The impact of Russian and Japanese high-explosive shells on the mast, superstructures and unarmored parts of the hull in naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War
In terms of explosive content
As you know, our 12-inch high-explosive projectile was an extremely strange design of ammunition. A fairly massive head part, thick walls and, as a result, a low explosive content. Only 6 kg of smokeless gunpowder, or (according to my calculations) 10 kg of wet pyroxylin, which, however, judging by the available data, high-explosive shells of ships fighting in the Russo-Japanese War were not equipped with.
With a projectile mass of 331,7 kg, its powder filling of 6 kg gave an explosive content of only 1,8%. The Japanese 12-dm projectile with a mass of 386 kg was loaded with 39,2 kg of shimosa, the explosive content in it was 13,7%. French and American high-explosive shells from the Russo-Japanese War, filled with black powder, carried 20,2 and 16,33 kg of explosives, which was 6,9% and 4,1%, respectively. Later domestic 331,7 kg high-explosive shells had an explosive content of 8,5%, and 470,9 kg - 12,5-13,1%.
It is quite obvious that for a high-explosive projectile 12-dm arr. 1894 had too little explosive content. Even the closest American landmine had 2,72 times more powder filling.
In terms of high explosive action
Here the Japanese shell had a clear advantage. Obviously, 39,2 kg of shimosa gave a burst of greater force than 6 kg of smokeless powder, but by how much? It will be possible to answer this question only after a detailed comparison of the results of Russian and Japanese shells hitting unarmored parts of ships, which I have not yet begun. Therefore, I will limit myself to the remark that even opponents of the “shell version” recognize the greater high explosiveness of Japanese shells, although estimates of the magnitude of this superiority vary.
In terms of fragmentation action
It must be said that this action is far from ideal for both the Russian and Japanese shells. When the Japanese land mine exploded, fragments flew in all directions, and this was correct from the point of view of achieving the maximum destructive effect. But the features of shimoza in combination with its large quantity led to the fact that the shell was broken into very small fragments, which quickly lost their destructive effect. At the same time, a significant part of them turned out to be so small that it was time to talk about them not as fragments, but as dust. As an illustration of this thesis, I present an interesting table by N. L. Klado from the article "Artillery and armor", published in "Military fleets and the naval reference book for 1906."
Pay attention to the weight of the collected fragments, and how much it differs for a projectile with a melinite filling - and this is with a very moderate explosive content in the projectile.
Russian shells produced more massive fragments, albeit in smaller quantities, but they, as a rule, scattered in a relatively narrow cone along the projectile’s flight path. In this cone, the fragmentation effect of the Russian projectile was superior to that of the Japanese one, since the fragments were larger, flew further and retained their lethal force longer, but in other directions it was inferior. However, sometimes our shells showed excellent results: earlier I described the hit in the Shikishima, which caused a lot of trouble for the Japanese precisely because of the fragments that scattered in all directions, including outside the usual cone of destruction.
However, the ability of Japanese shells to inflict significant fragmentation damage, affecting the combat effectiveness of the ship, should not be underestimated. I will not mention the numerous jamming of the towers of Russian battleships, since, apparently, it is not so much the Japanese fragments that are to blame for them, but the unsuccessful design of our towers (Mamarintsy). But even without jamming, the fragmentation potential of Japanese shells was enough for a lot.
Thus, a large-caliber shell that hit the hinged cover above the right 10-inch cannon of the bow turret of the squadron battleship Peresvet did not penetrate the armor, but produced a mass of fragments that killed three, including the turret commander, and disabled almost all the servants. In another case, the explosion of a large-caliber shell in the unarmored side of the Peresvet under the middle casemate disabled the 6-inch gun of this casemate. The hit of a Japanese high-explosive shell in the rear conning tower of the Peresvet resulted in the engine hatch being broken and the grate being covered with shrapnel, so that the ship’s middle engine had to be put out of action for half an hour.
The hit of a large-caliber projectile in the area of the second chimney of the squadron battleship Sevastopol led to damage to the steam pipelines - apparently from fragments, otherwise this episode should be recorded as confirmation of the merits of the high-explosiveness of the Japanese projectile. The consequence of this hit was that Sevastopol, taking into account previously received damage to pipes and a drop in thrust, was forced to reduce speed to 8 knots and could no longer maintain its place in the ranks. This point is usually not paid attention to, because just at this time the Russian squadron mixed up the formation, which is why “Sevastopol” no longer stood out in the general heap, nevertheless, such a decrease in its speed is an indisputable achievement of Japanese heavy shells in the battle in line would lead to the fact that the battleship was forced to leave it.
When assessing the fragmentation effect of Japanese shells, one more nuance must be taken into account. Japanese shells could cause fragmentation damage not only with shell fragments, but also with fragments of unarmored structures destroyed by the energy of the explosion - with our shells this effect was noticeably less pronounced.
