Phalanx: structure, maneuvers, camp

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Phalanx: structure, maneuvers, camp

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when individual valor and one-on-one combat ceased to be the primary objective on the battlefield, giving way to the coordinated actions of large units. The Spartan poet Tyrtaeus, who lived in the 7th century B.C., claimed that already in his time hoplites fought shoulder to shoulder, avoiding any action, even heroic, that could break the formation. It was with this concept that Western military art, are associated with numerous ethical, political and social changes.

The new invention turned out to be so effective that it attracted the attention of rulers throughout the Mediterranean. For centuries, Greek hoplites remained in demand as mercenaries. For example, “bronze people who came from the sea” served Pharaoh Psammetichus I in the second half of the 7th century BC. e.



Forming new tactics was a long process. It was not enough to simply direct the warriors towards more coordinated actions, restraining their desire to attack individually or in small groups. It was necessary to develop battle formations that would force soldiers to rely on each other, and to equip them with a new, more convenient and compact weapons.

Thus, tactics preceded technology, not the other way around. The new weapon only increased the effectiveness of the already established method of combat.

The Birth of the Phalanx: a Spartan Recipe


The formation of troops in ranks was probably introduced in the 8th century BC. e. This made it possible to quickly replace fallen comrades and create dense battle formations, providing a powerful onslaught in attack and reliable defense.

To achieve maximum cohesion, a new type of shield was required - large enough to cover the unprotected side of the neighbor on the left - and a spear for close combat, which replaced light javelins.

Thus was born a hoplite - a warrior protected by armor and closely interacting with his comrades. Hoplites fought as a single unit - a phalanx, which translated from ancient Greek means “battle formation”.

There was nothing more durable, compact and monolithic than the phalanx. Each warrior was aware of the damage his retreat could cause. The Athenian Xenophon compared the phalanx to a house, where the strongest materials are used for the foundation and roof, and less durable materials for the walls. So it was in the phalanx: the best warriors were located in the first and last ranks to maintain the cohesion of the formation.

There is an assumption that the phalanx was invented by the Spartans. However, the only distinguishing feature of the Lacedaemonian hoplites from the warriors of other policies was the red cloak (tribon), which they wore both in summer and winter, never washing. According to legend, Lycurgus established the red color for the clothing of the Spartans so that they would not resemble women.

We are inclined to consider the Spartans as the inventors of the phalanx, since by the beginning of the 4th century BC. e., when Xenophon left its first detailed description, their phalanx was much more developed in terms of organization and management than that of other policies, including Athens. In addition, it would be logical to expect revolutionary military innovations from a warlike society like the Spartans. Finally, the phalanx seems a logical transfer to the battlefield of the close brotherhood that reigned among the Spartiates - a society of “equals”.

The basic unit of the Spartan phalanx was the enomotia, which initially consisted of 23 hoplites, lined up in three rows of eight, and two commanders: the oenomotarch, who stood in front of the formation, and the uragos (uraga), who occupied a place in the last row and was responsible for the cohesion of the formation. Two enomotii made up the pentecostia, led by the pentecontarchus, and four made up the loch, the main unit of the phalanx, which in ancient times numbered about a hundred people under the command of the lochagus.

Before the Greco-Persian Wars, all poleis adhered to the standard of eight ranks. However, the sucker described by Xenophon already at the end of the Peloponnesian War consisted of 144 men, as the depth of the enomotia increased to 36 hoplites, arrayed in three rows of twelve or six rows of six men.

In Xenophon's time, four lochi constituted a mora, and six moras under the command of polemarchs constituted the entire Spartan army. the armyIn earlier periods, the term "lokh" could also denote larger units, especially since Herodotus does not use the word "mora" at all.

Mora was also the name given to a cavalry unit attached to the infantry. Initially, since its appearance in the Spartan army in 424 BC. e., it numbered no more than sixty horsemen under the command of the hipparmost. Later, the number of cavalry was increased to one hundred people, divided into two ulama of 50 horsemen, who were located on the flanks of the phalanx, in ten rows of five people - each five was called a pempada, and at its head was a pempadarch.

The elite of the Spartan phalanx were the hippeii, who, despite their name, were not horsemen. These were 300 selected hoplites assigned to the first sea and usually located on the right flank. They also served as the royal guard. Every year, from among the young Spartiates, three Hippagretae, appointed by the ephors, selected one hundred warriors each to form a detachment of Hippaeans.

...the main thing is maneuvers


The maneuvers of the phalanx were extremely complex and required lengthy preparation in order to maintain its compactness - a necessary condition for combat effectiveness - when changing from marching formation to combat formation. Of course, the Spartans had an advantage due to their habit of discipline and drill training from childhood. However, these elite warriors fought alongside the Perieci and other categories of the population, who eventually had to be recruited into the army to compensate for the lack of Spartiates.

It must be remembered that in Xenophon's time the Spartan army numbered only 4 men—half the size of three centuries earlier—and required an annual increase of about a hundred recruits, taking into account forty years of service and casualties.


Phalanx in battle

Recruits recruited according to year classes formed a separate enomoty. Experienced warriors from this enomoti were distributed among other units, with the exception of commanders who remained to train newcomers. In battle, the army of recruits occupied a place on the extreme left flank of the mora - the least honorable position.

Recruits in the enomotia learned to march in a line. At the signal of the trumpet, the enomotarch, who led the line, left the first twelve people in place, the next twelve under the command of the thirteenth took a step to the left, those following them took another step to the left, and so on.

Between the parted ranks there was an interval of at least two steps, sufficient for the subsequent closing or retreating behind the phalanx of lightly armed skirmishers before the battle. Now the enomotia was divided into three parallel lines of 12 people each. Then each of the three ranks of 12 people was divided in half: the soldiers standing in the second half-ranks took a step to the right, joining the first half-ranks and forming a 6 by 6 battle formation with a distance of one step between the hoplites.


Enomotia

The main difficulty for the commander of each small unit was to correctly and synchronously count steps and carefully follow the enomotarch. When four Mora suckers were involved in a maneuver, each successive sucker circled the previous one on the left, forming a phalanx line with a front and a depth of twelve hoplites. If necessary, the ranks closed, maintaining a distance of two steps between the ranks, and formed a phalanx with a front of 24 and a depth of 6 people. During the retreat, Uragos took the initiative, leading the retreat.

Changing from marching order to combat order on the scale of an entire mora was not an easy task: each division in open order had a front of 48 hoplites, each of whom led a column of twelve people. The sucker had to calculate the shift to the left in such a way that, having joined the previous sucker, he would occupy a front of 70 steps. Together with the 24 steps of the first division, this gave a total front of 94 steps, on which it was also possible to close ranks.

