, and today the recommendations from the article are no longer relevant, but what is relevant is why there is no and cannot be effective nuclear deterrence without surface anti-submarine forces.
Everything is explained in the link, here is a quote:
…Russia has a fully-fledged nuclear triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), both mobile and silo-based, strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons, and strategic missile submarines armed with ballistic missiles. At the same time, each branch of the triad has its own, not entirely identical, strengths.
Thus, aviation has the advantage over all other forces that are part of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) that, firstly, it can be retargeted in flight (when working with nuclear bombs), and secondly, its low speed gives politicians time to stop nuclear escalation...
Aviation, when at the proper level of combat readiness, makes retaliation flexible and manageable. The aircraft, however, are very vulnerable, and the slightest delay or error in their emergency dispersal will result in their loss...
ICBMs are the basis for both preemptive and retaliatory strikes.
ICBMs make it possible to destroy part of the enemy's nuclear forces that were not used in the first attack, and to inflict great damage on the enemy due to the large number of warheads being thrown.
ICBMs make retaliation devastating in force and swift.
However, contrary to popular belief, ICBMs are not invulnerable and have a certain vulnerability to a sudden disarming nuclear strike.
And here the third component of the triad appears on the scene – the RPLSN…
The submarine is mobile and even at its slowest speed – 6–7 knots – it can travel 260–310 kilometers in any direction in a day…
The enemy, before preparing to launch a nuclear strike, will in any case have to deploy large groups of heterogeneous anti-submarine forces to neutralize the SSBN, and this is an intelligence sign of preparation for aggression, which deprives the enemy of surprise.
If the enemy succeeds in everything except destroying all SSBNs before they launch missiles, but at least one boat manages to complete its combat mission, then this will negate all other successes of the enemy - he may have time to deliver an unpunished disarming strike, neutralize almost all of our strategic nuclear forces, achieve any success on the ground and in the air, but that very last surviving boat will still cause him unacceptable damage.
RPLSNs make retaliation inevitable.
Thus, aviation has the advantage over all other forces that are part of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) that, firstly, it can be retargeted in flight (when working with nuclear bombs), and secondly, its low speed gives politicians time to stop nuclear escalation...
Aviation, when at the proper level of combat readiness, makes retaliation flexible and manageable. The aircraft, however, are very vulnerable, and the slightest delay or error in their emergency dispersal will result in their loss...
ICBMs are the basis for both preemptive and retaliatory strikes.
ICBMs make it possible to destroy part of the enemy's nuclear forces that were not used in the first attack, and to inflict great damage on the enemy due to the large number of warheads being thrown.
ICBMs make retaliation devastating in force and swift.
However, contrary to popular belief, ICBMs are not invulnerable and have a certain vulnerability to a sudden disarming nuclear strike.
And here the third component of the triad appears on the scene – the RPLSN…
The submarine is mobile and even at its slowest speed – 6–7 knots – it can travel 260–310 kilometers in any direction in a day…
The enemy, before preparing to launch a nuclear strike, will in any case have to deploy large groups of heterogeneous anti-submarine forces to neutralize the SSBN, and this is an intelligence sign of preparation for aggression, which deprives the enemy of surprise.
If the enemy succeeds in everything except destroying all SSBNs before they launch missiles, but at least one boat manages to complete its combat mission, then this will negate all other successes of the enemy - he may have time to deliver an unpunished disarming strike, neutralize almost all of our strategic nuclear forces, achieve any success on the ground and in the air, but that very last surviving boat will still cause him unacceptable damage.
RPLSNs make retaliation inevitable.
But, as the link rightly points out, in order for submarines to leave their bases and safely move to designated areas, their deployment must be supported by anti-submarine forces, whose tasks include detecting foreign submarines and either destroying them with their own weapons or directing other forces (for example, anti-submarine aircraft) to them.
And here the inevitability of our retaliatory strike gets knocked out - we have nothing to provide for the combat services of submarines.