In general, it is very difficult to compare the fragmentation effect of Japanese and Russian 12-dm landmines. The only case when fragments of our shells knocked out a Japanese ship from the line was when two “goodies” hit the armored cruiser “Asama” in Tsushima. The shells exploded in the stern, in the area of the middle deck, and their fragments pierced the bulkheads, the unarmored flooring of the lower deck, and the opposite side. As a result, water not only gained access inside the ship, but also led to extensive flooding: the Asama sank 1,5 m with its stern and was forced to break down.
But it should be taken into account that, judging by the size of the holes on the starboard side, where Russian shells hit, they were 10-dm caliber. Such shells had a more powerful charge than 12-dm land mines - 6,71 kg of wet pyroxylin instead of 6 kg of smokeless gunpowder, and the pyroxylin produced more fragments. In addition, the walls of the 10-inch projectile were thinner, which probably increased fragmentation damage outside the usual cone of their expansion, characteristic of projectiles filled with powder. Accordingly, I cannot vouch for the fact that if 10-inch caliber landmines had been in place of our 12-dm shells, the Asama would have received similar damage. However, this is a debatable issue.
Without claiming to be the ultimate truth, I am inclined to assess the fragmentation effect of Russian and Japanese shells as differently directed, but generally comparable - with only one reservation, which I will make below.
In terms of incendiary action
Here the unconditional primacy belongs to Japanese shells. Apparently, this is due both to the high temperature of the explosion and to the fact that the explosive did not detonate completely, scattering fragments with shimosa burning on them to the sides.
It is known that on the squadron battleship "Eagle" serious measures were taken against fires - wood stocks were removed from the rostrum, wooden cladding was removed from the deckhouse, living quarters, etc. However, 64 shells that hit it (the average of credible estimates) caused up to 30 fires - domestic shells did not demonstrate anything like this.
It should be taken into account that fires greatly reduced the combat capability of the ships of the Russian Imperial Navy. Optical sights "smoked", the operation of artillery and movement along the decks were hampered. The latter was especially important. To control artillery fire, the Japanese widely used messengers with signs indicating the distance to our ships obtained by rangefinder stations. In the roar of battle, such a method was quite clever and effective. But it was hardly possible on a ship engulfed in numerous fires.
Regarding the fuse
For reasons unknown to me, the 12-dm high-explosive shells of the 2nd Pacific Squadron were equipped with smokeless gunpowder instead of pyroxylin (most likely, the 1TOE shells were the same), which probably entailed the replacement of their double Brink shock tubes with tubes mod. 1894
Thus, the domestic 12-dm high-explosive projectile was freed from an unusual fuse intended for armor-piercing ammunition. Tube arr. 1894 was triggered when hitting water, thin side plating, rigging, etc. But the price for such an innovation was very high: an already small amount of pyroxylin (no more than 10 kg) was replaced by a completely grotesque 6 kg of smokeless gunpowder .
Oddly enough, it can be argued that Japanese and Russian landmines used the same type of fuse. Structurally, they differed, but both were bottom inertial. The difference between them was that:
1) In the Russian fuse, the firing pin was held in place by a special spring, which was unbent when fired, and in the Japanese one - by a special weight that was screwed from the firing pin during the flight of the projectile (due to the rotation of the latter);
2) In the tube arr. 1894, the primer had sufficient force to ignite the gunpowder in the projectile, while in the Japanese the primer ignited an intermediate charge of gunpowder or melinite.
Both fuses provided an action time of approximately 0,005 seconds.
However, the similarity of the fuse did not give the same effect. Japanese high-explosive shells usually exploded either at the moment of contact with an obstacle or immediately after it, but Russian 12-inch high-explosive shells could cover significant distances after contact with an obstacle. This “speed of action” of Japanese shells should be explained not by the design of the fuse, but by the properties of the shimosa, which is capable of detonating even upon impact with a minor obstacle. But the ability to cover a certain distance after contact with an obstacle was, so to speak, “both a bug and a feature” of Russian shells.
On the one hand, our 12-inch shells had the ability to explode inside the ship, piercing its side or deck and going deeper into its compartments, which seemed to make it possible to cause more damage to the enemy than an explosion on the hull. Indeed, such a projectile could, having caused destruction to several compartments, flying through them, then explode, hit several more compartments with fragments, and even pierce the opposite side. While killing emergency crew sailors, messengers and other crew members whose duties did not allow them to be protected by armor.
But, on the other hand, Russian 12-inch shells could penetrate a relatively thin barrier and explode outside the ship. For example, in the Battle of Tsushima, a shell, which the respected Alexey Rytik estimated at 12-dm, pierced the Asama pipe without breaking. At Shantung, the same thing happened with the Mikasa - a 12-inch projectile from a distance of 8500-9000 m (46-49 cables) pierced the upper part of the rear pipe, but exploded only when it fell into the water behind the battleship.