After the phalanx was fully formed, a flanking move could be made, although rarely. At the signal of the trumpet, the right and left wings moved forward in a column to a certain point, and then turned back into a line, following the center. This maneuver was cumbersome, to say the least, which prompted the great military theorists of the 4th century, from Epaminondas to Philip II, to invent more effective ways of outflanking the enemy.

All these constructions found practical application with the beginning of the military campaign. The ephors announced the mobilization of the annual classes, the army gathered, and the king conducted fortune-telling with sacrifice. If the gods were favorable, the torchbearer took the fire from the altar and carried it to the borders of Laconia. The army followed him. At the border, the king performed another sacrifice, and if it was favorable, the army continued the march, following the sacred fire, which in no case could be extinguished.

Soldier's bag and camp


Each hoplite took a helot with him on the campaign, so his supply of provisions, which consisted mainly of barley and oat flakes, cheese, onions and dried meat, was calculated for two. Food was taken for a maximum of 20 days, even if the war was expected to last longer. They said that a hoplite's bag always stinks of onions. The diet was the same for everyone - from the king to the ordinary warrior. There is a known case when the king, having rejected the sumptuous dishes offered by the allies in honor of the appearance of the Spartan army, ordered everything to be given to the helots.
The Athenian hoplite also took with him a servant, most often a slave called a scenophore (“load-bearer”), and sometimes a young relative, so that he could gain experience in war. The servant followed the hoplite, and before the battle he moved to the rear. While there was no danger, he carried the warrior’s shield and other equipment. During the march, the assistant carried a rolled-up bedding on his shoulders - a kind of sleeping bag called a stromata - if it was not tied to the hoplite's shield.


The diet of the Athenian warrior was slightly different from the Spartan one and consisted of salt, sometimes with the addition of thyme, onions, and salted fish wrapped in fig leaves. All this was stored in a wicker basket - gyulios. The hoplite also had an iron spit for cooking fresh meat, which he could buy on the road, because from 462 BC. e. soldiers began to receive salaries.

As for the Spartans, the soldier wore bedding tied to his shield, as well as several changes of clothing. However, there was nothing in his equipment for an overnight stay - in the summer the Spartans slept in the open air, and in the cold season they built improvised huts from scrap materials. In the convoy, the composition and size of which was also determined by the ephors, shovels and picks were carried on carts, and axes and sickles were carried on pack animals, which were necessary for lightly armed warriors to clear the road. In addition, the convoy contained tools for artisans - doctors, blacksmiths and carpenters, mobilized by the ephors.

On the first day of the campaign, the army moved slowly so that those who had forgotten something at home could return and pick it up. The rhythm of movement with horn signals was set by the skirits - lightly armed highlanders from northern Laconia, who formed the vanguard of the column. Later they were joined by cavalry, which the Greeks still had very little of during the Greco-Persian Wars.

Typically, in open terrain, the Spartan army moved in a square formation, with the front and rear in a phalanx, the sides in a column, and the baggage train, light infantry, and non-combatants in the middle. In narrow places where an ambush could lie in wait, the infantry was built in two columns, running parallel to each other and separated by a convoy, or the suckers marched in four ranks, or even less. At the same time, each mora tried to stay close to its convoy in order to quickly gain access to it if necessary.

The Greeks did not follow the strict Roman rules for setting up a fortified camp. Even in dangerous places, they were unlikely to enclose their camp with a palisade and a ditch, as Roman legionaries did at all times. The only precaution was to place the skirits, and then the horsemen, on high ground, from where they could notice the approach of the enemy and warn of danger. The Spartans paid much more attention to the protection of weapons at night, carefully guarding them so that the helots could not take possession of them.
At times, the boundaries between parts of the camp were more strictly guarded than the camp itself. Each mora had to occupy a space allotted to it, from which the warriors were forbidden to leave even for the daily gymnastic exercises that they did before breakfast and dinner.

In the center of the camp was the king's tent, surrounded by his retinue and servants. Nearby were the three Spartiates responsible for the king's guard, as well as doctors, soothsayers, polemarchs (military leaders), two Pythias responsible for consulting the Delphic Oracle on special occasions, flute players who accompanied the king's sacrifices, and heralds who conveyed the king's orders to military leaders and units.

Perhaps the king’s personal guard of 300 hippei (selected warriors) was also located here.

To be continued ...
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  1. +2
    26 July 2024 04: 24
    It is difficult to determine exactly when individual valor and one-on-one combat ceased to be the main goal on the battlefield, giving way to the coordinated actions of large units. Spartan poet Tyrtaeus, who lived in the 7th century BC. e., argued that already in his time hoplites fought shoulder to shoulder, avoiding any actions, even heroic ones, that could disrupt the formation.

    If we are talking about the battle formation of heavy infantry in the form of a dense formation in several ranks, armed with polearms, then it clearly appeared earlier. A similar structure is depicted on the Sumerian stele of King Eanatum, dating back to 2400 BC.
    1. +4
      26 July 2024 05: 31
      Victor You just took it right off the tongue!
      Thus, tactics preceded technology, not the other way around. The new weapon only increased the effectiveness of the already established method of combat.

      Are you joking? The formation of hoplite and phalanx formations took place evolutionarily for several centuries from one or two rank formations to 16 during the Macedonian phalanx. The forerunner is the tower-like and figure-eight shields of the Cretan-Mycenaean civilization, which assumed the presence of ranks in formation. In that era, no one had specifically invented tactics; they arose from successful practice. This is clearly reflected in the evolution of the infantryman’s shield, which from a tower-like (close to the scutum) turns into an eight-shaped one, then into a round convex one with cutouts, just a round convex one, etc.
  2. +4
    26 July 2024 07: 47
    And if the fortune telling was unfavorable, did they go home?
    1. +5
      26 July 2024 11: 08
      There was a case when they went home after making sacrifices before invading the enemy’s area. The victims turned out to be unfavorable
  3. +7
    26 July 2024 08: 00
    Interesting material, thanks to the Author.

    Somehow, I still haven’t thought about how difficult it was to control the phalanx, although I remember how I myself learned to walk in formation when I served in the SA, and how later, as a sergeant, with no less difficulty I taught young people the same :) But The most difficult maneuver for us was simply changing formation on the move from a column to a rank or vice versa, turning left or right. Although turning around didn’t work right away either.

