Shipborne anti-aircraft missile system M-2 "Volkhov"

29
Shipborne anti-aircraft missile system M-2 "Volkhov"


About a couple of weeks ago, walking around the St. Petersburg Central Naval Museum in the company of Vladislav (known in VO as Kote Pan Kokhanka), we, standing in front of the model of the cruiser pr. 68bis, discussed the armament of this ship. During the conversation, I remembered the cruiser pr. 68bis "Dzerzhinsky", later converted into pr. 70e and equipped with anti-aircraft rocket medium-range complex M-2 "Volkhov".



In a good way, a separate article should have been devoted to this ship complex in the recent series about the S-75 family of air defense systems, but, frankly speaking, I forgot about it, and today I will try to correct my omission.

Cruiser pr. 68bis "Dzerzhinsky" and its conversion into pr. 70e


The Project 68bis ships differed from the previous Project 68k in their increased dimensions and displacement, all-welded hull, improved habitability, more powerful main power plant, and a larger number of universal and anti-aircraft artillery, the presence of special artillery radar stations, more modern navigation and radio equipment and communications equipment, increased autonomy and cruising range.

The cruiser pr. 68bis "Dzerzhinsky" was accepted into the Black Sea fleet in August 1952. The standard displacement of the ship was 13 tons, the total displacement was about 230 tons. Length - 17 m, width - 000 m. The power plant consisted of six water-tube steam boilers with a total capacity of 210 liters. With. provided speeds of up to 22,8 knots. The range at 118 knots could reach 100 miles. Autonomy – 33 days. Crew – 16 people.


Cruiser pr. 68bis "Dzerzhinsky"

The main armament was twelve 152-mm B-38 guns with a firing range of 30 km, housed in four MK-5bis turrets. The universal artillery was six twin 100-mm gun mounts SM-5-1.

Near-area air defense was provided by sixteen twin 37-mm B-11M assault rifles. In addition to artillery weapons, there were two five-tube 533-mm torpedo tubes. Also, 132 sea mines could be taken on board. The thickness of the armor varied from 10 to 130 mm.

To detect surface and air targets and identify them in the “friend or foe” mode, there was a meter-range radar “Guys-2”. This station could see surface objects at a distance of 20 km, airborne objects - 80 km.

The cruisers “Dmitry Pozharsky” and “Dzerzhinsky” were equipped with a powerful P-500 two-dimensional decimeter-range radar with a range of up to 300 km against large high-altitude air targets.


P-500 radar antenna post

The placement of the bulky antenna post of the P-500 radar required significantly strengthening the strength of its installation site.

To detect surface targets, provide target designation for 152-mm naval artillery and navigation tasks, there was a centimeter-range “Reef” radar with a range of up to 40 km. Measuring the distance to surface targets with an accuracy of 15 m was carried out using the Stag-B radio rangefinder, which also operated in the centimeter range.

The Yakor-M centimeter range station, with a range of about 30 km against air and surface targets, was intended for targeting 100 mm universal artillery mounts.

Centralized weapons control was carried out by the Zveno combat information and control system.

By the standards of the mid-1950s, the Project 68bis cruisers were considered quite modern and effective warships. In total, it was planned to build 25 cruisers of this project, but in reality the fleet received 14 units.

Project 68bis was the “basic” for subsequent modifications: Project 70e, control ships: Project 68u-1 and 68u-2. The service of the Project 68bis cruisers was long and lasted on average more than 30 years.

In the first post-war decade, weapons systems and military equipment progressed at a very rapid pace, and in the late 1950s it became clear that large warships with purely artillery weapons no longer fully meet modern requirements. In connection with the advent of the “jet era”, combat capabilities aviation potential enemy has increased sharply.

The command of the USSR Navy, wishing to keep cruisers in the fleet, initiated the creation of ships on the basis of Project 68bis Defense, capable of operating at a significant distance from their shores for an extended period of time.

Initially, within the framework of Project 70, it was planned to eliminate all the towers with 152-mm guns, placing in their place the M-2 medium-range air defense system with a total ammunition load of 44 anti-aircraft missiles. After a detailed review of the project, the admirals decided to leave the two front turrets and place the missile launchers in place of the rear 152 mm guns.

This option, known as Project 71, was considered a compromise, but it also raised many questions among experts. As a result, in order to develop technical solutions and gain experience before starting the construction of ships of Project 71, one cruiser, Project 68bis, was allocated from the fleet to create an experimental ship, Project 70e.

