The promising system for protecting the Strategic Missile Forces mobile group is meaningless, ineffective and dangerous
On August 8, the Army Collection, No. 8 for 2024, published an article entitled “Neutralizing a Prompt Global Strike,” which examines “A Prospective System for Protecting a Mobile Group Strategic Missile Forces under conditions of exposure to enemy air and space attack weapons in conventional equipment."
So, the article examines the threat of a surprise strike inflicted by the United States and the NATO bloc using conventional air-space attack weapons of various types to destroy command posts and launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces) - an integral part of our strategic nuclear forces ( strategic nuclear forces). Hypersonic missiles are considered to be a threat weapon, loitering munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and dual-use spacecraft. The strike will be carried out according to data from space reconnaissance means - Earth remote sensing satellites (ERS).
It is planned to resist the United States (NATO countries are clearly making weight here) by creating a zone of uncertainty in the location of mobile ground-based missile systems (GGRK), including due to the impact of combat laser systems (BLK) on enemy remote sensing satellites, the destruction of airborne missile systems, as well as disruption of control loops SVKN.
To destroy the SVKN, it is proposed to use existing air defense systems (Defense) short and medium range, such as the Pantsir anti-aircraft missile and gun systems (ZPRK), Tor anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) and Buk SAM systems of various modifications.
It is also planned to use electronic warfare equipment to protect against SVKN (EW), such as the R-330Zh "Zhitel", R-330M1P "Diabazol" and "Krasukha-20", radar complexes (RLK) "Divnomorye" and "Pole-21". To counter optical reconnaissance satellites, it is planned to use the combat laser complex (BLK) "Peresvet".
Electronic warfare complex "Krasukha"
Today we will talk about why the proposed system for protecting the Strategic Missile Forces mobile group under the influence of conventionally equipped enemy aerospace attack weapons will be meaningless, ineffective and even dangerous for the national security of the Russian Federation (RF).
First of all, let's deal with the threats.
Fast global strike
Prompt Global Strike (GSU) is a military-strategic initiative of the US Armed Forces, aimed at ensuring the ability to strike with conventional weapons anywhere on the planet within an hour.
The following were considered as BSU weapons:
- intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as well as non-nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs);
- hypersonic cruise missiles (CR) and hypersonic glide vehicles;
- orbital impact platforms.
As we see, there are no UAVs or loitering munitions here, since they contradict the BGU concept, of course, unless we are talking about hypersonic UAVs, but so far those do not exist.
Initially considered BGU weapon
In general, the BGU was not initially intended to inflict a strategic defeat on the enemy by depriving him of the ability to launch a retaliatory or retaliatory nuclear strike. For this purpose, there are two forms of attack - a sudden decapitating blow and a sudden disarming blow. As the name implies, a sudden decapitation strike is intended to destroy the enemy’s military-political leadership, and a sudden disarming strike is intended to destroy elements of the enemy’s nuclear deterrent forces.
So, in the near future, it is not possible to successfully deliver a sudden decapitating blow and a sudden disarming blow using conventional weapons.
Hit government bunkers located deep under Moscow with conventional ammunition? And is it guaranteed? Without this, what is the point of striking at strategic missile forces control centers?
Please note that in the article “Neutralizing a rapid global strike” only the PGRK protection system is considered, and why? Yes, because there will be no conventional ammunition capable of hitting ICBMs in highly protected silo launchers (silos) with an acceptable probability in the near future - even for nuclear warheads (NCU) this probability is significantly less than one.
At the moment and in the near future, it is impossible to hit an ICBM located in a highly protected silo with an acceptable probability
It will look somehow strange if the enemy begins to take out our PGRKs with conventional weapons, but at the same time does not touch the ICBMs in the silos. And if he hits the silos, he will have to use nuclear warheads. And if it comes to the use of nuclear weapons, then what is the point of hitting the PGRK with conventional ammunition, significantly reducing your chances of a successful attack? Moreover, in case of failure, the unaffected PGRK will definitely fire back with far from conventional ammunition.
For a conventional munition with a monobloc warhead weighing about 500 kilograms, it is necessary to ensure a hit accuracy of about ten meters; for a conventional munition with a cluster warhead, it is necessary to ensure a hit accuracy of about one hundred meters, and a nuclear munition with a high probability will destroy “delicate” PGRKs at a distance of several kilometers from the point of impact, so why would the enemy take the risk?
In this way, if the enemy decides to launch a sudden decapitation strike and a sudden disarming strike, then he will definitely use ammunition with a nuclear warhead.
And if ammunition with nuclear warheads is used, then the “Prospective system for protecting a mobile group of the Strategic Missile Forces under the influence of enemy aerospace attack means in conventional equipment” does not make any sense, since the first detonation of ammunition with nuclear warheads in the air will disable all its elements, as at least for a while, and then it will be too late.