    I was also amused by the thought that the Spartans were more afraid of their assistants, the helots, than of the enemy.
    1. +3
      26 July 2024 08: 47
      “But our most difficult maneuver was just changing formation on the move from a column to a line or vice versa, turning left or right...” Wow, and especially with weapons, for example, such as the SKS!!! A classic example is Charlie Chaplin's legendary film "On the Shoulder!"
  4. +3
    26 July 2024 09: 07
    The diet of the Athenian warrior was slightly different from the Spartan diet and consisted of salt, sometimes with the addition of thyme

    What tough warriors they were, it was truly enviable.
    1. -6
      26 July 2024 09: 37
      Perhaps you are especially envious of the true male friendship that was accepted among the Spartans? They were ordinary, as they are now, but instead of smartphones they had spears and shields.
      1. +8
        26 July 2024 10: 04
        Perhaps you are especially envious of the true male friendship that was accepted among the Spartans?

        "Who's talking about what, and the bald guy is talking about a comb." And you, it seems, are able to find sexual connotations in the “blue berets” of the Airborne Forces?
        And I’m envious that they could fight with a diet of SALT, sometimes with the addition of thyme.
  5. +3
    26 July 2024 09: 21
    Hm. Nothing is said about the length of the sarissas. So how many ranks of this phalanx (its size made it modest) could use their spears at a time?
    In the drawings the spears are not very long. And the structure in the picture with the battle is not very monolithic.
    In general, the phalanx is not such a prodigy. It is enough to upset it with throwing shells with burning oil, and then attack with heavy cavalry with long spears.
    And again, what shortcomings allowed the Roman legionaries to defeat the most advanced Macedonian phalanxes. Did the long spears give in to the short gladiuses or what?
    1. +6
      26 July 2024 11: 06
      Nothing is said about the length of the sarissas.

      There were NO sarissas in the classical phalanx. There were dori - 2.5-3 meters

      So how many ranks of this phalanx (its size made it modest) could use their spears at a time?

      Reenactors say that there are two in the classical phalanx. The third is episodic

      And again, what shortcomings allowed the Roman legionaries to defeat the most advanced Macedonian phalanxes. Did the long spears give in to the short gladiuses or what?

      Or should I read the classics? laughing
      Therefore, if the enemy decided to accept the final battle and was forced
      submit to the conditions of time and place suitable for the phalanx,
      that could always be expected according to what was just done
      clarification that the winner will be the side using the phalanx. On the contrary, if it is possible to avoid such a battle and achieve this without difficulty, the phalanx formation ceases to be dangerous. Everyone knows that the phalanx requires terrain
      flat, treeless, not presenting any obstacles to movement, such as ditches, ruts, hollows, elevations, river beds.
      1. 0
        28 July 2024 19: 54
        And Roman tactics stated that initially the adversary was fired upon by velites and then the legionnaires added pilums. Emnip, the defensive weapons of the Macedonians did not particularly protect them from throwing weapons.
    2. +2
      26 July 2024 15: 54
      Quote: Illanatol
      It is enough to upset it with throwing shells with burning oil, and then attack with heavy cavalry with long spears.
      And again, what shortcomings allowed the Roman legionaries to defeat the most advanced Macedonian phalanxes

      In those days, they didn’t carry catapults with them. But spears were used against cavalry. And the cavalry necessarily covered the flanks. For example, in the Roman cavalry there were no spears, as far as I know.
      And the disadvantages of the phalanx are its clumsiness. In wars with the Persians and other weakly organized peoples, the phalanx ruled, and the Roman legions and cohorts were more maneuverable
  6. +3
    26 July 2024 09: 32
    Actually, the reasons for the appearance of the phalanx are purely economic. A direct analogy is the emergence of chivalry in its time, and its collapse after it became possible to maintain mass infantry.

    Let's look at the description of fights from the same Homer - noble warriors ride up in chariots to the battlefield and engage in equal confrontation. The armor from Dendra is obviously part of the panoplia of a noble elite warrior, very similar in concept to the later knightly armor. A sort of Bronze Age tank. It is obvious that in the same way, in principle, there could not be very many such fighters, and they simply did not need any kind of dense formation.

    Again, the tablets from Pylos shed some light on the economics of the phenomenon. At least the chariots were issued from the royal household and were not the personal property of the fighter. The rest is less clear, but most likely the situation was exactly the same. For full bronze armor of that time is clearly a very, very expensive product. No cheaper than the classic one, say Maximilian.

    With the collapse of the Mycenaean palace economy, a class of free people gradually emerged who could afford to buy a panoplia. A much lighter type than the Mycenaean one - but still panoplia. And there are quite a lot of such people. From here, the need to somehow organize them on the battlefield naturally grew - the famous phalanx began to take shape.
  7. +4
    26 July 2024 10: 08
    Excellent material, thanks to the author.
    I will stand up here for the poor Athenian hoplites.
    I doubt that, in the conditions of a hot climate and a campaign, the Athenians ate only salted fish and salt.
    They should have had cheese, butter and flour!
    Knead unleavened dough and bake thin bread - it's a matter of minutes, and quick carbohydrates - and if you also dip it in oil with garlic and vinegar, it's a song.
    War is war, and soldiers are always ready to be devoured.
    On the other hand, perhaps the state gave out salted fish and salt as rations, and the hoplites bought the rest of the supplies themselves - it’s understandable - tricks with government contracts for the army did not appear yesterday, General Ivanov had many predecessors.
  8. +3
    26 July 2024 10: 17
    Quote: paul3390
    With the collapse of the Mycenaean palace economy, a class of free people gradually emerged who could afford to buy a panoplia. A much lighter type than the Mycenaean one - but still panoplia. And there are quite a lot of such people. From here, the need to somehow organize them on the battlefield naturally grew - the famous phalanx began to take shape.

    However, the class of free people could not appear on its own.
    Its appearance was preceded by technical progress, primarily in metallurgy (iron). The appearance of iron tools created the prerequisites for the growth of productive forces and surplus product in agriculture, the mining industry, shipbuilding, and materials processing.
    All hoplite weapons - shield, armor, leggings, cast helmet - are quite complex to produce and require a developed industrial base.
    1. +2
      26 July 2024 11: 07
      I wouldn't say so. Because at the time of the formation of the phalanx, iron was not cheap at all, and its quality was frankly poor. I don’t think that in such situations it would lead to any special increase in productivity...

      Please note - Greek panoplia, even in classical times, was largely bronze. And the helmet, and the thorax, and the greaves, and the frame of the shield. No - by the time of the Peloponnesian Wars, iron was in full swing, but - this is already the time of the established phalanx ..

