Soviet fighters in the USAF, MiG-23 (part 4)
"HEAV SED": MIG-23
Available in the US, the MiG-17F and the MiG-21F-13 no longer met the objectives of the project. By the middle of the 70, there was almost no such aircraft in service with the main likely opponents of the United States. Something more modern was needed. Although some kind of "stray" MiG-23, preferably a few ...
And after all found! In the middle of 70, Egypt changed its political orientation. By that time, the USSR had managed to supply the former main Arab ally, or rather, as they say in the West, the “client”, the party of the latest at that time MiG-23 fighter. At the start of 1974, Egypt received eight MiG-23MS, eight MiG-23BN and four Sparky MiG-23Us.
After cooling the Soviet-Egyptian relations, Cairo lost its technical support for the operation of MiGs, both 21-s and 23-s. For help in servicing and supplying aircraft with spare parts, the Egyptians turned to the United States and China.
“We give you spare parts — you give us planes,” they decided the question. China received ten MiG-21МФ, two MiG-23MS, two MiG-23БН and two MiG-23У. At least 16 MiG-21МФ, two MiG-21У, two Su-20, six MiG-23MS, six MiG-23БН and two Mi-8 helicopters were sent to the USA. Davis in his book talks about 12 MiG-23MS and one MiG-23BN, but information from the Internet is most likely closer to the truth: “BN-s” more than one hit the States.
The “Egyptian” MiG-23s were unassembled and delivered to Edward Air Base. In the main test center of the American aviation Soviet fighters were carefully studied, but they assembled and circled in Groom Lake, since the level of secrecy there was higher than at the Edwards base.
The tests of the aircraft (Have Pad Pad, Have Pad) were carried out under the auspices of the Foreign Technology Division of the USAF, but then a part of the fighters were handed over to the Red Eagles.
The first MiG-23 (MiG-23BN) 4477 squadron landed at Tonopah 1 in November 1980, then only one US Air Force tactical aviation command pilot David McClude had access to the MiG-23 (“Bandit 10”). In the 4477 Squadron, MiGi-23-e entered into service with the "sea" link "C", as naval aviation pilots, unlike their colleagues from the Air Force, had experience flying on airplanes with a variable sweep wing - F-14. The attitude to the MiG-23 immediately became controversial: "The admission to the flights on the Flogger was considered an honor, recognition of skill, although none of us wanted to fly it."
The MiG-23 began to show its temper already on the ground, almost crippling the US Air Force commander Grich. Griech accompanied Mr. Tonop George W. Bush who visited 18 in May 1982. Bush then served as vice president of the United States. The visit of the vice-president was pursuing two goals: to check the preparation of the base for receiving the F-117 and to personally get acquainted with the MiGs (Bush knew about the “Constant Pig” program since his work as director of the CIA). General Gritch later wished to inspect the cockpit of the MiG-23. Briefing was conducted by James Matini (27 Bandit). Together with the general, he climbed onto a ramp, similar to that supplied to passenger aircraft. As soon as the pilots looked into the cockpit, the ladder was folded - hydraulics refused. Matini barely kept the general from falling onto the concrete. And here is the MiG-23? It seems nothing to do with. Just standing next to ...
The first F-117 landed in Tonopah in the summer of 1982, and in the summer in the 4477, the commander was once again changed. Relocating to Tonopah F-117 made life difficult for the 4477 squadron personnel. Without that, unprecedented security measures effort even more. With information on the "invisible" acquainted only a few "bandits" from among the commanders of the squadron. The pilots said that now they are in captivity at their own base.
For the first time in Tonopah, along with MiGs, the regular military unit of the US Air Force began to be based.
The part “living” according to strictly prescribed instructions and instructions. A part is an elite one, the pilots and technicians of which considered themselves “better than not”. Naturally, mutual friction began. 4477-I was also an elite part, but the Red Eagles were always experiencing a shortage of airfield support. After the next refusal to “share” the truck crane, the chief of staff of 4477, on a pre-flight preparation, set a specific task:
- On the fuel saved during the execution of the main task, dive from 9000 to 150 m and at this height pass over the fukers in supersonic sound.
The task was performed with great desire. The next day, 4477-I got the cove for it.
Young guys in general, specific entertainment is not shunned. The order of Tonopi from the moment of appearance at the MiG airbase was adapted to the Soviet reconnaissance satellites. The base was in sight of the satellite equipment 22 minutes. At this time, the aircraft were either cleaned up in the hangars, or covered with covers that distorted the shape of the fighters. All personnel knew when the satellites were passing over the base. Sometimes jokers would surprise. So on the roof of the hangar appeared a large inscription "moya zopa". According to the experts of the Russian language from the base of Tonopah, this maxim meant "kiss me in the ass." What can I say? YOUR zopa, and serve in it! It makes sense to climb on Google Earth: Tonopah is really zopa! She, Akhtubinsk, on the background of Tonopah, looks like a Paradise on Earth.
Another time, the pranksters opened the front and rear gates of the hangar. In the front put the nose of one T-38, in the rear - the tail of the second. That is, there was a T-38 type 32 m in the hangar. The security of the airbase reacted extremely negatively to the work of satire and humor enthusiasts. Not surprising. After all, jokes of this kind attracted the increased attention of a likely opponent to a “quiet provincial” airfield. In fact, at least by the middle of the 80s in the USSR they knew about the MiGs in Tonopah, and not only at the very top. In the combat regiments of the USSR Air Force there were rumors about a squadron of MiGs that worked along with the “aggressors”.
The US Air Force Command (as well as the Air Force Command of any other country) did not like the "partisan-anarchist" order that had prevailed in the 4477 squadron since its formation. General Grich by this time in general had a grudge against all the "aggressors." Not without reason, the commander believed that the "aggressors" were too carried away by the "sports" side of their work in an effort to win every fight at any cost. Against such a background, the accident rate grew, and the main task — to teach combat soldiers air combat — faded into the background. New Commander 4477-th Grich appointed Lieutenant Colonel Joe Jennin, a well-known "aggressor" and, paradoxically, an equally well-known fan of military discipline. Jenin received clear instructions to bring all the work and life of 4477 into strict compliance with the statutes and instructions: no beards, patl and jeans! All stripes on flight overalls are only authorized, chevron is 57-e wing and no “red eagles”. The main thing is to carry out all flights only in accordance with the governing documents, which for the MiGs ... did not exist! Each new commander developed such documents, but - “things are still there”. What can I say: in 4477, in terms of imitation of the USSR Air Force, they went much further than in the USSR Air Force! For every kilogram of kerosene burned by a Soviet plane, as you know, there was a kilogram of written paper.
The new commander did not really have time to deal with the very complicated cases of the most unusual squadron of the USAF when 21 of October 1982 crashed MiG-23BN (onboard number "023", serial number of USAF "002"), pilot Mark Postai ("25 thug" ) died. Most recently, in April, Postaya miraculously managed to get out of the MiG-17 embraced in flames ...
The 25 Bandit flew a training battle with F-5E from the “aggressors”. In flight on the MiG there was a fire engine. Posta turned off the engine, turned the wing to the minimum sweep position and began to plan in the direction of Tonopah, located in 3 km. "Landing on the MiG-23 is very difficult and with a running engine, and without the engine it is not a plane at all," said colleague Posta Michael Scott (79 flying on the MiG-23, 386 on the MiG-21 and 110 on the MiG-17). Observers saw how already before the runway MiG-23 turned up their nose (obviously Posta wanted to increase the angle of attack to extend planning), after which the fighter lost speed, gave the right lurch and touched the ground with the right plane. The plane exploded, the pilot died. As friends recalled, Posta began to fly on the MiG-23, not desiring not the slightest desire, but after the decommissioning of the MiG-17 pilots in the 4477, it turned out more than the aircraft: “Do you want to fly MiGs? Fly on a flogger. ” Post was transferred to the “C” link, he became the sixth US Air Force pilot, who received admission to the MiG-23.
The catastrophe in which Posta died was almost led to the disclosure of the carefully guarded secrets of MiG flights in the United States. Wife Postai was informed that her husband had crashed on F-5. The wife of the pilot had doubts about this. Stand liked to tinker with the models, but cut out from the tree models only those planes on which he flew: F-5, "Phantom" ... And suddenly, first, the MiG-21, then the MiG-17, and then the MiG-23. The wife did not believe the confused explanations of her husband about her interest in the military equipment of the likely opponent, and she remembered about the models after the catastrophe. The situation was aggravated by a private lawyer who offered to file a lawsuit against the US Air Force and Northrop, who allegedly killed the pilot. The lawsuit against the Air Force, the wife, as a patriot of her country, rejected immediately, but Northrop ... Why not? I had to privately explain to the Air Force representatives to the woman that her husband had crashed on a secret plane, to which Northrop had nothing to do. The whole truth about the death of her husband Linda Postai was reported only in 2007 year. After the crash of the MiG-23, as always in such cases, the 4477 began a general inspection of all documentation related to the preparation of aircraft and flight operations. The flights of all MiGs were immediately stopped. Among other things, the commission found that the ejector seats of the KS-1 of the MiG-21F-13 fighters were checked on a case-by-case basis, and the squadrons of the seats were not checked at all from the moment they entered the 4477! Commission representatives asked Jenin the usual questions in a situation like this: “Where is the documentation? Where are the passports for airplanes? Where is the pilot training plan? ” And no ... Even the MiG raid in 4477 is considered approximately. We must pay tribute to Jenin, he twisted the nuts tight, but in the highest degree true. The commander achieved regular checks of ejection seats, banned flights with "delayed failures." One day, the commander accidentally noticed a fuel leak on the MiG-21. When asked why, the technician shrugged: "It always oozes." Jenin immediately banned flying until the cause of the leak was eliminated. It took a lot of time. Kerosene oozed through rubber linings that were no longer elastic, still Soviet-made. I had to order gaskets for the US military-industrial complex. Jenin demanded from technicians that all work on the equipment be recorded in journals, the inspection procedures and the regulations of the fighters were formalized. At first, the measures taken by the new commander led to a decrease in the “combat readiness” of the MiGs, but then the flights began to be performed with much greater intensity. Moreover, the forced simple MiGs did not reflect on the “infiltration” of the pilots themselves, since Jenin forced everyone without exception to fly on T-38. Jenin was the first of the commanders who introduced the practice of flying on different MiGs, without specialization of pilots by type.
The issue with a touch was particularly acute for the link "C". The MiG-21 rarely took more than a few days to repair, while the MiG-23 sometimes stood idle for several months. Jenin commanded 4477 until July 1984. He left the staff with not the kindest memory, but his achievements are obvious: if in 1983, 1198 was flown under 666 combat pilots, then in 1984 - 2099 for 800. Before Jenin arrived, the evil tongues called the Constant Peg program the Constant Keg (permanent bowling alley), since the pilots spent most of their time at the bar because of the unsuitability of the MiGs to flybys.
The Red Eagles didn’t like 23 much. With this MiG they found only one virtue - speed. As in the case of the MiG-21, problems began with the engine, and the pilots did not believe in the ejection seat (given the above, it is easy to understand the cause of disbelief).