At the stage of consideration of the project, it was planned to install 10-cm range guidance equipment and the B-750 missile defense system, which were used as part of the SA-75M medium-range air defense system. But by the time work began, more advanced SNR-75, operating in the 6-cm range, and V-753 (13DM) missiles, intended for the S-75 air defense system, had already appeared. To increase noise immunity and increase the target detection range without increasing the transmitter power, two parabolic antennas of a “narrow beam” probing the target were used.

According to this project, the cruiser "Dzerzhinsky" was rebuilt at the Sevastopol Marine Plant named after Sergo Ordzhonikidze from October 15, 1957 to December 24, 1958. It can be assumed that the choice of the Dzerzhinsky for conversion into an air defense ship was due to the fact that it had more advanced radio equipment than most cruisers of Project 68bis.

During the work at Dzerzhinsky, the third MK-5bis turret, the aft command and rangefinder post, eight 37-mm B-11M anti-aircraft guns and a torpedo tube were dismantled. In place of the removed weapons and equipment, the M-2 Volkhov anti-aircraft missile system was installed, which included a twin SM-64 launcher, a missile storage and loading device and a Corvette-Sevan control system.

Shipborne anti-aircraft missile system M-2 "Volkhov"


The M-2 Volkhov shipborne air defense system was created through the efforts of NII-1, NII-49, and TsKB-34. The work was supervised by the chief designers: S. T. Zaitsev, P. D. Grushin, A. S. Grinshtein, E. G. Rudyak.


Launcher SM-64 with B-753 missile defense system

Taking into account the specifics of sea conditions and long-term storage in the cellar with constant refueling (in a state of intermediate readiness), the 13DM anti-aircraft missile was modified for use from the SM-64 launcher with a lower suspension. Unlike the ground launchers SM-63 and SM-90, on the SM-64 the missile was suspended on special yokes.


On the rotating part and beams of the SM-64 launcher there were platforms for maintenance and inspection of missile defense systems.


For safety reasons, refilling with oxidizer was carried out immediately before use.

Initially, the cruiser's powder magazines were not suitable for storing the B-753 missiles, which had a length of 10,4 m and a stabilizer diameter of 2,6 m. The volumes of the former artillery ammunition storage facilities for vertical placement of 10 missiles (5 units per drum) were not enough . In this regard, it was necessary to increase the size of the cellar, for which three decks were cut and a superstructure 3,3 m high was built.


It is clear that such a decision turned out to be extremely unsuccessful in terms of ensuring the survivability of the ship. A rocket that is very sensitive to mechanical stress, filled with toxic fuel and a caustic, flammable oxidizer, even with a slight leak of components, could very likely explode in the storage facility, followed by the detonation of nearby missile defense systems.

For a number of reasons, TsKB-34 specialists, who designed the SM-64 launcher, as well as the system for pre-launch preparation, supply and storage of missiles, were unable to create an automatic refueling system at the launch site, and therefore used a manual refueling system, which did not meet fire safety requirements. and explosion safety.

Although the naval version of the S-75 complex was initially planned to be installed on warships of various projects, problems with the operation and equipment of missile defense systems, the main engine of which ran on two-component fuel, were the reason for the refusal to further build ships armed with the M-2 air defense system, and the Dzerzhinsky became the only air defense cruiser built on the basis of Project 68bis.

In addition, the antenna post of the guidance station had very significant dimensions, and it could be placed on a fairly large ship.


SAM M-2 "Volkhov" on the cruiser "Dzerzhinsky", converted according to project 70e

Testing of the M-2 ship complex began in February 1958. The very first launch of an anti-aircraft missile shot down an unmanned radio-controlled Il-28, which was used as a target, flying at an altitude of 10 km. This made a great impression on the admirals; at that time, the Soviet fleet did not have air defense systems capable of destroying high-altitude targets with a high probability.

The M-2 Volkhov shipborne anti-aircraft missile system had a single-channel target, but it was possible to fire two missiles simultaneously. The maximum firing range was 34 km, the minimum – 3 km. Ceiling – 22 km. The maximum speed of the target being fired is up to 640 m/s. A number of sources claim that this shipborne air defense system could use improved B-755 (20D) missiles, capable of combating air targets in the altitude range from 0,4 to 30 km, and at a range of up to 40 km. But it was not possible to find out whether this is actually so.