To understand the depth of the bottom where the Russian Navy currently finds itself, a few words about anti-submarine warfare.
Much has been written about how submarine searches are currently conducted, in particular in the articles of M. Klimov Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Hydroacoustics" и "Find the submarine!", A. Timokhina and M. Klimova "There is no more secrecy: submarines of the usual kind are doomed".
What all these materials have in common is the statement that our submarines are doomed because the enemy has powerful anti-submarine defense, built, among other things, on the broadest use of surface ships. Ours, not Western ones, because we simply do not have any organized anti-submarine defense (ASD).
It is the enemy who can reveal the underwater situation over many thousands of square kilometers, not us.
Here is a brief description of the anti-submarine search methods of modern Western fleets, a quote from one of the mentioned articles:
"A single surface ship with a GPBA and a low-frequency emitter (lower power), as well as a pair of anti-submarine helicopters, is capable of completely "illuminating" a strip many tens of kilometers wide. And if a submarine is in it, it will be immediately detected at any noise level...
But this is its own GPBA. "Illuminated boat" gives a secondary wave in all sides - and if on the opposite side from the hunter ship there is some tactical unit capable of detecting the reflected wave (a submarine or a helicopter), then the width of the strip in which any underwater target is detected turns from tens of kilometers into hundreds."
But this is its own GPBA. "Illuminated boat" gives a secondary wave in all sides - and if on the opposite side from the hunter ship there is some tactical unit capable of detecting the reflected wave (a submarine or a helicopter), then the width of the strip in which any underwater target is detected turns from tens of kilometers into hundreds."
If non-acoustic search methods (radar detection of a submarine's surface trace) have found wide application in aviation, along with acoustic ones, then for surface ships the main thing is to work with a towed sonar, with or without a gas-propelled aerial vehicle.
Now let's move on to what Russia has. The answer is very simple - nothing.
We have nuclear submarines in the Northern Fleet and Kamchatka, new corvettes of Projects 20380 and 20385 – in the Baltic and Vladivostok. Small anti-submarine ships of Project 1124M have not only lost their combat value at the moment – it is simply dangerous to go to sea on them. However, most of them do not go to sea.
The remaining frigates are Project 22350 and BPK Project 1155 (including modifications 1155.1 and "Shaposhnikov"). These ships are simply few in number, in the north we can theoretically concentrate 2 frigates and 3 BPK, and it is not known how they will cooperate.
The problem is that we still need at least some kind of force in the distant sea zone, and large ships are needed there.
The same picture is in the Pacific Ocean: a missile cruiser, 3 large anti-submarine ships and 4 corvettes – that’s all we have for the DMZ; these forces are not enough for Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk.
And even when another large anti-submarine ship, the Admiral Vinogradov, comes out of repairs and modernization as a frigate, there will still not be enough ships.
Now everything is complicated by the fact that the ships are on long voyages, and our small forces are scattered across the entire planet.
As a result, the Russian Navy does not control the underwater situation off its shores at all. And does not provide for the deployment of strategic submarines. In wartime or immediately before it, they will be easily destroyed. A retaliatory nuclear strike will be impossible.
And the possibility of receiving a massive nuclear strike without response is real.
And this is not a figure of speech, this is what is said deployment of US SSBNs for a strike in May-June 2023.
Water area protection and ships of the near sea zone
Water area protection (WARP) is an organization within a naval base designed to provide the main forces of the fleet in its base areas with protection from enemy actions from the sea.
The Soviet Navy had more than enough naval bases, and these bases had security.
What was the main striking means of the probable enemy – the USA – in the naval war? Deck aviation and submarines.
But to oversleep an aircraft carrier group, you have to try really hard; during the entire Cold War, this only happened once, but American submarines were always nearby.
Nuclear submarines were considered the main striking force of the USSR Navy. The main threat to them near our shores were NATO submarines, which could lay mines on the routes of our submarines or secretly reach the range of a torpedo attack.