Post was not the first who had an engine failure in flight. The first "motorless" landing on the MiG-23 in his second on this type of flight was performed at the end of 1980 by Mr. Michael Press ("The Bandit 20"). The press performed a familiarization flight, he was accompanied by T-28. At a height of 6000 m, the Press turned the wing to the maximum sweep position, after which the plane lost control and began to rotate. Pilot T-38 shouted on the air: “You burn! Jump !!! ”The press was in no hurry to pop up the plane. He managed to regain control, but the engine did not start. The pressure in the hydraulic system was enough to bring the wing to the minimum sweep position, after which the pilot performed the landing with the engine stopped on the Tonopah runway.
In 1981, the city of Michael Scott sat down with a failed engine on the MiG-21. The 21 engine failed during an air battle with the F-16 of the “aggressor” 422 squadron. Scott recalled: “We played the script one on one. I attacked. The enemy laid a steep turn. I tried to keep myself inside his turn, and then the engine stopped. I translated the throttle back, then forward. The engine did not start. OK - the engine is dead. He directed the plane towards Tonopah, decided to land - we did not believe in ejection seats of the MiGs.
A few more times I tried to start the engine. To no avail. The main thing was to follow the speed, not to let it fall below 400 km / h. Above the 400 km / h hydraulic system worked, below - no. Without hydraulics, I could not control the MiG. The issue during landing was the release of a parachute. It was forbidden to release it at speeds above 300 km / h, and I have 400! I went through the whole lane, the fighter stopped only the emergency barrier. ”
Scott concluded: "The plane is intact, I am safe, the barrier was made new."
Scott and Press in 1981 g. Distinguished themselves again. The pilots were sent to Somalia for familiarization flights on the MiG-21UM and MiG-21МФ. The secrecy of MiG flights in the United States almost played a cruel joke. The pilots were forbidden to tell Somali comrades about their experience of flying MiGs. Acquaintance with the Soviet aircraft technicians explained that Scott and Press belonged to the "aggressors". In the first flights on the Spark, the Somalis "taught" Americans to fly MiGs, but soon the situation turned to 180 degrees: Americans showed how to fly MiGs!
To fly the MiG-23 as well as the MiG-21, the Americans could not because of the restrictions on overloads. On the 23's, Americans discovered cracks in the wing box. The intelligence of the US Air Force knew about a similar problem on the MiG-23 of the first series, which was in service with the Soviet Air Force. Americans knew about the method of treatment: installation of external and internal linings that increase the structural strength. With only a few MiG-23, the US Air Force did not mess around with the overlays, but simply imposed an overload limit. The numerical expression of this limitation was not found, but it gives an idea of the turn radius: inside the turn, the MiG-23 freely described the turn of the F-5 pair!
Respect for the MiG-23 pilots demonstrated publicly, for a narrow, naturally, circle of people. In 1983, the 4477 was dismissed by Leonard Bako (“22 bandit”, 131 flight on MiG-21, 94 flight MiG-23). For the farewell flight, Bako chose the MiG-23, the only one in the squadron at that time fit to fly (with overload restriction). Bako made two passes over the airbase at a height of 30 m with a wing in the maximum sweep position at a speed close to the sound speed. Then I moved the wing to the 45 grad position, lifted my nose to the 70 grad and gave a full boost. The commander of 4477 found the strength to look at the pilot only half an hour after landing. Jenin assembled the pilots and declared: “If I hear about something like this, he who did it will be immediately expelled from the squadron. I will insist on the removal from flight work in general. " Yeah, Bako was the first, but not the last, noted on the MiG-23.
Here again, it is appropriate to return to the "formalization" of flights. In the 4477th, pilots of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps served. Bako, in particular, was a marine. The US Air Force and Naval Aviation have historically developed in parallel, competing with each other. According to the apt expression of one of the “Red Eagles”, the instructions of the Air Force spell out everything that needs to be done in the air, and nothing about what cannot be done; in the instructions fleet and the Marine Corps - they write how it is not necessary to do, but they do not mention how it is necessary. Bako, a true sailor, did exactly what they write in his “native” instructions.
About the dislike of the 4477 pilots for the MiG-23, Davis writes quite a lot in his book, but the facts, which he also holds, are cast in total dislike. “The feat” of Bako repeated at least two more “bandits” in his “farewell” flights. At all, without exception, the pilots were greatly impressed by the Flogger acceleration and speed qualities. Especially Americans were struck by the speed limit, or rather the reason for this restriction: “Most American airplanes simply cannot exceed the speed limit, but the stock of the MiG-23 makes it possible to go far beyond the limit. The limiting maximum speed factor is not the engine thrust, but the strength of the cockpit canopy, which can collapse due to air pressure when the speed limit is exceeded. "
Estimated in 4477-th and a significant duration of the flight of the MiG-23. With the wing in a cruising position, the MiG-23 stayed in the air longer than the Phantom without external hangers.
In aerial combat 1x1 MiG-23, as a rule, lost to opponents of the American design. The pilots agreed that the chance of a MiG pilot was only in the use of the hit-and-run tactics, that is, like in the Phantom versus the MiG-17.
The trump card of the MiG-23 was speed. The speed characteristics of 23 were often used in combat operations of the 2x2, when the Reds were played by one MiG-21 and one MiG-23. Paul Stucky (40 bandit, 230 flying on MiG-21, 96 flying on MiG-23) recalled the fight against F-15, which he spent on MiG-23 together with Francis Geisler (35 Bandit, 500 Paultov on the MiG-21): “In the role of the victim, I deployed my Flogger in front of the front of a pair of“ blue ”(opponents of the“ red eagles ”were called Blue Air). Virage I performed so that they watched me, but could not fire. Then he “folded” the wing and turned on the afterburner — let them catch up, and Paco (Geisler) would “fall down” on their MiG-21. I was a false target, but I did not fear being shot down. MiG-23 very quickly picked up speed 1700 km / h. ... We opened the eyes of many guys with the F-15 on the speed of the MiG-23 and its ability to conduct air battles at high speeds. Often, having a good speed, I climbed the height of 6500 m on a vertical slide. A loop at high speed turned out to be a good technique. F-15 in this mode could not pursue the MiG-23 and fell into the position of the defender, or I just broke away from the pursuer, getting the opportunity to attack from an arbitrary direction and angle. ”
In the last year of the 4477 squadron, the pilots happened to fly to intercept the aircraft of the Strategic Air Command of the US Air Force. Then they tested the capabilities of Soviet fighters to intercept near the ground at a height of about 60 and the fastest F-71F aircraft of the US Air Force after the SR-111. Once again, the MiG-23 surprised even speedy “red eagles” with its speed characteristics. The intercept flight of the F-111F was performed at extremely low altitude. The guidance, traditionally for 4477, was carried out from the ground. Flying at the very land of the MiG flare on the radar screen did not leave. The guidance officer asked the pilot to "jump" in order to detect the location of the MiG and give him direction to the "enemy." MiG "jumped", received guidance and disappeared from the radar screen again. The “red” fighter was five miles away (8 km) behind the “enemy” flying at the maximum speed possible for him. After some time, the earth asked to repeat the maneuver. It turned out that the MiG had overtaken the F-111 by two miles. The speed of 23-it in that flight exceeded 1700 km / h, right on the ground! "P-29-300 - devilish motor!"
MiG-23 demanded a respectful approach, errors and superficial attitude in the process of preparing for flights did not forgive. Due to the dismissive attitude to the 26 pre-flight preparation of April 1984, the Deputy Commander of AFSC (Air Force System Command, command of aviation systems of the US Air Force) Lieutenant General Robert Bond crashed on MiG-23. The same Bond, who together with Peck stood at the origins of the "red eagles".
By April, 1984, the re-training program on the MiG-23 in 4477 was worked out: academic study in the classroom, taxiing on the airfield and six flights (three for “familiarity” with piloting features, two for working with on-board equipment, and test). Bond crashed in its second flight on the MiG-23. Both times, the general received instructions from a fighter cockpit. The general tritely used his official position. AFSC was responsible for all the latest developments for the Air Force, Bond's responsibilities included also supervising the “black” programs. In 1984, the general was to resign. Bond was not only a general, but also a pilot (raid more than 5000 hours; mastered F-84, F-86, F-100, F-105, F-4, F-111, A-7; performed 44 combat sorties in Korea on the F-86, 213 sorties in Vietnam on the F-4). And what pilot does not want to fly on a new type? Bond "struck" a farewell tour. In March, the general flew two flights to YF-117A at Groom Lake; in April, it was the turn of the MiG-23. Practically valuable for the USAF Bond flights, most likely, did not represent at all, while not worth throwing at the general for his desires (which coincided with the possibilities!) Stones. Bond was a pilot, and that says it all.
Detailed information about the first flight of the Bond on the MiG-23 is missing. The second flight was also classified for many years and today the official information about the death of Bond is rather stingy. However, Davis recalls eyewitnesses. Some "bits of knowledge" are scattered on the World Wide Web sites.
The flight mission provided for acceleration to high speed and familiarization with the radar operation. At the initial stage, the MiG-23 Bond was accompanied by a T-38. Gaining height 12 000 m, Bond turned on the afterburner and broke the sound barrier. T-38 immediately fell behind. The speed to which the general dispersed the MiG was not officially called, but all involved in that stories are convinced: Bond exceeded the “two mach” and, possibly, exceeded the maximum speed limit. In 10 h 17 min 50 with Bond requested from the “land” the go-ahead to perform a U-turn. "Earth" allowed. In 10 h 18 min 02 with Bond conveyed: "I lost control." After 19 seconds, he repeated the same thing, and soon the plane disappeared from the radar screen of the airspace review.
The general died during the ejection, the plane collided with the ground at high speed at an angle of 60 degrees, the engine was working. Studies of aircraft wreckage showed the serviceability of all on-board systems and the engine; ORE was position 80-90% thrust. In the disaster investigation report dated 17 of May 1984, the cause of the crash was identified as “the loss of control of the aircraft by the pilot in flight at high altitude at supersonic speed (presumably more than M = 2) with a large angle of attack.” The report is not declassified in full to this day.
Some "bandits" put forward their version of the cause of the disaster. Bond underestimated the acceleration characteristics of the MiG, because of which the speed increased to the value at which the velocity of the air could destroy the lamp. The general took the turn and increased the angle of attack, while the fighter had self-oscillations along the course. The pilot's attempt to fend off these fluctuations led to a stall.
All the “gangsters” flying on the 23s note the poor controllability of the fighter at speeds of order M = 2: “This is a bullet. At speeds greater than M = 2, he does not want to turn at all. "
They could not hide the death of the general, but they didn’t want to admit that the United States had a Soviet fighter. The official statement said that Bond crashed on a "specially upgraded US Air Force aircraft." Immediately there were experts who “calculated” the aircraft - “the prototype of the top-secret stealth fighter”. Apparently, it is from those media reports that “legs grow” about the involvement of the MiG-23 in the F-117 development and testing program. Probably, such flights were performed, as well as they were carried out with other programs, for example, the F-15E, but they were purely “evaluative” in nature. There is no clarity on which MiG-23 Bond crashed. Some sources say about the MiG-23BN, Davis suggests that it could be one of two MiG-23 secretly transferred to the United States by India (!). The "platypuses" were delivered to India ...
