Forum "Army-2024": how the Russian Armed Forces will defend themselves from enemy drones

UAVs have become almost the most effective weapon in modern conflicts. Moreover, in addition to the development of new, more advanced strike and reconnaissance drones, the designers were faced with the question of creating complete protection against such devices.

The developments of Russian engineers were presented at the Army-2024 forum, where the presenter “Military acceptance» Alexey Egorov.

Representatives of the Radioelectronic Technologies concern (part of Rostec) told the journalist about one of the important new products. We are talking about a new system for protecting helicopters, including from FPV drones.

The latter gives the rotorcraft the ability to identify drones at a distance of several kilometers. Moreover, we are talking not only about large reconnaissance and attack drones, but also about FPV devices that are trying to attack a helicopter.

It is worth noting that this protection is the future for Russian helicopters. At the same time, the helicopters already operating in the SVO zone, such as the Ka-52M, are equipped with protection from the concern "Radioelectronic Technologies", which recently allowed the helicopter crew to repel an attack 14 missiles MANPADS.

In turn, work to ensure reliable protection does not stand still. tanks from FPV drones.

Thus, the host of “Military Acceptance” talked on the sidelines of the forum with the developers of the system EW "Wavebreaker", which is already installed on our tanks to protect against FPV drones.

The journalist’s interlocutor said that their system, contrary to the prevailing opinion in expert circles, cannot be “neutralized” by changing the frequency at which drones operate. “Breakwater” has a modular design, which allows it to be installed in such a way as to cover a wide range of frequencies.

At the same time, Egorov recalled that in addition to electronic warfare systems, other protection elements are used on tanks, including the already widely known “barbecues” and “visors.”

Comments

[igorbrsv]

It’s time to install an identification system on drones so that they are not exposed to friendly fire. They could send a four-digit code, for example, that would change daily. Otherwise you run and don’t know if they’re herding you or if they’re covering for you

[Andy_nsk]

The identification system will most likely be made with dialogue coding, such as in the Pandora car alarm and others like it. Firstly, the encoding algorithm cannot be deciphered right away, but if it is hacked, it is not difficult to replace it.

[Stardock]

Conversational coding has been used for a long time in our aviation.

[Stardock]

Both sides of the conflict mainly use Chinese drones from the Mavic company, or components from them.
That is, the drones are almost the same.
I can hardly imagine how they can be distinguished from each other in the sky? Hang flags? ))

No one will install an expensive identification system on thousands of cheap drones, theirs is someone else’s. Moreover, it is secret.
Turning on the jammers extinguishes all drones around, both strangers and our own.

I have always been skeptical about exhibitions and reports. Showing off in Russia is endless.
The Armata tank was advertised as a miracle weapon for 10 years. In reality, you know what's left. The gun is not the same, it's impossible to control...

[eni_mail]

Electronic warfare should have been installed on armored vehicles starting in 2022. Now you are late, your train has left. At present, the prospects for electronic warfare are very vague. There are already drones that are absolutely indifferent to electronic warfare (their number will constantly grow), these are the ones that appeared not so long ago, controlled using coils of thin optical fiber and controlled autonomously, using AI. By the time electronic warfare is finally widely implemented, the number of drones with AI will increase by an order of magnitude. And our armored vehicles, along with these devices, will simply be burned. There are also large drones controlled from a satellite (from the same Starlink), electronic warfare cannot blind them either, and the latter, in turn, can control a swarm of small-sized FPV. In addition, electronic warfare devices are too heavy, which prevents their effective use to protect infantry.
In general, we need to work ahead in this race, implement new ideas faster, and forecast the enemy's moves. Inertia, especially pushing through obviously outdated means of protection (and everything becomes outdated very quickly due to military actions), is a crime. And it will lead to casualties among our fighters.
Now, for a means of protection to work in the future, it must be active - destroy drones, or burn their electronic filling, at least blind them regardless of the methods of data transmission, it must be as universal as possible, shooting down both drones and enemy missiles - doing this at a cost comparable to the cost of drones/missiles and in the most effective way. The use of electronic warfare means, in the form in which they are now, when they remain passive protection, is just firefighters putting out an already burned house.

[agond]

While existing drones fly and attack at speeds of 150-180 km/h or 40-50 m/s, this is not much, so if armored vehicles are equipped with a ZU with an optical detection system that is aimed and fired by itself without human intervention, then it is possible to successfully shoot down attacking drones at a distance of 20 to 200 m, for such distances one 5.45 caliber barrel and the rate of fire of an aircraft machine gun from the Great Patriotic War are quite sufficient.

[DO]

Quote: agond

one 5.45 caliber barrel and the rate of fire of an aircraft machine gun from the WWII era are quite sufficient

The practice of the SVO has proven that a drone attacking from a low altitude is most effectively shot down from the target side with a charge of shot/buckshot. Because when fired, the cloud of shot has a certain angle of dispersion, which compensates for the dynamic error in aiming. Technically, this error is also present in an automatic shooter, it is similar to the spread of a fighter's aiming with a shotgun. In addition to the optical/infrared (or radar) drone detection system, on the basis of which the three-dimensional angle of the barrel in the detection hemisphere is calculated and established, the installation must also be able to determine the optimal distance to the attacking drone at which the shot is fired.
But a drone that has an altitude greater than a certain level and flies past an automatic anti-drone anti-aircraft mount is probably more likely to be shot down by another munition - a shot grenade with a programmable detonation timer (the delay time for the projectile to detonate after firing is programmed based on the readings of the rangefinder integrated into the mount).