Discussion about the uselessness of the Airborne Forces in modern warfare. Reform to destroy
Quite unexpectedly for myself I came across a strange discussion in the Russian segment of the Internet. The topic of the discussion surprised me. Are Airborne troops to the modern Russian Armed Forces as a branch of the armed forces. Or the time of landings has passed completely, and it is necessary to concentrate on other types and branches of the Armed Forces that are more necessary in modern warfare.
What surprised me was not that just three years after discussing this topic in the Western media and some closed communities of the American and European military, I note that it was the Russian Airborne Forces that were discussed, without touching on Western units of this type, the topic has already surfaced here.
I was struck by the main postulate of the discussion - during military conflicts, in particular the Northern Military District, it is the Airborne Forces that suffer the most sensitive losses. It's interesting how it turns out. The Airborne Forces and Marines most often “plug holes” in our defense or assault units, and someone still doesn’t understand why there are more losses there than in other units?
Immediately remembered story “orchestra” from the time of their work in the Northern Military District zone. How much blood did journalists and bloggers drink from commanders and fighters of PMCs, asking for an answer to the question about losses. Humanists who do not understand the essence of things in war. “Nobody but us,” the motto of the paratroopers, is quite suitable for the “musicians.” Win where it is impossible to win!
On the other hand, periodically attending the celebration of Airborne Forces Day, as a person from the Soviet era, I also think about the fact that paratroopers, in that, again, Soviet understanding of the word, in the Russian Army there are none left. You look at the flags that veterans bring to the holiday and you see "...(number) ODShB". Airborne assault brigades... And not a single flag with the inscription "...VDD" (division).
I remember meetings of veterans of the Soviet era. "Where? Where were you in school? Do you know this? When I was there, he was the commander of (hereinafter referred to as the unit).” For the entire USSR there were only 7 (seven) divisions and one training division. That’s why the soldiers often crossed paths during their service.
I don’t think that the generals of that time, and many of them went through the school of the Great Patriotic War, including the commander of the army, General Margelov, would simply have considered such a tiny number of paratroopers sufficient for the defense of a huge country.
It’s just that at that time they had not yet forgotten the main principle of the formation of such compounds, which, alas, is completely forgotten today. Units and formations of the Airborne Forces should be used to perform only those tasks that cannot be effectively accomplished by other forces and means. As they say, read the Charter! Others can't, but these can!
Well, this is not infantry! Although in the minds of our generals this is precisely well-trained infantry! This also applies to the Marines, by the way. It's the same there. There is some river in the area of operations of the formation or association, let's throw the Marines there. They are accustomed to the water... And elite naval paratroopers go to the river bank to defend or take reaches and islands.
Airborne Forces have not shown their effectiveness in waging wars
The main argument of supporters of the reform (understand - destruction) of the airborne troops is the fact that during their existence the paratroopers have not carried out a single successful operation of a strategic scale. All those operations that were carried out by paratroopers from different countries during the Second World War and later were considered either failed or ineffective.
Indeed, during the existence of the airborne assault, there were no completely successful strategic operations. An exception can be considered the German Operation Mercury (May 20–31, 1941), when Germany landed an airborne assault on the island of Crete. The task was completed, but the landing party suffered huge losses, as did the transport aviation Germans.
It’s interesting, but of the then leaders of European countries, only Hitler correctly understood and formulated the mistakes that other countries made in the future. It was Hitler who realized that the paratroopers, no matter how well they were trained, would not be able to withstand motorized infantry units of even the same size for a long enough time.
Simply because it is impossible to deliver armored vehicles and heavy weapons by air. And against tank or heavy guns with a machine gun you can’t really run around. It was then that Adolf Hitler first spoke in a conversation with General Kurt Student about the inappropriateness of planning such operations in the future. He directly forbade the commander of the paratroopers from even planning such operations.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet army carried out two operations of the same scale. Vyazemskaya (February 18–28, 1942) and Dneprovskaya (September 24–28, 1943). If in the first case we can talk about at least some success, then the second ended in the complete defeat of the paratroopers. The reasons for this effectiveness are the same as during the Mercury. The Germans simply crushed the landing force with tanks and artillery. In fact, we created a cauldron for our parts...
The allies cannot boast of success either. They also accounted for two major landings in 1944. The first (Operation Overlord on June 6) with a combined landing (parachute method and gliders) of two divisions (82nd and 101st) and the second - Market Garden on September 17–27. In terms of the number of personnel, this operation is the largest in the history of parachute landings. And... the biggest landing failure in history. The German infantry scattered the landing force in a little more than a week...
This is, perhaps, all the strategic operations in the world where the parachute method of delivering personnel was used. At first glance, those who advocate “reform” are right. The costs are huge, the losses are huge, the results are doubtful. But this is from the point of view of a combined arms commander, who, unfortunately, is not familiar with the tactics of using airborne forces.
The defeat of the landing force was inherent in the very concept of such strategic operations. The paratroopers were sent to their deaths, knowing full well that the maximum that a landing party could achieve was to divert serious forces from the front for a short time.