It was the OVR forces, brought together into brigades, that, among other things, were charged with preventing such actions on the part of the enemy.
The OVR brigades usually included a division (4–8 units) of small anti-submarine ships (SAS) and a division of minesweepers.
Based on the experience of the Cold War, one or two MPCs were always ready to immediately go to sea to search for a foreign submarine. Anti-submarine search operations were systematically carried out to prevent the enemy from tracking our submarines.
The OVR brigades, operating in full force, could ensure that nuclear submarines could safely leave their bases and escape potential enemy surveillance.
As stated above, nothing remained of these forces.
MPK "Koreets" of the Pacific Fleet. A symbolic photo can be a symbol of the state of the OVR. And if rust can be painted over, then non-working and unrepairable ship systems, turbines that cannot start, muffled shaft lines and leaking hulls cannot be fixed so easily. As well as the general obsolescence of the ship. Photo: Japan Self-Defense Forces, from forums.airbase.ru, apple 17
At the same time, the fleet had more than one chance to renew its anti-submarine forces.
The first was Project 20380, in the form in which it was originally conceived - all systems are strictly serial, there is only one experimental design development - the Main Power Plant (the same units with Kolomna 16D49 diesel engines).
However, the project was overcomplicated with a mass of new weapons systems, it became very expensive and difficult to build, and did not become widespread, and now the construction of these ships will apparently be impossible due to sanctions (and this will be another incredible surprise for our so-called “decision makers”, which everyone except them knew about for many years in advance).
The second program, which could have updated the anti-submarine forces and restored a full-fledged OVR, was the program to create an OVR corvette. Unfortunately, it died almost before it began.
The OVR corvette project was at one time sacrificed for the Project 22160 patrol ships – the most useless ships in the stories fleet. The war in Ukraine showed their worth, when in order to simply go out to sea, an army Tor air defense missile system had to be rolled onto the deck of a patrol ship.
There is no point in asking why it was impossible to build something useful with the same money; everything turned out the way it did.
But the navy has built quite a few low-seaworthiness small missile ships (MRK) of Project 21631 Buyan-M. It would seem that units are being built that can only operate near the coast anyway, why not make them multi-purpose?
But this idea simply did not occur to anyone - the doctrine of the Navy and at the same time the idee fixe of the General Staff were strikes on the coast with "Kalibrs", in the 2000s it seemed that they could bring entire countries to their knees. Ukraine showed that it is impossible, and this, by the way, was predicted by the author.
After the Buyan-Ms encountered sanctions on the supply of imported components, which led to the need to revise the project, the most technically successful post-Soviet ship appeared – the Project 22800 Karakurt missile ship.
The ship had the same number of cruise missiles as the Buyan-M, but was much faster, more seaworthy, and, unlike the Buyan-M, could independently attack surface targets with anti-ship cruise missiles.
MRK pr. 22800 "Odintsovo". Photo: Russian Ministry of Defense
At the same time, the ship did not have any irreplaceable or unique foreign components, had domestic engines and was cheaper than the Buyan-M, and in the version with the Pantsir-M anti-aircraft missile and artillery system, it could also shoot down even low-visibility Western cruise missiles or "harpoon-shaped" anti-ship missiles. In the Navy, this is the only type of ship guaranteed to be capable of intercepting such targets with a trained crew; for all the others, either the luck factor is too important, or they are technically incapable of it at all, or their capabilities have not been tested in exercises.
Alas, the Karakurt was ordered by the fleet as a purely strike missile ship, in accordance with the views of the General Staff and some naval theorists of the recent past, although technically the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau could have made the ship multi-purpose right away – if the customer had so desired. This ship cannot fight underwater targets or even detect them.
However, the mass construction of two small missile ships and a series of patrol ships created the illusion among a number of leaders that the naval composition of the forces operating in the near sea zone (NSZ) had been updated.