One of the “bandits” said eloquently about the cause of the catastrophe: “We must read the RLE”. Bond ex officio (and in spirit) was a tester, not a drill pilot. Testers think that they can fly on everything that should and should not fly ... The instructions are not written about them. Meanwhile, even the tester had to be more serious about the MiG-23 than the YF-117A. American 23-e did not differ in reliability, they were repaired constantly. From 1981 to the Bond catastrophe, the entire US Air Force fleet flew MiG-23 fleet hours, three months before the MiG-98 crash, an average 23 hours flew in a week.
Bond is not the only pilot-general in the world (and not the only tester) who killed - what is there - himself. There were examples in the domestic Air Force.
MEMORIES OF MIGS
In November, 2006 at a press conference at the National Museum of the United States Air Force (Wright-Patterson), Brigadier General Hawke Carlisley, who was in 1986 - 1988. the commander of the 4477 squadron, spoke about the tasks of the "test" squadron: "The program" Constant Pig "allowed pilots to learn how to conduct air combat with enemy aircraft in fully controlled, safe conditions that are not comparable to the high risk of real air combat. Usually, training began with a familiarization flight on an enemy plane, a study of its characteristics, then defensive and offensive one-on-one combat was practiced. The preparation was completed with group air battles over the desert in the vicinity of the Nellis air base. ... The Constant Pig program did not have time to influence the situation in Vietnam, but thanks to it, 40 of Iraqi fighters, mostly MiG-21 and MiG-23, was shot down during Operation Storm in the Desert.
It was from Carlisley that journalists and aviation enthusiasts received information about the top-secret squadron for the first time at first hand, and not according to fragmentary eyewitness reports or official data of a very modest size, published in 1989 (information only about aircraft).
At a press conference, Carlsley answered the question of how he served in the squadron, said simply: "I was happy." Meanwhile, Carlisley almost died on the MiG-23: broke into a flat spin and ejected already at the very ground.
Usually, according to Carlisley, there were 16 pilots in the squadron, most of whom had previously served in the Air Force, but there were also representatives from the fleet and the Marine Corps. Without exception, everyone experienced difficulties with mastering MiGs due to the lack of technical documentation. The accident rate was high - 100 incident on 100 000 flying hours.
At the same press conference, along with Carlisley, another commander of the 4477 squadron, retired colonel John T. Menklark, answered the questions. Manklak resigned from the post of Chief of the Flight Test Service of the United States Air Force, and in 2006 Carlisley commanded the 3 air wing deployed in Elmendorf, Alaska.
According to Menklark, on the MiG-21, the Americans were faced with an unusual problem: a combination of an unmanaged nose landing gear with pneumatic brakes on the wheels of the main pillars: “If a plane was driving in zigzags, then a newcomer was sitting in his cabin”. The pilots didn’t like the poor throttle response of the MiG-21 engine: “We preferred to fly with afterburner as long as possible”. On the MiG-23, there were no problems with acceleration in flight and taxiing on the ground, but, according to the Americans, the 23 was distinguished by instability in flight and difficulty in piloting. In the flight on the MiG-23, the pilot was released only after several dozen flights on the MiG-21. Manklark said: “The guys really didn't like the MiG-23. They were afraid of him. ”
One of the pilots of the 4477 Squadron wrote in a post from 25 in November 2008 on the website of the publisher Y2B Publishing about their flights on the MiG-23 the following: “The aircraft becomes more stable with increasing wing sweep: although the center of gravity shifts to the tail, but the center of pressure moves back even faster. 16 sweep degrees are good at takeoff and landing, in cruising flight. But if you are going to maneuver - it is best to set the wing in the position of 45 hail, "flight position." The maximum speed is not as high as it may seem (1350 km / h in training and 1450 km / h in combat if necessary), but the aircraft accelerated very quickly from 900 to 1350 km / h. Mach limit at the angle of sweep of the wing 72 hail is 2,35. At the maximum sweep angle of the wing, the fighter’s frontal resistance is very small. With a minimal sweep of the wing, the stability margin sharply decreased, due to which we could not maneuver over the entire range of permissible angles of attack. The position of the wing, optimal for maneuvering, as noted above, is 45 hail, but even here it was necessary to constantly control the angle of attack. When the wing was set to 72 hail, the aircraft was extremely stable - it was almost impossible to fall into a stall in this mode. I believe that for the angle 16 grad the critical speed is 740 km / h and overload Сg, for 45 and 72 grad, the maximum overload is somewhere 6,5 - 7g. We heard about Russian experiments with flights at a sweep angle in 30 hail and also tried to fly like that. Did not impress. The speed limit at an angle of 30 degrees, it seems, was 900 km / h. Overload - 5g.
- The rate of change of the sweep angle of the wing was approximately 3 degrees / s. To transfer the wing from 16 to hail, to 45 to hail, 10 was required from, from 45 to hail, to 72 hail - to 9 from. At the time of the transfer of the wing from one position to another, the overload was limited to the value of 2g. ...
The range of permissible angles of attack approximately corresponded to the “Phantom”. The angles of attack available F-16 (25 - 26 hail), we have never reached.
- I made a complete turn in about 10 with.
- All our guys liked the MiG-23 cockpit, although the angle of attack indicator could be placed more comfortably.
- I can not remember a single case of inclusion in the flight on the MiG-23MS autopilot. We always flew near the base, in a very limited area. Usually, the flight lasted about 35 minutes: take-off at the afterburner, a low altitude set-up, tactical interception, one or two “base” maneuvers for air combat, approach and landing. Why in this flight autopilot? But the system of increasing sustainability was often used, we called it “Sau”, from the Russian “SAU”. The CA U control panel is almost identical to the panels of similar systems of our aircraft.
- The angular velocity remained high at all speeds and wing positions.
- Once on the MiG-23BN I fell. The wing was in the 45 position, hail, the overload at the moment of stalling was slight (probably, somewhere 2g), the speed was about 600 km / h. The angle of attack was within acceptable limits, but the “Flogger F” suddenly began to spontaneously roll to the right, slowly. Reduced overload, based on the termination of rotation. It was a real right spin. I gently pulled the handle towards myself and to the left, gradually reducing the negative pitch angle. The plane leveled off, but immediately dropped its nose again and began to roll to the right. The plane described two full turns with increasing speed. The nose sank. After two or three consecutive turns, the nose dropped already on 70 hail. “Okay, let's try again,” I told MiG. Again he carefully took the handle and removed the engine speed. The MSA engine does not like a corkscrew, but the BNa engine is more tolerant to the corkscrew. Generally, the engine "MSA" I really liked: light and very powerful. Accelerating qualities - the strength of the MiG-23. At the afterburner and at the wing on the 72 hail is not a plane, but a rocket! So, in my 294 flight on the MiG, I hit the tailspin twice in a few seconds, probably a record. Most likely, I still exceeded the angle of attack limit. Nevertheless, I am grateful to Flogger for this flight.
- On the turns of the MiG-23C is close F-4E. The F-4E has a smaller turning radius, but it loses speed faster. All modifications of the “Phantoms” start to shake violently before stalling, so the pilot does not need to monitor the angle of attack indicator. F-4 rarely falls into a tailspin where the MiG-23 must fall.
- We regularly flew "MC" and "BN" against F-14, "beat" them. The problem of the MiG-23 was a small range of permissible angles of attack. We tried to impose an “offensive” battle with any “modern” American fighter (F-14, 15, 16, 18). According to the script most often the battles began with our attacks. Still more often knocked us down. In reality, the MiG-23 on an equal footing in a maneuverable battle could only fight with the "Phantom", but the MiG was also inferior in some ways. MiG-23MS is more an interceptor than a fighter. However, I understand that the MiG-23 of the later versions had better maneuverability.
“We at 4477 didn’t consider the MiG-23 to be optimal for conducting air combat, at least in comparison with the MiG-21 or our fighters, such as F-14, 15, 16”.
In total, the 23 of the pilot flew on MiG-4477 in the 32 squadron, although some of them performed only a few flights.
We upgraded the aircraft to a minimum: we installed several American-style instruments.
For a long time, the exercises of "Red Flag" were described as battles with the "aggressors" flying on the oddly colored F-5, A-4, F-16 ... And that was, but not quite. Menklark told about a typical doctrine, without naming, however, the year: “None of the pilots who arrived at the Nellis airbase for the joint exercises with the 4477 squadron, did not know that they would be opposed by real Soviet fighters, although rumors about MiGs went throughout the US military aviation. On the second day of their stay at the Nellis base, the pilots made the first flights to the Tonopah training ground. In the area of the landfill, they were accompanied by pilots from Constant Pig on T-38 and MiGs. To cause shock to the “guests” is the first goal of the emergence of MiGs. It is better to cry out "my God" at the sight of an unfamiliar fighter with red stars in Nevada, than somewhere over Western Europe in a real battle!
The pilots of the 4477 squadron demonstrated how fast the MiG-17 could lift up the nose, to give a queue of guns, how big the angular velocity of the heel of the MiG-21 was and how easily it picked up speed of the MiG-23. Then the "guests" were trained in aerial combat with MiGs. We started with “two on one”: two American fighters against one MiG. Then there were fights “couple for a couple”. Flights to air battles were performed during the week daily.
The pilots of combat units received very specific recommendations:
- Never attack the MiG-17 on a bend from the tail, because its turning radius is smaller than that of any American fighter (this is 80's). Try to fight in verticals.
- MiG-21 is also capable of making a sharp turn, you should not fight with him at low speeds. We must take him to the vertical, using the advantage of American fighters in thrust-to-weight ratio.
- MiG-23 is only capable of direct attack. On the turn it is yours.
The Red Eagles did not have the task to win every air battle. On the contrary, they often pointed out to their "opponents" errors in the "real time scale", prompted in the course of the battle which maneuver and how best to execute.
The pilots "Constant Pig" flew solely on air combat - there was no working off of strikes against ground targets! Opponents of the MiGs at one time or another were almost all tactical aircraft of the Air Force, Navy and USMC: T-38, F-5, F-15, F-16, F-4, RF-4, F-111, EF-111 , A-10, F-14, F-18, AV-8В. The “Red Eagles” converged in “dog fights” with instructors and cadets of the Combat Use Centers of the Air Force and Navy, test pilots from the 422 Squadron of the US Air Force, and combatant pilots. Of the combat units of the Air Force, 1, 33 and 49 fighter aircraft were most often involved in joint exercises with MiGs (“Red Flag” and not only). The already well-known “Red Eagle” said that he had fought battles with “Red Flag” on several occasions with ... C-130:
- They (C-130) imitated dumping cargo with a parachute. I then flew the MiG-23. The problem with the attack of any low-speed large aircraft lies in the turn radius. If the C-130 guys noticed us, they had a chance to make a sharp turn and thwart the attack. I could not keep inside the turn of the C-130. I had to make several visits, approaching at an awesome distance.
The pilots of the 4477 Squadron at the Red Flag Exercise interacted only with the pilots of the US armed forces and never with foreign participants of the exercises.
In the first years of the existence of the 4477 Squadron, the re-training system for MiGs did not exist at all. For a very short time, the pilots studied the available documentation, with the volume of which, and most importantly - with the translation, there were big problems. And even never studied. Here is an example: May 1979, the first flight of the “Red Eagl'a” on the MiG-17. Instructing:
“- Ready to fly?
- Yes.
- Let's go!
- Maybe give a few minutes to get acquainted? Tell me at least how this thing is controlled, what does it look like? I heard it steer should somehow different. And how to perform landing?