      And so - either bronze, or those who are poorer have linothorax ..

      As for shipbuilding, Greece was able to compare, say, with the Minoan thalassocracy only at the time of the heyday of Athens and other maritime trading cities.
      1. 0
        27 July 2024 02: 21
        The appearance of iron tools created the preconditions for the growth of productive forces on the contrary, growth associated with favorable climatic changes after the collapse of bronze, caused by sharp aridization, caused the massive use of iron tools, because many growing territories were left without bronze or its components, as a result of the destruction of global connections by the collapse of bronze, they began to work with iron and developed acceptable technologies for mass use, but in general iron was known at least from the middle bronze, but it was either very expensive or bad, and in conditions of universal availability of bronze they did not bother with it.
    2. 0
      27 July 2024 02: 09
      The appearance of iron tools created the preconditions for the growth of productive forces
  9. +5
    26 July 2024 10: 21
    Quote: Illanatol
    And again, what shortcomings allowed the Roman legionaries to defeat the most advanced Macedonian phalanxes. Did the long spears give in to the short gladiuses or what?

    The recipe is the same and was used in the 16th century by Spanish infantry - crawling under rows of Swiss spears and close contact combat with bladed weapons. When a phalangite is poked in the groin with a sharp object, enthusiasm quickly passes.
  10. +1
    26 July 2024 10: 25
    Quote from Frettaskyrandi
    It is difficult to determine exactly when individual valor and one-on-one combat ceased to be the main goal on the battlefield, giving way to the coordinated actions of large units. Spartan poet Tyrtaeus, who lived in the 7th century BC. e., argued that already in his time hoplites fought shoulder to shoulder, avoiding any actions, even heroic ones, that could disrupt the formation.

    If we are talking about the battle formation of heavy infantry in the form of a dense formation in several ranks, armed with polearms, then it clearly appeared earlier. A similar structure is depicted on the Sumerian stele of King Eanatum, dating back to 2400 BC.

    However, the phalanx is not just a military formation; it is a military formation of equal citizens in property and political terms, welded together by class unity and territorial proximity within a phylum or syssitia.
  11. +2
    26 July 2024 10: 32
    Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka
    Victor You just took it right off the tongue!
    Thus, tactics preceded technology, not the other way around. The new weapon only increased the effectiveness of the already established method of combat.

    Are you joking? The formation of hoplite and phalanx formations took place evolutionarily for several centuries from one or two rank formations to 16 during the Macedonian phalanx. The forerunner is the tower-like and figure-eight shields of the Cretan-Mycenaean civilization, which assumed the presence of ranks in formation. In that era, no one had specifically invented tactics; they arose from successful practice. This is clearly reflected in the evolution of the infantryman’s shield, which from a tower-like (close to the scutum) turns into an eight-shaped one, then into a round convex one with cutouts, just a round convex one, etc.

    Tactics cannot precede technology; the base determines the superstructure.
    First, a means of armed struggle appears—cheap iron weapons—and then an effective method of using it.
  12. 0
    26 July 2024 10: 50
    There is an assumption that the phalanx was invented by the Spartans.

    Some modern researchers believe that the Argives
    https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/bitva-pri-gisiyah-i-problema-vozniknoveniya-konflikta-mezhdu-argosom-i-spartoy/viewer
  13. +2
    26 July 2024 11: 08
    Quote: Illanatol
    And again, what shortcomings allowed the Roman legionaries to defeat the most advanced Macedonian phalanxes. Did the long spears give in to the short gladiuses or what?


    As far as I remember, when moving for a long time over rough terrain, the phalanx cannot maintain a continuous, uniform front, which is what the Romans used with their “manipulations.” If the front of the phalanx is broken through, then somehow it’s impossible to patch up the hole, there is no second phalanx behind the first, and the strategist’s detachment, which seems to have served for such cases, does not always have time.

    On the other hand, even if the Romans had suffered one or two defeats, they would have sent more legions - their numerical advantage would have affected.
  14. +1
    26 July 2024 11: 10
    The diet of the Athenian warrior was slightly different from the Spartan one and consisted of salt, sometimes with the addition of thyme, onion, salted fish, wrapped in fig leaves.
    Such a diet... Salty.
  15. +1
    26 July 2024 11: 55
    Quote: paul3390
    I wouldn't say so. Because at the time of the formation of the phalanx, iron was not cheap at all, and its quality was frankly poor. I don’t think that in such situations it would lead to any special increase in productivity...

    Please note - Greek panoplia, even in classical times, was largely bronze. And the helmet, and the thorax, and the greaves, and the frame of the shield. No - by the time of the Peloponnesian Wars, iron was in full swing, but - this is already the time of the established phalanx ..

    And so - either bronze, or those who are poorer have linothorax ..

    As for shipbuilding, Greece was able to compare, say, with the Minoan thalassocracy only at the time of the heyday of Athens and other maritime trading cities.

    1. Iron may not have been cheap, but it is 1000 times more abundant than copper.
    2. The quality of iron is a relative thing; for nails, for example, the quality of iron is not critical, for example, for fastening a set and plating a ship, it is quite suitable.
    3. Most likely, in the classical era, metallurgists learned to saturate the cutting edges of tools and weapons with carbon or make composite structures with the installation of plates of increased hardness.
    4. The spread of bronze armor and helmets was caused by the lack of skills in obtaining iron plates and the lack of the necessary equipment to obtain them - water hammers.
    Therefore, iron armor made from planks is already from the Roman era, when these technologies became available.
    Therefore, cuirasses and helmets were produced by casting using lost wax models or by splitting.
    5. I think that bronze armor was still rare, it was just that linen armor was less well preserved. And being in the heat in the ranks or on the march in bronze armor was a difficult ordeal.
    In the sun, metal can heat up to 70 degrees.
    6. With regards to shipbuilding, in the Minoan era there were no multi-oared specialized combat ships; the level of technology did not allow it; without iron fasteners, mass shipbuilding is impossible.
    A classic example, albeit from a later era, is a longship assembled on nails, which made it possible to abandon the deck and significantly lighten the structure without losing strength.
  16. +3
    26 July 2024 13: 26
    Quote: Engineer
    Or should I read the classics?


