Service and combat use of Soviet and Chinese SA-75 "Dvina" air defense systems
At the time of its appearance, the SA-75 Dvina air defense missile system was a significant step forward in the development of domestic air defense. Rocket B-750 compared to anti-aircraft artillery had an order of magnitude higher probability of hitting a target and an altitude that was unattainable for anti-aircraft guns.
Although the original SA-75 and improved SA-75M were developed to combat relatively unmaneuverable bombers and reconnaissance aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes, these air defense systems turned out to be quite effective against tactical and carrier-based aircraft aviation, having a noticeable impact on the course of a number of local conflicts.
The Dvina family complexes have not been in service for a long time. This is due to the fact that the air defense system with a 10-cm range guidance station was significantly inferior to the S-75 complexes operating in the 6-cm range in terms of guidance accuracy and noise immunity. Nevertheless, although not the most advanced air defense systems SA-75 and SA-75M played a huge role in the development of our anti-aircraft missile forces, covering important defense facilities and industrial and administrative centers in the late 1950s - early 1960s, as well as allowing us to acquire the necessary experience of mass deployment, operation and combat use, which was subsequently used on more advanced S-75 complexes operating in the 6-cm range.
It was the Dvina air defense system that was the first to be successfully used against real targets - high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft invading the airspace of the People's Republic of China and the USSR. The upgraded SA-75M complexes actively fought in Vietnam, the Middle East and other hot spots.
In addition to the USSR, the SA-75 and SA-75M air defense systems were in service in the following countries: Albania (1 zrdn), Algeria (3 zrdn), Afghanistan (3 zrdn), Bulgaria (15 zrdn), Hungary (10 zrdn), Vietnam ( 94 zrdn), East Germany (20 zrdn), Egypt (82 zrdn), India (21 zrdn), Indonesia (2 zrdn), Iraq (1 zrdn, transferred to Egypt in 1968), Yemen (4 zrdn), Cyprus (2 zrdn , in 1968 transferred to Egypt), China (5 zrdn), Cuba (24 zrdn), Poland (16 zrdn), Romania (10 zrdn), North Korea (39 zrdn), Syria (6 zrdn), Somalia (9 zrdn), Sudan (4 zrdn), Czechoslovakia (16 zrdn) and Yugoslavia (5 zrdn).
The latest SA-75Ms were transferred to Somalia (1976) and Yemen (1977), and these were not new SAMs, but systems taken from storage in the USSR and restored at the plant. The production of a number of SA-75M components for foreign customers continued until the end of the 1970s. In total, taking into account the SAMs intended for Defense USSR, about 500 Dvina family complexes were manufactured.
SA-75 and SA-75M air defense systems in the USSR air defense system and their combat use
After the adoption of the Dvina air defense system into service by the mid-1960s, more than a hundred SA-75 and improved SA-75M were delivered for domestic consumption. These complexes were in service with the USSR Air Defense Forces, and were also used for some time in the front-line and army air defense units of the Ground Forces.
It’s worth saying right away that the relatively low-mobility and very bulky systems, well suited for long-term combat duty in prepared positions, were not optimal for use in the Ground Forces. Subsequently, they were replaced by the Krug air defense system on a tracked base.
Soon after the start of mass production of the first very imperfect “five-cabin” SA-75 air defense systems with the B-750 missile defense system, which had a limited operational life, production of a “three-cabin” version with modified B-750V missiles began.
The first known case of combat use of the SA-75 in the USSR occurred on November 16, 1959, on that day an American high-altitude reconnaissance balloon was shot down near Volgograd by a B-750 missile defense system. After this, the Dvina air defense systems were regularly used to combat spy balloons, although, of course, the cost of the missile was many times higher than the cost of the reconnaissance probe.
Beginning in the summer of 1956, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft began to regularly fly over Soviet territory. They repeatedly invaded the airspace of the USSR and photographed large administrative and industrial centers, cosmodromes, missile ranges, long-range aviation airfields and naval bases. Flying at an altitude of over 20 km, the U-2 aircraft was invulnerable to air defense fighters. This situation made our leadership very nervous. To all Soviet diplomatic protests, the Americans declared their non-involvement.
American high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft U-2
The destruction of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which occurred on May 1, 1960 in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk, received wide resonance.