Tests continued until July 1959. The official adoption of the M-2 air defense system installed on the cruiser Dzerzhinsky was formalized in 1962. But even before this, due to the obvious shortcomings of the complex, which used bulky liquid-fueled missiles, the operation of which on a ship created the preconditions for accidents and disasters, an order was issued to develop ship-based air defense systems of various ranges with much safer to use solid-fuel missiles suitable for long-term storage and do not require complex manipulations before use.

Service of the cruiser pr. 70e "Dzerzhinsky"


After testing and realizing that the M-2 Volkhov air defense system did not meet naval requirements in many respects, on August 3, 1961 (even before the M-2 complex was put into service), the Project 70e cruiser Dzerzhinsky was reclassified as a training cruiser.

Nevertheless, in the 1960s and 1970s, the ship was actively used, participated in maneuvers of the Black Sea Fleet, and also made a series of foreign visits.


So, on August 20–26, 1964, the cruiser visited the Romanian city of Constanta. In April 1967, he paid a visit to the Yugoslav port of Split. July 10–14, 1967 he was in Port Said, Egypt. August 9–12, 1969 – visit to Varna, Bulgaria. In October 1969, the cruiser visited Alexandria, Egypt. April 26–30, 1971 – visit to Le Havre, France. December 14–18, 1971 – mooring in Syrian Latakia.

On October 5–24, 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, it covered Egyptian territory from the sea. In March 1976, the cruiser moored in Syrian Tartus. In 1976, the cruiser revisited Yugoslav Split. June 30 – July 4, 1977 – visit to Tunisia. On October 20–25, 1978, the ship was in the Greek port of Piraeus. On November 16–20, 1978, the cruiser Dzerzhinsky visited Istanbul.

By the early 1980s, the main components and assemblies of the ship were severely worn out. In addition, the fleet command had reasonable doubts about the combat effectiveness of the M-2 air defense system. During an inspection carried out in 1982, it was discovered that most of the anti-aircraft missiles had fuel leaks, which made them unusable.

After this, it became obvious that there was no point in keeping the morally and physically outdated cruiser in combat service, and it was put into reserve. On October 12, 1988, the cruiser Project 70e "Dzerzhinsky" was expelled from the USSR Navy, and on December 9, 1988 it was handed over for cutting into metal.
29 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +9
    24 August 2024 05: 27
    Greetings Sergey! Hello Ole!
    I am very glad that you fulfilled your plans!!!
    Good morning to the comrades, success and prosperity!!!
    1. +6
      24 August 2024 11: 21
      Quote: Kote pane Kohanka
      Greetings Sergey!

      Vladislav, good evening!
      Quote: Kote pane Kohanka
      Hello Ole!

      Thank you, she bows to you too!
      Quote: Kote pane Kohanka
      I am very glad that you fulfilled your plans!!!

      I was interested myself! On the good side, based on what you and I discussed at the Naval Museum and during our visit to the Decembrist, we can make a whole series of articles. But alas, naval themes are not my path.
    2. +1
      25 August 2024 17: 13
      Vladislav, hello! Only a week later my internal time completely changed and my body adapted to the change of day in the Far East. I noticed that flying from East to West is easier than flying in the opposite direction.
  2. +5
    24 August 2024 05: 54
    Thank you for the series of articles about the S-75.
    I would really like to read about the S-25. It all started with her.
    1. +8
      24 August 2024 11: 25
      Quote: B-15
      Thank you for the series of articles about the S-75.

      You are welcome! Yes
      Quote: B-15
      I would really like to read about the S-25. It all started with her.

      I wrote about the S-25 11 years ago at the beginning of my career at VO and in this article I made a number of mistakes, albeit not fundamental ones.

