Deployment of T-PVO – territorial air defense forces of the Russian Federation
The reality is that the number of kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of Ukraine against targets located deep in the territory of the Russian Federation is gradually increasing. Not only military facilities, as well as oil storage facilities and oil refineries, but also power supply facilities have already begun to come under attack. If anyone expected it to be different, they were clearly mistaken.
The problem of increasing the number of strikes delivered by high-precision weapons long-range, against targets located deep in the territory of our country, has already been raised by the author more than once, and kamikaze UAVs occupy a special place in it.
Firstly, the Ukrainian Armed Forces simply do not have any other long-range precision weapons – cruise missiles. missiles (KR) and operational-tactical missiles (OTR) capable of attacking targets at a range of several thousand kilometers. Not yet.
Secondly, even if the Armed Forces of Ukraine have such cruise missiles and OTRs, their number will not be comparable to the number of long-range kamikaze UAVs that Ukraine can produce independently, receive in the form of “assembly kits” or in the form of already assembled products.
A large number of kamikaze UAVs, combined with data provided by Western intelligence, allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to plan and carry out strikes “bypassing” Russian air defense systems (Defense). This means constant and painful losses of important infrastructure facilities, particularly sensitive industrial facilities that are difficult and expensive to restore, and the loss of vulnerable and expensive combat units, such as aircraft at airfields.
Nevertheless, the situation in this direction is changing somewhat sluggishly, for example, for aircraft, judging by open data, shelters, at least light ones, are still not being built, and industry is in no hurry to protect its facilities, for example, with barrage balloons.
Apparently, we can’t afford such “luxury” yet...
At the same time, this problem has a solution. We have already repeatedly discussed various options for protection against Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs on the pages of VO, in particular, in the material "Global Ear": a network for detecting enemy air attacks a sensor network was considered that makes it possible to reveal the direction of movement of an enemy kamikaze UAV, and in the material Air defense of cities, oil depots and industrial facilities: Avanpost-S UAV observers and FPV interceptors the possibility of creating and deploying relatively accessible means of detecting and destroying kamikaze UAVs on the approaches to the protected object was considered.
To increase the speed of creation and operational efficiency of such systems, it is necessary to ensure their deployment and use by both government (military) and civilian - commercial structures. Accordingly, a number of characteristics of these systems intended for government and commercial structures will differ.
The initiative, implemented as a whole, may be designated as T-Air Defense - the territorial air defense forces of the Russian Federation.
Air defense of Moscow during the Great Patriotic War (WWII)
T-air defense of government agencies
Territorial air defense forces can be created on the basis of various units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces), including conscripts, units of the Russian Guard, and possibly other government agencies.
The deployment of the Big Ear system will primarily fall on the state. Of course, theoretically, private companies can do this, for example, any of the cellular operators or all of them together, but in reality it is unlikely that any of them will decide on such a large-scale infrastructure project without external investment.
In addition, the legitimacy of collecting data obtained in this way will be questionable, and in any case, the final information should flow somewhere to the RF Armed Forces - it’s not like sending out information about the flight routes of kamikaze UAVs via SMS.
As for the air defense systems themselves, they are discussed in detail in the above-mentioned article - it should be based on observation UAVs of the “Avanpost-S” type, operating in the “quasi-mast” mode, and to destroy long-range kamikaze UAVs of the enemy, FPV should be used. interceptors.
Equipment lifting system "Quazimast" of the Kalashnikov concern of the state corporation ROSTECH
Not only “classical” FPVs can be considered for use as FPV interceptors.drones quadrocopter type, but also aircraft-type kamikaze UAVs or other design solutions. For example, very interesting models of aircraft-type UAVs are produced by the design bureau (KB) "Oko" from the city of St. Petersburg, it is possible that they UAV "PRIVET-82" may well be used as an interceptor.
T-air defense of civilian structures
As we said above, T-air defense for civilian structures will have certain differences imposed by the legislation of the Russian Federation. It is unlikely that anyone will allow commercial entities to use FPV interceptors with live warheads. And it is often inappropriate to use explosives on the protected objects themselves - otherwise the consequences of repelling an enemy kamikaze UAV attack may be worse than the possible results of the attack itself.
At the same time, the Avanpost-S observation UAVs can be used without any restrictions - only their lifting height must be agreed upon with the responsible structures.
Returning to the problem of FPV interceptors - for their use within the framework of air defense of civilian structures, they must defeat enemy kamikaze UAVs without the use of explosives.
The Red Bull Drone 1 UAV from the Dutch company Drone Gods can accelerate to a speed of 350 kilometers per hour - potentially FPV interceptors of this design can effectively attack enemy kamikaze UAVs without using a warhead
This can be done in several ways, for example, in a kinetic way, when the body of the FPV interceptor is strengthened, perhaps rigid wings or some kind of “whiskers” made of durable materials are installed, increasing the likelihood of the FPV interceptor colliding with an enemy kamikaze UAV, destruction or simply falling the last one.
Net throwers can also be installed - for self-defense of an individual fighter they are ineffective, but for an FPV interceptor they can be quite effective weapons. In addition, it can be combined - first, throwing a net is used, and then directly defeating an enemy kamikaze UAV using a ram.
The optimal option or options can only be determined based on the results of full-scale tests, including on real objects. It is possible that some manufactured cables with a length of about three meters, made of a composite material or something like fishing line, which is used for catching very large fish, can be used, and on these cables a net or something like anchors will already be attached, then there is an FPV interceptor that will attack “on the fly.”