    The question arises: did the Macedonians fight in an unknown, unfamiliar area? It seems that the Romans were the invaders. So how did it happen that among the Macedonians their system turned out to be less adapted to the familiar landscape than that of the strangers - the Romans?
    By the way, is Macedonia a landscape as flat as a table?
    And why did the Macedonian phalanx previously turn out to be quite suitable in Asia, right up to the north of India? The terrain there is also not as flat as a table.
    1. +1
      26 July 2024 13: 36
      Don't you want to read anything at all?
      There, literally further on, Polybius has answers to these questions
      Meanwhile, everyone will agree that it is hardly possible, and even if possible, it is very rare, to find a plain of twenty stades or even more in which there would be nothing of the kind. But let’s assume that such a location is found. And yet, what good will the phalanx be if the enemy does not want to descend into such an area and will walk around and around, devastating the cities and fields of our allies. Remaining in an area convenient for it, the phalanx would not have had the opportunity not only to help its friends, but also to keep itself intact. For it will be easy for the enemy to cut off the supply of vital supplies to the phalanx if the surrounding area is in his undisputed possession. But as soon as the phalanx leaves the places favorable for it and goes into action, it will deliver an easy victory to the enemy. Finally, even if the enemy descended into the plain, but did not place the entire army at once against the advancing phalanx and at the decisive moment were to shy away from battle a little, then from the current mode of action of the Romans it is easy to understand how this should end. And in fact, to confirm our thought there is no need for fortune-telling evidence; events that have already happened confirm it. Thus, the Romans do not build one battle line and do not advance with all their might against the phalanx, but only one part takes part in the battle, and the other remains in reserve for cover. Now, whether the phalangites repel the attacking enemy, or they themselves are repulsed by the latter, in both cases the phalanx loses its formation; for whether the phalangites are pursuing the retreating enemy, or fleeing before the enemy overtaking them, they are separated from the other parts of their army.
  17. 0
    26 July 2024 13: 36
    Quote: S.Z.

    As far as I remember, when moving for a long time over rough terrain, the phalanx cannot maintain a continuous, uniform front, which is what the Romans used with their “manipulations.” If the front of the phalanx is broken through, then somehow it’s impossible to patch up the hole, there is no second phalanx behind the first, and the strategist’s detachment, which seems to have served for such cases, does not always have time.


    The maniple is also quite densely constructed. Apparently the manipulator was not hampered by its movement over rough terrain, right? Well, yes, it's small. On the other hand, why did the Macedonians increase the number of the phalanx if this made it difficult to move around the battlefield, which is not always convenient, like a stadium? Their motives are unclear to me.

    Well, the front of the phalanx must be broken through to its full depth. I suspect that these Greek-Macedonians already mastered the technique of replacing fallen fighters from the front ranks from the rear ranks.
    Considering the comparative small number of the phalanx, nothing prevented them from being built in two lines or even more, if the number of warriors allowed.

    And what prevented the “Phalangists” from being supplied with additional melee weapons - short swords?

    Whatever one may say, as presented, the phalanx seems to me a rather crude formation. It is amazing how Alexander was able to achieve so many victories using these phalanxes. Maybe I was lucky that I didn’t have a chance to fight with the Romans.
  18. 0
    26 July 2024 13: 40
    Quote: Dozorny severa
    The recipe is the same and was used in the 16th century by Spanish infantry - crawling under rows of Swiss spears and close contact combat with bladed weapons. When a phalangite is poked in the groin with a sharp object, enthusiasm quickly passes.


    A counter-recipe is also known - cavalry, which took out such infantrymen at once. Infantry out of formation, without long spears (or baguettes) for cavalry is a tasty morsel.
    As far as I remember, these phalanxes were covered from the flanks by selected cavalry. Well, the Macedonians definitely do.
    1. 0
      27 July 2024 08: 43
      Quote: Illanatol
      A counter-recipe is also known - cavalry, which took out such infantrymen at once

      The Spaniards used a tertia, which included spearmen, musketeers, and arquebusiers—this formation worked against both cavalry and infantry.
      The first terts included 10 companies, approximately 300 people each, two of which were rifle companies, and the other 8 companies were mixed - arquebusiers and pikemen.
      Soldiers with pikes were equipped in different ways. They can be roughly divided into light and heavy pikemen. The latter were protected by “three-quarter” armor, that is, protecting ¾ of the body (protection of the legs was abandoned almost everywhere by that time). The head was covered with a morion helmet. It was the soldiers in heavy armor who stood in the first ranks of the thirds. Behind them stood pikemen in light armor - an inexpensive plate breastplate and helmet. Their main weapon was a pike about 5 m long, and their additional weapon was a sword or daga (with a short blade). Armored arquebusiers wore a morion helmet. The body was covered with a leather jacket, sometimes reinforced with copper linings.
      In battle, the thirds lined up in rectangles, at the corners of which small detachments of riflemen were stationed. The arquebusiers were placed around the central square of the pikemen, which was the main force of the third, its support. In the event of an impending threat in the form of a cavalry onslaught, the arrows quickly went behind the backs of the pikemen. Against reiters with pistols, the third had sufficient firepower to prevent the horsemen from methodically unloading their pistols into the pikemen's formation. Maneuverability allowed the arquebusiers to quickly inflict damage and take cover behind their allies.

      Tertia met approaching enemies with a powerful volley, then bristled with pikes and became literally inaccessible to the enemy. However, the main strength of the thirds lay not so much in the successfully selected proportions of the various types of infantry and formation, but in the nature of the personnel forming the tactical unit. The core of the Spanish tercios were professional fighters with a high level of discipline, persistent and ready to fight to the last, standing side by side with their brothers in arms and obeying the orders of their commanders.
  19. +1
    26 July 2024 13: 40
    Quote: Illanatol
    Quote: Engineer
    Or should I read the classics?


    The question arises: did the Macedonians fight in an unknown, unfamiliar area? It seems that the Romans were the invaders. So how did it happen that among the Macedonians their system turned out to be less adapted to the familiar landscape than that of the strangers - the Romans?
    By the way, is Macedonia a landscape as flat as a table?
    And why did the Macedonian phalanx previously turn out to be quite suitable in Asia, right up to the north of India? The terrain there is also not as flat as a table.

    The Macedonian wars were preceded by enormous diplomatic and economic work done by the Romans. They managed to win over most of Macedonia's neighbors, isolating it economically and politically. Prolongation of the war led to the weakening of Macedonia and inevitable defeat. Therefore, the Macedonians were forced to attack first, even in unfavorable conditions for yourself - for example, to advance uphill, having previously crossed the river.
  20. +1
    26 July 2024 13: 48
    Quote: Engineer
    Don't you want to read anything at all?


    Polybius is a renegade, by and large. A Greek by nationality who became a "Roman historian". And his arguments are not very convincing for me and he himself does not inspire confidence.
    More like PR for the Romans, whom Polybius faithfully served.