From materials declassified in the 1990s, it became known that the reconnaissance aircraft was able to hit the then latest B-750B missile (a modification with an altitude reach of up to 25 km) at a range of 27 km. The launch took place when the target was 35 km away. After the launch, the pilot turned the plane approximately 30° to the right, as a result of which the missile attacked the target almost in pursuit and the fragmentation warhead went off behind the plane - 15 meters to the right and below.
As a result, the tail section of the plane was destroyed, but the pressurized cabin with the pilot remained intact. After the plane lost control, pilot Francis Gary Powers bailed out and was detained by local residents after landing.
The rocket crews mistook the wreckage of the U-2 that had fallen apart in the air for passive interference, and three more missiles were fired. At the same time, the operators of the guidance station and P-12 radar did not record the fact that the intruder was destroyed. At that time, several Soviet fighters were in the air, trying in vain to intercept the intruder.
Due to confusion at the control level, half an hour after the defeat of the U-2, a pair of MiG-19s, raised to intercept the intruder, were fired at by another three-missile salvo. One of the pilots, Ayvazyan, promptly dived under the lower limit of the affected area, and the other pilot, Safronov, died along with the plane.
However, despite this tragic episode, the anti-aircraft missile forces for the first time confirmed their high efficiency. The missilemen’s victory looked especially impressive against the backdrop of repeated unsuccessful attempts by interceptor fighters to reach the U-2.
The destruction of the high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, which was considered invulnerable, was a very unpleasant surprise for the Americans. After this, reconnaissance aircraft flights over the territory of the USSR ceased.
In the Soviet Union, the modernized 10-cm SA-75M air defense system, unlike abroad, was used for a relatively short time. Thus, in the Far East, the last complexes of this type were removed from firing positions in 1970. Some of the SA-75Ms that served in the USSR were delivered to foreign customers after restoration and modernization, but the bulk were poisoned in storage, where they remained until the early 1980s.
For some time, some elements of outdated complexes were used as material aids for training and teaching calculations. Now the B-750B anti-aircraft missiles have been preserved only in the form of monuments and museum exhibits.
Deployment of Soviet SA-75M air defense systems in Cuba
In 1962, to cover the Soviet military contingent transferred to Cuba as part of Operation Anadyr, along with anti-aircraft artillery and MiG-21F-13 fighters, three anti-aircraft missile regiments of four SA-75M Dvina anti-aircraft missile divisions were deployed on the island. (12 air defense systems with 72 launchers). Covering the air situation and issuing target designations were entrusted to radio engineering units, which had 36 radar stations, including the newest ones at that time: P-12 and P-30. Taking into account the radars that the Cubans had, there were more than 50 radars operating on the island.
Despite the deployment of Soviet air defense systems on the island, American aircraft carried out regular reconnaissance flights over Cuba. On August 29, after deciphering photographs taken by a U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, the Americans became aware of the presence of a SA-75M air defense system on Cuban territory.
On September 5, American aviation photographic reconnaissance discovered supersonic MiG-21 fighters at the Cuban Santa Clara airbase. In this regard, fearing the loss of slow and unmaneuverable high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, the US Air Force command temporarily stopped using them, and photo reconnaissance was assigned to the supersonic RF-101C Voodoo and F-104С Starfighter with suspended reconnaissance containers, which, it was believed, due to their relatively low altitude flight and high speed were less vulnerable.
However, after a single RF-101C was almost intercepted by a pair of MiG-21F-13s in early October, reconnaissance was once again entrusted to high-altitude U-2 pilots.
On October 14, an American spy plane detected the presence of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, which came as a shock to the US military-political leadership. On October 16, information about the launchers of Soviet MRBMs was brought to the attention of the US President. This date is considered the beginning of events that in the world stories known as the Cuban Missile Crisis.
After the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy demanded an increase in the number of reconnaissance flights, and from October 14 to December 16, 1962, U-2 aircraft made 102 reconnaissance flights over Liberty Island.
On October 22, the US President declared a "quarantine of the island of Cuba" and US military forces in the area were placed on high alert. About a quarter of the available B-47 Stratojet and B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers were prepared for attacks on the island. American tactical and carrier-based aircraft were ready to carry out up to 2 combat sorties in the first 000 hours. Near Cuban airspace, American pilots simulated massive raids.
