Service and combat use of the SA-75MK "Dvina" air defense system in the Middle East
Although in the 1960–1970s the USSR adopted and exported the then very advanced S-75 family of air defense systems with 6-cm range guidance stations, it was the 10-cm range SA-75M "Dvina" complexes that became the most fighting. In addition to repelling American raids aviation to North Vietnam, they shot down Israeli warplanes in Egypt and Syria, and also countered Pakistani bombers during the Indian-Pakistani armed conflicts.
The massive use of Soviet medium-range air defense missile systems in local wars had a very noticeable impact on the course of military operations, preventing Western-made aircraft from dominating the air. This led to a change in the tactics of using combat aircraft and the introduction of active jamming and anti-radar stations. missiles not only on strategic bombers, but also on tactical and carrier-based aircraft.
However, even against similar aircraft, the effectiveness of the means Defense Soviet-made systems were not the same in different countries. Thus, the Vietnamese, who had to frequently change firing positions and drag equipment through the jungle almost by hand, achieved significantly higher results than the calculations of Egyptian and Syrian systems in the face of massive counteraction from American aviation.
The Arabs, and especially the Egyptians, were often extremely negligent about the need for relocation, camouflage, secrecy and radio silence, which led to unjustified losses of valuable anti-aircraft systems. When there were no Soviet advisers nearby, Arab officers did not always control the timeliness and quality of routine maintenance; in turn, the low performance discipline of local personnel affected the level of combat readiness of guidance stations, anti-aircraft missiles, mobile diesel power generators and other equipment.
For this reason, the number of equipment failures in Egypt and Syria turned out to be higher than in Vietnam, although the dry Middle Eastern climate was more favorable for the safety of electronics than the conditions of Southeast Asia. There are also cases when Egyptian crews, due to poor professional training or because of cowardice, stopped tracking the target.
Combat use of Egyptian SA-75MK Dvina air defense systems in the 1967 war
According to reference data, from 1965 to 1971 Egypt directly received from the Soviet Union fifty SA-75MK air defense systems (an option for non-socialist states) and 2 B-402V missiles. Several more complexes of this type were betrayed to Egypt by friendly countries.
Although Soviet military advisers and technical specialists spent a lot of time and effort training local personnel, during the Six-Day War of 1967, the Egyptian Dvina air defense systems did not have a noticeable impact on the course of hostilities. Their calculations were unable to prevent Israeli air strikes on airfields, radar stations, military bases, headquarters and communications centers. This is partly due to the suddenness of the Israeli attack and is largely due to the low professional qualities of the Egyptian crews, general disorganization and loss of centralized control.
According to Western data, the Egyptians, having 18 air defense systems, were able to launch 22 missile defense systems, shooting down two Mirage III fighters. According to Soviet sources, Egyptian air defense, having 25 combat-ready air defense systems, shot down 9 Israeli aircraft. The reliable number of Israeli aircraft landed with the help of the B-750V air defense system is unknown, but Soviet data on the number of SA-75MK air defense systems deployed in Egypt seem more truthful, in 1965–1967. Egyptian representatives accepted 29 complexes of this type.
During the fighting, a significant part of the divisions armed with the Dvina complexes were disabled or destroyed.
During the attack on Sinai, the Israelis captured some elements of the SA-75MK air defense system, including B-750B anti-aircraft missiles, which subsequently facilitated the development of countermeasures.
Combat use of Egyptian SA-75MK Dvina air defense systems in a war of attrition
After the cessation of hostilities, the restoration of the Egyptian air defense system began, and deliveries of Dvina complexes from the USSR continued. In 1969, 8 units were transferred, in 1970 – 10 units, in 1973 – 3 units. Unlike North Vietnam, Egypt also received more advanced 6-cm range S-75 Desna systems: in 1970 - 20 air defense systems and in 1971 - 12 air defense systems. In addition, in 1973, at least eight more advanced S-75M Volga air defense systems with long-range B-755 missiles were transferred, which Egypt later shared with China.