    If the phalanx is so imperfect, then why was it used for so long? And again: is the area in Greece or Macedonia “steppe and steppe all around”? The relief there is just not very smooth, so why didn’t this prevent the use of phalanges before? And why didn’t the inventive Greeks come up with a design more suitable for rough terrain?
    They could have borrowed the legion; it was supposedly invented by the Etruscans. But even if not, this was not such a novelty by the time of the Roman-Macedonian War.
    1. +1
      26 July 2024 15: 38
      You don’t want to read, and apparently you don’t want to think either.

      If the phalanx is so imperfect, then why was it used for so long?

      Because for centuries it has responded to the current state of affairs. But time passes and gradually it too becomes outdated.

      If the phalanx is so imperfect, then why was it used for so long? And again: is the area in Greece or Macedonia “steppe and steppe all around”? The relief there is just not very smooth, so why didn’t this prevent the use of phalanges before?


      You haven’t read anything on the topic and don’t understand the evolution of military affairs at all.

      Conflicts in archaic and classical Greece are formalized confrontations. The two policies deployed troops, met on the disputed territory, at a suitable place, formed a phalanx and sorted things out. The winner placed the trophy. This is practically an arrow in many respects. A long conflict is not beneficial. Therefore, both sides are interested in quickly finding a level surface and seeing whose valor is greater.

      By the Peloponnesian War, conflicts became longer and more violent and were sometimes fought to destroy the enemy. However, the inertia of the previous period existed and hoplites were still the decisive force in field battles. Side A (usually the Spartans and Allies) was still looking for level ground to exploit their phalanx advantage. Side B either avoided the fight or, having accepted the challenge, tried to protect itself as much as possible in case of defeat.

      Philip II carried out an organic synthesis of the phalanx and shock cavalry. Additionally, the quantitative and qualitative improvement in light infantry that has occurred since the time of Iphicrates came in very handy. Now the limitations of the phalanx on the ground in battle were partly offset by the presence of quality skirmishers. They quickly gained heights and mountain passes, and quickly carried out tactical maneuvers.
      On these three pillars - a new phalanx, shock cavalry, good skirmishers (their role is often underestimated) the Hellenistic military machine was based. Moreover, argyraspides appeared, with equipment similar to classic hoplites, who performed various functions.

      The Romans took a different route - they divided the battle formation in depth, highlighting the second and third lines. Now infantry combat has become more controlled and stable. Moreover, their linear infantry could not only fight in a line, but also carry out detours, knock down the enemy from heights, and occupy passages. For a long time they were let down by the weakness of the cavalry, but by the Macedonian Wars this problem was solved.
      Then grandfather Polybius described everything. If the Macedonians have a good position, we do not accept the battle, we sit in the camp, rob and burn the area. After all, it was the Romans who invaded Macedonia, so things are worse for the Macedonians. There is a dominant height - the legionnaires will occupy it faster than the Sarissophorans, if there are already enemy skirmishers there - the legionnaires will knock them out due to superior weapons. And so on until the enemy’s position becomes unbearable and he decides to fight in unfavorable conditions for himself.


      They could have borrowed the legion; it was supposedly invented by the Etruscans.

      Well, what a mess

      Legion is not a specific formation. Legion from the word lego - to collect, collect.

      The Etruscans and the inhabitants of early Latium most likely fought as part of a phalanx. Then the manipular system appeared, then by cohorts, then again the revival of the phalanx at a new level, moreover, rather a classical phalanx, judging by the length of the spear. This evolution does not fit into profane schemes. There were complex processes about which monographs were written.
  21. 0
    26 July 2024 14: 32
    Quote: Illanatol
    The maniple is also quite densely constructed. Apparently the manipulator was not hampered by its movement over rough terrain, right? Well, yes, it's small. On the other hand, why did the Macedonians increase the number of the phalanx if this made it difficult to move around the battlefield, which is not always convenient, like a stadium?

    Quote: Illanatol
    Quote: S.Z.

    As far as I remember, when moving for a long time over rough terrain, the phalanx cannot maintain a continuous, uniform front, which is what the Romans used with their “manipulations.” If the front of the phalanx is broken through, then somehow it’s impossible to patch up the hole, there is no second phalanx behind the first, and the strategist’s detachment, which seems to have served for such cases, does not always have time.


    The maniple is also quite densely constructed. Apparently the manipulator was not hampered by its movement over rough terrain, right? Well, yes, it's small. On the other hand, why did the Macedonians increase the number of the phalanx if this made it difficult to move around the battlefield, which is not always convenient, like a stadium? Their motives are unclear to me.

    Well, the front of the phalanx must be broken through to its full depth. I suspect that these Greek-Macedonians already mastered the technique of replacing fallen fighters from the front ranks from the rear ranks.
    Considering the comparative small number of the phalanx, nothing prevented them from being built in two lines or even more, if the number of warriors allowed.

    And what prevented the “Phalangists” from being supplied with additional melee weapons - short swords?

    Whatever one may say, as presented, the phalanx seems to me a rather crude formation. It is amazing how Alexander was able to achieve so many victories using these phalanxes. Maybe I was lucky that I didn’t have a chance to fight with the Romans.


    There could be gaps between maniples or cohorts and they were managed separately. In the clash, as far as I understand, the Romans also formed in a continuous formation, but moved separately. The phalanx was controlled only as a whole. Even without enemy influence, a long phalanx could break the formation - it was necessary to bypass ravines, bushes and trees. Here are the gaps.

    I think the increase in the number and depth of the phalanx and its depth is due to the increase in the strength of the opponents, which the usual phalanx “did not penetrate.” The huge sarissas of the Macedonians (Macedonians?) are not the same as those of the hoplites.

    In general, phalanx is a noble name for a wall, which everyone has always used :) This is the simplest formation - a wall, perhaps even the very first - after the crowd.

    It is interesting to read Anabasis - there the author explains the incredible successes of the hoplites, but, as far as I remember, he does not consider the phalanx to be the main factors. So Alexander’s successes had historical prerequisites.
  22. 0
    26 July 2024 15: 01
    Quote: Illanatol
    And what prevented the “Phalangists” from being supplied with additional melee weapons - short swords?


    They had swords, mahairs, etc. Only the strength of the phalanx is precisely the spear, it is long, you don’t have to open up to strike - they stab from above. The second row could stab.
  23. 0
    26 July 2024 16: 15
    Quote: Engineer
    Legion is not a specific formation. Legion from the word lego - to collect, collect.


