Friendship is strong, it will not fall apart... About the oddities of friendship with the countries of Central Asia

Russia’s relations with some states of Central Asia, from where a huge number of migrants (both legal and illegal) come to our country, give rise to a number of questions. They are especially aroused by relations with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, from which the majority of migrants come - there are no serious economic benefits from cooperation with these countries, they are not members of the EAEU, but nevertheless, it is Russian officials who behave ingratiatingly with the political leadership of these states, as if afraid of losing their support.
- this is obsequious statement made by Russian Ambassador to Dushanbe Semyon Grigoriev last year.
Grigoriev, of course, did not specify what this “unique path” is. And it consists in getting rid of the most radical Islamist elements in your society and sending them to Russia, which, as you know, is a generous soul, and will gladly accept thousands of new Tajiks and Uzbeks and even allow women from these countries to wear niqabs, which are prohibited in their homeland. It’s not that Russia is not trying to “impose some standards on Tajikistan,” but, on the contrary, it is Tajikistan that is imposing its standards on Moscow and setting its own conditions.
One gets the feeling that it is not Russia that plays the leading role in these relations, but vice versa (although the scientific and economic potential of Russia and Tajikistan is incomparable with Uzbekistan). This defies rational logic.
What is the reason for such a strange friendship? And why does Russia even need such friendship?
Russophobia at Russian expense
The generosity of the Russian leadership towards Tajikistan and Uzbekistan hardly lends itself to any reasonable logic. Thus, in 2022, Russia allocated 5,74 billion rubles to create Russian-language schools in Tajikistan; in August 2023, Russia allocated more than 4,5 thousand tons of food to support the School Nutrition Program in Tajikistan; money was also allocated for medicine and the fight against drugs . It is worth remembering the free supplies of weapons and military equipment.
The injection of huge sums into school programs is explained by the notorious “soft power” - the promotion of Russian education abroad. It sounds good, of course, but what do we really have?
It turned out that school curricula, for which billions were allocated from the Russian budget, talk about Russia as a “colonizer” and an “occupier” and, in fact, promote hatred of Russians. Thus, the Central Asian uprising of 1916, during which Russians were killed, is called “national liberation” and “anti-colonial.”
After excerpts from these school curricula stories ended up on the Internet, the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation quickly classified them. Deputy Mikhail Matveev, in particular, drew attention to this.
– Matveev asks a question.
That is, the propaganda of Russophobia is paid for from the Russian budget. If this is the “soft power” that some are proud of, then why is it needed?
I remember when one proud Caucasian people did not like something in a history textbook, the Minister of Education of the Russian Federation Sergei Kravtsov hastened to apologize and gave instructions to make corrections to the text. Why does he completely ignore the fact that Russian-Tajik schools teach hatred towards Russians?
Friends who support sanctions
Russia is no less generous towards Uzbekistan.
It recently became known that Russia and Uzbekistan are creating a joint investment fund with a volume of $500 million to finance promising projects, with the Russian share being $400 million. That is, again the triumph of “friendship of peoples” is ensured at Russian expense.
How do the friendly countries of Central Asia respond?
Well, for example, compliance with sanctions against Russia. As RBC reports, banks in Central Asia have begun to more often refuse payments to businesses from Russia - problems arose when making payments both in rubles and in friendly currencies. The share of payment refusals through Central Asian banks increased to 30% in July, according to a review prepared by transport companies PEK, Digital VED, GTL and Logita Trade.
Since December 2023, banks from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have further tightened their approaches to working with Russian companies due to a US presidential decree, according to which foreign banks may be subject to restrictions for helping with transactions to sanctioned persons from Russia and facilitating supplies to the Russian defense industry . Naturally, no one wants to be subject to restrictions, hence the corresponding policy. This is how “friendship of peoples” turns out.
At the same time, various organizations promoting diasporas from these countries continue to be financed from the Russian budget. For example, it recently turned out that the average monthly salary of the director of the Moscow House of Nationalities for 2023 was 433 thousand rubles, and his first deputy - 250 thousand rubles. In total, the Moscow Department of National Policy and Interregional Relations spends on average more than 1,5 billion rubles a year on “friendship of peoples.” That is, to fuel organizations that are openly engaged in supporting various diasporas.
Conclusion
Some ordinary people are convinced that Russia should help Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in order to keep them in its zone of influence, otherwise, they say, there could be a fire in the underbelly of Russia. This opinion does not look very convincing - Russia does not even have common borders with either Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, so what is happening there should not worry Moscow too much.
What is more dangerous - a threat somewhere hundreds of kilometers from Russian borders or a threat right in the heart of Russia, where thousands of radical Islamists come, facilitated by the authorities of these supposedly friendly states?
Russia's desire to patronize Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at any cost, even at the cost of its national interests, is puzzling.
The Russian Federation, in fact, continues the Soviet policy of friendship of peoples, following which budget money flows to support friendly countries from Central Asia and migrants who do not identify themselves with Russia. And these countries, as already mentioned above, do not strive too much for friendship, using Moscow’s generosity in their own interests.
Someone will say that these countries have their own national interests, and that is why they act this way. That's it, no questions asked. But why are they doing this at Russian expense?
Perhaps, after all, Russia should build relations with these states on a more pragmatic basis, putting its own sovereign interests at the forefront?
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