In these cases, we are not talking about a fuse defect at all, but about the nuance of its operation. When a projectile hits an obstacle, its speed decreases, while the striker inside it continues to move at the same speed. Therefore, the operating time of the sample tube. 1894 differed greatly depending on how much the obstacle slowed down the projectile (more on this here). And it is not surprising that a 12-inch land mine could explode ten or even tens of meters behind a light barrier, which could be, say, the spars or rigging of an enemy ship.
At the same time, the ruptures in the casing caused by Japanese shells destroyed the side much more than domestic ones. And since the edges of the holes caused by Japanese shells were often bent inward, repairing such damage with wooden shields applied from the inside was difficult or even impossible. Of course, this is not necessary for superstructures, but when Japanese land mines hit an unarmored side near the waterline, it turned out very unpleasant.
Holes received as a result of the battle of Ulsan, in which the caliber of Japanese artillery did not exceed 8 inches. Obviously, 12-inch “suitcases” could make much larger holes in the side
Of course, the squadron battleships of the Borodino and Tsesarevich type, which had a continuous armor belt along the waterline, were well protected against Japanese shells. But this cannot be said about the Retvizan - although its ends were covered with 51-mm armor plates, the latter could not protect the battleship from large-caliber landmines, as the battle in the Yellow Sea showed. The 10-12 dm shell, although it did not break such an armor plate, made a large dent with cracks in it, causing the deformed plate and side to let water into the bow of the battleship. Consequently, of the 7 battleships of the Arthurian squadron, only one had sufficient protection for the ends, and of the 12 Russian ships of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd armored detachments that fought in Tsushima, only 4.
The remaining Russian ships suffered greatly, finding themselves under fire from Japanese “suitcases”. In the battle of Shantung, “Poltava” received serious damage: two 12-inch Japanese shells formed a solid hole measuring 6,2x2 m in its stern. “Poltava” received a trim to the stern, its speed decreased, and it fell behind the main forces of the squadron, which It almost turned out to be fatal for him when he came under fire from the catching column of Kh. Togo. In addition, such a hole would hardly allow a breakthrough to Vladivostok. "Peresvet", having suffered destruction of the unarmored side in the nose, by the end of the battle it lost a lot of controllability. The ship had a list of 7-9 degrees and did not obey the rudder very well, which was corrected only when the commander ordered the compartments of the double-bottom space to be flooded, with the exception of the bow ones. “Peresvet” and “Tsesarevich” received serious damage to their chimneys, with a drop in thrust and a corresponding increase in coal consumption, which made it impossible for both ships to further attempt to break through to Vladivostok.
In the Battle of Tsushima, the decisive role in the death of the squadron battleship Oslyabya, apparently, was played by a single hit of a 12-inch Japanese shell in the bow end of the battleship, although here, again, in my opinion, the quality of the ship’s construction was primarily to blame. “Sisoy the Great” and “Admiral Ushakov” received serious flooding, which caused a significant decrease in speed, as a result of which they fell behind the main squadron at night. Of course, this lag did not in any way affect the results of the Tsushima battle, but this does not change the fact that hits from high-explosive shells knocked out 2 of our warships from the line. Despite the fact that both of them were not priority targets for Japanese artillerymen. As a matter of fact, both battleships remained in formation on the first day of the battle (“Sisoi the Great left the formation, but this was caused by a fire”) only due to the low speed of the Russian column. But as soon as Nebogatov increased his speed, dodging the attacks of the destroyers, they quickly fell behind.
Russian heavy shells, due to their ability to penetrate deep into the hulls of Japanese ships, could and often did cause extensive damage to compartments not protected by armor. With luck, the armored compartments also suffered - the crew of the 6-dm Shikishima gun was literally mowed down by shrapnel through the floor of the casemate, but this was rare. If the emergency parties or other Japanese sailors found themselves outside the protection of the armor and in the sectors of the “cones of death” formed by fragments of Russian shells, this led to serious crew losses
However, our 12-inch high-explosive shells, due to the “delayed” explosion, caused much less damage to the sides and chimneys of Japanese ships. The area of the holes in the unarmored side was much smaller than that left by Japanese shells. As far as I know, the maximum size of the hole caused by a Russian 12-inch projectile in a vertical casing was 1,21 x 0,97 m (Iwate, Tsushima). This is less than the average Japanese 8-dm ammunition produced.
But even such a hole arose only because our land mine hit not the side of the cruiser, but the joint between the side and the deck, which delayed its movement and ensured an explosion during the passage of the skin
Since, when breaking through a light barrier, the projectile passed through it without breaking, it left relatively smooth edges that did not “roll” inward as happened when Japanese high-explosive shells exploded. This made it easier to seal such holes. Despite the presence of a sample tube. 1894, Russian 12-inch high-explosive shells did not always explode when they hit a chimney, examples of which have already been given above. Although sometimes this happened - a 12-inch shell exploded when it hit the Asahi pipe in Tsushima. Passing smokestacks with a projectile without breaking was bad for three reasons.