These people do not understand what these BMZ ships should be like, what they should do and where, and what the main threat to BMZ is (hint: foreign submarines), their worldview is very simple. There are small ships, they operate "offshore", we have built them, we need to think about large ships. It's funny - but the intellectual level of some people responsible for the development of the fleet today is exactly like that.
The final touches to the drama of the surface forces must be recognized as sanctions and reduction of funding for the fleet. Even components for the supposedly Russian Kolomna diesel engines fell under sanctions, not to mention electronics. The construction of all ship projects, except for the small missile ships and minesweepers of the 12700 project, is now in question.
Add to this the reduction in funding in favor of funding the SVO, plus the problems with the development of radar and anti-aircraft missile systems that existed before the SVO, and we get a situation that the Americans call a “perfect storm” – all the factors that exist have converged against the Navy, and it is impossible to eliminate the failures in shipbuilding policy without new ideas.
However, as it turns out, these ideas exist in the country.
Rescue Corvette
The main contradiction of the current moment is that it is necessary to quickly set up many ships capable of performing, among other things, the tasks of the OVR (including at the cost of economically justified costs) in the conditions of chronically ill shipbuilding, while they must also perform other tasks of surface ships, but they must be cheap, and at the same time they must be independent of sanctions and so that they can be built even at those factories that are located on inland waterways, for example in Zelendolsk, that is, they must be small ships, but powerful.
A complex task, but it received a simple and cost-effective solution.
At Army-2024, the United Shipbuilding Corporation exhibited a model of a ship with the code 22800E "Karakurt-E".
The similarities with the Karakurt are obvious, the differences are also visible
It is immediately obvious that the ship is a relative of the Karakurt, it has a similar superstructure and the same electronic weapons as the small missile ship. The same 76-mm gun. But the differences are immediately visible. On the sides, closer to the stern, the ship has launchers for the Paket-NK complex.
This means that the ship is capable of fending off a torpedo attack by intercepting the torpedo heading towards the ship with the M15 anti-torpedo.
Under the keel, you can see the fairing of a small hydroacoustic station (GAS), this is the GAS of the Paket-NK complex. Now our ship is invulnerable to a sudden attack from under the water. Of course, we would like to see regular reloadable torpedo tubes, but there are none in the series, how long to wait if R&D is ordered is unclear, so the serial products are standing.
Launchers of "Paketa-NK" on the sides
Can such a ship not only repel a torpedo attack, but also hit a submarine?
Yes, the universal vertical launchers 3S14, which are part of the universal ship firing complex (USFC), can also be used to launch anti-submarine missiles (ASM) "Otvet" 91RT. These missiles are guaranteed to hit a submarine at a long range, many tens of kilometers.
This is a fundamental difference between the new ship and the old small anti-submarine ships - the MPC had to approach the boat at torpedo range. The proposed corvette will hit the boat without getting close to it.
But how to detect it at a great distance?
We look at the aft hatch.
Stern port for the sonar. Also noteworthy are the water jets instead of propellers.
This lap port can definitely be intended only for a sonar system - either a lowered or towed one. In the latter case, with the group use of such ships, the fleet will have the opportunity to fight in the same way as NATO - due to the large number of units with towed sonar systems, capable of operating in active mode, creating acoustic illumination zones tens or hundreds of kilometers in diameter, inside which even the quietest submarine will have no chance of evading detection. And any target that ends up in such a zone can immediately be hit by an anti-submarine missile from the ship.
With such a tactical model of application, the requirements for the ship's speed are reduced; the main thing for it is to tow the sonar, and the missile will catch up with the fastest submarine.