During low-intensity combat operations, which are known as a war of attrition, there was also active use of Egyptian SA-75MK air defense systems. In 1969, two SA-75MK anti-aircraft missile brigades (7 zrdn) were deployed along the Suez Canal in the vicinity of the cities of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez.
In 1969, an Israeli Do 750 piston aircraft, used as a reconnaissance spotter, was shot down by a B-27B missile not far from the demarcation line. The pilot died, and the observer pilot escaped by parachute.
Airplane Do 27
In response, the Israeli Air Force attacked Egyptian air defense positions. In the fight against air defense systems, Israeli aviation widely used the experience of the US Air Force in Vietnam with adaptation to local conditions. The leadership of the Israeli Air Force, when planning operations, sought to avoid losses. At the same time, targets were carefully selected, the sequence of strikes and tactical techniques were determined.
Each raid was thoroughly prepared. For this purpose, a thorough reconnaissance of the targets of the airstrike was carried out, the surrounding area, hidden approaches to it and the air defense system of the opposing side were studied. The pilots mastered flight routes and methods of action against targets using a terrain layout. The actions of Israeli aviation had great flexibility and lack of stereotypes.
When striking at the positions of the air defense missile forces, a wide variety of tactical techniques were used. As a rule, the approach to the launch position of the air defense missile system took place at extremely low altitudes (30–50 m), and 3–5 km from the location of the launchers, a climb was made to overcome the fire of anti-aircraft weapons.artillery cover and visual aiming, then the aircraft dived from a height of 1–500 m to drop bombs and launch unguided rockets, exiting the attack at low altitude. Often, strikes on launch sites were carried out from several directions. At the same time, groups of aircraft or individual vehicles performed diversionary maneuvers.
American-made Israeli aircraft were equipped with warning equipment for radar exposure and missile launches. This made it possible to carry out an anti-missile maneuver with even greater efficiency, which was generally similar to that used by American pilots in Vietnam. The aircraft was removed from the air defense missile zone during the missile's flight by turning 90–180° with a sharp increase in speed to 450 m/s due to the inclusion of afterburner, with an overload of up to 8G, and the flight altitude was reduced to a minimum.
The anti-missile maneuver with high overloads was especially typical for “fire reconnaissance” aircraft. These groups consisted of fighter-bombers with a small combat load, controlled by experienced pilots trained for operations in air defense zones. “Fire reconnaissance” aircraft, entering the range of anti-aircraft missile systems at medium altitudes, called fire on themselves and, after revealing the location of the launch positions, carried out an energetic anti-missile maneuver to exit the affected area. After that, they directed strike groups operating at low altitudes at the detected air defense systems, and under favorable conditions, they destroyed the identified targets themselves.
When organizing missile and bomb attacks on Egyptian air defense systems, the Israelis very widely used active noise interference. Helicopters, transport piston aircraft, and light jet bombers Vautour II were used as jammers, which patrolled 20–40 km east of the Suez Canal at an altitude of 3–000 m. In addition, interference was created by a ground-based generator located 5 km from the canal on a hill. After the F-000E Phantom II aircraft entered service with the Israeli Air Force, jamming was carried out by these fighter-bombers from the strike groups.
In turn, in the organization of the combat work of the Egyptian SA-75MK divisions there were a number of significant shortcomings that were repeated, and, despite the failures and losses, due attention was not given to their elimination.
The starting positions of field-type air defense systems were poorly equipped in engineering terms, which did not provide even minimal protection for military equipment and personnel. As a rule, there was no camouflage. When an anti-aircraft missile was launched, a cloud of dust and sand, clearly visible from a distance, rose, which could have been avoided by watering the soil around the launchers. The Egyptians did not build false and reserve positions that could be passed off as workers and simulate the launch of missiles by detonating TNT blocks and thus forming a sand and dust cloud that hung in the absence of wind for up to half an hour.