Firstly, the possibility of damage to boilers through chimneys by shell fragments was lost. Japanese land mines had this ability: for example, the very first hit in the chimney of the Tsarevich in the battle of Shantung led to the fact that boiler No. 13 was disabled by shell fragments.
Secondly, Russian shells, punching right through the pipe, did not provide a significant loss of thrust, excessive consumption of coal and a decrease in the speed of the affected ship. Sometimes, however, even a hit without an explosion was enough - a shell that pierced the Asama's pipe right through still caused a decrease in the cruiser's speed. However, we must take into account that in this case the projectile hit very well for us, at the base of the pipe, which, apparently, predetermined such a significant drop in thrust.
And thirdly, having pierced the pipe right through and without causing a rupture above the deck of the enemy ship, our shells, naturally, could not hit the crew members who were on the bridges and upper deck with shrapnel.
In general, the impact of our 12-inch shells on chimneys was noticeably weaker than the Japanese ones.
From the above, it is obvious that when hitting the spar, Japanese land mines also turned out to be more effective. Exploding at the moment of contact, they showered the decks and superstructures of Russian ships with many fragments, tearing the halyards on which combat signals were raised. It must be said that Russian shells could also perform well when they exploded in superstructures or directly above the deck of a ship, but this happened noticeably less frequently than Japanese landmines. Tube arr. 1894 could and should have worked upon contact with a light barrier, but, taking into account the time of its action for heavy projectiles, the explosion still had to occur outside the ship.
Obviously, the “reluctance” of the Russian shell to explode immediately at the moment of passing through the casing or immediately behind it reduced its fragmentation effect on the enemy. In this regard, an indicative example is the same hit by a 12-dm high-explosive projectile in the Shikishima in the Battle of Tsushima, when the explosion of a shell under the casemate led to the death and failure of the crew serving the 6-dm gun in it. The fragmentation effect is undoubtedly powerful, but it was achieved as a result of an unfortunate accident for the Japanese - it hit the lower part of the armor plate of the casemate and the projectile ricocheted downwards. If our shell hit the unarmored side under the casemate, then the explosion would follow closer to the center plane of the hull, from where fragments could no longer hit the casemate through the floor.
Conclusions
Considering the impact of explosion energy and fragments of domestic 12-inch high-explosive shells and Japanese “suitcases” on unarmored hull structures, one can come to rather unexpected conclusions. In a number of cases, Russian and Japanese heavy landmines caused quite comparable scales of destruction. But the peculiarities of Japanese land mines, combined with an undeniable advantage in starting fires, allowed them to inflict damage that significantly reduced the combat potential of warships. Japanese landmines caused flooding, reduced speed, hampered and disabled fire control, hit artillery pieces, even those protected by armor, etc.
In contrast, Russian high-explosive shells caused serious destruction in the unprotected compartments inside Japanese ships, often leaving giant holes in their unarmored decks. The problem was that with a comparable volume of destroyed structures, the destruction of these compartments had little effect on the combat effectiveness of Japanese battleships and armored cruisers. Of course, emergency parties suffered from such internal explosions, but the Japanese could tolerate it because our shells did not create much work for them (holes filled with water, fires).
In my opinion, the ability of our heavy high-explosive shells, when hit on an unarmored side, to travel a considerable distance and explode, going deeper into the hull of an enemy ship, in the conditions of the Russo-Japanese War should be considered not an advantage, but a disadvantage. Giving a burst when passing the side or immediately behind it, they could effectively hit enemy artillery (“Shikishima”!), contribute to the occurrence of extensive flooding, and if they hit the spar, they could shower the deck with fragments, knocking out officers, rangefinders and messengers; if they hit the pipes, they could disrupt the thrust of Japanese ships, while also damaging their boilers with shrapnel.
Instead, they, exploding in the depths of the hull, effectively destroyed the crew's cabins and other secondary, in general, rooms, causing extensive damage to the hull structures, but at the same time having very little effect on the combat effectiveness of the enemy ship.
In my opinion, it should be said that Japanese high-explosive shells, when hitting unarmored parts and masts, effectively reduced the combat potential of Russian ships, but, unfortunately, the same cannot be said about our shells. Without claiming to be the ultimate truth, I still think that here the 12-dm Russian high-explosive shells were undoubtedly inferior to the Japanese.
However, this ammunition of ours had a quality that their Japanese “counterparts” did not possess - they could penetrate armor. Did this advantage compensate for the weaknesses of the Russian high-explosive projectile described above?
To be continued ...
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