- You're talking about nonsense. Let's go! L! The instructor accompanied me on the F-4 (alone, without an operator in the rear cockpit). We still talked with him for a few minutes, and then I took off at MiG. Fine".
It is possible, the veteran added colors, but on the whole is true. There were no US Air Force instructors for the MiGs at the time. Sparky Soviet designs in the 4477-th squadron did not appear. With the formalization of the process of retraining, each new commander of the 4477 began, but still the process remained fairly “free”.
MiGs were maintained in flightable condition by literally titanic efforts of engineers and technicians. The Americans appreciated Soviet philosophy, but it was completely different from the American one: “The backside of simplicity is a small resource ... If we had connections with Soviet factories, then we would not have experienced problems.” Lacked everything: documentation, spare parts. Some failed units and assemblies were replaced with similar American ones, for example, the hydropumps on the MiG-21 more often had to be repaired or re-manufactured according to "piece" orders. In the MiG-17, the greatest criticism from the technicians was caused by the engines. The fuel lines on the MiG-21 constantly flowed; once there was even a fire when the engine was racing. Regarding the MiG-23, the opinion of the technicians completely coincided with the opinion of the pilots: “Monster!”.
Here's another amazing and not quite clear in the history of the Soviet aircraft in the United States the moment. Many sources point to the absence of Aircraft Operation Manuals or the extremely poor (in the case of the MiG-23) translation of the RLE. RLE is easier to get than a "live" aircraft. For example, in the TsAGI Department of Scientific and Technical Information (ONTI TsAGI) there was no “Phantom”, but there was full technical documentation on its (and not only “its”) operation.
Soviet fighters crashed at least three American pilots. One of the reasons - the lack of RLE or inaccurate translation. According to Steve Davis's Red Eagle. America's Secret MiGs ”, the translation of documentation for the MiG-23 was carried out at the Center for Technical Intelligence of the US Air Force by an autotranslator using the most powerful IBM 360 computer and subsequent editing by 4477 pilots. Davis speaks of a very high quality translation ... Maybe. In 90-s in the aforementioned ONTI TsAGI, there was some simple entertainment: Pushkin's verses were introduced into the autotranslator, translated first into English, then into Russian. Take a word: it was a lot of fun !!! Jokes from ONTI in those years used the IBM 386 “supercomputer”.
The moment with the translation is extremely incomprehensible. In the US, there was never a shortage of Russian speakers, and they were clothed with the highest tolerances of secrecy. Examples? Even without the help of Google, names like Sikorsky, Seversky, Kartvelishvili immediately come up in memory. Constructors? Yes. So this is a small piece of iceberg. At the same time, the United States Air Force paid great attention to the collection of information on MiGs. Jenin did a lot to establish direct contacts of the squadron entrusted to him with various special services of the United States and Great Britain. Some pilots went on business trips to Germany, where they were familiarized with the data of NATO radio-technical intelligence on the characteristics of the tactics of operations and flight operations of Soviet fighters. Taki, probably, it was worth starting with a high-quality translation of the available documentation? (The author of the article has been able to hold “native” manuals for F-4 “Phantom II” and F-105D “Thunderchief” aircraft, to translate the RLE of Agusta A109 helicopter. Difficulties in the translation of the RLE met, which is not surprising in the presence of engineering education and the absence of flight, but these were separate problems, completely solved through consultation with the pilots. The story of the transfer of RLE to MiGs in the United States is truly amazing, if it really had a place to be the same as described by Davis. Maybe the Americans really, as Mikhail Zadornov says, are “stupid”?)
END HISTORY?
The inevitability of change in the US Air Force became apparent at the end of 1987. “White” (“legal”) “aggressors” were subject to reorganization with a drastic reduction and rearmament from F-5 to F-16. In parallel with the reduction of military spending, another “black” program was unfolding - the development of the F-22 Raptor fighter. The Air Force, as always, did not have enough money. All the “aggressors” fell victim to budgetary savings: both “white” and “black” (that is, “red”).
Before ceasing to exist, the 4477-I squadron that flew MiGs was noted in the Red Fire large-scale exercises, which, in fact, was formed to participate in.
Earlier, the battles with the MiGs took place in the framework of the “Red Flag” in isolation, now against the general tactical background. Sometimes MiGs acted jointly with the F-5 squadrons of the “aggressors”. The “aggressors” shackled escort fighters into battle, while the MiG-23 attacked the bombers on the “two maxs”. "Shoot down" the B-52 was considered a great honor. Here the Americans were no different from our pilots. One lieutenant colonel of the Air Force of the Russian Federation, having seen a large eight-engine bomber at MAKS in Zhukovsky, rushed to him with a shout: “Ooo, B-52 !!!”. A guard from among decently speaking Russian Americans was flattered:
- Do you like our plane so much?
- Of course!!! For such a hero will give immediately!
Mute scene ....
The last flights on MiGs by pilots of the 4477 squadron carried out 4 in March 1988. 13 MiG-21 and 4 MiG-23 rose to reflect the massive attack of the “blue” ones. Under the Constant Peg program, from July 1979 to March 1988, 15264 flights were made on MiGs, 5930 crews of the Air Force, Navy and USMC were familiarized with the features of the combat use of Soviet fighter aircraft in the air.
However, the year 1988 has not yet become the year of the disbanding of the 4477 squadron. In 1988, they only curtailed the program Constant Peg (officially, the existence of this program by the US Air Force was recognized only in 2006). The Red Eagles were finally disbanded only in July 1990. That is, according to the official history of the US Air Force, and it’s not always worth believing.
The squadron remained “black” for the entire period of its existence, it was forbidden to mention it in non-secret documentation. In 1985, the issue of forming a MiG wing based on the 4477 squadron and transferring it to white status was considered, but this did not happen.
The last commander of 4477 Squadron (took office in November 1987) was Lieutenant Colonel John T. Men-Clark. Previously, Man-Clark served in the "aggressors", where he performed more than 900 flights on F-5; In 4477 Squadron, the veteran aggressor performed an 301 flight on MiGs. MiG-21 F-13 on the frame of the lantern of which was written "LtCol Jhon N" Jack "Manclark" stood in the VIP-hangar of Tonop airbase for some time, then the plane was transferred to the museum at Eglin airbase.
The tasks previously performed by the 4477 Squadron shifted to the 2 X division of the 57 Tactical Fighter Wing (Detachment 2 57th Fighter Weapon Wing). In December, 1996 was reformed into the Detachment 3 53rd Test and Evaluation Group.
Pilots and 4477 aircraft were also involved in research work. Of those that became public, the most important are probably flights to take radar “portraits” of the MiG-21 and MiG-23. The Americans, not without surprise, discovered the identity of the flares from the MiG-23 and the passenger DC-10 on the radar screen of the F-15 fighter. It turns out that the powerful reflected signal at certain angles of exposure was given by the P-29 engine compressor. It was necessary to conduct additional flights to test the new version of the Igla radar software, capable of distinguishing the P-29 engine from the General Electric CF-6 turbofan engines installed on DC-10.
Most of the 4477 research missions I carried out in cooperation with the 422 test squadron deployed at the Nellis base. A large program was devoted to the removal of the thermal characteristics of the MiGs as applied to the GOS of the Sidewinder AIM-9L rocket. The goal of the program was to determine the capture zones of the missile seeker, depending on the mode of operation of the “target” engine and the distance to it. It is worth noting that in 4477, practical missile launches were never carried out, in some cases flights to "combat use" (very rarely) were performed with SD "Sidewinder" of the first modifications imitating the Soviet K-13.
Individual 4477 pilots performed flights at Edwards airbase on Soviet aircraft, other than the MiG-21 and MiG-23 types, which the 6513-I test squadron “Red Hats” had, in which, as well as in 4477-y, were operated MiGs; In addition to the MiGs, the testers also had "Dry". The question of what soo and how much remains unanswered. In the official history of this squadron, references to Soviet-built aircraft are absent altogether. The 6513 Test Squadron was disbanded in 1992.
In the same 1992, the question of the formation of a “white” squadron of “aggressors” on the Su-27 with a deployment at Edwards airbase was considered. The US Air Force found the required amount of Flanker'oe, but did not find the money to maintain them.
Flight of pilots in 4477 Squadron
Flight time in the 4477 squadron flying on the Soviet MiGs was counted according to the practice adopted at that time in the USAF from the moment of take-off to the moment of touch plus five minutes for taxiing. The extra five minutes were important. On average, the flight on the MiG-17 was 18 minutes, that is, the added five minutes in this case means an increase in flying time by more than 25%. Flight time on the MiG-21 averaged 20-30 minutes, 21-e almost always flew without PTB. The flight time of the MiG-23 was 40-60 minutes. All flights on MiGs were carried out only during the day and only in simple weather conditions. There was no precise “measurement” of the raid, especially in the early years of the 4477. In the flight books simply bring the number of flights or landings. Here, the influence of naval aviation is obvious, where the number of landings on an aircraft carrier is not a defining indicator of the pilot’s skill. However, there was another reason, as in the cartoon about Boa: “And I landed more on the landings!” For example, James Robb flew only 21 hours on MIG-70, but made 213 landings (flights). As part of the 4477 squadron, the most flights to the MiG-21 were performed by Francis K. Geisler (“35 thug”) - 500. On the MiG-23 - Thomas I. Drake ("42 bandit") - 249 flights. The absolute champion in the total number of flights on MiGs was McClee R. Scott (“14 bandit”) - 569 flights, including 106 on MiG-17, 388 on MiG-21 and 75 on MiG-23.
Coloring aircraft 4477 Squadron
The training squadrons T-38, which were in service with the armament, carried identification marks in the form of five-pointed stars of red color with yellow edging. Double-sided numbers were applied, like the aircraft of the USSR Air Force, on the sides of the fuselage in the cockpit area. The font of the numbers of the board numbers roughly corresponded to that adopted by the USSR Air Force.
All MiG-21 initially had the color of natural metal and carried the identification marks of the United States Air Force, the last two digits of the serial number were applied to the doors of the landing gear niche. Chinese J-7 (b / n 47) received camouflage from yellow and sandy spots.
In 1983-1984 most of the 21's were camouflaged, one MiG was camouflaged in spots of two shades of gray. Identification marks are red stars with yellow and red edging.
MiG-23 fighters were repainted several times, but the identification marks were put the same each time: red stars with a white and red edging - as in the USSR Air Force. The MiG-23BN (nickname “Bomber”), of which there were at least two, retained the Soviet factory color: tricolor camouflage on the upper and side surfaces of the airframe, the lower surfaces are light blue; the “technical equipment” applied at the factory has also been preserved, but it was not possible to find information about the language in which technical inscriptions were made. At least one MiG-23 (“Interceptor”, w / o 49, number on the wing of the niche of the nose support of the 20 chassis) was repainted in gray (battleship gray) with gloss paint. One MiG-23 camouflaged under the desert with patches of sand and light brown color. The MiG-23BN, one for sure, was camouflaged in a “forest” pattern with brown and green spots.
Available in the US, the MiG-17F and the MiG-21F-13 no longer met the objectives of the project. By the middle of the 70, there was almost no such aircraft in service with the main likely opponents of the United States. Something more modern was needed. Although some kind of "stray" MiG-23, preferably a few ...
