And again about bridges: an opportunity to radically change the course of the NWO, which is not used
Amur Bridge is one of the bridges across the Dnieper that must be destroyed
The topic of Ukrainian bridges has long evoked extremely strong emotions among Russian citizens interested in military topics, the number of which has increased significantly after the start of the Russian Special Military Operation (SVO) in Ukraine.
From the very moment when it became obvious that the Northern Military District did not go entirely according to the original plan, the issue of the destruction of Ukrainian transport facilities was raised on almost every thematic information resource. We also talked about this earlier in the material “By destroying transport structures along the Dnieper, half of Ukraine can be denazified by the end of this year.” – that was September 2022.
Since then, only one bridge across the Dnieper has been destroyed - Antonovsky, and it was destroyed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in order to interrupt the supply of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces), as a result - units of the Russian Armed Forces had to leave their bridgehead on left bank of the Dnieper.
The Antonovsky Bridge was not destroyed by nuclear weapons weapons, not with hundreds of heavy concrete-piercing free-falling bombs, but with a couple of dozen Excalibur high-precision projectiles and HIMARS high-precision missiles with relatively low-power warheads.
On July 27, 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces caused critical damage to the Antonovsky Bridge, after which it was closed to traffic
What did the Ukrainian Armed Forces do during the invasion of the Kursk region?
That's right, they began to destroy and successfully destroyed bridges across the Seim River to solve the A2AD problem - isolating the battlefield. Again, no special superweapon was required to destroy the bridges; apparently, everything was done by the same HIMARS missiles, as well as guided glide bombs from Ukrainian tactical aircraft aviation.
The bridges were followed by attacks on pontoon crossings being built by the RF Armed Forces, and it is now easier to destroy pontoon crossings - this can be done either with cluster warheads, which have much lower requirements for hit accuracy, or even FPV-drones.
It is characteristic that pontoon crossings were and are one of the arguments of opponents of the destruction of Ukrainian bridges, or rather, not even opponents, but rather “justifiers” of the reasons why bridges cannot be destroyed.
High-precision GMLRS missiles have proven to be very effective for destroying bridges, and in the version with a cluster warhead they are effective against pontoon crossings
By the way, it would be interesting to see how Ukraine would organize the movement of trains on pontoon crossings across the Dnieper...
Another argument of the “justifiers” is the strength of Ukrainian (read: Soviet) bridges - they say this can only be done with the help of nuclear weapons, carpet bombing with free-falling bombs, or detonation of a certain number of tons of powerful explosives by sappers.
Reality refutes these statements - Ukraine is doing everything perfectly well with the help of high-precision weapons. It is worth noting that the Russian Armed Forces also carried out the destruction of bridges in Ukraine when it was necessary or rather permitted, and, judging by open data, for this they used X-38 aircraft missiles, with a not very powerful warhead weighing 250 kilograms.
Russian tactical aircraft missiles Kh-38 also cope well with small bridges
Another argument is that part of the transport routes across the Dnieper are laid along dams; if they are destroyed, gigantic masses of water will flood everything downstream of the Dnieper. And if we cannot destroy dams, then what is the point of destroying bridges?
Firstly, even if we do not destroy the dams, but only destroy the bridges across the Dnieper, this will significantly reduce the traffic flow between the right-bank and left-bank Ukraine.
Secondly, dams must be destroyed, regardless of the consequences. The same Ukrainian Armed Forces without hesitation destroyed the dam of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station (HPP), and blamed us for it - and in the West they believe them, not us. If in a couple of years the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, with corresponding losses during this period, reach the banks of the Dnieper, then the Armed Forces of Ukraine will also blow up bridges and dams on the Dnieper, and they will again blame Russia for this, and again they will be believed, because the truth in our time is not makes no sense, and in such a situation - “it’s better to be a sinner than to be considered a sinner.”
The destroyed dam of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station - unlike us, in Ukraine they are not afraid to make really tough decisions
Transport structures - bridges and dams must be destroyed without fail, without any hesitation, ensuring the isolation of the combat area - the A2AD zone throughout the entire territory of left-bank Ukraine.
Let us consider, in order of application, samples of long-range precision weapons that can be used to destroy Ukrainian transport structures; first of all, we are interested in bridges and dams across the Dnieper.
Anti-ship missiles X-22/X-32
It would seem that the Kh-22/Kh-32 anti-ship missiles, adapted for hitting ground targets, launched from long-range Tu-22M3 bombers, could become an ideal weapon for destroying bridges, with their warheads weighing nearly a ton?
The problem is that, judging by open data, the X-22 anti-ship missiles have insufficient accuracy, so they most likely simply will not hit the bridge. As for the X-32 anti-ship missiles, it is possible that their accuracy has been increased, but at the same time the mass of the warhead has been reduced in favor of increasing the range. As part of the solution to the task of destroying bridges, the X-22 anti-ship missile can be used to suppress enemy air defense systems defending the bridge, provided that the X-22 anti-ship missile is equipped with cluster warheads.