The desire to cover as much territory as possible led to the dispersion of anti-aircraft divisions and did not allow the organization of reliable focal defense. Firing positions in the center of the grouping of Egyptian air defense forces were located at intervals of 25–30 km, and flank positions at distances of 65–75 km. With this order of placement of the complexes, it was impossible to ensure mutual overlap of the affected areas at low altitudes, and the SA-75MKs located on the flanks had no fire interaction at all with the divisions of the central group.
In addition, several battalions deployed in mountainous terrain had limited low-altitude fire capabilities due to high closure angles. Unstable and poorly protected communications with brigade command posts did not always allow timely notification and target designation. Not all air defense systems had their own P-12 meter-range surveillance radars. Coverage of air defense missile systems by anti-aircraft artillery was often insufficient, or even absent altogether.
The anti-aircraft machine gun mounts of 12,7–14,5 mm caliber, which were available in the air defense system, did not provide effective cover, since fire was opened, as a rule, after the enemy aircraft had left the attack. To some extent, the Strela-2M MANPADS available in the Egyptian army could have helped, but for some reason they were not used to protect the SA-75MK positions.
From July 1969 to March 1970, the SA-75MK air defense system carried out 36 firing exercises and shot down 8 Israeli aircraft. As a rule, the shelling was carried out in a 2-3 missile salvo, the average consumption was 9,1 missiles per shot down aircraft. Taking into account the fact that during the same period the Israeli Air Force neutralized 18 anti-aircraft missile divisions, the successes of the Egyptian air defense systems were more than modest. In Vietnam, before the SA-75M air defense system was put out of action, it managed to hit an average of 4–5 American aircraft.
Egypt's anti-aircraft missile forces not only could not protect important facilities, but were even incapable of self-defense. The complexes deployed along the Suez Canal required cover, and above all from attacks from low altitudes. As a result of the lack of proper camouflage and the long-term presence of the missile defense system in the same positions, Israeli intelligence was able to uncover the design of the Egyptian anti-aircraft missile defense, identify its weak points and then defeat it.
After analyzing the results of the confrontation with the Israeli Air Force, the Egyptian command, together with the leadership of a group of Soviet advisers, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to radically strengthen the anti-aircraft missile forces and change the tactics of use. A restructuring of the organizational and staffing structure of air defense was carried out, a network of command posts was created, proper maintenance, military and medium repairs of military equipment were organized, the number of deployed divisions was increased, existing air defense systems were refined and new systems were put into operation, much attention was paid to the training and retraining of personnel .
The matter was not limited to improving only the Egyptian anti-aircraft missile systems; in March 1970, in the port of Alexandria, units of the 18th Special Anti-Aircraft Missile Division, formed from Soviet military personnel, began to unload. The division included three anti-aircraft missile brigades. All brigades consisted of 8 S-125 air defense systems (4 launchers), a cover group of 4 ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” and a squad of anti-aircraft gunners with “Strela-2” MANPADS in each.
Until July 1970, the number of deployed air defense systems did not yet allow the creation of a strong air defense group along the Suez Canal. In order to make the actions of Israeli aviation as difficult as possible, ambushes of maneuver groups formed from 3-4 complexes were organized. In order to increase mobility, sometimes the number of launchers in the involved divisions was halved.
To ensure reliable mutual cover, the missile defense systems were located at a distance of 7–10 km from each other. The advancement of divisions was carried out in the dark. Particular attention was paid to ensuring secrecy and secrecy during the preparation of the ambush. After arriving in a given area and deploying the launcher, routine and camouflage work was carried out throughout the night.
The divisions' actions were controlled and target designation was issued from a mobile command post equipped in the KUNG of a ZIL-157 vehicle. In order to avoid revealing the coordinates of firing positions by electronic reconnaissance means, communication between the air defense system and the command post was carried out mainly through wire lines. Data on the air situation was received at command posts via a radio network from nearby surveillance radars and visual observation posts.
These measures have yielded positive results. Due to the use of the surprise factor, the number of targets hit increased significantly. In May-June 1970 alone, Egyptian air defense systems carried out six firing from ambushes and shot down three enemy aircraft.