And after all found! In the middle of 70, Egypt changed its political orientation. By that time, the USSR had managed to supply the former main Arab ally, or rather, as they say in the West, the “client”, the party of the latest at that time MiG-23 fighter. At the start of 1974, Egypt received eight MiG-23MS, eight MiG-23BN and four Sparky MiG-23Us.
After cooling the Soviet-Egyptian relations, Cairo lost its technical support for the operation of MiGs, both 21-s and 23-s. For help in servicing and supplying aircraft with spare parts, the Egyptians turned to the United States and China.
“We give you spare parts — you give us planes,” they decided the question. China received ten MiG-21МФ, two MiG-23MS, two MiG-23БН and two MiG-23У. At least 16 MiG-21МФ, two MiG-21У, two Su-20, six MiG-23MS, six MiG-23БН and two Mi-8 helicopters were sent to the USA. Davis in his book talks about 12 MiG-23MS and one MiG-23BN, but information from the Internet is most likely closer to the truth: “BN-s” more than one hit the States.
The “Egyptian” MiG-23s were unassembled and delivered to Edward Air Base. In the main test center of the American aviation Soviet fighters were carefully studied, but they assembled and circled in Groom Lake, since the level of secrecy there was higher than at the Edwards base.
The tests of the aircraft (Have Pad Pad, Have Pad) were carried out under the auspices of the Foreign Technology Division of the USAF, but then a part of the fighters were handed over to the Red Eagles.
A rare shot of one of the MiG-23 4477 squadron
The first MiG-23 (MiG-23BN) 4477 squadron landed at Tonopah 1 in November 1980, then only one US Air Force tactical aviation command pilot David McClude had access to the MiG-23 (“Bandit 10”). In the 4477 Squadron, MiGi-23-e entered into service with the "sea" link "C", as naval aviation pilots, unlike their colleagues from the Air Force, had experience flying on airplanes with a variable sweep wing - F-14. The attitude to the MiG-23 immediately became controversial: "The admission to the flights on the Flogger was considered an honor, recognition of skill, although none of us wanted to fly it."
The MiG-23 began to show its temper already on the ground, almost crippling the US Air Force commander Grich. Griech accompanied Mr. Tonop George W. Bush who visited 18 in May 1982. Bush then served as vice president of the United States. The visit of the vice-president was pursuing two goals: to check the preparation of the base for receiving the F-117 and to personally get acquainted with the MiGs (Bush knew about the “Constant Pig” program since his work as director of the CIA). General Gritch later wished to inspect the cockpit of the MiG-23. Briefing was conducted by James Matini (27 Bandit). Together with the general, he climbed onto a ramp, similar to that supplied to passenger aircraft. As soon as the pilots looked into the cockpit, the ladder was folded - hydraulics refused. Matini barely kept the general from falling onto the concrete. And here is the MiG-23? It seems nothing to do with. Just standing next to ...
The first F-117 landed in Tonopah in the summer of 1982, and in the summer in the 4477, the commander was once again changed. Relocating to Tonopah F-117 made life difficult for the 4477 squadron personnel. Without that, unprecedented security measures effort even more. With information on the "invisible" acquainted only a few "bandits" from among the commanders of the squadron. The pilots said that now they are in captivity at their own base.
For the first time in Tonopah, along with MiGs, the regular military unit of the US Air Force began to be based.
The part “living” according to strictly prescribed instructions and instructions. A part is an elite one, the pilots and technicians of which considered themselves “better than not”. Naturally, mutual friction began. 4477-I was also an elite part, but the Red Eagles were always experiencing a shortage of airfield support. After the next refusal to “share” the truck crane, the chief of staff of 4477, on a pre-flight preparation, set a specific task:
- On the fuel saved during the execution of the main task, dive from 9000 to 150 m and at this height pass over the fukers in supersonic sound.
The task was performed with great desire. The next day, 4477-I got the cove for it.
Young guys in general, specific entertainment is not shunned. The order of Tonopi from the moment of appearance at the MiG airbase was adapted to the Soviet reconnaissance satellites. The base was in sight of the satellite equipment 22 minutes. At this time, the aircraft were either cleaned up in the hangars, or covered with covers that distorted the shape of the fighters. All personnel knew when the satellites were passing over the base. Sometimes jokers would surprise. So on the roof of the hangar appeared a large inscription "moya zopa". According to the experts of the Russian language from the base of Tonopah, this maxim meant "kiss me in the ass." What can I say? YOUR zopa, and serve in it! It makes sense to climb on Google Earth: Tonopah is really zopa! She, Akhtubinsk, on the background of Tonopah, looks like a Paradise on Earth.
Another time, the pranksters opened the front and rear gates of the hangar. In the front put the nose of one T-38, in the rear - the tail of the second. That is, there was a T-38 type 32 m in the hangar. The security of the airbase reacted extremely negatively to the work of satire and humor enthusiasts. Not surprising. After all, jokes of this kind attracted the increased attention of a likely opponent to a “quiet provincial” airfield. In fact, at least by the middle of the 80s in the USSR they knew about the MiGs in Tonopah, and not only at the very top. In the combat regiments of the USSR Air Force there were rumors about a squadron of MiGs that worked along with the “aggressors”.
The US Air Force Command (as well as the Air Force Command of any other country) did not like the "partisan-anarchist" order that had prevailed in the 4477 squadron since its formation. General Grich by this time in general had a grudge against all the "aggressors." Not without reason, the commander believed that the "aggressors" were too carried away by the "sports" side of their work in an effort to win every fight at any cost. Against such a background, the accident rate grew, and the main task — to teach combat soldiers air combat — faded into the background. New Commander 4477-th Grich appointed Lieutenant Colonel Joe Jennin, a well-known "aggressor" and, paradoxically, an equally well-known fan of military discipline. Jenin received clear instructions to bring all the work and life of 4477 into strict compliance with the statutes and instructions: no beards, patl and jeans! All stripes on flight overalls are only authorized, chevron is 57-e wing and no “red eagles”. The main thing is to carry out all flights only in accordance with the governing documents, which for the MiGs ... did not exist! Each new commander developed such documents, but - “things are still there”. What can I say: in 4477, in terms of imitation of the USSR Air Force, they went much further than in the USSR Air Force! For every kilogram of kerosene burned by a Soviet plane, as you know, there was a kilogram of written paper.
The new commander did not really have time to deal with the very complicated cases of the most unusual squadron of the USAF when 21 of October 1982 crashed MiG-23BN (onboard number "023", serial number of USAF "002"), pilot Mark Postai ("25 thug" ) died. Most recently, in April, Postaya miraculously managed to get out of the MiG-17 embraced in flames ...
The 25 Bandit flew a training battle with F-5E from the “aggressors”. In flight on the MiG there was a fire engine. Posta turned off the engine, turned the wing to the minimum sweep position and began to plan in the direction of Tonopah, located in 3 km. "Landing on the MiG-23 is very difficult and with a running engine, and without the engine it is not a plane at all," said colleague Posta Michael Scott (79 flying on the MiG-23, 386 on the MiG-21 and 110 on the MiG-17). Observers saw how already before the runway MiG-23 turned up their nose (obviously Posta wanted to increase the angle of attack to extend planning), after which the fighter lost speed, gave the right lurch and touched the ground with the right plane. The plane exploded, the pilot died. As friends recalled, Posta began to fly on the MiG-23, not desiring not the slightest desire, but after the decommissioning of the MiG-17 pilots in the 4477, it turned out more than the aircraft: “Do you want to fly MiGs? Fly on a flogger. ” Post was transferred to the “C” link, he became the sixth US Air Force pilot, who received admission to the MiG-23.
MiG-23MS 4477 squadron. Radar in training battles were not used, perhaps because camouflage is distributed to radome radome
At least one MiG-23MS received a monochromatic glossy gray color. The fighter was formally assigned to Major Thomas Drake ("42 bandit") who performed a flight on the MiG-23 (more than any other "bandit")
The catastrophe in which Posta died was almost led to the disclosure of the carefully guarded secrets of MiG flights in the United States. Wife Postai was informed that her husband had crashed on F-5. The wife of the pilot had doubts about this. Stand liked to tinker with the models, but cut out from the tree models only those planes on which he flew: F-5, "Phantom" ... And suddenly, first, the MiG-21, then the MiG-17, and then the MiG-23. The wife did not believe the confused explanations of her husband about her interest in the military equipment of the likely opponent, and she remembered about the models after the catastrophe. The situation was aggravated by a private lawyer who offered to file a lawsuit against the US Air Force and Northrop, who allegedly killed the pilot. The lawsuit against the Air Force, the wife, as a patriot of her country, rejected immediately, but Northrop ... Why not? I had to privately explain to the Air Force representatives to the woman that her husband had crashed on a secret plane, to which Northrop had nothing to do. The whole truth about the death of her husband Linda Postai was reported only in 2007 year. After the crash of the MiG-23, as always in such cases, the 4477 began a general inspection of all documentation related to the preparation of aircraft and flight operations. The flights of all MiGs were immediately stopped. Among other things, the commission found that the ejector seats of the KS-1 of the MiG-21F-13 fighters were checked on a case-by-case basis, and the squadrons of the seats were not checked at all from the moment they entered the 4477! Commission representatives asked Jenin the usual questions in a situation like this: “Where is the documentation? Where are the passports for airplanes? Where is the pilot training plan? ” And no ... Even the MiG raid in 4477 is considered approximately. We must pay tribute to Jenin, he twisted the nuts tight, but in the highest degree true. The commander achieved regular checks of ejection seats, banned flights with "delayed failures." One day, the commander accidentally noticed a fuel leak on the MiG-21. When asked why, the technician shrugged: "It always oozes." Jenin immediately banned flying until the cause of the leak was eliminated. It took a lot of time. Kerosene oozed through rubber linings that were no longer elastic, still Soviet-made. I had to order gaskets for the US military-industrial complex. Jenin demanded from technicians that all work on the equipment be recorded in journals, the inspection procedures and the regulations of the fighters were formalized. At first, the measures taken by the new commander led to a decrease in the “combat readiness” of the MiGs, but then the flights began to be performed with much greater intensity. Moreover, the forced simple MiGs did not reflect on the “infiltration” of the pilots themselves, since Jenin forced everyone without exception to fly on T-38. Jenin was the first of the commanders who introduced the practice of flying on different MiGs, without specialization of pilots by type.
The issue with a touch was particularly acute for the link "C". The MiG-21 rarely took more than a few days to repair, while the MiG-23 sometimes stood idle for several months. Jenin commanded 4477 until July 1984. He left the staff with not the kindest memory, but his achievements are obvious: if in 1983, 1198 was flown under 666 combat pilots, then in 1984 - 2099 for 800. Before Jenin arrived, the evil tongues called the Constant Peg program the Constant Keg (permanent bowling alley), since the pilots spent most of their time at the bar because of the unsuitability of the MiGs to flybys.
The Red Eagles didn’t like 23 much. With this MiG they found only one virtue - speed. As in the case of the MiG-21, problems began with the engine, and the pilots did not believe in the ejection seat (given the above, it is easy to understand the cause of disbelief).