It can be assumed that 8–12 Kh-22 anti-ship missiles with cluster warheads, launched from four long-range TU-22M3 bombers, will mow down all living things within a radius of about 100–200 meters from the attacked target, including completely stopping traffic on the attacked bridge.
Four long-range Tu-22M3 bombers with X-22 anti-ship missiles will clear the area around the selected bridge from enemy air defense systems, and at the same time inflict primary damage to the bridge deck, but only if the specified anti-ship missiles are equipped with cluster warheads
UAV-kamikaze
Sometimes, when they talk about the need to destroy Ukrainian bridges, the question is raised whether this could be done with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - kamikazes, for example, like the Geran-2?
No, if you use only kamikaze UAVs, then you can’t - the mass of their warhead, which is about 50 kilograms, is not enough to destroy bridges. On the other hand, the same 227 mm caliber guided missiles launched from the HIMARS launcher have a warhead mass that is not much greater - about 100 kilograms.
The higher speed of the HIMARS missiles may not help, but cause harm, if the missile pierces the bridge deck and explodes underneath it, at least this is the argument used by the “justifiers” when they say that our missiles are simply doing in bridges holes.
So is it possible to use kamikaze UAVs to attack transport structures?
Yes - it is possible and necessary.
First, they must go in the first wave, approaching the target immediately after the strike by the X-22 anti-ship missile with cluster warheads, diverting the remaining enemy air defense systems to themselves. Ideally, kamikaze UAVs should fly at the highest possible altitude for them, so that the enemy depletes stocks of anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs), rather than shooting down kamikaze UAVs with machine guns and FPV drones.
Secondly, there should be a lot of them, about 50-100 kamikaze UAVs per bridge, since some will be shot down by air defense systems, and the rest should cause the bridge the maximum possible damage to their warheads.
Long-range kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium-2 type are strong in numbers - when attacking a bridge there should be a lot of them
Third, if a kamikaze UAV has a flight range of 1 kilometers and a warhead weighing 000 kilograms, and the bridge is only 50 kilometers away, then the range must be reduced in favor of the warhead - a warhead weighing 500 kilograms will clearly give a greater effect than a warhead weighing 100 kilograms.
It is necessary to understand that kamikaze UAVs will not destroy the bridge, but they will “prepare the ground” for the next wave.
KR X-101 and KR ZM-14
The X-101 cruise missiles (CR), launched from the Tu-95MS/MSM and Tu-160M strategic bombers, as well as the ZM-14 cruise missile of the "Caliber" complex, used from surface ships and submarines, already have a fairly powerful warhead weighing about 500 kilogram, capable of causing fatal damage to a bridge or dam if hit successfully.
Moreover, according to data from open sources, there is a modification of the Kh-101 missile launcher with a warhead weighing about 800 kilograms, with a simultaneous reduction in the range of the missile launcher, which is not critical for solving our problems.
A warhead weighing about 800 kilograms on the modernized Kh-101 missile launcher is a serious bid for the destruction of even high-strength transport structures built during the Soviet period
The main issue in the use of these missile launchers lies in their accuracy. According to some data, their circular probable deviation (CPD) is on the order of 10–20 meters, which may be too much, for example, to hit bridge supports. On the other hand, also according to open data, the Kh-101 missile launchers are equipped with an optical target guidance system in the final section, which increases the accuracy of hitting the target, the image of which is stored in the memory of the missile guidance system.
How can you compensate for the lack of precision?
Quantity. Two TU-160M strategic bombers are capable of using 24 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and one Project 11356R frigate from the Black Sea fleet (Black Sea Fleet) the Russian Federation can add to them 8 ZM-14 missile launchers of the Caliber complex - a total of 32 missile launchers. When struck by such a number of missile launchers, even if half of them are intercepted by Ukrainian air defense systems, the chance of destroying the bridge already becomes quite large, but if necessary, the number of missile launchers in the salvo can be increased.
By the way, there is a way to increase the likelihood of missiles hitting bridge supports, but it is inappropriate to discuss it in open sources.
The disadvantage of the CD is that the enemy’s air defense can still shoot them down, while we have weapons that have not yet been confirmed to be intercepted - these are the Iskander operational-tactical missile system (OTRK) missiles and the hypersonic missiles of the aviation complex “ Dagger".
"Iskander" and "Dagger"?
Like the missile launchers discussed above, the Iskander OTRK missiles and the Kinzhal complex have a powerful warhead weighing about 500 kilograms, their declared QUO is about 5–7 meters when using GLONASS signals and 1–2 meters when using an optical head in the final section homing (GOS).