    Oh really? Is it okay that the legion had a certain structure and strength?
    A kind of Roman division consisting of cohorts.

    Quote: Engineer
    The Romans took a different route - they divided the battle formation in depth, highlighting the second and third lines. Now infantry combat has become more controlled and stable.


    What prevented the Greeks and Macedonians from borrowing it?
    By the way, did this always work against Hannibal’s Carthaginians? What formation did the infantry in Carthage use?
    I suspect that the Romans stupidly overwhelmed the Macedonians in numbers...
    1. +1
      26 July 2024 16: 34
      Oh really? Is it okay that the legion had a certain structure and strength?

      The organizational division (structure) does not always coincide with the tactical division (combat formation), so again it’s off the table.
      Once again, a legion is not a battle formation.
      We know almost nothing about the ancient legion; presumably it resembled a classic phalanx in battle.

      What prevented the Greeks and Macedonians from borrowing it?

      Because there was a complex of reasons.
      In general, the victory of Rome does not come down to superior tactics or weapons. This is a multifactorial phenomenon.
      And so the same Seleucids attempted to build their legions. But it was already too late.

      By the way, did this always work against Hannibal’s Carthaginians? What formation did the infantry in Carthage use?

      It has been written and rewritten a thousand times. You are like that extremely curious little elephant. Is it really important for you not to read this?
  24. 0
    26 July 2024 16: 17
    Quote: S.Z.
    They had swords, mahairs, etc. Only the strength of the phalanx is precisely the spear, it is long, you don’t have to open up to strike - they stab from above. The second row could stab.


    Well, if the enemy got under the spears (it was interesting to see how this worked out), then the best thing to do is to use short swords.
  25. 0
    26 July 2024 16: 23
    Quote: S.Z.
    In the clash, as far as I understand, the Romans also formed in a continuous formation, but moved separately. The phalanx was controlled only as a whole. Even without enemy influence, a long phalanx could break the formation - it was necessary to bypass ravines, bushes and trees. Here are the gaps.


    Well, in the battle itself, bushes and other things could also interfere.
    The number of the phalanx and the Macedonian was also not so great, and neither was the length of the formation. If there are 16 ranks, how many soldiers are there on the front -50? 60? Hardly any more. Not such a large formation, less than 1 thousand soldiers.
    And, of course, rarely only one phalanx took part in the battle. Again they were covered by cavalry or lightly armed soldiers.

    On the march, however, they did not move in a phalanx, but in marching formation. They were built only in a suitable place. Cohorts of legions were also not very comfortable in the forests or among the ravines.
  26. 0
    26 July 2024 16: 29
    Quote: Illanatol
    Well, if the enemy got under the spears (it was interesting to see how this worked out), then the best thing to do is to use short swords.


    They probably climbed under the spears, but they were suicide bombers; such close combat is very risky. There have never been many suicide bombers.

    As far as I understand, most of the battles were still fought at the maximum possible distance - within the distance of a throw or strike of a spear. Self-preservation instinct, I want to live. In addition, you can retreat - I read that such weapons rarely killed immediately, more often they wounded, but the losing wounded were then slaughtered, so their losses were many times higher.
  27. 0
    26 July 2024 16: 30
    Quote: Engineer
    If the Macedonians have a good position, we do not accept the battle, we sit in the camp, rob and burn the area. After all, it was the Romans who invaded Macedonia, so things are worse for the Macedonians. There is a commanding height; the legionnaires will occupy it faster than the Sarissophorans, if the enemy’s skirmishers are already there; the legionnaires will knock them out due to their superior weapons.


    It is impossible to rob and burn in the ranks. Marauders are quite vulnerable, including to cavalry. Let me note that out of formation, legionnaires are not that effective, sometimes they were even lost to the barbarians.
    The Macedonians have the best knowledge of the area on their side. And nothing prevented the use of partisan methods of struggle... or was there not enough intelligence, unlike our “wild” Slavic ancestors?
    Once again, the Romans gained the upper hand, stupidly winning in numbers.
    1. -1
      26 July 2024 17: 02
      It is impossible to rob and burn in the ranks. Marauders are quite vulnerable, including to cavalry.

      LIKE peas hitting a wall laughing
      The Romans set up a fortified camp in suitable terrain, but are in no hurry to engage in direct conflict. Their foragers and skirmishers plunder and burn enemy terrain. The Macedonians may try to intercept them with their light infantry, but the Romans have learned to play this kind of chess since the Punic Wars. They immediately reinforced the foragers with maniples of soldiers. Light infantry gives way to legionnaires because they also know how to throw darts, but are better armed. You can throw cavalry into battle and disperse the foragers. That's what happened. But by that time the Romans had the best cavalry and they themselves attacked the enemy’s cavalry and defeated it. That's what happened. If the terrain allows, you can deploy the phalanx and try to force a battle. But the Romans control the situation and either retreat to a fortified camp or deploy their army themselves, and the legionnaires do this faster than the Sarissophorans.

      And nothing prevented the use of partisan methods of struggle... or was there not enough intelligence, unlike our “wild” Slavic ancestors?

      It is clearly shown above that Rome has an advantage in such games. They rob the enemy while in his land, transferring the burden of war to him and his allies. And the allies, seeing the indecisiveness of the Macedonians, begin to hesitate.
    2. 0
      27 July 2024 09: 01
      Quote: Illanatol
      sometimes they leaked it even to barbarians

      They were drained when the barbarians were outnumbered, or due to tactical errors.
      Battle of Carrhae, Cannae, Quintilius Varus, return my legions....
      Battle of Arausion - The Romans sent an expeditionary army there, consisting of two corps under the command of the proconsul Quintus Servilius Caepio and the consul Gnaeus Mallius Maximus. These corps did not unite and stood in separate camps on the opposite banks of the Rodan due to Caepio’s refusal to obey the senior Mallius.
  28. 0
    26 July 2024 16: 35
    Quote: Dozorny severa
    The Macedonian wars were preceded by enormous diplomatic and economic work done by the Romans. They managed to win over most of Macedonia's neighbors, isolating it economically and politically. The prolongation of the war led to the weakening of Macedonia and inevitable defeat.


    This is more like the truth. Since they brought in their neighbors, that means they also used their military strength. In such a situation, the defeat of Macedonia was a foregone conclusion, and the adventurous actions of the Macedonians no longer affected the final outcome. A classic example of a war of attrition, the comparative qualities of phalanxes and cohorts are of secondary importance.
  29. 0
    26 July 2024 16: 44
    Quote: Engineer
    The organizational division (structure) does not always coincide with the tactical division (combat formation), so again it’s off the table.