An important advantage of FPV interceptors that are not equipped with warheads will be their reduced danger for use in dense urban areas or industrial facilities, especially those prone to fire or explosion. And they certainly won’t be able to “fold” the entrance of a residential building - even easily erected structures can withstand their impact.
Limits of responsibility
How can the boundaries of responsibility be distributed between state paramilitary and civilian commercial structures?
Of course, paramilitary structures must protect their facilities - air bases, naval bases, warehouses, locations of military equipment and personnel. They will also be responsible for the defense of important infrastructure facilities, such as the Crimean Bridge. Potentially, paramilitary structures could create a kind of “Air Defense Barrier” - an extended area protected from penetration by enemy kamikaze UAVs.
Russian UAV-interceptor "Vogan-9SP" from Red Line
In materials Waiting for the Helios-RLD UAV: for protection against low-flying air attack weapons и UAV "Sirius-PVO": hunter of air attack weapons we talked about the need to differentiate the areas of responsibility of “traditional” air defense systems and air defense systems of the new format; it is possible that the same division will make sense for the “Air Defense Barrier”.
Passing through the “Air Defense Barrier”, the enemy must lose a significant part of its kamikaze UAVs, as a result of which the work of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) will be simplified, and they can concentrate on difficult targets, such as cruise and operational-tactical missiles.
But the enemy can also strike elements of the Barrier-Air Defense?
Maybe if you approach your work in a formulaic and stupid way. Or you can change the location of the “base stations” of UAV observers and FPV interceptors several times a day, then enemy weapons will attack empty sites, and the creation of false targets has not been canceled.
Once in one telegram channel they wrote that somewhere in Laos they created such successful dummies of air defense systems that the higher command wanted to take them and transfer them to protect another facility, mistaking them for real combat vehicles. Is it really impossible to organize mass production of dummies of military equipment, for example, by convicts in the penitentiary system?
UAV observers and FPV interceptors themselves are much more convenient for camouflage - a ground platform with a diesel generator can hide somewhere in the trees or in some garage, and a UAV on a power-control cable will move several tens of meters from the base. In this case, a well-covered position of FPV interceptors will be almost impossible to detect. Of course, we are talking only about rear areas where the enemy will not be able to operate with their FPV drones - somewhere on the order of hundreds of kilometers from the line of combat contact (LCC).
Instead of the “Barrier-Air Defense” or together with it, focal T-Air Defense zones can be created, for example, to protect cities and other populated areas.
It is possible that the creation of T-air defense focal zones will be easier organizationally, it will be possible to gradually close city by city, and it is possible that the best solution will be a combination of T-air defense focal zones to protect cities and “Barrier-air defense” focal zones, which can be located in places poorly visible by radar stations of air defense systems, for example, with difficult terrain.
Commercial power station for tethered UAVs. Image by karneev.com
Civilian commercial structures must create T-air defense zones around their facilities - factories, oil depots, gas and oil processing enterprises, power plants and much more. They should have their own interest in this, if they have a head on their shoulders - how much more expensive will a complex repair or replacement of a distillation column cost? What could be the consequences of an explosion of a container with toxic substances?
Who will pay for the destroyed objects - insurance companies or the Russian budget? If there are insurance companies, then they can include clauses in the insurance contract that payments from UAV strikes are made only if there is a deployed air defense system at the site. Those who do not understand the importance of solving this problem can be “stimulated” by legislative measures.
T-air defense - to protect ships and the Crimean bridge
The proposed T-air defense format in the form of observation UAVs and FPV interceptors will make it possible to effectively fight not only against enemy kamikaze UAVs, but also against kamikaze unmanned boats (UUVs).
UAV observers and FPV interceptors can be placed directly on the ships of the Russian Navy fleet (Navy), and their “civilian” version on civilian ships. In fact, these civilian T-air defense systems are not weapons, so there should be no problems with them, but with their help you can fight off not only Ukrainian BEC-kamikazes, but also pirates - this problem is still not lost relevance.
In the material The Kerch barrier will protect the Crimean bridge from Ukrainian terrorist attacks from water and from under water the author proposed to ensure the defense of the Crimean Bridge from Ukrainian BEC-kamikazes by deploying a line of universal protective pontoon modules (UPPM). Something similar is now being implemented in a limited format by coupling a certain number of barges (one would only like to hope that they are equipped with nets that go to depth, since the power steering is probably working on BEC-kamikazes capable of diving under such barriers).
Barges guarding the Crimean Bridge from BEC kamikazes
Additionally, the barges can accommodate observation UAVs and T-air defense FPV interceptors, which will be able to work against both kamikaze UAVs and enemy kamikaze UAVs.
Conclusions
Recently, the Bloomberg news agency announced that Russia and China are developing a new kamikaze UAV, such as the Iranian Shahed-136 or the Russian Geran-2. It is assumed that the new UAV will be able to be produced in significantly larger quantities than Geranium-2. The problem is that similar work can be carried out in Ukraine, and as a result, at one “wonderful” moment, losses from Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs may become too significant to ignore.
In addition, intentionally or accidentally, the Armed Forces of Ukraine or the power steering can strike such an object, the destruction of which can lead to monstrous consequences, as a result of which Russia will be forced to either use nuclear weapons or capitulate – there simply will be no alternatives.
So maybe we shouldn’t wait for the worst case scenarios, but start creating territorial air defense forces now?
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