But let’s assume that the enemy nevertheless decided on this adventure and attacks the PGRK with the help of ammunition with a conventional warhead. Conventionally, the “Prospective system for protecting a mobile group of the Strategic Missile Forces in conditions of exposure to enemy aerospace attack means in conventional equipment” can be divided into a destruction subsystem, which will include air defense systems and air defense missile systems, and a cover subsystem, which will include electronic warfare equipment, radar and BLK "Peresvet" .
Damage subsystem
The conditional defeat subsystem, according to the authors of the article “Neutralizing a rapid global strike,” should include air defense systems of the “Pantsir” family, as well as “Tor” air defense systems and “Buk” air defense systems of various modifications. As we said above, their targets will be the warheads of ICBMs and SLBMs, hypersonic missile launchers, as well as ammunition launched from orbital strike platforms.
There can be no talk of any UAVs and loitering ammunition, because if UAVs and loitering ammunition are circling in the combat patrol areas of our PGRKs, and we do not strike back or retaliate, then that’s it - the war is over, we have lost.
As for the warheads of ICBMs and SLBMs, hypersonic missile launchers, as well as ammunition launched by orbital strike platforms, they will all be hypersonic, that is, their final speed will exceed 1 meters per second, and most likely for those being developed in the USA gliding hypersonic warheads, the speed at the final stage will be up to 500-4 meters per second, that is, about 000-6 Mach (Mach - the speed of sound). The rate of descent of the warheads of ICBMs and SLBMs even reaches 000–12 meters per second.
The American hypersonic air-launched missile AGM-183A ARRW (Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon) should reach speeds of up to 6 meters per second
None of the air defense systems or air defense missile systems under consideration are capable of fighting such targets in principle.
Theoretically, of the complexes under consideration, the Buk-M3 air defense system can fight hypersonic missiles, but provided that their speed in the final section is no more than 3 meters per second, the rest have no chance at all. But, as the authors of the above article themselves say, the Buk-M000 air defense system does not work while moving, so it still needs to be deployed.
SAM "Buk-M3"
Perhaps the S-500 air defense system could cope with some targets, but this is not certain.
Thus, the conditional destruction subsystem from the “Advanced system for protecting the mobile group of the Strategic Missile Forces under the influence of enemy aerospace attack means in conventional equipment” is not capable of withstanding airborne missile systems, which could potentially be used by the PGRK within the framework of the BGU, regardless of whether they are in conventional or nuclear equipment.
Cover subsystem
The conditional cover subsystem, according to the authors of the article “Neutralizing a rapid global strike,” should include electronic warfare equipment, radar and BLK “Peresvet”, should ensure the secrecy of the PGRK and suppress airborne attack systems, for example, by jamming satellite navigation system (GPS) signals.
And here we have a number of problems.
All of the above means should theoretically ensure functional suppression of enemy airborne missile guidance systems and enemy reconnaissance means - remote sensing satellites, again, since if reconnaissance UAVs and manned enemy reconnaissance aircraft are circling in the combat patrol areas of our PGRKs, then we have already lost the war. Functional suppression is an unreliable thing, since at any given moment in time we cannot be sure whether the enemy’s air defense systems and reconnaissance assets are suppressed or not.
For example, how can we talk about jamming satellite navigation system (GPS) signals for SVKN, if subsonic Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs often perfectly reach objects located deep in the territory of our country, while these kamikaze UAVs are low-speed, and therefore tend to accumulate errors determining their location when they are in a GPS signal jamming zone; as for hypersonic high-speed missile systems, due to their high speed they will not have time to deviate from the target, even if the GPS signal is jammed at the final section of the trajectory.
The same applies to remote sensing satellites - how can we be sure that they are suppressed?
We should start with the fact that this entire “gypsy convoy” - a PGRK with security vehicles, air defense systems and air defense missile systems, electronic warfare equipment, etc., will stretch for several kilometers, thereby multiplying the likelihood of detecting a PGRK. Even if they are placed at some distance, the enemy will clearly pay attention to the bustle in the area and draw the appropriate conclusions.
“Oboz” PGRK with additional cover from air defense systems and electronic warfare systems will stretch for kilometers
At the same time, the operation of electronic warfare and radar systems will be guaranteed to be detected by the enemy’s electronic reconnaissance satellites (RTR), of which there are already many, and in the near future there will be a huge number. There are suggestions that RTR equipment can even be installed on low-orbit satellites of the Starlink high-speed communications network as an undocumented payload – Although the SpaceX company is private, it works closely with the Pentagon.
Simultaneously The United States is working to deploy a network of next-generation military satellites, Starshield., capable of tracking targets on the surface in real time.