    So they are not connected in any way? If there are 20 cohorts in a legion, for example, will this be taken into account during battle formation?

    Quote: Engineer
    Because there was a complex of reasons.
    In general, the victory of Rome does not come down to superior tactics or weapons. This is a multifactorial phenomenon.
    And so the same Seleucids attempted to build their legions. But it was already too late.


    I agree with this.
    Didn’t a complex of reasons hinder the Seleucids? Like, weren’t you so conservative?
    1. 0
      26 July 2024 17: 11
      So they are not connected in any way? If there are 20 cohorts in a legion, for example, will this be taken into account during battle formation?

      They are not connected “by default.” In the late legion (dominant), for example, there are 10 cohorts, but they are formed by one phalanx, and possibly from several legions.

      Didn’t a complex of reasons hinder the Seleucids?

      They failed to achieve anything equal to the Romans. Like Yuba of Numidia.
  30. 0
    26 July 2024 16: 49
    Quote: S.Z.
    Besides, you can retreat - I read that such weapons rarely killed immediately, more often they wounded


    A puncture wound inflicted by a spear tip or a short sword was usually fatal.
    This wound is quite deep and cannot be stitched up.
  31. 0
    27 July 2024 00: 26
    Quote: Engineer
    They are not connected “by default.” In the late legion (dominant), for example, there are 10 cohorts, but they are formed by one phalanx, and possibly from several legions.


    Connected, connected.
    Since the total number of forces (number of warriors), as well as the number of structural units, will also influence the tactical formation on the battlefield.
    Since the company was the last commander of the legion, he had to proceed from two basic principles:
    1. The distance between cohorts in the line must be certain. The distance is not too small so as not to interfere with the restructuring of the cohorts, but not too large so as not to create problems for the interaction of the cohorts, if necessary, to create a single continuous formation.
    2. The front of the army should not be inferior in length (better - superior) to the front of the enemy army. The Romans learned at Cannae what neglect of this principle could lead to. It’s not for nothing that I mentioned the Carthaginians.

    That is, the reduction in the number of cohorts was essentially compensated by the use of “double”, paired legions.
    Just. Well, if the enemy is small in number, such a “half” legion was enough.

    Well, to end the topic. What determined the success of the cohorts over the phalanx?
    It’s not at all that the bushes were in the way or that the Romans turned out to be successful marauders (according to the then sycophant and renegade Polybius, who for the sake of Roman citizenship could not have invented such things).
    The main disadvantage of the phalanx is that it is dangerous only from the front; it can strike the enemy only from the frontal projection, in one direction. Moreover, the phalanx is not capable of quickly changing the direction of the attack due to its organization. Roman cohorts were capable, since they contained smaller subdivision structures. The cohort consisted of 4 centuries, the number was not accidental. After all, a construction has four sides.

    So in battle, the Romans did not rely on the fact that uneven terrain and bushes would lead to disruptions in the phalanx formation. There was no need to rely on such random factors.
    They, using their numerical superiority, also ensured a longer formation front. Part of the forces (possibly phalanxes of local allies) were sent into a frontal attack on the phalanxes in order to constrain their actions and exhaust the enemy. And the cohorts took the phalanxes in pincers and hit the flanks. They destroyed the cavalry and lightly armed troops defending the flank and struck directly at the phalanx itself. The phalanx's ability to provide itself with protection from attacks from the flanks (possibly from the rear) was very limited. The battle turned into a complete massacre.

    Yes, the cohorts descended from the phalanx (original, Greek). However, the presence in their composition of smaller units ( maniples, centuries) and more convenient weapons predetermined much greater tactical flexibility in their use. The cohorts easily changed the direction of attack and could strike in several directions.
    In principle, I see no reason why the Greeks and Macedonians should not improve their phalanxes in a similar direction. The Macedonians chose otherwise, and ended badly. However, they would have leaked it anyway.

    Nec Hercules contra plures...
    1. 0
      27 July 2024 10: 39
      Aplomb is no substitute for lack of knowledge.

      The Roman system of the era of the Macedonian wars is generally a manipulative system, and not a system based on cohorts. By cohortsperhaps , the Italian allies were building, but there was no certainty. The Romans and the inhabitants of Latium were built precisely according to maniples.
      By the way, there never were 20 cohorts in the legion. Ten.

      The Macedonian phalanx also had an organizational division - there were syntagms of 256 fighters. However, there is no evidence that this was reflected at the tactical level and increased the maneuverability of the phalanx. Therefore, one cannot automatically transfer the organizational division to the tactical one.

      No one knows whether there were gaps in the composition of the phalanx or whether it was a single whole, but most likely there were. Arrian mentions the formation of a phalanx in taxis of 1200-1500 people and it can be assumed that the taxis was an independent unit based on the description of the actions (“took two taxis of the phalangites”, etc.)

      They, using their numerical superiority, also ensured a longer formation front. Part of the forces (possibly phalanxes of local allies) were sent into a frontal attack on the phalanxes in order to constrain their actions and exhaust the enemy. And the cohorts took the phalanxes in pincers and hit the flanks. They destroyed the cavalry and lightly armed troops defending the flank and struck directly at the phalanx itself. The phalanx's ability to provide itself with protection from attacks from the flanks (possibly from the rear) was very limited. The battle turned into a complete massacre.


      Flight of fancy. There is no point in discussing. The clashes between the armies of Rome and Macedonia are described well. They need to be analyzed
  32. 0
    27 July 2024 09: 50
    Quote: Andobor
    The appearance of iron tools created the preconditions for the growth of productive forces on the contrary, growth associated with favorable climatic changes after the collapse of bronze, caused by sharp aridization, caused the massive use of iron tools, because many growing territories were left without bronze or its components, as a result of the destruction of global connections by the collapse of bronze, they began to work with iron and developed acceptable technologies for mass use, but in general iron was known at least from the middle bronze, but it was either very expensive or bad, and in conditions of universal availability of bronze they did not bother with it.

    What was the growth based on - what was the land used to cultivate or the hulls of ships secured?
    And what is the collapse of bronze? Bronze products were fully produced in the ancient period.
    There was no collapse of bronze.
    Mines in Spain and Britain, the Caucasus were discovered by Mediterranean inhabitants at the beginning of 2 thousand BC. and many functioned until the 20th century, and some still operate today.
    Therefore, there is no need to broadcast anti-scientific fiction.
    And another statement that demand creates supply is a myth.