After the deployment of new complexes and modernization of existing SA-75MK air defense systems, as well as the introduction of new tactics, camouflage measures and improvement of the engineering equipment of firing positions, there was a qualitative increase in the combat capabilities of the Egyptian anti-aircraft missile forces. To cover important facilities and troop concentration areas, large mixed anti-aircraft missile groups began to be created, consisting of SA-75MK, S-75 and S-125 air defense systems. They also had units of small-caliber artillery and Strela-2M MANPADS.
The newly formed air defense units had to independently conduct combat operations in a difficult air situation, repel simultaneous enemy air strikes from different directions and at all altitudes, with a raid density in the main direction of up to 10–12 aircraft per minute.
As of the end of June 1970, the central part of the Suez Canal was covered by a mixed air defense group, which included 16 zrdn. Its battle formations were deployed along a front of 45 km and a depth of 25 km. The intervals between the launches were 6–12 km. There were reserve positions for each division. A number of decoy positions were also equipped using mock-ups and P-12 roving radars. To cover the air defense system, eight regiments of anti-aircraft artillery of 37–57 mm caliber, sixteen machine-gun companies with 12,7–14,5 mm anti-aircraft guns, 12 self-propelled ZSU-23-4 “Shilka”, 20 platoons of MANPADS “Strela-2M” were allocated.
Faced with such a powerful group, Israel suffered serious losses. On June 30, 1970, Israeli aviation lost seven aircraft, 5 of them were carried out by on-site air defense systems, and another 2 were hit by operators of the Strela-2M MANPADS. During the confrontation between Egyptian air defense and Israeli pilots, two divisions were put out of action. An attempt by the Israeli Air Force to take revenge on July 3, 1970 led to the loss of three more aircraft. In June-July 1970, Egyptian SA-75MK air defense systems conducted 65 firing exercises and destroyed 11 aircraft with an average consumption of 12,9 missiles per downed vehicle.
Although Israeli pilots achieved significant success at the initial stage of the war of attrition, after the strengthening of Egyptian air defense they were unable to solve the tasks assigned to them, and in August 1970, the military-political leadership of Israel agreed to conclude a truce.
However, the fighting did not completely end there. On September 17, 1971, the Egyptians hit a C-750 Stratofreighter military transport aircraft, converted for electronic reconnaissance, with a B-97B missile.
C-97 Stratofreighter
The Israeli C-97 was shot down at a distance of more than 30 km, but it is unclear which system got it: the 10-cm SA-75MK “Dvina” or the 6-cm S-75 “Desna”. In any case, the pilots of a very large aircraft for those times exposed themselves by entering the air defense missile system’s kill zone.
Total for 1969–1971 Egyptian air defense missile systems fired 124 shots, expending 264 missiles and hitting 32 targets. The average consumption per aircraft shot down was 8,3 missiles. However, these are general statistics for the SA-75MK, S-75 and S-125 air defense systems.
Combat use of the SA-75MK air defense system in the Yom Kippur War
To Syria in 1968–1969. six SA-75MK and 344 B-750V missile defense systems were delivered, which, along with Egyptian systems, were also used against Israeli aircraft in 1973. However, in the Yom Kippur War, the Syrian and Egyptian “seventy-fives” found themselves in secondary roles and mainly covered rear targets where enemy aircraft did not fly often. In addition, the Israeli “Phantoms”, striking in the depths of the territory, carried very effective active jamming stations, which suppressed the transmission line of guidance commands, which negatively affected the results of the shooting.
Much more successful in this conflict were the low-altitude S-125 air defense systems and, in particular, the Kvadrat mobile military systems (the export version of the Kub air defense system). The 3M9 missile defense system, used as part of the Kvadrat air defense system, had a semi-active radar guidance system, against which in 1973 the Israeli Air Force did not have jamming stations.
Nevertheless, Egyptian and Syrian SA-75MKs also hit air targets. But, apparently, the Egyptians also used the S-75 Desna air defense system, which in the reports on the combat activities of the air defense forces is not separated from the SA-75MK Dvina.