      https://topwar.ru/29102-pervyy-otechestvennyy-zrk-s-25.html
      1. +4
        25 August 2024 09: 33
        Thanks for the link.
        Yes, I saw a small typo. They removed it from the database a little later. At least in 1985 they were still on the database in some regiments. And they were supported by S300s in part of the positions of the S25 divisions.
        I would also like to ask you to complete your article about the C25 with a description of the latest upgrades. After all, they confidently hit further than 30 km.
        You can also cite real cases of CVs during live firing. There was a lot of funny and instructive stuff there.
        It’s a pity that the site https://www.c25.ru/ was closed. It was interesting. It's a shame that all the information about C25 is now hardly of interest to our damned friends. Their reconnaissance satellites are too good. But we need to know and be proud of our achievements.
  3. +7
    24 August 2024 06: 16
    hi
    As always, an interesting article!
    to place 10 missiles in a vertical position (5 units per drum) ... this solution turned out to be extremely unsuccessful in terms of ensuring the survivability of the ship. A rocket that is very sensitive to mechanical stress, filled with toxic fuel and a caustic, flammable oxidizer, even with a slight leak of components, could very likely explode in the storage facility, followed by the detonation of missile defense systems located nearby.
    .
    And the next generation of “missiles in drums” was also unsafe: “...the flame in the cellar appeared due to the spontaneous activation of the main engine of one of the anti-aircraft missiles. This was followed by the launch of the rocket engine of its own launch stage, which led to the launch of the launch engines of several more rockets. All this led to a sharp jump in pressure in the cellar (about 3 atmospheres), as a result of which a force of approximately 2500 tons began to act on the cellar lid, which caused its failure. As a result of the explosion, 8 holes were formed in the side plating of the ship in the area of ​​the 2th cellar, through which sea water began to flow into the compartments...."
    The history of the BOD "Valiant" is well known. https://topwar.ru/23944-gibel-bpk-otvazhnyy.html

    Storing rockets in drums is probably not very safe. Individual vertical launch cells will be safer.
    Unfortunately, I can no longer attach a video of how the German frigate Saxony with Mk41 survived the SM-2 Block IIIA accident.
    1. +7
      24 August 2024 11: 27
      Andrey, welcome!
      Quote: Wildcat
      And the next generation of “missiles in drums” was also unsafe: “...the flame in the cellar appeared due to the spontaneous activation of the propulsion engine of one of the anti-aircraft missiles...

      By the way, in this case it was never possible to reliably find out why the engine started. request
      1. +2
        24 August 2024 15: 15
        Thanks for the interesting topics.
        And a question from an amateur.
        The fire hazard of such missiles was high. And the main problem was possible spontaneous combustion.
        Have any measures been taken to minimize the danger?
        Automatic fire extinguishing system or something similar???
        Thanks in advance.
        1. +3
          25 August 2024 08: 45
          Hello!
          Quote: garri-lin
          The fire hazard of such missiles was high. And the main problem was possible spontaneous combustion.
          Have any measures been taken to minimize the danger?
          Automatic fire extinguishing system or something similar???

          When fuel and oxidizer spontaneously combine, the process takes on an uncontrolled explosive character. You've probably seen newsreels of rocket carrier explosions in the event of unsuccessful launches, and the same thing happens on liquid-fueled SAMs in the event of an accident. The problem is that the oxidizer already contains oxygen and when combined with fuel, combustion is possible without access to air. If such combustion has begun, no fire extinguishing systems will help. Of course, you can flood the rocket cellar with seawater, but this must be done before detonation occurs.
          1. +3
            25 August 2024 09: 21
            It turns out that things happen in seconds. It's clear. Thanks for the answer. Brave people served. Honor and Glory.
      2. +3
        24 August 2024 18: 40
        Good afternoon!

        The reason for the launch is of course important, but the saddest thing is that no conclusions were drawn about the storage of the missiles.
        And the "drum system", in which damage to one missile will most likely lead to catastrophic consequences, was retained even on the S300f (https://glav.su/files/messages/ef1644af252bfcc934d38715837ce281.jpg) and OSA-M. Kinzhal, it seems, is also made using the "drum system".

        IMHO, “vertical launchers” were not immediately accepted, since there were questions “about the strength of the deck,” it seems.