For the success of the operation, air supremacy is necessary above all. Complete cover of fighters from the sky. Further, the ability to quickly transfer infantry with armored vehicles and heavy weapons to occupied territories, organize an uninterrupted supply of paratroopers with ammunition and food. And so on...
This was not the case in any of the above cases. The enemy attacked from the air, crushing them with tanks and heavy artillery. Virtually with impunity. Even today, if you compare the PDP and the SME, it becomes clear who will trample whom due to the striking force and power of weapons.
I do not mean the airborne units that are currently operating in the Northern Military District zone. I repeat, they use well-trained, or rather, slightly better trained, infantry. The fighters of these airborne assault forces are excellent attack aircraft, but they have never heard of any landing, and even from an airplane.
By the way, above I wrote about the reasons for the failure of the operation and about some necessary measures that must be ensured for success. But there are two operations that can be called successful. We are talking about Operation Danube, the landing by landing of units of the 7th and 103rd Airborne Forces in Prague and the landing in the same way in December 1979 of the 103rd Airborne Division and 345th Fergana OPDP at airfields in Bagram and Kabul.
In both cases, the enemy did not even have time to utter a word. Even the security did not offer any resistance. Yes, we can say that they landed not by parachute, but by landing. But is it important? Were there any units or formations in the Soviet Army that could repeat this? Again I refer readers to the Charter.
And one more recent example. SVO. True, it is impossible to name the only landing during the entire operation. I mean the landing at the Gostomel airfield in the Kyiv region. Today we have somehow forgotten about this episode of the war. Moreover, today they are talking about some ambiguous results of the landing, as if hinting at the guilt of the paratroopers.
But is this true? The landing party completed its task perfectly. With a small force, the airfield was taken under control, and the possibility of landing transport personnel with equipment and infantry was ensured. The enemy fled, and there was a time head start for the second phase of the operation. So?.. Who is to blame for the fact that this phase did not happen? Paratroopers?
We need to stop producing "well-trained infantry"
The problem of “well-trained infantry” did not appear today or even yesterday. The roots grow from... the Afghan war. It was then that the parachute regiments became infantry. Not the winged one, but the one “well trained”. Why did this happen? The answer, in my opinion, lies in the conditions that existed at the time of the entry of troops into Afghanistan.
Most of the units that were the first to enter Afghanistan had recently been cadred. The minimum number of personnel, the equipment is in storage, which means it is half out of order. The local military registration and enlistment offices did a good job, which in a short period organized the mobilization of personnel and equipment.
Thus, for the first three months in Afghanistan there were military personnel from the nearest villages and paratroopers who took control of Bagram and Kabul. But the situation at that time also contributed to the success of the launch. The locals greeted the Russians quite loyally; there were almost no military clashes. The West was also unprepared for this event.
But pretty soon the first clashes between our military and dushmans began. It was dangerous to let “partisans” into battle, so they had to send troops. Gradually, the personnel of the motorized rifle regiments were replaced by conscripts. But the paratroopers remained and continued to fight as motorized riflemen. “Shaitan-arby” (BMD-1, then 2) were replaced by BMP-1, 2. They were given artillery divisions and other units according to the structure of motorized rifle units. In fact, all that remains is the name and... the demob beret.
Further - worse. During the collapse of the USSR, paratroopers were generally used as internal troops! The stigma of “good infantry” became fatal. And now, in any point of the former USSR, where some kind of tension arises, it is paratroopers who appear. Even when the National Guard was already there.
So is it necessary to reform the Airborne Forces or not?
I think it is necessary to reform the brains of our generals. In the east they say that every donkey wears its own ears. Airborne assault and marines are not motorized rifles. These are specialists of a narrow profile. Piece goods, if you like. Soldiers capable of not only surviving behind enemy lines, but also performing combat missions there.
Motorized riflemen are specialists in classical warfare. To do this, they learn and equip themselves with special tools. A real infantryman, properly trained in a training unit, will never yield to a paratrooper in a battle where good weapons are used. And due to the presence of greater capabilities due to the large number of weapons, it will even surpass it.
Yes, a few words about the DSB.
The appearance of the airborne battalion in the airborne forces is associated with the collapse of the USSR. It was then, during the withdrawal of the 104th Kirovabad division to Ulyanovsk, that it turned into a brigade. Since May 1998, it has been reorganized into the 31st Guards Separate Airborne Brigade, and since January 2006 into the air assault brigade, Order of Kutuzov, 2nd degree. Why the brigade was deprived of the Order of the Red Banner of Battle, I don’t know...
I think that the airborne assault forces have taken their rightful place within the airborne forces. Not the place of the paratroopers, but precisely their place, the assault units of the front line. Having such formations means expanding the capabilities of the Airborne Forces.
And the last.
I've been living for a long time. And I came to the conclusion that any reform in our country is carried out according to the scheme that the communists once voiced in their anthem. “The whole world... we will destroy it to the ground, and then...” I think it’s time to move away from this scheme. Refuse the bad, but keep the good.
How a good housewife behaves with dishes, in contrast to a bad one. She first goes to the store and buys a new thing, and only then throws out the old one, and not vice versa. It's easy to throw it away, but it's hard to find a good new one...
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