The first victim of the Syrian Dvina air defense system in this conflict was a Skyhawk, shot down on October 6 in the area of Mount Hermon. The pilot was injured during the ejection, but survived and was rescued by Israeli ground forces.
Wreckage of an Israeli Skyhawk
On October 7, 1973, an A-4N fell in the vicinity of the Egyptian city of Port Said, at which several missiles were fired by SA-75MK (possibly S-75) and S-125 crews. But who shot him down is not known for certain. The pilot died.
On October 9, 1973, while repelling an attack by Israeli Phantoms on the main headquarters of the Syrian armed forces in Damascus, an F-750E was hit by a B-4B missile. The pilot died, and the operator managed to eject and was captured. This airstrike killed many civilians as a series of bombs hit residential areas. After this air raid, the Syrians removed the Kvadrat air defense system brigade from the front and used it to protect the capital.
On October 11, 1973, a Syrian SA-75MK in the Tell Shams area finished off a CM-170 Magister training aircraft damaged by ZPU fire, which was used as a light attack aircraft.
Light attack aircraft CM-170 Magister
Despite numerous injuries, the pilot managed to cross the front line and successfully eject.
On October 11, 1973, an A-75N attack aircraft was shot down by a Syrian SA-5MK complex 4 km northeast of Mount Hermon. The pilot was captured.
On October 13, 1973, an Egyptian SA-75MK or S-75 hit a two-seat Skyhawk on a reconnaissance flight along the Suez Canal. Both crew members ejected, but one did not survive.
On October 17, 1973, the joint actions of the Egyptian SA-75MK and Kvadrat air defense systems managed to shoot down an F-4E fighter-bomber. The pilot and operator were missing.
On the same day, in the area of Port Said and Kantara, Egyptian air defense shot down three Skyhawks and two Phantoms. It is believed that two aircraft became victims of the “seventy-fives”. The two pilots managed to successfully eject over their territory. The F-4E crews were captured. One A-4H pilot was killed.
On November 9, 1973, a meeting with a B-4B anti-aircraft missile turned out to be fatal for the F-750E. The plane was performing a reconnaissance flight over Egypt at an altitude of about 18 km at a speed of 1,6 M. The crew ejected, but the operator died from decompression due to damage to the high-altitude suit. After this incident, the Israelis began to use UAVs to conduct reconnaissance over the territory of Syria and Egypt, which were also successfully intercepted by the SA-75MK air defense system.
Taking into account the fact that the Israeli Air Force in 1973 lost at least 110 aircraft of various types from enemy fire, the results of the combat work of the Syrian and Egyptian crews of the Dvina and Desna air defense systems may seem insignificant. Indeed, many more planes and helicopters were shot down by crews of the Kvadrat and S-125 complexes, as well as MANPADS, anti-aircraft artillery and fighters.
However, one should not underestimate the importance of the “seventy-five” as part of an air defense system. It was the presence of medium-range high-altitude complexes, which provided cover for strategically important objects in rear areas, that forced Israeli pilots to switch to low-altitude operations, where they came under attack from anti-aircraft artillery and MANPADS.
When planning long-range raids of F-4E fighter-bombers, the Israeli Air Force command was forced to take into account the presence of a significant number of SA-75MK and S-75 air defense systems in the depths of the enemy’s defense, and therefore the Phantoms on the external sling carried active jamming containers, which is significant reduced the combat load.
In addition, having noticed the launch of a “flying telegraph pole” (as Israeli pilots called the B-750B missile defense system), the Skyhawks and Phantoms often stopped performing their combat missions.
Operation of the SA-75MK complexes in Egypt and Syria continued until the second half of the 1980s. Subsequently, the Egyptians replaced them with their own modification of the "seventy-five", known as Tayir as Sabah ("Morning Bird"). This air defense system was created with technical support from China and Western companies.
In the Syrian air defense system, the SA-75MK complexes have been replaced by the S-75M/M3 Volga air defense system with a 6-cm range SNR.
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