What can we talk about here, if even civilian remote sensing satellites can provide anyone with images of the surface in the radar wavelength range. In particular, in December 2020 we talked about this in the material Capella Space's All-Seeing Eye: Harbinger of the Satellite Intelligence Revolution - then the Capella Space company offered photographs with a resolution of 0,5 meters to everyone. And now satellite data provider Umbra is delivering high-resolution radar wavelength imagery with its new line of Mission Solutions satellites. 16 centimeters (!), in words: sixteen centimeters.
Umbra's Mission Solutions satellite
What then are the capabilities of radar reconnaissance satellites of the intelligence services and the US Armed Forces?
Are the above electronic warfare equipment capable of jamming the above DZ3 satellites? If so, why do we still see on enemy resources images of Russian objects taken by remote sensing satellites in the radar wavelength range before and after strikes on them by Ukrainian long-range precision weapons?
The ability to functionally suppress remote sensing satellites in the optical wavelength range using the Peresvet BLK is also questionable - how can we be sure that the satellite is really suppressed? Any calculations here can hardly be considered relevant, since we do not know for certain the stability, sensitivity and selectivity of enemy satellite matrices, their optical system, installed protective filters and much more.
The second question is - will we suppress the Peresvet BLK all optical reconnaissance satellites in the area, military and civilian, of all countries? If not, then there is no guarantee that any of them is not working for the enemy.
And if two or three, or even more, enemy optical reconnaissance satellites are simultaneously located over the PGRK combat patrol area, which is quite likely in the near future, then how many Peresvet BLKs will we need in order to suppress them all?
How many Peresvet BLKs will be needed to cover all PGRKs from all enemy optical reconnaissance satellites in combat patrol areas?
Thus, the conventional cover subsystem from the “Advanced system for protecting a mobile group of the Strategic Missile Forces in conditions of exposure to enemy aerospace attack means in conventional equipment” is not capable of ensuring the secrecy of the PGRK and suppressing airborne attack forces; moreover, elements of the specified system can additionally unmask the area where the PGRK is located .
Conclusions
Based on the above, the “Prospective system for protecting a mobile group of the Strategic Missile Forces in conditions of exposure to enemy aerospace attack means in conventional equipment” is meaningless, ineffective and dangerous.
Pointless because the enemy will not inflict BGU using conventional weapons, but will deliver a sudden decapitation strike and a sudden disarming strike using nuclear warheads.
Ineffective, because it will not be able to ensure the secrecy of the PGRK, nor the suppression and/or defeat of airborne attack systems, which can be used as part of a sudden decapitation strike and a sudden disarming strike, nor even ensure the suppression and/or defeat of conventional airborne attack systems, which can be used as part of application of BGU.
Dangerous, because it gives a false impression that it can fulfill its purpose, but a sudden decapitation blow and a sudden disarming blow is not a war in Ukraine, most likely there will be no second chance.
PGRK - everything, at least within the framework of strategic nuclear forces. All ICBMs from the Strategic Missile Forces must be placed in highly protected silos.
Even The United States, which has a mighty fleet exceeding in total combat power all the fleets of all countries of the world combined, keeps more than a third of its nuclear arsenal of constant readiness in silos, while it does not have a PGRK at all and never has had one, and this despite the fact that our space reconnaissance assets are significantly inferior to the American ones.
However, the PGRK will not remain idle; for example, they can be used to launch small-sized spacecraft (SC) and/or satellites in the event that the cosmodromes are destroyed during high-intensity combat operations, while the mobility of the PGRK will allow it to be brought to the optimal position for launching a spacecraft into a given orbit.
Russia already has experience in converting SLBMs into spacecraft carriers; the same can be done with ICBMs deployed on the PGRK
Or PGRK can be used to launch ICBMs or intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with a conventional warhead within the framework of Strategic Conventional Forces, if any are created.
This will make it possible to separate the launch areas of nuclear-armed ICBMs/MRBMs from silos and conventionally equipped ICBMs/MRBMs from PGRK for the orbital segment of the American enemy missile attack warning system (EWS), thereby minimizing the risk of an accidental outbreak of a nuclear war (for this, the United States must know , that we do not have PGRK with ICBMs and MRBMs with nuclear warheads).
Russia needs Strategic Conventional Forces
In both the first and second cases, PGRK will no longer be a priority target for a sudden disarming strike by the enemy using nuclear warheads.
Could there be any benefit at all from the “Advanced system for protecting a mobile group of the Strategic Missile Forces in conditions of exposure to enemy aerospace attack weapons in conventional equipment”?
Yes, but only to suppress “image” strikes delivered by such primitive countries as Ukraine, which are unable to cause critical damage to the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, but from the moment all Russian ICBMs are deployed in highly protected silos, “Prospective system for protecting the mobile group of the Strategic Missile Forces in the conditions impact of enemy aerospace attack means in conventional equipment” will completely lose its significance.
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