The general composition of weapons and equipment shown on the model, according to independent experts, looks like this:
– radar complex (radio-technical reconnaissance and detection of surface targets) KRS-27M "Mineral-M";
– radar complex (air target detection station) RLK-S-1RS1-2F of the Pantsir-M anti-aircraft missile and artillery complex;
– radar fire control system MR-123-02/3 "Bagheera";
– 2× unified observation and target designation sights UV-450-01;
– radio reconnaissance and suppression complex MP-405-1 (four antennas);
– PK-10 passive jamming system with 4× KT-216 launchers (40 jamming shells in total);
– navigation radar station MP-231-3 "Pal-N-4";
– satellite communications station "Centaur-NM";
– combat module 3M87-1F with a below-deck storage and delivery system for transport and launch containers with anti-aircraft guided missiles of the Pantsir-M anti-aircraft missile and artillery system (a total of 32 TPKs with 57E6 SAMs and 2 x 000-mm rounds for two AO-30KD anti-aircraft guns);
– universal shipborne firing system 3S-14 (one module, 8 cells for medium-range cruise missiles 3M-14T and anti-ship missiles 3M-54T, and when additional shipborne automated control systems are installed – supersonic and hypersonic anti-ship missiles 3M-55 and 3M-22 and anti-submarine guided missiles 91RT);
– AK-176MA-01 naval artillery mount (total of 152 x 76 mm rounds in the automatic loader, ready to fire, plus additional stored ammunition);
– 2× SM-588 launchers of the Paket-NK anti-torpedo defense system (a total of 8× 324-mm M-15 Lasta anti-torpedoes or 324-mm MTT torpedoes or their combinations)
– 2× pedestal mounts with a 12,7-mm 6P59 Kord heavy machine gun (a total of 100 × 12,7-mm rounds in boxes plus stored ammunition);
– Palfinger PK 15500 Performance crane-manipulator with a lifting capacity of 6 kg or equivalent;
- outboard motor boat;
– hydroacoustic target designation station "Paket-A" of the anti-torpedo defense system "Paket-NK".
Presumably, there is: anti-sabotage hydroacoustic station MG-757.1 "Anapa-M". The rest of the hydroacoustic means are still in question, their composition is not obvious and may change as the project develops.
The deck container can accommodate any replaceable load, such as mine-resistant unmanned underwater vehicles, and the rails on the deck can not only facilitate the movement of the container, but also be used as mine gangways.
The important thing is that all of the above are serial systems that do not need to be developed. The ship can thus easily repeat the success of the Karakurt, which turned out to be possible to build at a rate that was ahead of the Soviets on the first hull.
As you can see, the exhaust is directed outboard, not into the water, so as not to interfere with the operation of the hydroacoustic stations.
The exhaust is visible on the side
If we assume that the ship has not only a towed but also a lowered sonar, then it can search for submarines while at rest, without moving. This is important, since the ship does not have an under-keel sonar capable of detecting submarines in motion. But work from rest and competent tactics within a detachment of ships easily reduce the significance of this drawback to zero.
The most interesting thing is the engine.
Unlike the Karakurt, which had a three-shaft propulsion plant with propellers, water jets were used here – four in a row, one diesel for each.
Why is this scheme made?
It is worth citing the author's article, dedicated to such a power plant scheme and its application on a multi-purpose corvette, written back in 2022, "Near Sea Zone and Nuclear Deterrence":
“First of all, it is necessary to find an import-substituting power plant that is inexpensive and mass-produced.
At present, the only manufacturer of diesel engines, on the one hand, independent of sanctions, and on the other, capable of producing a diesel suitable specifically for a combat ship, is PAO Zvezda from St. Petersburg. Small missile ships (MRK) of Project 22800 Karakurt are designed for engines of this plant.
Unfortunately, the production rate of M507D diesel engines for Karakurts at Zvezda is very low. The enterprise has not overcome the crisis, in which it is still. Today Zvezda is capable of producing a maximum of two Karakurts per year.
However, experts know that the 112-cylinder M507D is a "pair" of two 56-cylinder M504s working on a common gearbox. Thus, 5-6 M507s (there are three of them on the Karakurt) turn into 10-12 M504s. Moreover, the capabilities of the Zvezda, in principle, allow for the production of a certain number of precisely these "halves" of M504s.