Post was not the first who had an engine failure in flight. The first "motorless" landing on the MiG-23 in his second on this type of flight was performed at the end of 1980 by Mr. Michael Press ("The Bandit 20"). The press performed a familiarization flight, he was accompanied by T-28. At a height of 6000 m, the Press turned the wing to the maximum sweep position, after which the plane lost control and began to rotate. Pilot T-38 shouted on the air: “You burn! Jump !!! ”The press was in no hurry to pop up the plane. He managed to regain control, but the engine did not start. The pressure in the hydraulic system was enough to bring the wing to the minimum sweep position, after which the pilot performed the landing with the engine stopped on the Tonopah runway.
In 1981, the city of Michael Scott sat down with a failed engine on the MiG-21. The 21 engine failed during an air battle with the F-16 of the “aggressor” 422 squadron. Scott recalled: “We played the script one on one. I attacked. The enemy laid a steep turn. I tried to keep myself inside his turn, and then the engine stopped. I translated the throttle back, then forward. The engine did not start. OK - the engine is dead. He directed the plane towards Tonopah, decided to land - we did not believe in ejection seats of the MiGs.
A few more times I tried to start the engine. To no avail. The main thing was to follow the speed, not to let it fall below 400 km / h. Above the 400 km / h hydraulic system worked, below - no. Without hydraulics, I could not control the MiG. The issue during landing was the release of a parachute. It was forbidden to release it at speeds above 300 km / h, and I have 400! I went through the whole lane, the fighter stopped only the emergency barrier. ”
Scott concluded: "The plane is intact, I am safe, the barrier was made new."
Scott and Press in 1981 g. Distinguished themselves again. The pilots were sent to Somalia for familiarization flights on the MiG-21UM and MiG-21МФ. The secrecy of MiG flights in the United States almost played a cruel joke. The pilots were forbidden to tell Somali comrades about their experience of flying MiGs. Acquaintance with the Soviet aircraft technicians explained that Scott and Press belonged to the "aggressors". In the first flights on the Spark, the Somalis "taught" Americans to fly MiGs, but soon the situation turned to 180 degrees: Americans showed how to fly MiGs!
To fly the MiG-23 as well as the MiG-21, the Americans could not because of the restrictions on overloads. On the 23's, Americans discovered cracks in the wing box. The intelligence of the US Air Force knew about a similar problem on the MiG-23 of the first series, which was in service with the Soviet Air Force. Americans knew about the method of treatment: installation of external and internal linings that increase the structural strength. With only a few MiG-23, the US Air Force did not mess around with the overlays, but simply imposed an overload limit. The numerical expression of this limitation was not found, but it gives an idea of the turn radius: inside the turn, the MiG-23 freely described the turn of the F-5 pair!
Respect for the MiG-23 pilots demonstrated publicly, for a narrow, naturally, circle of people. In 1983, the 4477 was dismissed by Leonard Bako (“22 bandit”, 131 flight on MiG-21, 94 flight MiG-23). For the farewell flight, Bako chose the MiG-23, the only one in the squadron at that time fit to fly (with overload restriction). Bako made two passes over the airbase at a height of 30 m with a wing in the maximum sweep position at a speed close to the sound speed. Then I moved the wing to the 45 grad position, lifted my nose to the 70 grad and gave a full boost. The commander of 4477 found the strength to look at the pilot only half an hour after landing. Jenin assembled the pilots and declared: “If I hear about something like this, he who did it will be immediately expelled from the squadron. I will insist on the removal from flight work in general. " Yeah, Bako was the first, but not the last, noted on the MiG-23.
Here again, it is appropriate to return to the "formalization" of flights. In the 4477th, pilots of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps served. Bako, in particular, was a marine. The US Air Force and Naval Aviation have historically developed in parallel, competing with each other. According to the apt expression of one of the “Red Eagles”, the instructions of the Air Force spell out everything that needs to be done in the air, and nothing about what cannot be done; in the instructions fleet and the Marine Corps - they write how it is not necessary to do, but they do not mention how it is necessary. Bako, a true sailor, did exactly what they write in his “native” instructions.
About the dislike of the 4477 pilots for the MiG-23, Davis writes quite a lot in his book, but the facts, which he also holds, are cast in total dislike. “The feat” of Bako repeated at least two more “bandits” in his “farewell” flights. At all, without exception, the pilots were greatly impressed by the Flogger acceleration and speed qualities. Especially Americans were struck by the speed limit, or rather the reason for this restriction: “Most American airplanes simply cannot exceed the speed limit, but the stock of the MiG-23 makes it possible to go far beyond the limit. The limiting maximum speed factor is not the engine thrust, but the strength of the cockpit canopy, which can collapse due to air pressure when the speed limit is exceeded. "
Estimated in 4477-th and a significant duration of the flight of the MiG-23. With the wing in a cruising position, the MiG-23 stayed in the air longer than the Phantom without external hangers.
In aerial combat 1x1 MiG-23, as a rule, lost to opponents of the American design. The pilots agreed that the chance of a MiG pilot was only in the use of the hit-and-run tactics, that is, like in the Phantom versus the MiG-17.
The trump card of the MiG-23 was speed. The speed characteristics of 23 were often used in combat operations of the 2x2, when the Reds were played by one MiG-21 and one MiG-23. Paul Stucky (40 bandit, 230 flying on MiG-21, 96 flying on MiG-23) recalled the fight against F-15, which he spent on MiG-23 together with Francis Geisler (35 Bandit, 500 Paultov on the MiG-21): “In the role of the victim, I deployed my Flogger in front of the front of a pair of“ blue ”(opponents of the“ red eagles ”were called Blue Air). Virage I performed so that they watched me, but could not fire. Then he “folded” the wing and turned on the afterburner — let them catch up, and Paco (Geisler) would “fall down” on their MiG-21. I was a false target, but I did not fear being shot down. MiG-23 very quickly picked up speed 1700 km / h. ... We opened the eyes of many guys with the F-15 on the speed of the MiG-23 and its ability to conduct air battles at high speeds. Often, having a good speed, I climbed the height of 6500 m on a vertical slide. A loop at high speed turned out to be a good technique. F-15 in this mode could not pursue the MiG-23 and fell into the position of the defender, or I just broke away from the pursuer, getting the opportunity to attack from an arbitrary direction and angle. ”
MiG-23BN from the aviation museum in Brussels. Presumably, earlier this car received by Americans from Egypt flew in the 4477 squadron
In the last year of the 4477 squadron, the pilots happened to fly to intercept the aircraft of the Strategic Air Command of the US Air Force. Then they tested the capabilities of Soviet fighters to intercept near the ground at a height of about 60 and the fastest F-71F aircraft of the US Air Force after the SR-111. Once again, the MiG-23 surprised even speedy “red eagles” with its speed characteristics. The intercept flight of the F-111F was performed at extremely low altitude. The guidance, traditionally for 4477, was carried out from the ground. Flying at the very land of the MiG flare on the radar screen did not leave. The guidance officer asked the pilot to "jump" in order to detect the location of the MiG and give him direction to the "enemy." MiG "jumped", received guidance and disappeared from the radar screen again. The “red” fighter was five miles away (8 km) behind the “enemy” flying at the maximum speed possible for him. After some time, the earth asked to repeat the maneuver. It turned out that the MiG had overtaken the F-111 by two miles. The speed of 23-it in that flight exceeded 1700 km / h, right on the ground! "P-29-300 - devilish motor!"
MiG-23 demanded a respectful approach, errors and superficial attitude in the process of preparing for flights did not forgive. Due to the dismissive attitude to the 26 pre-flight preparation of April 1984, the Deputy Commander of AFSC (Air Force System Command, command of aviation systems of the US Air Force) Lieutenant General Robert Bond crashed on MiG-23. The same Bond, who together with Peck stood at the origins of the "red eagles".
By April, 1984, the re-training program on the MiG-23 in 4477 was worked out: academic study in the classroom, taxiing on the airfield and six flights (three for “familiarity” with piloting features, two for working with on-board equipment, and test). Bond crashed in its second flight on the MiG-23. Both times, the general received instructions from a fighter cockpit. The general tritely used his official position. AFSC was responsible for all the latest developments for the Air Force, Bond's responsibilities included also supervising the “black” programs. In 1984, the general was to resign. Bond was not only a general, but also a pilot (raid more than 5000 hours; mastered F-84, F-86, F-100, F-105, F-4, F-111, A-7; performed 44 combat sorties in Korea on the F-86, 213 sorties in Vietnam on the F-4). And what pilot does not want to fly on a new type? Bond "struck" a farewell tour. In March, the general flew two flights to YF-117A at Groom Lake; in April, it was the turn of the MiG-23. Practically valuable for the USAF Bond flights, most likely, did not represent at all, while not worth throwing at the general for his desires (which coincided with the possibilities!) Stones. Bond was a pilot, and that says it all.
Detailed information about the first flight of the Bond on the MiG-23 is missing. The second flight was also classified for many years and today the official information about the death of Bond is rather stingy. However, Davis recalls eyewitnesses. Some "bits of knowledge" are scattered on the World Wide Web sites.
The flight mission provided for acceleration to high speed and familiarization with the radar operation. At the initial stage, the MiG-23 Bond was accompanied by a T-38. Gaining height 12 000 m, Bond turned on the afterburner and broke the sound barrier. T-38 immediately fell behind. The speed to which the general dispersed the MiG was not officially called, but all involved in that stories are convinced: Bond exceeded the “two mach” and, possibly, exceeded the maximum speed limit. In 10 h 17 min 50 with Bond requested from the “land” the go-ahead to perform a U-turn. "Earth" allowed. In 10 h 18 min 02 with Bond conveyed: "I lost control." After 19 seconds, he repeated the same thing, and soon the plane disappeared from the radar screen of the airspace review.
The general died during the ejection, the plane collided with the ground at high speed at an angle of 60 degrees, the engine was working. Studies of aircraft wreckage showed the serviceability of all on-board systems and the engine; ORE was position 80-90% thrust. In the disaster investigation report dated 17 of May 1984, the cause of the crash was identified as “the loss of control of the aircraft by the pilot in flight at high altitude at supersonic speed (presumably more than M = 2) with a large angle of attack.” The report is not declassified in full to this day.
Some "bandits" put forward their version of the cause of the disaster. Bond underestimated the acceleration characteristics of the MiG, because of which the speed increased to the value at which the velocity of the air could destroy the lamp. The general took the turn and increased the angle of attack, while the fighter had self-oscillations along the course. The pilot's attempt to fend off these fluctuations led to a stall.
All the “gangsters” flying on the 23s note the poor controllability of the fighter at speeds of order M = 2: “This is a bullet. At speeds greater than M = 2, he does not want to turn at all. "
They could not hide the death of the general, but they didn’t want to admit that the United States had a Soviet fighter. The official statement said that Bond crashed on a "specially upgraded US Air Force aircraft." Immediately there were experts who “calculated” the aircraft - “the prototype of the top-secret stealth fighter”. Apparently, it is from those media reports that “legs grow” about the involvement of the MiG-23 in the F-117 development and testing program. Probably, such flights were performed, as well as they were carried out with other programs, for example, the F-15E, but they were purely “evaluative” in nature. There is no clarity on which MiG-23 Bond crashed. Some sources say about the MiG-23BN, Davis suggests that it could be one of two MiG-23 secretly transferred to the United States by India (!). The "platypuses" were delivered to India ...