        Well, the idea of ​​extinguishing rocket engines with sea water is, IMHO, ineffective.
  4. +4
    24 August 2024 06: 38
    Interesting article. In the 50s, the choice of rocket came down to one. Unlike the Americans, who had at least three purely marine ones - from Terrier to Talos.
  5. +4
    24 August 2024 07: 25
    I’m wondering if the cruisers had torpedo tubes, but did at least one Soviet cruiser launch a torpedo attack?
    1. +6
      24 August 2024 07: 44
      IMHO, from memory:
      Yes
      No
      IMHO, the destroyers went out twice during WW2 - a miss and again..... .
      1. +7
        24 August 2024 10: 55
        About torpedo tubes on cruisers during the Great Patriotic War.
        If in our history torpedoes on ships of the first rank are more evil than good. The history of the damage to the battleship Marat, the Japanese convincingly proved in at least two night clashes that their 600mm torpedoes were not superfluous!
        1. +6
          24 August 2024 15: 05
          As if “in first rank” I agree, but not quite request
          Theoretically, "large torpedoes" at close range could be useful, for example - Rodney fired a torpedo at Bismarck.
          But in practice, especially in our case, Marat’s 450 mm torpedoes were meaningless, given the concept of combat at a mine-artillery position.
          1. +5
            24 August 2024 16: 07
            I’m writing this offhand - from memory! Because of the torpedoes on board, the Japanese, having 2 auxiliary cruisers on order with 12 150mm guns between them, lost one when it was hit by a torpedo tube from the only 76mm gun of an Indian minesweeper paired with an English tanker armed with a 102mm gun. Both Allied ships reached their ports.
            An opposite example is the light cruiser Sydney, which was killed by a torpedo from a German auxiliary cruiser. I agree about Marat.
    2. +6
      24 August 2024 11: 13
      US losses in cruisers from torpedo weapons of surface ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy:
      Heavy cruisers 2:
      Kuinski in the battle of Savo Island;
      Northampton - near Tassafaronga (by destroyer).
      Light cruisers: 1
      Helena at the Battle of Kula Bay.
      Their photos:
      1. +6
        24 August 2024 15: 13
        Regarding the second rank, cruisers, I also agree, but even less so. feel
        Quotes from Suliga, "Japanese heavy cruisers": "According to the project, torpedo armament was not provided, since for the reconnaissance officer it would only be an unnecessary and dangerous load. But both cruisers entered service with 12 stationary TAs. The installation of heavy torpedo weapons on “Class A” cruisers occurred under pressure from the MGSH, which, after the signing of the Washington Treaty, began to attach great importance to night combat and torpedo attacks in order to compensate for the restrictions imposed on line forces. .... Hiraga was an ardent opponent of installing torpedo weapons on large ships, especially inside the hull above the MoD or near the magazines, because It was feared that if hit by a shell or caused by a fire, the torpedo warheads would detonate and cause terrible damage. Hiraga's views were confirmed by the results of tests carried out on the hull of the unfinished battleship Tosa on June 24, 1924. Then, in the bow torpedo compartment, located under the upper deck, several warheads of Type 8 torpedoes (300 - 346 kg of “shimoza”) detonated and the hull above the overhead line received enormous damage. Hiragi's predictions were also confirmed during the war in the Pacific Ocean, when a good half of the 18 heavy Japanese cruisers that entered service died precisely after the detonation of their own torpedoes, which, in addition to the most powerful charge, also had explosive oxygen engines. And this is despite the fact that after repeated upgrades on all cruisers, it would seem that all possible precautions were taken: the torpedo tubes that had become rotating were placed on sponsons so that when they turned abeam, the torpedo warheads would be as far as possible from the side, and spare torpedoes were placed in special armored boxes.
        Despite Hiraga's protests, the tactical considerations of the Moscow General Staff prevailed...
        ....Taking advantage of the temporary belay due to the absence of Hiragi, supporters of torpedo weapons in the MGSh were able to impose request their views and forced belay his successor Fujimoto to redo the drawings, providing for the installation on cruisers of the 7100-ton and 10000-ton projects of 4 twin torpedo tubes of the 12 year type in fixed installations under the upper deck above the engine rooms. "
        https://litmir.club/br/?b=589055&p=10
        1. +6
          24 August 2024 16: 47
          Sorry, I didn’t write who Hiraga is, quote from Wiki: "Yuzuru Hiraga (Japanese: 平賀譲 Hiraga Yuzuru, March 8, 1878, Tokyo - February 13, 1943, Tokyo) was a Japanese shipbuilder, known for the warship designs he developed in the second half of the 1910s and early 1920s. Vice Admiral (1.12.1926/1931/XNUMX), since XNUMX - professor at the University of Tokyo, in the last years of his life - its rector.
          Biography