Their production is possible and must be accelerated...
At the same time, however, “half” of the engine is also half of its power, which is critically important for the ship’s performance.
The solution is suggested by foreign experience. For many years now, multi-shaft water jet installations have been used on foreign high-speed vessels, sometimes quite large ones. This is a "battery" of water jets from side to side, for which "their" engine works. And here lies the solution: a "battery" of affordable and completely domestic M504, working for water jets, is capable of providing a ship with approximately the same weight and size characteristics as the "Karakurt", but with a smaller number of diesel engines."
At present, the only manufacturer of diesel engines, on the one hand, independent of sanctions, and on the other, capable of producing a diesel suitable specifically for a combat ship, is PAO Zvezda from St. Petersburg. Small missile ships (MRK) of Project 22800 Karakurt are designed for engines of this plant.
Unfortunately, the production rate of M507D diesel engines for Karakurts at Zvezda is very low. The enterprise has not overcome the crisis, in which it is still. Today Zvezda is capable of producing a maximum of two Karakurts per year.
However, experts know that the 112-cylinder M507D is a "pair" of two 56-cylinder M504s working on a common gearbox. Thus, 5-6 M507s (there are three of them on the Karakurt) turn into 10-12 M504s. Moreover, the capabilities of the Zvezda, in principle, allow for the production of a certain number of precisely these "halves" of M504s.
Their production is possible and must be accelerated...
At the same time, however, “half” of the engine is also half of its power, which is critically important for the ship’s performance.
The solution is suggested by foreign experience. For many years now, multi-shaft water jet installations have been used on foreign high-speed vessels, sometimes quite large ones. This is a "battery" of water jets from side to side, for which "their" engine works. And here lies the solution: a "battery" of affordable and completely domestic M504, working for water jets, is capable of providing a ship with approximately the same weight and size characteristics as the "Karakurt", but with a smaller number of diesel engines."
The solution was obvious, they worked on it, and here is the result - the "diesel issue" is losing its urgency, now, if we start working on these ships now, then by 2032 we can get at least 12 such corvettes, and for very reasonable money. And this is the solution to the BMZ problem: 12 ships - this is two brigades of surface ships capable of fighting against submarines, one per fleet.
The competent use of the Project 20380 corvettes (in the European part of Russia, it is urgently necessary to transfer these ships from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet) will allow the Northern and Pacific Fleets to have the necessary minimum of multi-purpose ships just in time for the next world war, if it cannot be avoided.
This is the salvation of both the fleet and the country, and the design of this ship, judging by the number, is for export and needs to be urgently adapted to the needs of the Russian fleet.
We wasted the time that history gave us to prepare for the next global slaughter. We admired nuclear torpedoes and the release of the "Strike Force". But time is up, and now we must do something for our survival. And, as shown above, ships capable of fighting submarines are critically important for this survival.
But the fleet does not live only on anti-submarine defense.
If we assume that 12 such ships will be built in this decade, this means, for example, a total missile salvo of 96 cruise missiles of all types, including hypersonic ones.
And, for example, in the current war in the Black Sea, these ships would be the most useful - having the same air defense as the Karakurt (and this is a proven interception of two Storm Shadow cruise missiles at low altitude - an unprecedented result for our Navy), these ships would be able to operate even near the Ukrainian coast, and attempts by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to attack them with Harpoons or Neptunes would end the same way as the firing from the Karakurts at the RM-24 during tests, or the cruise missiles of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
And if the Ukrainians tried to use underwater weapons against these ships, the Paket-NK complex would come into play.
To combat unmanned boats, there are serial machine gun modules and FPV UAVs.
True, these corvettes won't make it to Ukraine in time. But they will make it in time for the next war if we start building them now.
I would like to hope that the Navy command will not miss this chance. Because this is the last chance of the fleet. As well as the country as a whole.
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