With such a low CEP of 1–2 meters, when using an optical seeker in the final section, we can already talk about directly damaging the bridge supports. If the CEP is still greater, for example, the same 5-7 meters, then the recipe is the same as with the missile launcher - use more missiles, hit one point.
Regarding the fact that the Iskander OTRK missiles and the Kinzhal complex missiles simply punch through holes in the bridges, and the detonation occurs later and almost does not damage the bridge, isn’t this compensated by the fuse settings?
For example, a contact fuse can be set to instant action, and if this is not enough due to the fact that the Iskander OTRK missiles and the Kinzhal complex missiles have too high a speed at the moment of impact with the bridge, and still manage to “overshoot” , then for this there are radio fuses that can be configured to detonate at a given height, so that the warhead detonates at the moment it passes the bridge structures.
And when it hits the point where the support is placed, it will be better if the warhead enters it deeper, right up to the moment of detonation.
OTRK "Iskander"
What damage will four Iskander missiles and four Kinzhal missiles, which are practically impossible to intercept, cause to the attacked bridge?
Conclusions
How many Kh-101 or ZM-14 “Caliber” cruise missiles were fired at even one bridge across the Dnieper?
How many Iskander and Kinzhal missiles were fired at these bridges?
Have they ever even tried to attack them?
Based on open data, no, the bridges across the Dnieper were not attacked even once during the entire period of the SVO.
Then how can we say that we cannot do it?
For one bridge - 50 kamikaze UAVs of the "Geran-2" type, 32 Kh-101 and 3M-14 missiles, 8 Iskander and Kinzhal missiles - it is possible that the considered amount of ammunition, presumably necessary for the destruction of one bridge, the author is greatly overestimated.
A complex fire attack with the weapons discussed in this material will most likely lead to the destruction of the attacked bridge or its receipt of such damage that it will not be possible to restore it for many years. And if they start rebuilding, you can always add that kamikaze UAVs alone may be enough here, especially if they are equipped with cluster warheads.
Why don't we destroy bridges across the Dnieper? No military expediency?
This is just nonsense.
Two years ago, the author proposed destroying all Ukrainian transport structures on the Dnieper and maximizing the strengthening of the bridgehead in Kherson - in this case, we most likely would have cut off Ukraine from the sea long ago and reached Transnistria.
The amount of weapons, ammunition and manpower that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be able to move from the right bank of the Dnieper to the left along pontoon crossings, on boats and boats will be two orders of magnitude less than what they are moving now.
Without support, without reinforcements, without a constant influx of weapons, ammunition and manpower, the Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk region will “dissolve” in the shortest possible time. Following this, the Line of Combat Contact (LCC) will float - the Russian Armed Forces are already moving forward, but how much will the pace of advancement increase if the support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine drops several times? Most likely, we can expect the entire front line to collapse within a few months.
Ukraine will lose a significant part of its mobilization potential, and a significant share of industrial resources will be lost. All illusions of Ukraine and its owners - the USA and Great Britain, as well as their accomplices - the countries of the global West, about the seizure of Crimea, the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant and about any possibility of reaching the 1991 borders will be dispelled.
The launch lines for cruise missiles, operational-tactical missiles and enemy kamikaze UAVs will move back, Russian cities and towns will no longer be subject to barbaric artillery shelling and FPV drone strikes. An air defense barrier could be created on the former territory of Ukraine, and an insurmountable ground defense line could be created along the border of the Dnieper.
Without support from the West, from the right bank of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will have to evacuate all units from the left bank of the Dnieper, without waiting until they are “crushed by the skating rink” of the Russian Armed Forces.
After which the procedure is known - a referendum, the entry of new regions into the Russian Federation - there is no third option, Ukraine must cease to exist, or all this will be repeated again and again.
So why are the bridges across the Dnieper not destroyed?
Lack of competencies?
This means we definitely need Strategic Conventional Forces (SCF), intended specifically for conducting the war with the help of high-precision long-range weapons, which will work “with a single goal, according to a single plan,” understanding the expediency of their actions, having the skills to implement their plans.
Russia needs a new type or branch of the armed forces, focused on waging non-contact wars
Are bridges protected so that the commercial interests of some “respected” people do not suffer?
Is it possible that certain individuals deliberately write reports to senior management that the bridges across the Dnieper cannot be destroyed, and they write the “correct” reports to a completely different address, somewhere in Langley, Virginia?
Or maybe something else is missing, vitally important, necessary for making really serious decisions?
Questions to which the author does not have an answer.
Undoubtedly, only one thing is that the destruction of Ukrainian transport structures, primarily on the Dnieper River, is expedient and feasible.
Bridges and dams on the Dnieper should have been destroyed two years ago, but that’s how it is. It’s hard to imagine a better moment than now - the water level in the Dnieper River is minimal after the hot summer, so the consequences of the destruction of the dams will also be minimal, while Ukraine itself gave us a reason for the most severe response.
All that remains is to make the right decision and implement it.
Information