One of the “bandits” said eloquently about the cause of the catastrophe: “We must read the RLE”. Bond ex officio (and in spirit) was a tester, not a drill pilot. Testers think that they can fly on everything that should and should not fly ... The instructions are not written about them. Meanwhile, even the tester had to be more serious about the MiG-23 than the YF-117A. American 23-e did not differ in reliability, they were repaired constantly. From 1981 to the Bond catastrophe, the entire US Air Force fleet flew MiG-23 fleet hours, three months before the MiG-98 crash, an average 23 hours flew in a week.
Bond is not the only pilot-general in the world (and not the only tester) who killed - what is there - himself. There were examples in the domestic Air Force.
MEMORIES OF MIGS
In November, 2006 at a press conference at the National Museum of the United States Air Force (Wright-Patterson), Brigadier General Hawke Carlisley, who was in 1986 - 1988. the commander of the 4477 squadron, spoke about the tasks of the "test" squadron: "The program" Constant Pig "allowed pilots to learn how to conduct air combat with enemy aircraft in fully controlled, safe conditions that are not comparable to the high risk of real air combat. Usually, training began with a familiarization flight on an enemy plane, a study of its characteristics, then defensive and offensive one-on-one combat was practiced. The preparation was completed with group air battles over the desert in the vicinity of the Nellis air base. ... The Constant Pig program did not have time to influence the situation in Vietnam, but thanks to it, 40 of Iraqi fighters, mostly MiG-21 and MiG-23, was shot down during Operation Storm in the Desert.
A press conference at the National Museum of the United States Air Force, held in November 2006, was held against the backdrop of the MiG-21F-13, painted in the colors of the DRV Air Force. Previously, the fighter flew in the 4477 Squadron
It was from Carlisley that journalists and aviation enthusiasts received information about the top-secret squadron for the first time at first hand, and not according to fragmentary eyewitness reports or official data of a very modest size, published in 1989 (information only about aircraft).
At a press conference, Carlsley answered the question of how he served in the squadron, said simply: "I was happy." Meanwhile, Carlisley almost died on the MiG-23: broke into a flat spin and ejected already at the very ground.
Usually, according to Carlisley, there were 16 pilots in the squadron, most of whom had previously served in the Air Force, but there were also representatives from the fleet and the Marine Corps. Without exception, everyone experienced difficulties with mastering MiGs due to the lack of technical documentation. The accident rate was high - 100 incident on 100 000 flying hours.
At the same press conference, along with Carlisley, another commander of the 4477 squadron, retired colonel John T. Menklark, answered the questions. Manklak resigned from the post of Chief of the Flight Test Service of the United States Air Force, and in 2006 Carlisley commanded the 3 air wing deployed in Elmendorf, Alaska.
According to Menklark, on the MiG-21, the Americans were faced with an unusual problem: a combination of an unmanaged nose landing gear with pneumatic brakes on the wheels of the main pillars: “If a plane was driving in zigzags, then a newcomer was sitting in his cabin”. The pilots didn’t like the poor throttle response of the MiG-21 engine: “We preferred to fly with afterburner as long as possible”. On the MiG-23, there were no problems with acceleration in flight and taxiing on the ground, but, according to the Americans, the 23 was distinguished by instability in flight and difficulty in piloting. In the flight on the MiG-23, the pilot was released only after several dozen flights on the MiG-21. Manklark said: “The guys really didn't like the MiG-23. They were afraid of him. ”
One of the pilots of the 4477 Squadron wrote in a post from 25 in November 2008 on the website of the publisher Y2B Publishing about their flights on the MiG-23 the following: “The aircraft becomes more stable with increasing wing sweep: although the center of gravity shifts to the tail, but the center of pressure moves back even faster. 16 sweep degrees are good at takeoff and landing, in cruising flight. But if you are going to maneuver - it is best to set the wing in the position of 45 hail, "flight position." The maximum speed is not as high as it may seem (1350 km / h in training and 1450 km / h in combat if necessary), but the aircraft accelerated very quickly from 900 to 1350 km / h. Mach limit at the angle of sweep of the wing 72 hail is 2,35. At the maximum sweep angle of the wing, the fighter’s frontal resistance is very small. With a minimal sweep of the wing, the stability margin sharply decreased, due to which we could not maneuver over the entire range of permissible angles of attack. The position of the wing, optimal for maneuvering, as noted above, is 45 hail, but even here it was necessary to constantly control the angle of attack. When the wing was set to 72 hail, the aircraft was extremely stable - it was almost impossible to fall into a stall in this mode. I believe that for the angle 16 grad the critical speed is 740 km / h and overload Сg, for 45 and 72 grad, the maximum overload is somewhere 6,5 - 7g. We heard about Russian experiments with flights at a sweep angle in 30 hail and also tried to fly like that. Did not impress. The speed limit at an angle of 30 degrees, it seems, was 900 km / h. Overload - 5g.
- The rate of change of the sweep angle of the wing was approximately 3 degrees / s. To transfer the wing from 16 to hail, to 45 to hail, 10 was required from, from 45 to hail, to 72 hail - to 9 from. At the time of the transfer of the wing from one position to another, the overload was limited to the value of 2g. ...
The range of permissible angles of attack approximately corresponded to the “Phantom”. The angles of attack available F-16 (25 - 26 hail), we have never reached.
- I made a complete turn in about 10 with.
- All our guys liked the MiG-23 cockpit, although the angle of attack indicator could be placed more comfortably.
- I can not remember a single case of inclusion in the flight on the MiG-23MS autopilot. We always flew near the base, in a very limited area. Usually, the flight lasted about 35 minutes: take-off at the afterburner, a low altitude set-up, tactical interception, one or two “base” maneuvers for air combat, approach and landing. Why in this flight autopilot? But the system of increasing sustainability was often used, we called it “Sau”, from the Russian “SAU”. The CA U control panel is almost identical to the panels of similar systems of our aircraft.
- The angular velocity remained high at all speeds and wing positions.
- Once on the MiG-23BN I fell. The wing was in the 45 position, hail, the overload at the moment of stalling was slight (probably, somewhere 2g), the speed was about 600 km / h. The angle of attack was within acceptable limits, but the “Flogger F” suddenly began to spontaneously roll to the right, slowly. Reduced overload, based on the termination of rotation. It was a real right spin. I gently pulled the handle towards myself and to the left, gradually reducing the negative pitch angle. The plane leveled off, but immediately dropped its nose again and began to roll to the right. The plane described two full turns with increasing speed. The nose sank. After two or three consecutive turns, the nose dropped already on 70 hail. “Okay, let's try again,” I told MiG. Again he carefully took the handle and removed the engine speed. The MSA engine does not like a corkscrew, but the BNa engine is more tolerant to the corkscrew. Generally, the engine "MSA" I really liked: light and very powerful. Accelerating qualities - the strength of the MiG-23. At the afterburner and at the wing on the 72 hail is not a plane, but a rocket! So, in my 294 flight on the MiG, I hit the tailspin twice in a few seconds, probably a record. Most likely, I still exceeded the angle of attack limit. Nevertheless, I am grateful to Flogger for this flight.
- On the turns of the MiG-23C is close F-4E. The F-4E has a smaller turning radius, but it loses speed faster. All modifications of the “Phantoms” start to shake violently before stalling, so the pilot does not need to monitor the angle of attack indicator. F-4 rarely falls into a tailspin where the MiG-23 must fall.
- We regularly flew "MC" and "BN" against F-14, "beat" them. The problem of the MiG-23 was a small range of permissible angles of attack. We tried to impose an “offensive” battle with any “modern” American fighter (F-14, 15, 16, 18). According to the script most often the battles began with our attacks. Still more often knocked us down. In reality, the MiG-23 on an equal footing in a maneuverable battle could only fight with the "Phantom", but the MiG was also inferior in some ways. MiG-23MS is more an interceptor than a fighter. However, I understand that the MiG-23 of the later versions had better maneuverability.
“We at 4477 didn’t consider the MiG-23 to be optimal for conducting air combat, at least in comparison with the MiG-21 or our fighters, such as F-14, 15, 16”.
In total, the 23 of the pilot flew on MiG-4477 in the 32 squadron, although some of them performed only a few flights.
We upgraded the aircraft to a minimum: we installed several American-style instruments.
For a long time, the exercises of "Red Flag" were described as battles with the "aggressors" flying on the oddly colored F-5, A-4, F-16 ... And that was, but not quite. Menklark told about a typical doctrine, without naming, however, the year: “None of the pilots who arrived at the Nellis airbase for the joint exercises with the 4477 squadron, did not know that they would be opposed by real Soviet fighters, although rumors about MiGs went throughout the US military aviation. On the second day of their stay at the Nellis base, the pilots made the first flights to the Tonopah training ground. In the area of the landfill, they were accompanied by pilots from Constant Pig on T-38 and MiGs. To cause shock to the “guests” is the first goal of the emergence of MiGs. It is better to cry out "my God" at the sight of an unfamiliar fighter with red stars in Nevada, than somewhere over Western Europe in a real battle!
The pilots of the 4477 squadron demonstrated how fast the MiG-17 could lift up the nose, to give a queue of guns, how big the angular velocity of the heel of the MiG-21 was and how easily it picked up speed of the MiG-23. Then the "guests" were trained in aerial combat with MiGs. We started with “two on one”: two American fighters against one MiG. Then there were fights “couple for a couple”. Flights to air battles were performed during the week daily.
The pilots of combat units received very specific recommendations:
- Never attack the MiG-17 on a bend from the tail, because its turning radius is smaller than that of any American fighter (this is 80's). Try to fight in verticals.
- MiG-21 is also capable of making a sharp turn, you should not fight with him at low speeds. We must take him to the vertical, using the advantage of American fighters in thrust-to-weight ratio.
- MiG-23 is only capable of direct attack. On the turn it is yours.
The Red Eagles did not have the task to win every air battle. On the contrary, they often pointed out to their "opponents" errors in the "real time scale", prompted in the course of the battle which maneuver and how best to execute.
The pilots "Constant Pig" flew solely on air combat - there was no working off of strikes against ground targets! Opponents of the MiGs at one time or another were almost all tactical aircraft of the Air Force, Navy and USMC: T-38, F-5, F-15, F-16, F-4, RF-4, F-111, EF-111 , A-10, F-14, F-18, AV-8В. The “Red Eagles” converged in “dog fights” with instructors and cadets of the Combat Use Centers of the Air Force and Navy, test pilots from the 422 Squadron of the US Air Force, and combatant pilots. Of the combat units of the Air Force, 1, 33 and 49 fighter aircraft were most often involved in joint exercises with MiGs (“Red Flag” and not only). The already well-known “Red Eagle” said that he had fought battles with “Red Flag” on several occasions with ... C-130:
- They (C-130) imitated dumping cargo with a parachute. I then flew the MiG-23. The problem with the attack of any low-speed large aircraft lies in the turn radius. If the C-130 guys noticed us, they had a chance to make a sharp turn and thwart the attack. I could not keep inside the turn of the C-130. I had to make several visits, approaching at an awesome distance.
The pilots of the 4477 Squadron at the Red Flag Exercise interacted only with the pilots of the US armed forces and never with foreign participants of the exercises.
In the first years of the existence of the 4477 Squadron, the re-training system for MiGs did not exist at all. For a very short time, the pilots studied the available documentation, with the volume of which, and most importantly - with the translation, there were big problems. And even never studied. Here is an example: May 1979, the first flight of the “Red Eagl'a” on the MiG-17. Instructing:
“- Ready to fly?