An attack by American combat aircraft on Soviet and Cuban targets was expected on the night of October 26–27 or at dawn on October 27. Due to the aggravation of the situation, Fidel Castro and the commander of the Soviet military contingent, Army General I. A. Pliev, gave the order to shoot down American planes “in the event of an obvious attack.”
On October 27, eight violations of Cuban airspace were observed. At the same time, Cuban anti-aircraft gunners opened fire on the intruders, and they managed to seriously damage one F-104C. To determine the deployment locations of Soviet ballistic missiles and air defense forces, the Americans decided to conduct additional aerial reconnaissance. A U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flying out to photograph at an altitude of 21 m was hit by a B-000B anti-aircraft missile, and the American pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, was killed.
After the downing of U-2, the situation became tense, and at that time an American strike on Cuba seemed inevitable to many, which could most likely provoke a global nuclear conflict between the USSR and the USA.
Fortunately, common sense prevailed, the parties managed to reach an agreement, and a nuclear disaster did not occur. In exchange for guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba and the withdrawal of missiles from Turkish territory, the Soviet leadership agreed to remove its own nuclear weapons from the island. weapon and means of its delivery. To control the withdrawal of Soviet missiles, U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were used, and the SA-75M air defense missile system crews were ordered not to open fire on them.
Soviet crews were in Cuba until 1964, after which all deployed systems were transferred to local military personnel. In parallel with the SA-75M air defense system, the Cuban side received MiG-21F-13 fighters, P-30, P-12 radars, PRV-10 altimeters and batteries of 57-100 mm anti-aircraft guns.
According to archival materials, during the USSR, a total of 24 SA-75M Dvina air defense systems with 961 B-750V missiles were transferred to the Cuban side. The operation of anti-aircraft systems with a 10-cm range guidance station, obtained during the Caribbean Crisis, in the Revolutionary Armed Forces continued until the mid-1980s.
SA-75 air defense system in China
In Soviet times, domestic sources avoided mentioning that the first case of successful combat use of domestically produced air defense systems occurred outside the USSR.
In the second half of the 1950s, massive air battles took place over the Strait of Formosa and the adjacent territory of the South China Sea between combat aircraft of the Air Force of the People's Republic of China and the Air Force of the Republic of China, led by Marshal Chiang Kai-shek. Under the cover of air power, communist Chinese troops in 1958 tried to capture the islands of Kinmen and Mazu, located off the coast of mainland Fujian province.
Three years earlier, thanks to massive air support, the Kuomintang forces were driven out of the islands of Yijiangshan and Dachen. After both sides suffered significant losses in the air, large-scale battles between Chinese and Taiwanese fighters ceased, but the Americans and the Taiwanese leadership jealously monitored the strengthening of the military power of mainland China, and regular flights of high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were made over the territory of the PRC, in the cockpits of which sat Taiwanese pilots.
The high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were provided to the island Republic of China as part of free American aid. The US intelligence services were primarily interested in the progress of the implementation of the nuclear program in China, the construction of new aircraft factories and missile ranges.
From January to March 1959 alone, Taiwanese Air Force RB-57D aircraft violated Chinese airspace 10 times, conducting reconnaissance flights over thirteen Chinese provinces.
Initially, Martin RB-57D Canberra high-altitude strategic reconnaissance aircraft were used for flights over the Chinese mainland. This aircraft was created by Martin based on the British Electric Canberra bomber. A single-seat reconnaissance aircraft could fly at an altitude of more than 20 m and photograph ground objects at a distance of up to 000 km from its airfield.
Taiwan Air Force RB-57D high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
Due to the inability to intercept high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, despite deteriorating relations between Beijing and Moscow, at the personal request of Mao Zedong to China in 1958–1959. In compliance with strict secrecy, five new and at that time scarce SA-75 Dvina complexes and 62 B-750V missile defense systems were delivered.
A group of Soviet advisers and technical specialists also arrived in the PRC and organized the training, deployment and maintenance of the air defense system. Under their leadership, training and combat firing of anti-aircraft guided missiles at La-17 radio-controlled targets took place, conducted in the summer of 1959 at a training ground in the Gobi Desert. In the fall of 1959, the first divisions served by Chinese crews began combat duty.