          Hiraga was born in Tokyo in 1878 and spent his childhood in Yokosuka. From 1898 to 1901, he studied shipbuilding at the Faculty of Engineering at the University of Tokyo, and after graduating with the rank of lieutenant, he worked at the naval arsenal in Yokosuka. From April 1903 to January 1904, he served on the battleships Yashima and Mikasa and was promoted to senior lieutenant. During the Russo-Japanese War, he worked at the headquarters of the naval arsenal in Kure. In January 1905, Hiraga was sent to Great Britain, arriving via the United States in April. In October, after much effort, he entered the prestigious Naval College at Greenwich, where he studied the latest technology in warship design before graduating in June 1908. Over the next six months he visited shipyards in France and Italy, returning to Japan in early 1909.
          He then worked for Yokosuka Kyosho, and in May 1916, having received the rank of lieutenant, he became head of the fundamental design section (kihon keikaku) at the 4th department (shipbuilding - josen) of the MTD. In it, Hiraga was initially responsible for work on the battleship Nagato. In April 1917, Hiraga received captain's shoulder straps and supervised further work on the creation of battleships and battlecruisers that were part of the "8-8 fleet".
          In the summer of 1921, military shipbuilder Captain 1st Rank Yuzuru Hiraga proposed a new version of a 7500-ton reconnaissance cruiser (future Furutaka-class cruisers), which would meet all the requirements of the MGSh and surpass the American Omaha-class cruisers. This cruiser project, with the same displacement as its overseas counterparts, had significant advantages due to the fact that Hiraga used new design principles that made it possible to significantly save weight. The side and deck armor plates were used as longitudinal load-bearing elements of the hull, and the continuous and longitudinally curved upper deck made it possible to make all load-bearing elements of the set long. To test his ideas in practice, Hiraga brought to life the project of the experimental cruiser Yubari.
          Becoming a rear admiral in June 1922, Hiraga led the design and construction of the light cruiser Yubari, as well as the heavy cruisers Furutaka, Aoba and Myoko.
          However, already in 1924, Hiraga was sent abroad because he entered into an acute conflict with the MGSh over the latter’s introduction of additional proposals to ship designs that increased the ship’s load. Thus, the MGSH got rid of the unyielding admiral. Fujimoto Kikuyo took his place as head of the main design section. Hiraga returned to Japan in 1926 with the rank of vice admiral and became head of the shipbuilding department at the Navy Institute of Science and Technology (kaigun gijitsu kenkyusho). Now Hiraga was designing new types of ships.
          In 1931, Hiraga retired from design work and devoted himself to teaching shipbuilding at the University of Tokyo. From 1938 to 1943 he served as rector of the University of Tokyo[1]. Yuzuru Hiraga died in 1943."
      2. +5
        24 August 2024 15: 37
        And for the use of Long Lances, the Japanese had more suitable and cheaper platforms - destroyers.
        Someone “Sidorenko from LiveJournal” (not a bad author, IMHO; CHU is specific) very often praises them, for example: ““For example, a 610-mm torpedo at a distance of 40 km could deviate from the aiming point by 1500 m. Since ships of such length did not exist, hitting the target at such a distance was simply an accident” - thereby the author hints that Japanese theorists are fools and not could have come up with such simple conclusions, and were also planning to fire single torpedoes at a single target. But that's not true. In fact, torpedo firing at such distances was supposed to be a salvo at a column of American battleships, where the deviation of one torpedo from the aiming point - a specific ship in the column - could lead to it hitting another ship in the column." https://sidorenko-vl.livejournal.com/5966.html
  6. +5
    24 August 2024 08: 57
    The article is definitely a plus! The history of the ship and the air defense system are very successfully intertwined.
    As for me, the main conclusion is that the adaptation of a land complex to naval service is not much different from the development of a specialized one.
    1. +8
      24 August 2024 11: 30
      Quote: dzvero
      As for me, the main conclusion is that the adaptation of a land complex to naval service is not much different from the development of a specialized one.

      This is true! Yes The S-300F is proof of this. The naval modification of the missile defense systems differs from the land-based ones, and the hardware of the S-300P and S-300F was only partially unified.
  7. +1
    24 August 2024 15: 05
    In addition, the antenna post of the guidance station had very significant dimensions, and it could ONLY be placed on a fairly large ship
    Missing adverb
    1. +7
      24 August 2024 18: 12
      There are no full-fledged editors on VO, only censors. So if there is only one typo in an article, I think nothing terrible has happened. Those who do not work - do not make mistakes!!
      1. +6
        24 August 2024 18: 43
        I think nothing bad happened
        ☺ Of course, nothing bad happened. Good article, as always from Sergei. I set it to "Plus". And I say “thank you”!
  8. 0
    25 August 2024 20: 38
    The maximum firing range was 34 km, the minimum – 3 km. Ceiling – 22 km. ...

    It is interesting to see a picture with the possible launch zone (height - range) for the 753/755 missile defense system.
  9. 0
    13 September 2024 18: 14
    Very informative.
    And the author was not interested in the reason why the Shtorm or Volna-M SAM systems were not used on the 68-bis cruisers? After all, these were originally naval SAM systems.