- Yes.
- Let's go!
- Maybe give a few minutes to get acquainted? Tell me at least how this thing is controlled, what does it look like? I heard it steer should somehow different. And how to perform landing?
- You're talking about nonsense. Let's go! L! The instructor accompanied me on the F-4 (alone, without an operator in the rear cockpit). We still talked with him for a few minutes, and then I took off at MiG. Fine".
It is possible, the veteran added colors, but on the whole is true. There were no US Air Force instructors for the MiGs at the time. Sparky Soviet designs in the 4477-th squadron did not appear. With the formalization of the process of retraining, each new commander of the 4477 began, but still the process remained fairly “free”.
MiGs were maintained in flightable condition by literally titanic efforts of engineers and technicians. The Americans appreciated Soviet philosophy, but it was completely different from the American one: “The backside of simplicity is a small resource ... If we had connections with Soviet factories, then we would not have experienced problems.” Lacked everything: documentation, spare parts. Some failed units and assemblies were replaced with similar American ones, for example, the hydropumps on the MiG-21 more often had to be repaired or re-manufactured according to "piece" orders. In the MiG-17, the greatest criticism from the technicians was caused by the engines. The fuel lines on the MiG-21 constantly flowed; once there was even a fire when the engine was racing. Regarding the MiG-23, the opinion of the technicians completely coincided with the opinion of the pilots: “Monster!”.
Here's another amazing and not quite clear in the history of the Soviet aircraft in the United States the moment. Many sources point to the absence of Aircraft Operation Manuals or the extremely poor (in the case of the MiG-23) translation of the RLE. RLE is easier to get than a "live" aircraft. For example, in the TsAGI Department of Scientific and Technical Information (ONTI TsAGI) there was no “Phantom”, but there was full technical documentation on its (and not only “its”) operation.
Soviet fighters crashed at least three American pilots. One of the reasons - the lack of RLE or inaccurate translation. According to Steve Davis's Red Eagle. America's Secret MiGs ”, the translation of documentation for the MiG-23 was carried out at the Center for Technical Intelligence of the US Air Force by an autotranslator using the most powerful IBM 360 computer and subsequent editing by 4477 pilots. Davis speaks of a very high quality translation ... Maybe. In 90-s in the aforementioned ONTI TsAGI, there was some simple entertainment: Pushkin's verses were introduced into the autotranslator, translated first into English, then into Russian. Take a word: it was a lot of fun !!! Jokes from ONTI in those years used the IBM 386 “supercomputer”.
The moment with the translation is extremely incomprehensible. In the US, there was never a shortage of Russian speakers, and they were clothed with the highest tolerances of secrecy. Examples? Even without the help of Google, names like Sikorsky, Seversky, Kartvelishvili immediately come up in memory. Constructors? Yes. So this is a small piece of iceberg. At the same time, the United States Air Force paid great attention to the collection of information on MiGs. Jenin did a lot to establish direct contacts of the squadron entrusted to him with various special services of the United States and Great Britain. Some pilots went on business trips to Germany, where they were familiarized with the data of NATO radio-technical intelligence on the characteristics of the tactics of operations and flight operations of Soviet fighters. Taki, probably, it was worth starting with a high-quality translation of the available documentation? (The author of the article has been able to hold “native” manuals for F-4 “Phantom II” and F-105D “Thunderchief” aircraft, to translate the RLE of Agusta A109 helicopter. Difficulties in the translation of the RLE met, which is not surprising in the presence of engineering education and the absence of flight, but these were separate problems, completely solved through consultation with the pilots. The story of the transfer of RLE to MiGs in the United States is truly amazing, if it really had a place to be the same as described by Davis. Maybe the Americans really, as Mikhail Zadornov says, are “stupid”?)
END HISTORY?
The inevitability of change in the US Air Force became apparent at the end of 1987. “White” (“legal”) “aggressors” were subject to reorganization with a drastic reduction and rearmament from F-5 to F-16. In parallel with the reduction of military spending, another “black” program was unfolding - the development of the F-22 Raptor fighter. The Air Force, as always, did not have enough money. All the “aggressors” fell victim to budgetary savings: both “white” and “black” (that is, “red”).
Before ceasing to exist, the 4477-I squadron that flew MiGs was noted in the Red Fire large-scale exercises, which, in fact, was formed to participate in.
Earlier, the battles with the MiGs took place in the framework of the “Red Flag” in isolation, now against the general tactical background. Sometimes MiGs acted jointly with the F-5 squadrons of the “aggressors”. The “aggressors” shackled escort fighters into battle, while the MiG-23 attacked the bombers on the “two maxs”. "Shoot down" the B-52 was considered a great honor. Here the Americans were no different from our pilots. One lieutenant colonel of the Air Force of the Russian Federation, having seen a large eight-engine bomber at MAKS in Zhukovsky, rushed to him with a shout: “Ooo, B-52 !!!”. A guard from among decently speaking Russian Americans was flattered:
- Do you like our plane so much?
- Of course!!! For such a hero will give immediately!
Mute scene ....
The last flights on MiGs by pilots of the 4477 squadron carried out 4 in March 1988. 13 MiG-21 and 4 MiG-23 rose to reflect the massive attack of the “blue” ones. Under the Constant Peg program, from July 1979 to March 1988, 15264 flights were made on MiGs, 5930 crews of the Air Force, Navy and USMC were familiarized with the features of the combat use of Soviet fighter aircraft in the air.
However, the year 1988 has not yet become the year of the disbanding of the 4477 squadron. In 1988, they only curtailed the program Constant Peg (officially, the existence of this program by the US Air Force was recognized only in 2006). The Red Eagles were finally disbanded only in July 1990. That is, according to the official history of the US Air Force, and it’s not always worth believing.
The squadron remained “black” for the entire period of its existence, it was forbidden to mention it in non-secret documentation. In 1985, the issue of forming a MiG wing based on the 4477 squadron and transferring it to white status was considered, but this did not happen.
The last commander of 4477 Squadron (took office in November 1987) was Lieutenant Colonel John T. Men-Clark. Previously, Man-Clark served in the "aggressors", where he performed more than 900 flights on F-5; In 4477 Squadron, the veteran aggressor performed an 301 flight on MiGs. MiG-21 F-13 on the frame of the lantern of which was written "LtCol Jhon N" Jack "Manclark" stood in the VIP-hangar of Tonop airbase for some time, then the plane was transferred to the museum at Eglin airbase.
The tasks previously performed by the 4477 Squadron shifted to the 2 X division of the 57 Tactical Fighter Wing (Detachment 2 57th Fighter Weapon Wing). In December, 1996 was reformed into the Detachment 3 53rd Test and Evaluation Group.
Pilots and 4477 aircraft were also involved in research work. Of those that became public, the most important are probably flights to take radar “portraits” of the MiG-21 and MiG-23. The Americans, not without surprise, discovered the identity of the flares from the MiG-23 and the passenger DC-10 on the radar screen of the F-15 fighter. It turns out that the powerful reflected signal at certain angles of exposure was given by the P-29 engine compressor. It was necessary to conduct additional flights to test the new version of the Igla radar software, capable of distinguishing the P-29 engine from the General Electric CF-6 turbofan engines installed on DC-10.
Most of the 4477 research missions I carried out in cooperation with the 422 test squadron deployed at the Nellis base. A large program was devoted to the removal of the thermal characteristics of the MiGs as applied to the GOS of the Sidewinder AIM-9L rocket. The goal of the program was to determine the capture zones of the missile seeker, depending on the mode of operation of the “target” engine and the distance to it. It is worth noting that in 4477, practical missile launches were never carried out, in some cases flights to "combat use" (very rarely) were performed with SD "Sidewinder" of the first modifications imitating the Soviet K-13.
Individual 4477 pilots performed flights at Edwards airbase on Soviet aircraft, other than the MiG-21 and MiG-23 types, which the 6513-I test squadron “Red Hats” had, in which, as well as in 4477-y, were operated MiGs; In addition to the MiGs, the testers also had "Dry". The question of what soo and how much remains unanswered. In the official history of this squadron, references to Soviet-built aircraft are absent altogether. The 6513 Test Squadron was disbanded in 1992.
In the same 1992, the question of the formation of a “white” squadron of “aggressors” on the Su-27 with a deployment at Edwards airbase was considered. The US Air Force found the required amount of Flanker'oe, but did not find the money to maintain them.
Flight of pilots in 4477 Squadron
Flight time in the 4477 squadron flying on the Soviet MiGs was counted according to the practice adopted at that time in the USAF from the moment of take-off to the moment of touch plus five minutes for taxiing. The extra five minutes were important. On average, the flight on the MiG-17 was 18 minutes, that is, the added five minutes in this case means an increase in flying time by more than 25%. Flight time on the MiG-21 averaged 20-30 minutes, 21-e almost always flew without PTB. The flight time of the MiG-23 was 40-60 minutes. All flights on MiGs were carried out only during the day and only in simple weather conditions. There was no precise “measurement” of the raid, especially in the early years of the 4477. In the flight books simply bring the number of flights or landings. Here, the influence of naval aviation is obvious, where the number of landings on an aircraft carrier is not a defining indicator of the pilot’s skill. However, there was another reason, as in the cartoon about Boa: “And I landed more on the landings!” For example, James Robb flew only 21 hours on MIG-70, but made 213 landings (flights). As part of the 4477 squadron, the most flights to the MiG-21 were performed by Francis K. Geisler (“35 thug”) - 500. On the MiG-23 - Thomas I. Drake ("42 bandit") - 249 flights. The absolute champion in the total number of flights on MiGs was McClee R. Scott (“14 bandit”) - 569 flights, including 106 on MiG-17, 388 on MiG-21 and 75 on MiG-23.
Airplanes F-4 "Phantom", MiG-23 and MiG-29 at Tindell airbase. Snapshot of 2000's
Coloring aircraft 4477 Squadron
The training squadrons T-38, which were in service with the armament, carried identification marks in the form of five-pointed stars of red color with yellow edging. Double-sided numbers were applied, like the aircraft of the USSR Air Force, on the sides of the fuselage in the cockpit area. The font of the numbers of the board numbers roughly corresponded to that adopted by the USSR Air Force.
All MiG-21 initially had the color of natural metal and carried the identification marks of the United States Air Force, the last two digits of the serial number were applied to the doors of the landing gear niche. Chinese J-7 (b / n 47) received camouflage from yellow and sandy spots.
In 1983-1984 most of the 21's were camouflaged, one MiG was camouflaged in spots of two shades of gray. Identification marks are red stars with yellow and red edging.
MiG-23 fighters were repainted several times, but the identification marks were put the same each time: red stars with a white and red edging - as in the USSR Air Force. The MiG-23BN (nickname “Bomber”), of which there were at least two, retained the Soviet factory color: tricolor camouflage on the upper and side surfaces of the airframe, the lower surfaces are light blue; the “technical equipment” applied at the factory has also been preserved, but it was not possible to find information about the language in which technical inscriptions were made. At least one MiG-23 (“Interceptor”, w / o 49, number on the wing of the niche of the nose support of the 20 chassis) was repainted in gray (battleship gray) with gloss paint. One MiG-23 camouflaged under the desert with patches of sand and light brown color. The MiG-23BN, one for sure, was camouflaged in a “forest” pattern with brown and green spots.
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