The Chinese military-political leadership wanted to provide anti-aircraft cover for Beijing for the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1959, and this task was successfully completed.
The SA-75 combat crew deployed in the vicinity of Beijing did not have to wait long. On October 7, 1959, a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft of the Taiwanese Air Force RB-57D was shot down by a salvo of three missiles at an altitude of 20 m, killing the pilot of the aircraft. The tape recording of the pilot's negotiations with Taiwan stopped mid-sentence and, judging by it, he did not see any danger. The Soviet military adviser, Colonel Viktor Slyusar, was directly involved in the destruction of the Kuomintang high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.
As a result of a nearby explosion of the warhead, the plane fell apart, as a result of which its individual elements scattered over a radius of 5–6 kilometers. The official news agency of the PRC government, Xinhua, announced the destruction of the intruder aircraft, but hid from the general public the fact of the use of a new type of weapon.
The command of the Air Force of the Republic of China and the CIA officers who supervised the flights of Taiwanese high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft attributed the loss of the RB-57D to a technical malfunction. American experts did not admit the possibility that China had developed an anti-aircraft system capable of shooting down air targets flying at an altitude of more than 20 km.
In 1961, a group of pilots from Taiwan were trained in the United States for retraining as U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. The aircraft, created by Lockheed, was capable of conducting reconnaissance from an altitude of more than 21 m. The flight duration was 000 hours, the speed along the route was about 6,5 km/h. According to American data, six U-600s were transferred to the ROC Air Force, which were actively used in reconnaissance operations. However, the fate of these vehicles and their pilots was unenviable; they were all lost in accidents or became victims of the SA-2 air defense system.
Wreckage of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft shot down over China
Between November 1, 1963 and May 16, 1969, four high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were hit by anti-aircraft missiles and two more crashed in flight accidents. At the same time, two Taiwanese pilots who ejected from planes shot down by B-750B missiles were captured.
After the successful use of the SA-75 Dvina, the Chinese government asked for assistance in establishing mass production of the air defense system. The Soviet leadership considered it possible to meet the ally halfway, which, however, was increasingly demonstrating its own independence, developing into hostility, and transferred to the PRC technical documentation for the modernized SA-75M complex.
Increasing Soviet-Chinese disagreements became the reason that in 1960 the USSR announced the recall of all military advisers from China, which marked the beginning of the curtailment of military-technical cooperation between the USSR and the PRC. Under the current conditions, further improvement of Chinese anti-aircraft missile weapons took place on the basis of the “self-reliance” policy proclaimed in the country in the early 1960s.
Despite great difficulties and a significant time delay, the PRC at the end of 1966 managed to create and put into service its own complex, designated HQ-1.
Simultaneously with the development of the air defense system, the Chinese mobile standby radar station YLC-12 was created on the basis of the Soviet two-dimensional surveillance radar P-8.
However, production and technological problems hampered the production of ground-based components of the HQ-1 air defense system and anti-aircraft missiles, which negatively affected production volumes. Between 1966 and 1969, only four complexes were completed.
In the 1960s, China lagged far behind not only Western countries but also the Soviet Union in the production of electronic components. Reproducing the anti-aircraft missile guidance station has proven particularly difficult for Chinese industry.
Although the technical reliability of the electronic equipment of the Chinese HQ-1 complexes was lower than that of the Soviet SA-75M, they were also involved in combat duty. In total, until October 26, 1969, the PRC anti-aircraft missile forces shot down five high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, three reconnaissance aircraft drone, as well as several balloons.
In the second half of the 1960s, after becoming familiar with the Soviet SA-75M air defense systems, supplied to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by rail through Chinese territory, a more effective HQ-2 air defense system was created in the PRC.
R.S.
Having started an article devoted to the service and use of air defense systems of the Dvina family with a 10-cm range guidance station, I planned in one publication to briefly talk about the operation and the most striking combat episodes in which the SA-75 and SA-75M complexes took part. However, having assessed the amount of information, I came to the conclusion that I would have to do two parts on this topic, and the next article will be about the use of the SA-75M in Vietnam, the Middle East and other places.
To be continued ...
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